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Abstract
This thesis investigates the philosophical and ethical relationship between the writings of 
Henry Lawson and Frank Moorhouse and demonstrates that their similar approaches are 
rooted in moral pragmatism. The formal philosophy of Pragmatism, as it is largely 
understood through the works of John Dewey and William James, creates the framework 
for the discussion.
In this thesis, the works of Lawson and Moorhouse are seen in the context of periods of 
social pioneering and their works are focused on society-in-change. Crucial to the study is 
the idea of meaning and certainty when societies are confronted by changing values. 
Lawson and Moorhouse both push a vision of society which would privilege a moral 
method of inquiry7 over absolute moral standards, and which is self-critiquing, 
progressive and open to the “other”. In both Lawson and Moorhouse, the dreams of 
certainty7 must give way to the embrace of creative possibility7.
In Pragmatism, meaning is derived through action and for Lawson, provisional security is 
derived through the daily meanings obtained from observing the rituals, duties and 
obligations of the social unit (with an ironic awareness that these responsibilities are 
contingent and might change). The importance of duties and obligations to others is 
largely expressed through the consequent guilt and anxiety when Lawson’s men fail in 
them. Ritual and social role-plays, on the other hand, are typically powerful, positive 
forces which steady social meaning and alleviate social dysfunction.
In Moorhouse’s fiction, meanings are constructed through role-plays and 
experimentation with types of being. Moorhouse’s technique is to contrast value systems 
in order to challenge the locus of meaning. Despite the ontological anxieties such 
questions create, the ambiguity of the self is given a positive orientation. Moorhouse 
shows his pragmatic impulses through his dismissal of the possibility of creating one 
coherent “way” of being, in favour of developing provisional “ways” o i  going and doing.
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1Boundary Writers: Moral Pragmatism 
in Henry Lawson and Frank Moorhouse.
The following thesis locates a pragmatic moral tradition in Australian literature through 
analysis of the works of Henry Lawson and Frank Moorhouse. In their fiction, Lawson 
and Moorhouse both concentrate on characters that inhabit environments where value 
has become unstable, where old ethics are challenged and new habits of behaviour are 
under construction. As such, moral competence becomes a key issue in both writers’ 
works as their characters face, fail and sometimes even resolve, moral crises. These 
characters, standing on the brink of ethical frontiers, are social pioneers, revising and 
pushing ethical boundaries. The characters of these stories must negotiate the new and 
unknown moral terrain and do so with varying rates of success. This thesis aims to open 
a new discussion in Australian literary research by mapping the moral dimensions of the 
shared pragmatic consciousness that is operating in the works of Lawson and 
Moorhouse.
Moral crisis occurs under the pressures of competing systems of value; the critical 
inquiry and open inventiveness required for successful re-evaluations of this kind form 
the core of this thesis. Lawson and Moorhouse disrupt expected moral values or socially 
condoned behaviours; these continual challenges to customary ethos and prevailing 
mores make room to imagine new ways of being. Building up new social values from an 
old stock of customary values requires an adventurous, conscientious and reflexive 
creativity. This is the essence of the pragmatic consciousness and it is the vital attitude 
which Lawson and Moorhouse share.
Gillian Whitlock has commented that in Lawson’s stories: “all social, ethical and 
moral norms and stable reference points recede.”1 By removing or interrupting expected 
cultural norms, Lawson’s work sets the task of reimagining value. Lawson’s exploration 
into moral values and social behaviours reinterprets the popular utopian literary form of 
the eighteenth century in order to establish the question of value as central to his work.
In the imaginary voyages of European literature, {Gulliver s Travels and Kobinson Crusoe are 
examples) the “fantasy frontiers” of the antipodes often present “a topsy-turvy new
1 VCTiitlock, G. “The Bush, The Barrack-Yard and the Clearing: Colonial ‘Realism’ in the Sketches and 
Stones o f Susanna Moodie, C.L.R. James and Henry Lawson”. Journal oj Commonwealth literature. No.l, 
1985. pp. 36-48. p. 41.
9world waiting to be discovered.”" Maack writes: “In the myth of the antipodes, writers 
invent a world which in every detail is the reversal of their known environment.” ’ By 
interrupting typical assumptions of order, the reader is forced to assess the reigning order 
when it is placed in contrast with a possible order. This kind of writing thus demands a 
reimagination of value. This element of antipodean writing is often present in Lawson’s 
work in stories like “Hungerford” where, as a traveller to the border town, the narrator 
inverts the expected order of things. The reader cannot rest comfortably with an image 
of a plague of rabbits, leap-frogging over and burrowing under the rabbit-proof fence, 
laughing heartily at the folly of humankind. The narrator says, “I never saw a rabbit laugh 
before; but I’ve seen a ’possum do it.” In “The Drover’s Wife” this antipodean world is 
an anti-Eden; the garden is full of rotten apple trees, there is neither God nor man and 
the wife is victorious over the snake. When even the mythologies of human beginnings 
are being rewritten—in particular, a myth which gave birth to Christian concepts of sin 
and redemption—how are men and women to conduct themselves in this strange, new 
environment? When so many things have been turned upside-down, how is human value 
to be maintained? When faced with a circumstance where the human population is being 
mocked by old buck rabbits, the question must be asked, does human life have value 
here? Can we, in fact, insist on any meaning?
It has been widely argued that the renegotiation of value, where no standard is 
taken for granted, is typical of colonial literature.2 34 It is also part of the post-colonial 
condition, for Moorhouse also presents the reader with constant negotiations of value, 
principally through his navigation of personal identities as his characters struggle to find a 
satisfactory code by which to live. His continual moral contrasts illuminate the standards 
that guide one’s critical decisions and, it must be remembered, these standards are often 
dangerously unconscious. It can be likewise said of Moorhouse’s work that all stable 
reference points have receded. Looking at Lawson and Moorhouse together, the
2 Longley Arthur, P. “Capturing the Antipodes: An Imaginary Voyage to Terra Australis” (ed) Harper, G. 
Comedy, Fantasy and Imagination. London: Continuum. 2002. pp. 205-217. p. 209.
3 Maack, A. “‘It’s all contrary'’— Utopian Projections in the Antipodes.” Antipodes. December 2000. pp.123- 
128. p. 123.
4 For further reading on this condition in colonial literature see Whitlock’s article referenced above; and 
Wevers, L. “Inventions of the Real: The Nationalisms of Henry Lawson and Frank Sargeson.” Australian 
and New Zealand Studies in Canada. 12, (1994) (Online) http://www.arts.uwo.ca/~andrewf/anzsc/ 
anzscl2/weversl2.htm [date accessed: 2/12/02]; and Sunderland, L. The Fantastic Invasion: Kipling, Conrad 
and Lawson. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 1989.
3upheaval of value emerges as a clear thematic trend. It could very well be an ongoing 
effect of what Moorhouse describes as this “ever-renewing country.” 5
Such an ever-renewing country requires an ever-renewing philosophy. This thesis 
offers pragmatism as such a philosophy, one which was developed in that other ever- 
renewing country, the United States of America. This philosophy is based on experience- 
funded workable truths, producing a style of living that can accommodate change and 
shifting values, a lifestyle symbolically characterised by the pioneer. Lawson and 
Moorhouse both use this pioneer type who ultimately must favour the changeable and 
insecure over restrictive, and even unhealthy, “isms”. There is a very clear philosophical 
relation between these two writers, however, there have been no investigations into their 
ethical, epistemological and ontological similarities. The social philosophies of Lawson 
and Moorhouse are pragmatic in being experience-based and relational. By applying the 
philosophy of formal pragmatism to Lawson and Moorhouse, this thesis will chart the 
moral development in these writers’ works showing that, for them, experience is the 
source of knowing, the social is the source of being and meaning is derived from doing. 
This thesis will show that Lawson’s and Moorhouse’s moral understanding is pragmatic: 
their thesis is that there is no absolute moral reality. Emerson sums up this pragmatic 
position nicely: “There are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid and volatile. 
Permanence is but a word of degrees.”6
Australians are often described as a pragmatic people, yet what does this precisely
mean? Helen Irving locates the development of a pragmatic ethic at the pioneering stages
of Australian development when she writes:
The Australian bush myth expressed a type of commitment to 
the values associated with the rural pioneer: resourcefulness, 
pragmatism, rough egalitarianism and romanticism. These 
values, growing out of both dream and experience, shaped 
what had now emerged as the white Australian ‘type’.'
5 Moorhouse, F. Forty-Seventeen. Ringwood: Penguin. 1988. p. 150 Future page references will be to this 
edition and will be shown in-text.
6 Emerson, R. W. “Circles” (ed) Goodman, R. Pragmatism: A  Contemporary Reader. New York: Routledge. 
1995. pp.25-33. p.25.
Irving, H. To Constitute a Nation: A  Cultural History oj Australia's Constitution. Cambridge: Cambndge 
University Press. 1997. p. 15.
4David Malouf locates an Australian pragmatism further back than this, with the 
Indigenous cultures. He discusses Bennelong’s imaginative flexibility of mind when he 
displayed:
an act of accommodation, of inclusiveness, that is an example to 
each one of us, and, considering all that followed, a shame to each 
one of us as well... [Bennelong] had behind him the strength of a 
culture that in being old had developed, in its long view of things, 
an extraordinary capacity to accept change and take in what was 
new and must be adapted to.*
Here pragmatism suggests openness and creative inventiveness; the pragmatic 
mindset in these instances creates original responses to new problems. These examples 
also show the social ethic that informs pragmatic practice. In contrast, “the ‘p’ word”9, as 
it is currently used in political commentary, is used to define a position that sits in 
opposition to principle. One will often hear the current Prime Minister, John Howard, 
stressing the necessity to strike “a balance of principle and pragmatism.” In the same 
vein, Mackenzie Wark writes:
There is a distinctively Australian pragmatism is [sic] just 
trying to hitch a ride with whatever is going. In the 1890s,
Australia rode on the sheep’s back. In the 1990s, it’s Kawasaki 
jet skis.. .Who knows what it is we are becoming?.. .Let’s just 
grab the nearest buoyant concept and dive on in! This is the 
Australian style - to never let a chance go by. Stuff that 
jumbuck in your tucker bag. The swaggie sinks in the 
billabong, laughing at his fate. Such is life, mate. No worries.* 11
Such usage of “pragmatism” is unfortunately reductive both in what the word 
can mean and what it can offer as a moral charter for a people. In the popular 
imagination, this Australian pragmatism is almost taken for granted, yet what does it 
mean for an Australian moral reality? In the three passages quoted above, this Australian 
pragmatism clearly has an ethical dimension whether it suggests blatant opportunism, a 
work ethic or the moral grain of community life. Despite what this suggests about 
Australian ethics, no extended research has been attempted to chart its dimensions and
8 Malouf, D. A Spirit ofPlay: The Making o f  Australian Consciousness. Sydney: ABC Books. 1998. pp. 60-61.
9 Henderson, G. “Pragmatism is the Order of the Day” http://www.smh.com.au/news/Gerard- 
Henderson /Pragmatism-is-the-order-of-the-dav /'2005 /03 /14/1110649125< )79.html March 15, 2005 [date 
accessed: 30 September, 2005]
10 Howard, J. Speech to the Lowy Institute, 31 March 2005.
http://www.chmaembassy.org.au/eng/xw/tl90220.htm[date accessed: 30 September, 2005]
11 Wark, M. “Australia: You’re Swimming In It.”
http: / /www.dmc.mq.edu.au/nrwark/warchive/Other/ ozstyle.html [date accessed: 27 September, 2005]
5effects in our literature. This study uses formal pragmatism to re-examine what 
pragmatism as a philosophy can offer to social and ethical process and reformation as 
depicted in the works of Lawson and Moorhouse. The primary sources for this 
philosophy are John Dewey and James Tufts’ Ethics (1908) and William James’s 
Pragmatism (1907) with tangential references to other pragmatist philosophers and 
commentators as it is appropriate.
By interpreting Lawson and Moorhouse through the framework of pragmatism, 
the present study will attempt to enrich a limited understanding of pragmatism with a 
dimension not typically referred to in its Australian context. Primarily, the pragmatist in 
this study is a responsive and creative thinker who holds an ironic awareness of the 
limitations of single worldviews. This study analyses how Lawson and Moorhouse 
construct moral dilemmas which cannot be solved through appeal to a single, higher or 
absolute value system—for there is none. The new moral territory—alive with competing 
value systems and shifting mores and proliferating points of view—must be explored 
with agility of body, imagination and flexibility of mind and, importantly, a sense of social 
responsibility, if one is to survive intact. The pragmatic mind is able to cope with the 
unexpected through this flexibility. This fortifies, in the subject, the necessary agility to 
cope with ever-changing circumstances in this “ever-renewing country”.
One might question the legitimacy of importing an American philosophy and 
applying it to two distinct periods of Australian literature with more than half a century 
between them. There are many similarities between these two “new world” countries and 
the origins of a shared philosophical consciousness interests us here. Malouf writes: 
“Australia and the United States are variations, though, very different in tone and 
constitution, on the same original. This means that we share qualities... [and] forms of 
social and political thinking”.12 Pragmatism, then, as America’s major contribution to 
philosophy is a worthy starting point, particularly given the frequency with which 
Australian culture is tagged as pragmatic. An American philosophy such as this has useful 
applications to the fiction under question here for several reasons. As Malouf says, we 
came from the “same original”. A.A. Phillips draws the parallel between the American 
“frontier” with the Australian “outback”; importantly, he frames this similarity as a 
psychological parallel and not simply the physical realities of the pioneer. As rural 
pioneers, early settlers are faced with a “blank canvas” that stretches out before them.
12 Malouf, p. 26.
Through the demands of such a life, a specific ethic of opportunity develops, one which
requires flexibility of mind as much as it requires muscle. Phillips writes that the
American and Australian pioneer shared this sense of opportunity. Typically, the rhetoric
says that anyone with enough determination could make a fortune (although, through the
ironic eyes of Lawson, the Australian landscape often seems thoroughly indifferent to
human toil). Similarly too, communities were theoretically freed from class stratification:
Australia, like America, had largely been created by men who had 
escaped from the dark Satanic mills of the European slums, or the 
more endurable, but scarcely less mean, servility of still Feudal 
villages. Such men had found in the conditions of the new 
countries a chance to prove their individual worth as men.1 ’
Such freedom from tradition-bound Europe has its problems. When Malouf
focuses on our shared legacy with America he notes that the troubling questions of value
and meaning are shared questions:
Henry James spoke of the ‘complex fate’ of those who are 
children both of the old world and the new, and of the 
responsibility it entails for fighting against the ‘superstitious 
valuations of Europe.’ What James was concerned with was how, 
in the face of all that Europe represents in terms of achievement 
and influence, we are to find a proper value, neither brashly above 
nor cringingly below its real one, for what belongs to the new 
world; for what is local but also recent, since part of what is 
‘superstitious’ in our valuation of Europe has to do with the 
reverential awe we may feel in the presence of mere age.14
This is a central question of this thesis: what is the source of meaning in a “new 
world”? If so much of the gravity and meaning in the “old world” is entrenched in 
centuries-old buildings and traditions, where can meaning be found in the new?11 How is 
meaning to be developed in a new country that H.P. Heseltine described as “a cultural 
vacuum without the support of a sanctioned tradition.”16 Malouf s concern, in focusing
13 Phillips, A.A. Henry Lawson. New York: Twayne Publishers. 1970. p. 14. It must be said that Phillips’s use 
of the male pronoun is decidedly inaccurate given, for example, Lawson’s women in the bush who operate 
the selections while the men disappear for months on end. True, they might be looking for work but 
they’re often “knocking down their cheques beautifully” in the wayside shanties.
14 Malouf, pp. 25-26. For further reading on Henry James’s conceptions o f identity in relation to the new- 
world America, and the operation of pragmatic pluralism in his work, see Posnock, R. “Affirming the 
Alien: The Pragmatist Pluralism o f The American Scene." The Cambridge Companion to Henry James. Ann Arbor: 
Cambridge University Press. 1998. pp. 224-245.
15 Moorhouse takes this question up explicitly when Edith Campbell Berry sets out for Geneva, in awe of 
old, established, meaning-filled Europe.
16 Heseltine, H.P .The Uncertain Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1986. p. 2.
7on Australian and American relations with Europe, is with this question of how—and
whether—value is related to time:
One of the ‘superstitious valuations’ I wanted to point to in 
Henry James’s definition of ‘complex fate’ was that of age as 
opposed to newness; a valuation, as we have experienced it here, 
that has sometimes made our 210 years seem too small a purchase 
on time to constitute a genuine history.1
Malouf tackles this problem of age by suggesting: “This business of making
accessible the richness of the world we are in, of bringing density to ordinary, day-to-day
living in a place, is the real work of culture.”18 Here is a key principle of Deweyan and
Jamesian pragmatics. As temporalists, Dewey and James draw focus onto daily events as
the only place meaning can reside. John McDermott, a commentator on American
pragmatism, describes Dewey’s and James’s temporality thus:
Our activities take on meaning not because they are endowed by 
the eternal but because they are not endowed by the eternal. It is 
for this reason that the motif of the journey, so central to 
American life, turns up our most important metaphor, frontier, 
along with a host of allied and culturally significant terms: 
experiment, chance, edge, and novelty.'9
In the following analysis of Lawson’s stories, it will become clear just how much 
our literature participates in this experimental, frontier philosophy. Dewey prescribes: “a 
doctrine of creative transiency, wherein the journey is its own mean and does not take its 
significance from a hoped-for, wished-for paradisaical future.”2" This prescription 
provides a meaningful freedom from the conditions of a long-standing customary reality. 
This idea of creative transiency also provides a link between Lawson and Moorhouse for, 
symbolically, both the bushman tribe and urban tribe are nomadic. Lawson’s men 
resdessly wander the outback; Moorhouse’s characters similarly shift about, sharing flats, 
constandy moving in and out of the lives of other restless wanderers. Such transience 
questions the value and meaning of life: Lawson continually employs the ironic and 
defensive refrain that “nothing mattered much”. In Moorhouse, meaning in these 
transient lives exists on a knife-edge. Jimmy, for example, is an “intellectual Arab in a
17 Malouf, p. 34. 
lK Malouf, p. 35.
19 McDermott, J. Streams o f Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy o f American Culture. Amherst: The 
University o f Massachusetts Press. 1986. p. 72.
20 McDermott, p. 119.
8mental tent on the border of two countries. The countries of futility and hope.”“1
Through the pragmatism of James and Dewey, this transiency can be seen as most
valuable precisely because each present situation is all we have and, therefore, can be the
only place where human meaning can reside:
If we are finite, if our experiences are finite, and if there is no 
higher meaning which transforms these experiences into 
something other than the way in which we undergo them, then 
the affairs of time, our things and events, are to be taken at face 
value. The flow of time is the only setting for judging the worth 
of human life and human activity.“
Reality seen this way is alive with possibilities of future modifications and, importantly,
an ever-expanding consciousness:
[James] offers us not the pragmatism identified with Realpolitik, 
but a pragmatism forged from his pluralism, his commitment to 
irreducible ambiguity and his conviction that the truth of the 
matter is not to be found in either a definition or in agreement 
between concepts and the alleged object. Rather the truth 
emerges from working out a hypothesis as subjected, tested, and 
revised in the light of ongoing experience.2’
The feeling in this philosophy, and in these works of fiction, is one of movement, 
perpetual motion. In the analysis to come, continual movement across borders and 
resistance to the fixed abode is suggestive of an ever-expanding knowledge and moral 
sympathy. This is the philosophical perspective Lawson and Moorhouse share. For them, 
reality offers no lasting fixtures; there are no final ends. This idea is brought to bear in 
the fiction through the shared metaphor of borders and boundary lines.
Central to both writers’ works is the metaphor of the border, a metaphor that 
proves essential in investigating the concepts of identity and progressive or destructive 
engagement with the other. In the fiction under investigation, borders—particularly as 
they pertain to exclusive groups or conventionally held assumptions—function in two 
important ways. Firstly, the border becomes a site of transgression. Borders signify lines 
of difference and multiple perspectives; transgression, then, is a powerful act that fuels 
the decentralisation of power. The act of transgression, however, need not privilege one 
mode of being over another with a view to eradicate difference. The border has a
21 Moorhouse, F. “What Can You Say.” ¥ utility and Other Animals. Angus & Robertson: Sydney. 1988. p. 19. 
All future references will be to this edition and will be shown in-text.
22 McDermott, p. 114.
23 McDermott, pp. 112-113
9resistant function in that by maintaining sites of difference, potential for moral 
development remains possible. In accepting difference rather than eradicating it, human 
sympathy must grow, as does our capacity for ever-advanced, ever-inclusive ways of 
thinking.
Firmly held positions and tightly managed modes of being are the focus of much 
of Lawson’s and Moorhouse’s ironies. Common to both writers is an interest in social 
groups and how those groups interact at large. In “The Union Buries Its Dead”, the 
impact of an exclusive group of mates “skylarking on the river” is deadly, with the 
insistent irony that the stranger who dies is, by virtue of his union credentials, supposedly 
“one of them”. Likewise, Moorhouse “forces us to be group wary.”-4 Whether it is the 
dogmatic ethic of the exclusive, conservative Rotarians in The Electrical Experience or the 
hard-line zealotism of the left-wing revolutionaries of the urban tribe, Moorhouse 
routinely insists on the problems caused when groups inhabit a single, inflexible position. 
In both Lawson and Moorhouse, the “other”, who is on the outer of the exclusive group, 
is at a disadvantage; what is lacking in these exclusive groupings is, firstly, the extension 
of sympathy to the outsider and, secondly, a lack of internal, critical reflection within the 
group itself. Both writers use irony to probe the inadequacies of the group mentality7 and 
the single point of view. Legasse writes that Moorhouse’s treatment of ethical problems 
show “that convictions about moral issues lose their certainty and show ‘sureness’ as 
arrogance, if not ignorance.T he same might be said for Lawson, whose sympathy for 
the “other” is unlimited.
These writers leave us with the sense that no moral, social or political position 
can be taken with lasting confidence. Any decision taken to act from a particular position 
derives from the conditions of unique experiences. Tim Rowse argues that Moorhouse’s 
emphasis throughout his fiction on the discontinuous narrative is suggestive of an 
interest in promoting the devolution of power. The discontinuous narrative confounds 
the legitimacy of any single point of view.26 In an interview with Ray Willbanks, 
Moorhouse comments:
looking back, one realises that one adopts different codes and that
life involves adaptation and modification and refinement and
24 Legasse, J. “Telling A Self: More on Moorhouse’s Family.” Westerly. 27:1 March, 1982. pp. 73-83 p. 77.
25 Legasse, p. 76.
26 Rowse, T. “The Pluralism o f Frank Moorhouse.” (eds) Docker, J., Modjeska, D., Dermody, S. Nellie 
Melba, Ginger Meggs and Friends: Essays in Australian Cultural History. Malmsbury: Kibble Books, 1982. pp. 
250-267, p. 251.
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sculpturing of one’s self. The book [Forty-S even teen] is very much 
about sculpturing, shaping a life.2
Moorhouse makes the pertinent—and pragmatic—point that, in Forty-Seventeen, age
differences, or age perspectives, show that: “differing perspectives are witnesses to the
testing of thought systems via materialised experience.” The difference between thought
systems and materialised experience is a key focus of this thesis, as pragmatism insists on
material rather than abstract solutions. Moorhouse comments that whilst humans may
crave “a system of thought [that] can be comprehensive”28 this is impossible. Instead,
some tentative security may be assured through the process of inquiry. It is a journey
which can have no end. Moorhouse comments that inquiry: “produces temporary
positions which allow us to act and behave with some competence.”21 Whilst this
position is pluralist, Rowse makes the interesting point that Moorhouse’s attitude of
inquiry and self-reflection demonstrates a pluralism with a hierarchy. In his article, “The
Pluralism of Frank Moorhouse”, the ironic character, in particular, is one which holds an
elite position: “It is an elite not in the sense of having institutional power, but in its
capacity to take the wider view, to think critically and ironically about the rest of society,
and about itself. This is a qualified elitism indeed.” " In [amesian terms, a system could
only be comprehensive if we lived in a “ready-made universe.” James is an emphatic
pluralist. McDermott stresses the importance and value of this position for James:
fames does not hold that pluralism is a waiting game, a temporary 
aberration until the archons of clarity—theological, scientific, or 
ideological—can rescue us from confusion. No, it is quite the 
opposite, for pluralism is the irreducible characteristic of not only 
the human presence but also of the evolutionary and 
developmental character of reality. In James’s philosophy, closure 
and finality “violate the character with which life concretely 
comes...with an ‘ever not quite’ to all our formulas, and novelty 
and possibility forever leaking in”.’1
Dewrey’s position is equally unequivocal on this point. “Every thinker puts some 
portion of an apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will 
emerge in its place.’”2 To the conservative mind, such never-ending change is a
27 Willbanks, Ray Speaking Volumes. Ringwood: Penguin. 1992. pp. 158-170. p. 169.
28 Willbanks, p. 170.
29 Willbanks, p. 170.
30 Rowse, p. 252.
31 McDermott, p. 112.
32 McDermott, citing Dewey, p. 119.
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frightening thought. Self-modification through routine re-evaluations of being requires
one to reflect on past decisions taken under the influence of a particular thought system.
Guilt and anxiety over decisions and actions constitute a large part of Lawson’s and
Moorhouse’s work. Ongoing moral modifications also suggest there is no final
destination. Such a reality is resistant to any “right” worldview; we are continually in a
state of correction. The principle here is pragmatic meliorism and I would argue Lawson
and Moorhouse are melioristic in twTo different ways. Lawson’s writing was emphatically
concerned with social and political improvement. In his famous rejection of the
Paterson-style romantic vision of the Australian outback, he wrote:
In conclusion. We wish to Heaven that Australian writers would 
leave off trying to make a paradise out of the Out Back Hell; if 
only out of consideration for the poor, hopeless, half-starved 
wretches who carry swags through it and look in vain for work— 
and ask in vain for tucker very often. What’s the good of making 
a heaven out of a hell when by describing it as it really is we might 
do some good for the lost souls there?”
Literally, Lawson sees one of his roles as artist as “doing some good”. In 
Moorhouse’s case, this may seem less obvious since much of Moorhouse’s agenda has 
been to tackle established social conventions through so-called and self-confessed 
“aberration”. This is his melioristic streak in disguise. His narrator suggests brightly, for 
example: “I guess., .that really I’m for sin and against Motherhood.” He claims “the only 
solace” is “Volupté! Sensual pleasure! Evil sensuality!” 4 In advancing flexible modes of 
thinking, however, Moorhouse’s work proposes a highly developed ethical model and 
this will become clear through the textual analysis of his stories within the context of 
Dewey and Tufts’ Ethics and the pluralistic program of James’s pragmatism. The criticism 
so far available on Moorhouse’s work is largely focused on the “shock value” of 
Moorhouse’s open attack on sexual taboo, or on analysis of his literary form. This thesis 
aims to extend Moorhouse criticism by offering a comprehensive analysis of the 
prevailing pragmatist ethic throughout his work in order to develop what Milton might 
call, “a coherent critique.”
33 Lawson, H. “Some Popular Australian Mistakes” (1893) repnnted in A Camp-Fire Yarn: Henry Lawson 
Complete Works, 1885-1900. (ed) Cronin, L. Dingley: Landsdowne Publishing. 2000. p. 275. All references 
to A Camp-Fire Yarn will be to this edition.
34 Moorhouse, F. “The Airport, The Pizzeria, The Motel, The Rented Car and the Mysteries of Life.” Tales 
o f  Mystery and Romance. North Ryde: Angus&Robertson, 1988. pp. 55-63. p. 62. All future reference to Tales 
will be to this edition and will be shown in-text.
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Since there has as yet been no extended study into Moorhouse’s ethical system, 
this thesis is timely. In contrast, critical interpretations of Lawson has always emphasised 
Lawson’s ethics, although, readings of this kind have been limited because interpretations 
have often been driven by a nationalist agenda. The “radical nationalist” critics of the 
1950s (Vance Palmer, Phillips and Russel Ward, for example), who were concerned with 
documenting the “Australian tradition” and “legend”, designed their interpretations of 
Lawson’s ethic in order to crystallise a nationalist, masculinist, bush ethic. This was an 
interesting perspective given that Lawson’s contemporary critics, such as A.G. Stephens, 
criticised Lawson for not presenting a strong, masculine voice that might reflect and 
encourage the kind of physical and mental hardiness required for life in a tough land. 
Stephens wrote, for example, that Lawson had “the womanish wail of someone who 
needed a sturdy Australian backbone.”13 When interest turned to the 1890s as the 
mythical source of Australian national identity, many of Lawson’s so-called weaknesses 
were overlooked in favour of a representation of Lawson as the quintessential national 
type, inaccurately casting him as “the centrepiece of a nationalist tradition’”6. As a writer 
from the 1890s bulletin school, Lawson was rolled into a tradition, which “identified with 
what was seen as the robust and optimistic democratic spirit of the nation.”1 As 
something of an antidote to this overworked nationalism, critics such as Heseltine sought 
to foreground Lawson’s artistic practice rather than nationalist ideas. This was an 
important movement away from what had been an insistent critical approach to 
Australian writing, that is, the interest in “thematic patterns, ethical patterns, colonial 
patterns giving way to nationalist patterns”. Heseltine made inroads into destabilising the 
“Apostle of Mateship” myth and concentrated on Lawson’s art rather than his value as 
cultural artefact. This approach, however, created another problem. By privileging 
Lawson’s artistic practice and, in particular, limiting Lawson’s irony to a nihilistic reading, 
much of his economic, political and social commentary—and his melioristic streak—was 
under-examined. Michael Wilding’s critiques of Lawson have concentrated on 
rehabilitating this aspect of Lawson’s work. It is vital to replace this aspect of the work 
for, in the current study, the local and immediate practical concerns of the group breed
35 Stephens, cited by Lee, C. “Looking for Mr Backbone: The Politics o f Gender in the Works o f Henry 
Lawson”, (ed) Stewart, K. The 1890s: Australian litera ture and litera ry Culture. St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press. 1996. pp.95-108. p. 108.
36 Lee, p. 108.
37 Schaffer, K. Women and the Bush: Forces o f  Desire in the Australian Cultural Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1988. p. 17.
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the ethic, whether that is, for example, a work, family or mateship ethic. It is my interest, 
then, to revisit the ethical patterns which have already concerned so much of Lawson 
criticism but from a vantage point that has not yet been tackled: the pragmatist ethic. 
Lawson’s ethics are routinely reduced to the mateship ethic but, as the analysis to follow 
will show, this aspect of Lawson’s ethic is just one arm of his social philosophy rather 
than his sole concern.
It should be of no surprise that, at different stages, Lawson’s work has been 
situated as central to a nationalist agenda and also in opposition to it. That he has been 
located in both the positive-nationalist and pessimistic movements of our literature 
suggests something of immense importance in Lawson’s work; that is, his practice of 
irony. An ironist such as Lawson inhabits no fixed position. Since “irony is in the eye of 
the beholder”, sometimes statements such as: “Australian shearers are certainly the most 
democratic and perhaps the most independent, intelligent and generous body of 
workmen in the world” or “nothing mattered much”—can seem like unequivocal 
positions. Contextualised within his ethic, however, judgements such as these become far 
less exact.
This thesis offers a fresh approach to Lawson that follows on from the work of 
critics such as Christopher Lee who unlock Lawson’s work from previous ideological 
readings. Much of the newer criticism has focused on deconstructing the Lawson-as- 
national-icon discourse which fortunately opens a discussion on Lawson which can be 
held on different terms. This thesis attempts to move discussion away from nationalist 
and masculinist questions and to face his ethical program anew. It is important to move 
away from the traditional binary positions critical interpretation has concentrated on 
because Lawson’s philosophical resistance to fixed positions is central to this thesis. It is 
not enough to use, for example, the masculine/feminine binary for, to do so, we must 
always depend on typical roles and types of gendered behaviours. That either/or reading 
cannot respond to what Lawson’s characters do, wThich is to often become both male and 
female. Personalities in Lawson’s outback can at any time be both masculine and 
feminine as characters are required to constantly morph if they are going to survive 
physically, mentally and socially in the environment.
This thesis shows how Lawson’s moral philosophy disdains the maintenance of 
absolute “types” or “positions”. Lawson’s philosophy is inclusive and urges a sympathy
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with the disempowered other; his philosophy is critical of exclusive groupings for the 
inherent limitations of the customs which bind such a group together. Henry Lawson has 
always been the target of critics interested in—or anxious about—the forging of an 
Australian cultural identity. Fortunately, Lawson need no longer be considered the sole 
property of a nationalist mythology. Instead, we can now look at Lawson as a writer 
whose philosophies have much broader and much more relevant application than 
generally allowed. His setting is the bush but his subject is the moral development of 
people-in-community.
Lawson shows characters negotiating ethical crisis as unprecedented situations 
emerge and, importandy, traditional moral attributes do not necessarily meet the 
demands of new situations. In “Telling Mrs Baker”, for example, if a man cannot lie he 
cannot be trusted. Whilst Lawson’s world is often imagined and remembered as a 
construct of “old Australia”, a world inhabited by a certain type of man with a certain set 
of values, close study of Lawson’s prose uncovers flexible forms rather than rigid types. 
Far from promoting a particular and static set of values, Lawson depicts a functional, 
dynamic ethical system. This dynamism of value is symptomatic of a post-Victorian 
modernity" and, in addition to this, it occurs within a new colonial environment where the 
values and certainties heretofore embedded within culture are renegotiated with the 
terms a new landscape imposes. Lawson’s preoccupations with the question of value and 
conventional systems of meaning are symptomatic of the post-colonial condition where 
everything in the new land is under construction. By viewing Lawson through the 
contemporaneous framework of the American pragmatists, this study will reveal 
Lawson’s significant contribution to an ethical approach that, far from being solely 
concerned with Australia, or, even more narrowly, the bush, had an international context.
Henry Lawson, in his most productive phase of the early to mid-1890s, more or 
less anticipated the key issues of the pragmatist movement. While pragmatism was first 
discussed in 1878 by Charles Saunders Peirce in Popular Science Monthly, the concepts went 
largely unnoticed until twenty years later when William James brought it to public 
attention in 1898. By this stage, James notes, “the times seemed ripe for its reception.”j8 
It is perhaps litde wonder that the solutions pragmatism provides to questions about 
meaning, value, and its impacts on conduct, were similarly springing up in societies
38 James, W. “What Pragmatism Means.” Pragmatism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1975. p. 29. All 
future references will be to this edition and will be shown in-text.
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influenced by frontier beginnings in a post-Victorian era. It is also a reflection of the
moods of modernism. A new moral methodology became necessary since value systems
could no longer make claims for absolute standards, certainties or an idea of Truth. What
was required was a methodology that, firstly, could guide behavioural norms without
having to resort to dogmatic and, therefore, fallible (because limited) systems and,
secondly, one which might also relieve the mounting pressures of negation. Pragmatism
potentially offered a new method of thinking founded in concrete experience rather than
abstract principles through which the validity of conduct could still be tested. It could
also reconcile modernism’s “apocalyptic ironies’”9 through the practice of a progressive
ironic mode that could generate meaning despite, or perhaps because of, forever-
incomplete knowledges and indeterminacy. Brian May writes:
[I]n the face of negation one might fairly wish for an alternative 
that is positive, constructive, and material, not a reclamation of 
the old contested grounds of belief and action but a divination of 
new grounds...To transcend negation is to do more than simply 
undo it. From the old overworked (double negated) grounds to 
fresh woods, and pastures new; transcendence tends to suggest 
departure and founding.4-1
Pragmatism’s emphasis on experience maintains the open-ended nature of value 
ensuring its continual construction rather than its negation. Given what William James 
writes in “What is Truth”, that experience has a way of “boiling over” what we know, 
logically, experience must refuse the limitations of dogmatism. The emphasis here is on 
unhmited-ness rather than indeterminacy which does not “undo” negation by returning 
to “old grounds of belief’ but surpasses negation via the valuing of the present as a 
continuing source of meaning. This ethical dimension of experience forms the focus of 
this study of Lawson’s short stories.
39 May, B. Modernist as Pragmatist: E.AI. Forster and the Fate o f Liberalism. Columbia: University o f Missouri 
Press. 1997. p. 5.
40 May, pp. 7-8.
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This thesis is divided into three main parts. Part I outlines the pragmatic 
philosophy. Chapter one describes Dewey and Tufts’s Ethics, concentrating on the 
construction of society and the maintenance of society as it progresses through time. The 
focus is on the generation of customary morality which, if the society is to become 
morally sophisticated, develops into a reflective morality. Dewey and Tufts focus on the 
social network as the generator of morality. This integration of self and society works to 
improve and empower both self and society7 and improvement suggests progressiveness 
and a dynamic field of play. In this discussion we see how morality and values change as 
society changes. The catch-cry here is: “Not order but orderly progress.” Environments 
are described as “experiential fields” peopled by subjective minds, thus emphasising the 
dynamic quality of any situation.
Chapter two looks at James’s philosophy as outlined in Pragmatism where he 
makes his argument for pragmatism in response to the common criticisms leveled at the 
philosophy. The focus is on solving problems by looking at what works'.; truth is tackled 
this way, and through these discussions on truth and Truth, and essays such as “The One 
and the Many”, James also clearly distinguishes pragmatism’s position in relation to 
absolute and relative systems of value. For James, values are found in-relation. Values 
change but, according to James, do so at such a slow rate as to allow a gentle evolution in 
morality. To change thus requires a certain plasticitv of nature, which means: “the 
possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to 
yield all at once.”41 This chapter will also include reference to James’s Principles o f  
Psychology, which contains the germ of his pragmatist ethic, where he discusses the 
constitution of the self as a social entity.
Part II looks at a selection of Henry Lawson’s major short stories and sketches. 
Chapter one outlines the ethics in growing practice amongst the men on the track, his 
nomadic tribe of bushmen. To outline the pragmatic spirit, I will begin with “The Iron- 
Bark Chip” which illustrates the social impulses within the pragmatic mindset of 
Lawson’s survivors. Chapter two draws mainly from the Mitchell and Peter M’Laughlan 
sketches where, under the influence of Peter M’Laughlan, the men are called to assess the 
morality of their actions, thus placing the concept of ethics at the forefront of Lawson’s 
characters’ lives. Here, experience is the teacher. The theme is social responsibility and 
this chapter will discuss Lawson’s version of mateship which is built on the inevitable
41 James, W. Principles oj Psychology. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. 1890. p. 105.
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weaknesses of the human condition. This chapter will culminate in a discussion on 
“Telling Mrs Baker” where sympathy for Mrs Baker and the men’s guilt and anxiety are 
played out against male loyalties and survival. Here, truth is looked at from a pragmatic 
point of view.
Chapter three looks at the concept of identity through the social network, this 
time when the social network is dysfunctional or entirely absent in “The Union Buries Its 
Dead” and “The Bush Undertaker”. Lawson investigates how his characters 
pragmatically cope with such absence and the concept of reflective morality. The social 
impulse is highlighted in these tales through the very absence of the social.
Chapter four looks at “Joe Wilson’s Courtship” and “A Double Buggy at Lahey’s 
Creek” from the Joe Wilson series. The analysis will focus on Lawson’s pragmatic 
conceptualisation of self (“Joe Wilson’s Courtship”) placed in ironic contrast with a 
nagging Romantic self-conception that Joe often labours under. “A Double Buggy at 
Lahey’s Creek” demonstrates the imaginative consciousness at work.
Part III looks at Frank Moorhouse’s fiction which will be divided into three 
general areas: the small town, urban bohemia and the international. These zones often 
clash providing ironic contrasts through which to interpret the different value systems 
operating in each. The reader is left with very litde sure ground to step upon as each 
world’s limitations threaten self-destruction. At times, Moorhouse’s characters attempt to 
steady their boats by clinging to worlds in which the rules might be fixed (Conference- 
ville, Hiltonia, Rotary, the South Coast) and where experience may in some way be 
predictable or circumscribed maybe for a lifetime or for just one night’s reprieve. Becker 
thinks: “Motels. A clean, safe passageway around the world. He could be in Manitoba. Or 
good old Atianta. The joy of standardisation.”42
Chapter one will outline the social values of the provincial Australian town, as 
described in The Electrical Experience. Here, the emphasis is on George McDowell’s ethical 
system and, ironically, given his insistence on pragmatic entrepreneurship, his resistance 
to moral change.
Chapters two and three concentrate on the short stories which describe the 
Balmain scene—Moorhouse’s urban tribe—and will look at the eruptions of moral crisis
42 Moorhouse, F. The Electrical Experience. North Ryde: Angus&Robertson. 1988. p. 139. Future page 
references will be to this edition and will be shown in-text. As an aside, Flenry James calls America’s 
“genius for organisation,” that ensures the country is kept “in positively stable equilibrium,” the “hotel- 
spirit.” James cited in Posnock, p. 228.
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and the very complex challenges inherent in developing new moral systems and codes of 
behaviour. Key figures under consideration in these chapters will be Kim, Carl, Cindy, 
Milton and the ever-present male narrator, and how they deal with doctrine, social 
change, gender politics and, especially in the figure of the narrator, the ever-increasing 
vulnerability of a self confronted with crumbling, alienating or implausible social 
networks.
The final chapter looks at Grand Days and Edith Campbell Berry’s pragmatic 
modifications of self in the constantly changing world of international diplomacy. Edith’s 
Rationalism shows a flaw by restricting her thinking to a monist worldview which is 
confounded by the irrational, the random and the unpredictable. Positions are continually 
renegotiated internationally, interpersonally and within the self and traditional hierarchies 
of power or typical roles are constantly turned upside down. These ironic inversions 
constantly challenge any assumed repositories of value. Grand Days offers a complete 
model of the pragmatic behaviours under discussion in this thesis and for this reason it is 
unnecessary to include Dark Palace in this particular study except for the occasional 
minor reference to illuminate a point.
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Part I: The Pragmatists
Chapter 1
The Social Contract: John Dewey and James Tufts’ Ethics
The aim of Ethics, first published in 1908, was to “awaken the vital conviction of the 
genuine reality of moral problems and the value of reflective thought in dealing with 
them.”4’ Reflective thought is the key to Dewey and Tufts’ position and is instrumental 
in practising ethical action. The activities of Lawson’s and Moorhouse’s characters and 
their social/moral progress will be viewed from this perspective. Where such reflective 
thought is absent, the irony within the text suggests the power and potential of full, 
reflective thought, especially when conceived in relation to the social contract, as 
essential to providing the stuff of a diverse and dynamic social realm.
To illustrate the development of ethical conduct, Dewey and Tufts examine 
primitive communities progressing towards complex social organisation, providing 
examples from early Greek, Roman, Israelite, Mongolian, North American Indian and 
Aboriginal Australian formations. Whilst they acknowledge the difficulties in such a 
project given there is much that is uncertain and certainly much that is varied between 
primitive societies, the writers posit very directly the “dominant influence of group 
life.”(17)
Dewey and Tufts identify that, in the initial stages of community7, action is largely 
instinctive. Survival is the goal of action. People form groups to work together in order 
to increase the likelihood of survival. Thus, if survival is largely secured by group 
formation, the maintenance of the group is crucial. Out of successful group maintenance 
strategies, customs emerge. This model of moral progress gives a clear outline how, out 
of the initial formations of the practical life, cultural idealisations grow thus creating 
ethical concepts. By demonstrating that moral development grows out of practical and 
local concerns Dewey and Tufts emphasise the progressive and dynamic qualities of 
morality7 and, in so doing, address the origins of moral authority. “Not order, but orderly 
progress, represents the social ideal.”(485)
43 Dewey, J. & Tufts, J. 'Ethics. London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd. 1914. p. (iii) All future references will be to 
this edition and will be shown in-text.
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Dewey and Tufts identify the social realm as the birthing place of morality since, 
as the etymology suggests, it is through the ethos and mores of a social group that ethics and 
morals develop. (51) As they point out, “customs were not merely habitual ways of acting; 
they were ways approved by the group or society.” (1) [My emphasis] Dewey and Tufts then 
privilege the Ladn term ‘mores’ over ‘custom’ since it implies the factor of approval and 
is, therefore, more than simply habitual. (52) Mores develop over generations and, whilst 
they may stem from an instinctive origin, they are not merely instinctive but approved.
(5 1 )
Techniques, which originate in instinct, that have been tested and ensure survival 
establish custom. For example, to ensure procreative possibilities, procreative ties, already 
naturally prohibited by biological laws of kinship, begin to form the moral ideas of 
married union. Therefore, the techniques which are seen to work (healthy, fertile 
offspring) thus form custom and a customary morality. The “natural forces of instinct 
lead to activities which elevate men and knit them together.”(51) These social bonds 
become political, industrial, religious and economic units.
Dewey and Tufts write that the “necessary activities of existence start the [moral] 
process.”
The prime necessities, if the individual is to survive, are for food, 
shelter, defense against enemies. If the stock is to survive, there 
must be also reproductive and parental care. Further, it is an 
advantage in the struggle if the individual can master and acquire, 
can outstrip rivals, and can join forces with others of his kind for 
common ends. To satisfy these needs we find men in group life 
engaged in work, in war or blood feuds, in games and festal 
activities, in parental care. They are getting food and booty, 
making tools and houses, conquering or enslaving their enemies, 
protecting the young, winning trophies, and finding emotional 
excitement in contests, dances and songs. These all help in the 
struggle for existence. But the workmen, warriors, singers, 
parents, are getting more. They are forming certain elements of 
character which, if not necessarily moral in themselves, are yet 
indispensable requisites for full morality. We may say therefore 
that nature is doing this part of moral evolution, without the aid 
of conscious intention on man’s part.. .We may call this a 
rationalizing and socializing process, though not a conscious 
moral process. (40-41)
Using the above to describe the roots of moral development, the organic reality of the 
moral process is evident. It moves with the progress of society and is not absolute or
21
extraneous from it. That is, the moral develops through the social; the moral process is
embedded in social relationships. The individual consciousness arises out of this dynamic.
For Dewey and Tufts, the progress of moral conduct follows a similar pattern to
conduct in general. (8) It is distinguished by three stages: (i) instinctive behaviour, (ii)
attention or “conscious intervention” (where the consciousness is activated) and (iii)
habit. Habits are the accrual of previous experiences that have led to effective action. As
a moral process this cycle potentially repeats itself many times over as a developed habit
(a standard moral) shows itself inadequate to an unprecedented situation.
But unless the man or society is in a changeless world with no 
new conditions there will be new problems. And this means that 
however good the habit was for its time and purpose there must 
be new choices and new valuations. (10)
Each time the cycle repeats itself, the moral consciousness becomes increasingly 
sophisticated. “There is deliberation, struggle, effort. If the result is successful new habits 
are formed, but upon a higher level. For the new habits, the new character, embody more 
intelligence.” (9) Continuity, a continuous building-upon, is necessary for moral progress. 
“If everyone had to start anew to frame all his ideals and make his laws, we should be in 
as melancholy a plight morally as we should be intellectually if we had to build each 
science anew.”(174-175) This intelligence is cumulative and the critical faculties utilise 
past experiences to determine future action. Yet, and this is crucial to the current study, it 
is the conscious awareness of the limitations of moral knowledge that enables the cycle to 
continue. Expansion of awareness is only possible through a conscious acceptance of our 
own moral limitations.
In their treatment of the origins of the cycle, Dewey and Tufts illustrate that the 
survival compact is the chrysalis of social responsibility and, hence, moral awareness. As 
previously mentioned, rates of survival increase with group effort. The important by­
product: individuals bond together through shared experience. These mutual sympathies 
develop into solidarity where the moral germ is found.
The gregarious instinct may be the most elemental of the 
impulses which bind the group together, but it is reinforced by 
sympathies and sentiments growing out of common life, common 
work, common danger, common religion. The morality is already 
implicit; it needs only to become conscious. (35)
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The sympathetic instincts manifest themselves in cooperative activities and 
mutual aid. Cooperation implies a shared goal and means that: “each is interested in the 
success of all. This common end forms then a controlling rule of action, and the mutual 
interests means sympathy. Cooperation is therefore one of nature’s most effective 
agencies for a social standard and a social feeling.”(43) Vital cooperation is engaged in 
such pursuits as industry, defence and the arts such as dance and song. Dewey and Tufts 
write: “to sing with another involves a contagious sympathy.. .There is, in the first place,
.. .a unity of rhythm. Rhythm is based upon cooperation and, in turn, immensely 
strengthens the possibility of cooperation.”(45) In Ethics, sympathy is the powerful 
leading principle of ethical practice. That which is cooperative: “contribute[s] powerfully 
to the social basis of morality.”(42)
The concept of sympathy raises a second and equally important issue: the 
treatment of the other, of those with whom a group has no immediate identification. The 
more common the standard, the easier sympathy is. (190) In later stages of community7 
growth the exclusivity inherent in instinctive sympathies becomes problematic. With 
increased levels of individuality or difference the more challenging sympathy becomes 
and, as an extension, the ministering of justice. Dewey and Tufts recognise that if we are 
to achieve truly progressive and equitable societies, the instinctive sympathies require 
transformation from a customary reflex into an active ethical reflection. The reticence to 
allow transformative sympathy can result in moral scapegoating, a practice indicative of 
the inadequacies of customary or instinctive sympathies.44 Dewey and Tufts write that 
sympathy itself is: “the actuating principle of reasonable judgment” and the “general 
principle of moral knowledge.”(334-335) If a culture is closed or non-reflective and, 
therefore, does not practice transformative sympathy, how will the rights of the other be 
secured? If justice is a reflection of social value and is interested in the conduct of a 
specific social group, then, logically, an outsider has no natural claim to the justice of the 
group. They are outside the “charmed circle”. (299) The closed shop must open its doors 
if social diversity is to thrive and social systems are to develop in sophisticated cultural 
ways. The charmed circle, which initially secures survival and growth and lays the 
foundations for morality, must push out in order to keep meeting the challenges of an 
ever-changing environment.
44 Gunn, G. Beyond Solidarity: Pragmatism and Difference in a Globalised World. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 2001. pp. 35-36.
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In the primitive cultures Dewey and Tufts focus on, they note that sympathy 
goes hand in hand with a strong concept of group responsibility. All who share in the 
benefits of a social group also share the responsibilities of each member’s actions.(17-35) 
If all are responsible for the others, a sense of social duty emerges. This duty keeps 
groups together. Clan and kinship ties predominate and form a customary morality. 
Duties are discharged when customary morality is observed. A standard of behaviour, 
adhered to through a sense of duty, regulates the social equilibrium. Given this group 
morality was “corporate rather than personal”, standardised behaviour, the ethos, was 
coercive. Customary morality:
secured steadiness by habit and social pressure, rather than by 
choices built into character. It maintained community of feeling 
and action, but of the unconscious rather than the definitely social 
type. Finally it was rather fitted to maintain a fixed order than to 
promote and safeguard progress. (73)
At this point of customary morality, “conscious intention” has not been activated; the
first stage is the root of morality though not yet consciously so. Consciousness is invoked
during the shift to the second stage of the process:
Advance then must (1) substitute some rational method of setting 
up standards and forming values, in place of habitual passive 
acceptance; (2) secure voluntary and personal choice and interest, 
instead of unconscious identification with the group welfare, or 
instinctive and habitual response to group needs; (3) encourage at 
the same time individual development and the demand that all 
shall share in this development—the worth and happiness of the 
person and of every person. (73)
At this stage of the process, habit and instinctive action develops an intellectual, 
reflective component: “Action under the stress of attention, with conscious intervention 
and reconstruction.” (12) Habit, which includes customary morality (the conventions of 
the group), may come under review. Since society is continually evolving, no set of 
standard practices can ever be entirely coherent; a less habitual and more conscious and 
flexible way of dealing with moral issues becomes vital. Conscious intervention is 
required to ensure continuing adaptability. This consciousness accepts that no standard is 
to be taken for granted.
The movement from custom to conscience, then, involves a voluntary act where 
the individual “recognises the right or chooses the good freely, [and] devotes himself
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heartily to its fulfillment.” (73) The awakening of social consciousness is important if 
progress is to be achieved. Customary morality maintains the status quo. It is a 
conservative and stabilising agent. Full moral maturity, however, only comes with the 
reflecdve, critical mind. Whilst an act carried out in keeping with customary morality is 
moral, it is a limited morality given that it may be carried out unconsciously. The act does 
not require analysis or deliberation. It is a kind of reflex. Borrowing from Aristotle, 
Dewey and Tufts write that “it is not enough to do the act; it is necessary to do them in a 
certain way,—not merely to get the result, but to intend it. The result must be thought of 
as in some sense good or right; its opposite as in some sense bad or wrong.” (37-38) The 
awakening of the consciousness is not only critical to the individual mind but to society 
in general, since the reflective, morally conscientious mind produces results that lead to 
the moral advancement of society.
Given the frequency of the “unsolved problems of life” (4), in Dewey’s reflective 
morality the act of reflection is the crux of the ethical system rather than any strictly 
codified action based on inflexible rules of right and wrong. That which is known 
(already defined rules of action) cannot necessarily satisfy that which has not been 
anticipated (a circumstance that lacks precedence). Hence, where the known meets the 
unknown in such unanticipated circumstances, consciousness arises.(9) Habit or custom 
cannot satisfy that which falls outside the actions of habit. Put simply, we are obliged to 
think. We are forced into acts of thoughtfulness and reflection. Within this process of 
deliberation, valuation occurs, leading to “the final act of choice.” (9) Action may then be 
embarked upon with intent. The intent gives value to the action because a particular act 
has been chosen on merit, as a best alternative, rather than thoughtlessly or through 
customary habit.
Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are 
intellectual; they are useful methods o f judging things... the object o f  moral 
principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the 
individual to make for himself an analysis o f the elements oj good and evil in 
the particular situation in which he finds himself. (333)
To demonstrate the qualities of reflective action, one example Ethics offers is that
of a parent guiding a child’s behaviour. The question: how is “good” behaviour measured
or arrived at? Dewey and Tufts offer two methods:
(1) “the parent...may teach his child...what tradition or the 
accepted standard calls for; or (2) he may consider and examine
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the principles and motives involved. Action by the first method is 
undoubtedly moral, in one sense. It is judging according to a 
standard, though it takes the standard for granted. Action by the 
second method is moral in a more complete sense. It examines 
the standard as well. The one is the method of “customary” 
morality, the other that of reflective morality, or of conscience in 
the proper sense. (38)
Here we have a distinction between two types of morality: moral by rote and moral by 
reflection. In the first case, the moral standard is accepted as a given. In the second case, 
the method by which we arrive at a moral decision is scrutinised. This method enhances 
moral attitude. Also, and specifically important for this present study, by accepting this 
method, the anxiety about continuing to act morally in an environment stripped of any 
known moral signifiers can begin to ease. The reflective approach accommodates change.
The movement from instinct and habit to attentive reconstruction and 
intervention involves reason, a reason that both acts “as a means to secure other ends” 
and is “an element in determining what shall be sought.”(13) This includes gaining 
consensus through rational dialogue. Dewey and Tufts put premium on the social aspect 
of this movement. The shift from habit to attention is a “socialising process” and 
considers the broader implications of action in its social context; in this it is an ethical act 
since ethics is concerned with judging action in relation to persons. (3) Dewey and Tufts 
argue that this process of socialisation builds up the social self, contributing to individual 
power. This socialisation also transforms individual goals into social goals. (11) They 
write: “Society both strengthens and transforms the individual.” (13) Socialisation 
influences the idealising component of conduct. Importantly, through these shifts, 
conduct itself is made “the conscious object of reflection, valuation, and criticism. In this 
the definitely moral conceptions of right and duty, good and virtue appear.” (13)
For Dewey and Tufts, attentive reconstruction or forethought is counted among 
“the valuable weapons” that ensures survival. Mental activity must be stimulated. As an 
example, work carried out with the aid of reason ensures longevity of agricultural 
projects.
[I]n the pastoral life and still more with the beginning of 
agriculture and commerce, the man who succeeds must have 
foresight and continuity of purpose. He must control impulse by 
reason. He must organize those habits which are the basis of 
character, instead of yielding to the attractions of various 
pleasures which might lead him from the main purpose. (40)
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Differentiation of labour also encourages mental activity. “If all do the same
thing, all are much alike, and inevitably remain on a low level. But when the needs of
men induce different kinds of work, slumbering capacities are aroused and new ones are
called into being.”(41) The arts and crafts, as idealising agencies, also influence this shift
to the second stage since artistic practices require rational, aesthetic considerations.
The textiles, pottery, and skillfully made tools and weapons; the 
huts or houses when artistically constructed; the so-called free or 
fine arts of dance and music, of color and design—all have this 
common element: they give some visible or audible embodiment 
for order or form. The artist or craftsman must make definite his 
idea in order to work it out in cloth or clay, in wood or stone, in 
dance or song...It is part of the daily environment of the society.
Those who see or hear are having constantly suggested to them 
ideas and values which bring more meaning into life and elevate 
its interests. (42)
Only with increasing avenues for mental activity comes the potential for moral 
advancement. Increased intellectual activity7 refines the reflective quality of the mind. As 
we have seen, it is through reflective activity that moral advancement may come. “To 
reflect on one’s own behaviour in relation to the existing order is a standing habit of 
mind.”(182) Building upon this, the individual should only accept current standard if it 
agrees with his/her own moral intelligence. “The fact that it exists gives it indeed a 
certain prima facie claim, but no ultimate warrant. Perhaps the custom is wrong—and the 
individual is responsible for bearing this possibility in mind.”(181) The social good thus 
becomes the individual responsibility. Without this reflective component, standards go 
unchallenged resulting in social stagnation. “\R\eflective morality is a mark of a progressive 
society, ju st as customary morality is o f a stationary society. Reflection on values is the method of 
their modification.”(186) Stagnation easily becomes a reactionary power where those 
who resist change may “entrench themselves in the ‘righteousness’ and ‘honesty’ of a 
past generation.”(188) Clinging to a value system when its integrity7 is under dispute may 
indicate a lack of critical foresight especially when the customs have become mere 
convention and where tradition is followed blindly. “It requires a higher degree of insight 
and a greater initiative to get any moral attitude at all when the forms have become mere 
forms and the habits mere habits.” (188)
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As previously touched upon, the intent which guides action—where one 
alternative is chosen over another as a better course of action—contributes to the value of 
action. Where is the value in a thoughtless action? Whilst custom followed by rote is, in a 
sense, moral, as we have seen, higher morality7 consists of thoughtful intervention. It is 
this process which lends value to action. This is a positive moral system, based on the 
value of action and what one can do rather than what one can’t do because of, for 
example, the prohibitions of custom.
The goal of change, undertaken by the reflective mind, is not to undermine 
existing social institutions or values but to continually seek a moral extension of the 
order. As Ralph Waldo Emerson writes: “Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new 
series.”4^ This type of social change is constructive rather than destructive and has the 
social good at its core. The very nature of Dewey and Tufts’ morality7 and ethics is 
socially based and funded from local contingencies and does not “come from on high” as 
an authoritative, controlling mechanism of human action. Values are relative, locally 
produced and change. But this is vastly different to saying the changeability of value leads 
us to valuelessness. Values change slowly in response to community growth. Ethical 
systems are social and determine and judge how we are to act in community. The social 
component of action is the source of value and the social becomes the fund, in a sense, 
of sacredness, or what Dewey and Tufts call the “cosmic roots” of the moral life. (50) 
Here, we discover the sacred in the prosaic.46 The social is both the point of departure 
and the point of return.
The movement from custom to conscience advances the idea of the organic 
progress of both society and value itself. Two collisions occur in this movement:
1. The collision between the authority and interests of the group, 
and the independence and private interests of the individual
2. The collision between order and progress, between habit and 
reconstruction or reformation. (74)
The agent of these collisions is the individual, for it is through a reaction against group 
standards that new levels of conduct are reached. Moral courage is, therefore, required. 
Also requisite in the personality is moral sensitivity, a certain responsiveness, “a spring to 
be touched”, and moral thoughtfulness, a capacity to reflect. (415) Herein lies the 
importance of the quality of each individual’s reflective mind. With the freedom to act
4:1 Emerson, p. 26.
46 McDermott, p. 115.
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voluntarily comes the freedom to act either better or worse than the current custom 
observes. (75) Dewey and Tufts observe that civilisation is neither melioristic nor upon 
an apocalyptic path. “If the evolution were supposed to be all in one direction there 
would be no seriousness in life. It is only in the pressure of constantly new difficulties 
and evils that moral character adds new fibre, and moral progress emerges.”(191)
Becoming acquainted with consequences.
This “seriousness”, the onus of social moral development, is very much with each 
individual consciousness and it is only in the world of action where this development 
occurs. Dewey and Tufts explain that each individual is always in some form of social 
contract.
Every relationship in life, is, as it were, a tacit or expressed contract 
with others, committing one, by the simple fact that he occupies 
that relationship, to a corresponding mode of action. Every one, 
willy-nilly, occupies a social position. (345)
Thus, each individual moves in a community or network of individual agents where the
effects of one upon the other continually change the dynamic of relationships. “Every act
brings the agent who performs it into association with others, whether he so intends or
not. His act takes effect in an organized world of action; in social arrangement and
institutions.”(451) The changes extend further than the direct effects of single acts and
hence increase the importance of responsible action. In fact, Dewey and Tufts write that
it is our “chief moral business.. .to become acquainted with consequences.”(464)
An act is outwardly temporary and circumstantial, but its meaning 
is permanent and expansive. The act passes away; but its 
significance abides in the increment of meaning given to further 
growth. To live in the recognition of this deeper meaning of acts 
is to live in the ideal, in the only sense in which it is profitable for 
man to dwell in the ideal.
Our “ideals,” our types o f  excellence, are the various ways in which we figure 
to ourselves the outreaching and ever-expanding values oj our concrete acts.
(420)
Given the “ever-expanding values of our concrete acts”, acts of negligence also 
carry extreme moral weight. Negligence is deeply connected to the concept of reflective
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thought. Unless there is continual improvement in levels of thought, the ability to
consciously choose best alternatives lies dormant.
Our moral character surely does not depend in this case, then, 
upon the fact that we had alternatives clearly in mind and chose 
the worse; the difficulty is that we had only one alternative in 
mind and did not consciously choose at all. Our freedom lies in the 
capacity to alter our mode of action, through having our ignorance 
enlightened by being held for the neglected consequences when 
brought to accountability by others, or by holding ourselves 
accountable in subsequent reflection. (464)
Furthermore, Dewey and Tufts suggest that the neutrality of nature can be read
as a kind of indifference to ignorance thus increasing the responsibility incumbent within
an act. “Nature does not forbear to attach consequences to acts because of the ignorance
of the one who does the deed.”(464-465) The long-standing consequences of single,
temporal acts together wTith the fact that ignorance is no defence against unexpected
consequences sharply raises the stakes of action. Intentions, therefore, must be highly
realised; the first act is to choose consciously between alternative forms of action.4
Consequences must be anticipated and played out through the deliberation of a dramatic
rehearsal. Then, there must be action. However, it is action in the knowledge that our
deliberations, however sophisticated, are still limited by what is known, such is the
human condition. Therefore, intentions and consequences are not in a tidy binary but
part of an organic trajectory. (246-262)4K
Since intentions and consequences may not always match one may be victim to
undeserved failures but—and this is an extremely important and exciting “but”—the
intention and consequence mismatch also accommodates the opposite result: undeserved
successes. Dewey and Tufts see this as part of the “game” and ask whether we would be
truly better off if all consequences could be safely predicted. Is it better if all effort was
accorded its fair share of merit? As an example of a situation where luck and nerve raise
the stakes, Dewey and Tufts discuss economic competition and write:
He prefers an exciting game to a sure but tame return of his 
investment.. .A game in which every player was sure to win, but 
also sure to win just what he had put in, would be equitable, but it 
would not be a game. An equal distribution might rob life of its
4 Bawden, H.H. The Principle o f  Pragmatism: A Philosophical Interpretation o f  Experience. Bristol: Thoemmes 
Press. 2001. p. 8.
48 Dewey and Tufts criticise the conception that intentions and consequences are in a binary relationship to 
one another. Theories about whether morality lies in intentions or consequences uphold this false bmary.
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excitement and its passion. Possibly the very strain of the process 
develops some elements of character which it would be 
unfortunate to lose. (548)
“The very strain of the process” of participating in such games develops attributes like 
initiative, nerve, boldness, guts. Yet praise of the attributes that result from the game by no 
means induces Dewey and Tufts to endorse a kind of survival-of-the-fittest laissez-faire 
policy where only the strong survive in the brave competition. Pragmatism was influenced 
by Darwin’s theory of evolution, responding to that sense of gradual change and the 
adaptability of flexible organisms. However, to stress the survival of the fittest (strong 
over the weak) would be a misinterpretation of the relationship between Darwinism and 
Pragmatism. Dewey and Tufts’ pragmatic philosophy is not individualistic in this sense 
because the “human animal is a human animal.”(372) They insist that the products of the 
sympathetic and gregarious instincts are the “highest achievements, the high-water mark 
of evolution.” (373) In contrast, strong-over-the-weak theories of individualism, where all 
receive formal rather than real freedoms “urges a systematic relapse to lower and 
foregone stages of biological development.”(373)
In Ethics we are continually brought back to social responsibility where the 
growing strength of any one member uses that strength for the social good. Whilst Dewey 
and Tufts praise the philosophies of individualism for emphasising personal responsibility 
(which as we have seen contributes, in their scheme, to moral awareness and progress) 
they argue that it does not secure real freedoms, only formal ones. Given that the factors 
which influence success include that which lies outside of the individual’s initial 
responsibility, for example, background, family, money, class etc, the survival-of-the- 
fittest elements of individualism do not necessarily secure the moral good. “It is a 
misreading of evolution to suppose unregulated competition to be its highest category of 
progress, and that it is a misinterpretation of ethics to assume that might is right.” (528)
In the pragmatist, through the understanding of the uncertainty of future 
experience together with the limitations of the individual perspective, an attitude of 
flexibility obtains. However, the flexible attitude which is less interested in the permanent 
laws of a customary or settled morality does not negate duty or suggest that all things 
become allowable. The strength of the social network (which is essentially conservative 
and slow-changing) resists this. Social duty remains the leading determinant of behaviour. 
This duty is implicit in the social contract. Dewey and Tufts stress that the highest form
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of conduct is that which seeks the social good since ethics is concerned with the impact
of one’s actions upon at least one other being. If moral practice is thus derived from the
social, for action to achieve integrity self-interest must be moderated by its social
implications. Although social development can only occur when an individual seeks to
move away from accepted and customary practices, that individual is seeking the
extension of the moral order rather than a retraction. At the heart of this act must be the
social good because by one individual extending the moral range the moral intelligence of
the group increases. Dewey and Tufts explain that it is often forgotten that this
“distinctly personal morality, which takes its stand against some established usage, and
which, therefore, for the time being has its abode only in the initiative and effort of an
individual, is simply the means of social reconstruction.”(432)
Dewey and Tufts describe an ethical society where the highest character seeks the
progressive development of society where the strong support the weak to achieve
common social purposes rather than an individualistic society where individual members
put high premium on seeking individual goals for their own gain. The individualistic
doctrine which says one may pursue one’s own interests as long as they do not impinge
on the freedoms of others only guarantees, they say, a formal freedom. Likewise,
individualism’s opposite, collectivism, (in its broadest sense), is also criticised. An
understanding of the collectivist approach, which routinely subordinates the individual
for the good of the group, is also a narrow conception since in doing so, it dissuades
progress by achieving a “static social whole”.
An individual variation may involve opposition, not conformity 
or subordination, to the existing good taken statically; and yet may 
be the sole means by which the existing State is to progress.
Minorities are not always right; but every advance in right begins 
in a minority of one, when some individual conceives a project 
which is at variance with the social good as it has been established.
(484)
The individual’s relationship with society—its rights and responsibilities—is 
integral to understanding this style of organic ethics. The charge of pragmatism’s 
critics—that it is solipsistic and self-serving since it allows for flexible conduct49—fails to
49 See James, W. “The Notion of Truth”. Pragmatism. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1946. p. 233:
“A favourite formula for describing Mr Schiller’s doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that 
by saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil ever}' pragmarisdc [sic] 
requirement.”
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consider this cornerstone of Dewey and Tufts’ argument for a principled pragmatism.
Here, the term ‘individualism’ describes:
a person who is individual in choice, in feeling, in responsibility, 
and at the same time social in what he regards as good, in his 
sympathies, and in his purposes. Otherwise individualism means 
progress toward the immoral. (76)
To guard against the kinds of exploitations that go hand in hand with an “ever}7
man does what is right in his own eyes” philosophy Dewey and Tufts insist that moral
progress can only be advanced when this sense of freedom is taken with its incumbent
responsibilities. This is the “reconstructed individual” who, while maintaining an
individualist quality, values the social. (75-76) The search for just solutions over private
interests indicates the moral willingness over self-interest. Furthermore, Dewey and Tufts
demonstrate, as does fames in The Principles o f Psychology, that the individual self can only
manifest through the social.50 A self is a self insofar as it is recognised. It is recognised
through the social compact and activated and empowered through existing institutions.
(431) For example, the increasing diversity of modern society increases the opportunities
through which the self s individualism may flourish. An environment of reduced
circumstances and opportunities has the opposite effect. Satisfactory economic conditions
and modes of production must be secured. If conditions are such that prevent mental
stimulation or opportunities to develop, then, despite any formal freedoms stipulated, real
freedoms, choices, are absent. The self stagnates.
Breadth in extent of community life goes hand in hand with 
multiplication of the stimuli which call out an individual’s powers.
Diversification of social activities increases opportunities for his 
initiative and endeavour. Narrow and meager social life means 
limitation of the scope of activities in which its members may 
engage. It means little occasion for the exercise of deliberation 
and choice, without which character is both immature and 
fossilised; it means, in short, restricted personality. (430)
The flipside to the self-empowerment, available through an increasingly diverse 
range of organsiations and activities (a growth which is to be regarded as a right), is 
responsibility and obligation. “But a rich and varied society, one which liberates powers 
otherwise torpid and latent, also exacts that they be employed in ways consistent with its 
own interests.” (430) Importantly: “The world of action is a world of which the individual
3° Ethics, p. 428; Principles oj Psychology, p. 293.
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is one limit, and humanity the other.” (430) Again, the “social contract”, where the
contract is a free one, the aim of which is to achieve mutual benefit, is useful to illustrate
the balance of rights and obligations between the individual and the social group.
Although the group will insist on consistency with its own interests, the individual’s
progressive development he/she receives through this bargain also enacts change and
may change social interests in the pursuit of the social good. This is the difference
between customary and reflective morality where, in the former, the moral is the social as
opposed to the latter which accepts the limitation of any customised system of thought or
behaviour and is prepared to extend it.
The good man not only measures his acts by a standard, but he is 
concerned to revise his standard. His sense of the ideal, of the 
undefinable because ever-expanding value of special deeds, 
forbids his resting satisfied with any formulated standard; for the 
very formulation gives the standard a technical quality, while the 
good can be maintained only in enlarging excellence. The highest 
form of conscientiousness is interest in constant progress. (422)
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Chapter 2
“A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking”:
William James’s Pragmatism
William James’s Pragmatism is the collection of lectures he gave in Boston and New York 
between November 1906 and January 1907. The purpose of these lectures was to explain 
his pragmatist ideas in relation to religion, humanism, common sense, monism and 
pluralism, and truth and reality. Importantly in these lectures, James takes up much of the 
criticism leveled at the pragmatist movement and clearly lays out the tasks of pragmatism. 
Pragmatism, he explains, is primarily a method rather than a highly conceptualised 
dogmatic worldview; however, its method allows for a pluralist approach. Given this, 
James tackles the question of value in relation to truths rather than an Absolute Truth, 
outlining the balance between old stocks of truth and its negotiation with the new. In 
short, habit is of a deeply conservative nature; it is between this and the conditions of 
reality that we are “tightly wedged” thereby maintaining the integrity of old value even as 
it becomes modified. Through the accrual of habits, slowly expanded or “built out” by 
new experience, we thus become repositories of history. These ongoing modifications 
show a plasticity vital to our nature that ensures ongoing adaptability to changing 
conditions. We build out rather than dismantle: “we patch and tinker more than we 
renew.” (83) This suggests that, while we are released from an idea of the Absolute, it 
does not necessarily follow that standards and value collapse into anarchy. “We are 
continuity.”31 Where a particular sense of value is lost as the idea of a single capital-T 
Truth is dispatched, value is relocated in a plural set of provisional truths so long as they 
are found to be useful. As we shall see, a truth’s provisionality does not negate its value. 
Pragmatism, being experimental in design, is concerned with experience-funded truths; 
we verify ideas by bringing them back into reality where they may be tested. James at all 
times stresses the concrete. However, it is not his intention to simply champion an 
empiricist worldview over a rationalist one; in these lectures, James is promoting 
pragmatism as the mediator between what he calls the tough- and the tender-minded. An 
idealist worldview is still valuable so long as you bring those ideas back into experience 
where they can be put into practice and made to work.
31 Principles o f Psychology, p. 127.
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At the time of his lectures, James declared: “Never were as many men of a
decidedly empiricist proclivity in existence as there are at the present day.” (14) In saying
so, he recognises the pulse of the modernist mind and also goes on to address its
quandary: “But our esteem for facts has not neutralised in us all religiousness.”(15) In
response, James’s pragmatism is a method of thinking that can mediate between what he
sees as the antagonistic split between the ‘tough-’ and the ‘tender-minded’. For the
present discussion it is useful to briefly discuss these two worldviews as James identifies
them to gauge where pragmatism is placed between these poles. In doing so, we can get
at a more thorough understanding of James’s pragmatism and the tighdy bonded
concepts of truth and reality. Truth and reality are important to the discussion on ethics
since one’s worldview dictates action and the assignation of value.
The real anxiety for pragmatism’s critics was its implications for truth.
Summarising this critical perspective, James puts:
These pragmatists destroy all objective standards,” critics say,
“and put foolishness and wisdom on one level.” A favorite 
formula for describing Mr Schiller’s doctrines and mine is that we 
are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it pleasant 
to say and calling it truth you fulfil ever}7 pragmatist requirement.
(Ill)
This pragmatist talk about truths in the plural, about their utility 
and satisfactoriness, about the success with which they ‘work,’ 
etc., suggests to the typical intellectualist mind a sort of coarse 
lame second-rate makeshift article of truth. Such truths are not 
real truth. Such tests are merely subjective. (38)
Such criticisms come from the tender-minded, the rationalist’", who James describes as
regarding the world ready-made, a unified entity, and truth can only be that which
corresponds to the already-made world. Truth is what matches a constant reality. For
such thinkers truth is immutable. It does not change and, in fact, represents the unity of
the higher order of the world. James writes that for the rationalist:
objective truth must be something non-utilitarian, haughty, 
refined, remote, august, exalted. It must be an absolute 
correspondence of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality.
It must be what we ought to think, unconditionally. (38)
52 I will use the term ‘rationalist’ as James uses it, in describing those who see the world as dictated by 
principles — that there is a unified reason for the progress o f the world. In James’s theory this rationalist is 
also religious and monistic.
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This idea of truth is problematic since in this conception, truth is closed and is 
removed from the practical and the everyday. This gives rise to two complications of 
particular importance to the current study: (i) being a closed system of thought, the habit 
that experience has of “boiling over” our current ideas will continually confound such 
ideas of Truth, and (ii) being “refined”, the tendency is to value ideas over action. James 
writes:
The actual universe is a thing wide open, but rationalism makes 
systems, and systems must be closed. For men in practical life 
perfection is something far off and still in process of achievement. 
This for rationalism is but the illusion of the finite and relative: 
the absolute ground of things is a perfection eternally complete. 
(20)
An “absolute ground”, an “objective standard”, the “ready-made universe”: all terms
which denote a world that modernist thought must concede lost. All systems, being
closed, will eventually be thwarted by an inherent fallibility: “Experience, as we know, has
ways of boiling over; and making us correct our present formulas.” (106) It is important to
note, then, that pragmatism is a method of thinking rather than a system of thought.
The pragmatic method...is to try to interpret each notion by 
tracing its respective practical consequences.. .What difference 
would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that 
notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be 
traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and 
all dispute is idle. (28)
Here we start digging in the dirt of the ordinary: the practical solution. Borrowing from 
Charles Saunders Peirce, James emphasises that: “the tangible fact at the root of all our 
thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist 
in anything but a possible difference of practice.” (29) Pragmatism unapologetically 
disdains “verbal solutions” (31); it is for James the unabashedly anti-intellectual streak of 
pragmatism. “[Ojur beliefs are really rules for action, [and] to develop a thought’s 
meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is 
for us its sole significance.” (29)
Pragmatism.. .asks its usual question. “Grant an idea or belief to 
be true,” it says, “what concrete difference will its being true make 
in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What 
experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the 
belief were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in 
experiential terms?
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The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer:
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify.
False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical difference it 
makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of 
truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.
This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an idea is not a 
stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes 
true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: 
the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity 
is the process of its valid-ation. (97)
The focus put on possible consequences of action stemming from the truth of particular
notions forces us into contemplation of the future. The open manner of the future, only
predictable to a certain degree, precludes the maintenance of a closed system:
A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot 
of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns 
away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, 
from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, 
and pretended absolutes and origins...It means the open air and 
possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the 
pretence of finality in truth. (31)
The resulting difference in temperament between the tender-minded and the pragmatist 
is telling:
The rationalist mind, radically taken, is of a doctrinaire and 
authoritative complexion: the phrase ‘must be’ is ever on its lips.
The belly-band of its universe must be tight. A radical pragmatist 
on the other hand is a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of creature.
(124)
We might add that upon the lips of the pragmatist, the phrases could be and what then 
linger. While James uses the term “anarchistic” in describing the pragmatic temperament 
he uses such a term by way of contrast rather than as an explicit assessment. He would 
be the first to resist anarchy as a true depiction of the pragmatic attitude. For James’s 
pragmatist, the universe is far from a lawless realm. While this will be discussed in more 
detail when I address James and his attitudes to habit, suffice it to say here that our 
choices to act and the notions we accept as true follow quite a narrow path from 
previous knowledge into interpreting the novel experience. To be acceptable, a truth 
cannot “clash” or be contradictory to the broader stock of old truths. Truths have “this 
desperate instinct of self-preservation” and a “desire to extinguish whatever contradicts
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them.” James writes: “My belief in the Absolute, based on the good it does me, must run 
the gauntlet of all my other beliefs. (43)
This condition keeps tight rein on ethical behaviour. The process of agreements
prevents anarchy. Our theory of value, then, as will become progressively clear, is not
contingent upon notions of absolute, immutable Truth. As we saw in Ethics, a balance
between the socially defined consciousness and the external environment manages this
value rather than an abstract notion operating independently. Even though the idea of
the objective standard against which values may be judged has been dismissed, ethical
behaviour can still be maintained by a particular order. It is not the green light to anarchy
critics of pragmatism feared. In fact, its theory of value has a longevity monism lacks. A
monistic worldview cannot allow:
any mitigation of its inner rigidity[.] The slightest suspicion of 
pluralism, the minutest wiggle of independence of any one of its 
parts from the control of the totality, would ruin it. Absolute 
unity brooks no degrees.. .” (78)
In accepting the fact that experience “boils over” our knowledge we must also
accept that any “wriggle of independence”, any dissent from the unified whole, is
possible and will cause the entire theory of absolutism to crumble. Therefore,
pragmatism must be pluralist in its approach: “Every idea must be judged by its own
specific purpose as an idea.. .There is no purely abstract standard.”5'
A pluralist worldview makes room for a flexible approach to truth and reality. In
pragmatism, truth is not an “inert static relation” (96) between things. It can not be a
stable agreement between an idea and reality since reality can only be ever understood
subjectively: “The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything.”(37) It is a dynamic
relation between the internal world of consciousness and the external world of stimuli.
Moreover, the mere truth of an idea does not assure its value as an idea. An idea’s
usefulness or relevance brings value to it:
When may a truth go into cold-storage in the encyclopaedia? and 
when shall it come out for battle? Must I constandy be repeating 
the truth ‘twice two are four’ because of its eternal claim on 
recognition? or is it sometimes irrelevant? Must my thoughts 
dwell night and day on my personal sins and blemishes, because I 
truly have them?—or may I sink and ignore them in order to be a 
decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid melancholy and 
apology?.. .Truth with a big T, and in the singular, claims
53 Bawden, p. 203.
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abstractly to be recognised, of course; but concrete truths in the 
plural need be recognized only when their recognition is 
expedient. (I l l )
As a basic example, James asks that if someone were to ask you the time and you
answered by giving your address, what does it matter if you give a true or false address
since it has no bearing on the question and is of no use to the inquirer? The answer is
useless and so the truth or falsity of the answer is irrelevant. The truth of an idea does
not guarantee its value. At this point, Dewey and Tufts might add here that since the
relevancy of an idea needs to be subjectively assessed the onus rests squarely with the
individual in making choices about truth and consequential conduct. The duty implied in
the social contract provides the checks and balances for these assessments of expediency
and relevancy. The truth of an idea is also controlled by the negotiation between the
habitual old stock of knowledge and the new:
Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to 
be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the 
past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so 
well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under 
which our minds perform their operations? (111-112)
Whilst James puts forth a case that establishes the conservative nature of social 
evolution, it is nevertheless plastic. Pushing his experimental line, James goes on to say: 
“We can learn the limits of the plasticity only by trying, and that we ought to start as if it 
were wholly plastic, acting methodically on that assumption, and stopping only when we 
are decisively rebuked.” (117) Plasticity is also an attribute of the human form since the 
organic body operates within an environmental continuum. Neither the self nor the 
environment in which it is found is static. The “happy-go-lucky”, open disposition of the 
pragmatic character is equipped to cope with the dynamism apparent in this conception 
of reality. Importantly, pragmatism’s conception of the individual shares this attribute of 
plasticity. Since the self is socially constituted, social change effects individual change and 
vice versa. H.H. Bawden discusses at length the dynamic relation between the self, 
experience and reality and writes that the distinction between experience and reality is not 
an ontological one, but a methodological and functional one. 54 Referring back to Dewey, 
he maintains that reality can only be what it is experienced as. If this is striding towards
54 Bawden, p. 31.
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solipsism, as pragmatism’s critics suggested, Bawden points out that personal knowledge
is really a form and expression of social knowledge:
The human individual is the social whole undergoing 
readjustment at its points o f transition and reorganisation...
Consciousness is, what the word suggests, the knowing-together 
of estranged aspects of the social whole.55
Bawden argues that consciousness is not a different kind of reality but a: “mode of
experience in the phase of metamorphosis into further experience.” 56 Removing such
classifications as mind and matter, Bawden puts that: “ mind or consciousness is what it
seems to be— a transformation phase o f experience, not a separate entity.”3
just as the hypostasising of the distinction o f reality and 
experience gave rise to the tedious detour o f the epistemological 
problem, so the erection o f the practical distinction between the 
psychical and the physical into an ontological chasm has produced 
the paradox o f mind and matter in metaphysics.58
By accepting that the mind is not a separate entity to experience we must accept 
the plasticity o f the arrangement. Yet, this plasticity, or what Dewey and Tufts call 
“ flexible adaptability” , does not free up practice so much that it becomes misshapen. 
James’s proposition is that: “Plasticity, then, in the wide sense o f the word, means the 
possession o f a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to 
yield all at once.” 5; (105)
The strong structure that does not immediately yield is generated by habit. We are
“bundles o f habits,” 6" which, given the flexibility o f our organism, change gradually over
time to suit environmental circumstances:
The habits o f an elementary particle o f matter cannot change (on 
the principles o f the atomistic philosophy), because the particle is 
itself an unchangeable tiling; but those o f a compound mass of 
matter can change, because they are in the last instance due to the
structure of the compound, and either outward forces or inward tensions can, 
from one hour to another, turn that structure into something different from 
what it was. That is, they can do so if  the body be plastic enough to maintain 
its integrity, and be not disrupted when its structure yields.'
55 Bawden, p. 74.
56 Bawden, p. 34.
57 Bawden, p. 32.
38 Bawden, p. 33.
59 P rin ciples o f Psychology, p. 105.
60 P rin ciples o f Psychology, p. 104.
61 P rin cip les o f Psychology, p. 104-105.
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This “maintenance of integrity” is a crucial idea if pragmatism is to withstand the
criticisms that suggest pragmatism encourages a collapse of standard and social
responsiveness. As Dewey and Tufts write: “A self without habits, one loose and fluid, in
which change in one direction is just as easy as in another, would not have the sense of
duty.” (343) Hence we are led to consider the “ethical implications of the law of habit”/’2
lames writes: “habit is .. .the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious
conservative agent.”6 ’. As a basis of knowledge that influences conduct, habit takes on an
ethical dimension and, in fact, becomes an anchor of conduct rather than any “objective
standard”. As with Dewey and Tufts, James notes that even the most ancient of ethical
behaviours and parts of truth: “also once were plastic. They also were called true for
human reasons.” (36-37) Such “truths” were developed rather than inherently possessed:
The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a 
new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts 
them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they contradict 
each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; 
or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an 
inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, 
and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous 
mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this 
matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to 
change first this opinion, and then that (for they resist change 
very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can 
graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of 
the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new 
experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and 
expediently. (34-35)
So far, we have seen how the body, be it individual or social, bends to the new. 
The monistic temperament, of necessity, disallows this bend and, thus, must be passed 
over in favour of a pluralistic worldview. Yet, as we have seen, the character of habit 
maintains the integrity of a being, albeit a slowly changing one. The second problematic 
aspect of the monistic view—the aloof character of a single Truth—is implicated in this 
bend and now we must go deeper into James’s attitude to value in an absence of a single 
truth. As stated earlier, the “refined” version of a Truth threatens to value the idea over 
action. It is the crux of pragmatist thought to overturn this notion. It should be 
emphasised, however, that an idea is an action of a kind. It is, as Bawden says, the first
62 Principles o f Psychology, p. 120.
63 Principles o f Psychology, p. 121.
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movement of a series of actions.64 The surfacing of an idea is indicative of a point of 
tension in the consciousness. It is the reflective moment which should prompt 
progressive action. Yet, if it does not proceed into the world of tangible evidence, it has 
no value.
fames rejects the tender-minded sentimentality that shows itself in the 
glorification of Ideas. James’s emphasis is on hortatory ethics and warns against 
sentimentality:
But everyone in his measure, whenever, after glowing for an 
abstracdy formulated Good, he practically ignores some actual 
case, among the squalid ‘other particulars’ of which that same 
Good lurks disguised [fails]. All Goods are disguised by the 
vulgarity of their concomitants, in this work-a-day world; but woe 
to him who can only recognise them when he thinks them in their 
pure and abstract form.63
fames strongly emphasises that activity must follow the emotion to act. Without its 
concomitant action, the thought, however noble, has no value. This quite clearly suggests 
that value does not lie inherendy in noble, or truthful, or lofty7 ideals but in them being 
put into practice.
No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and 
no matter how good one’s sentiments may be, if one have not 
taken advantage of ever}7 concrete opportunity to act, one’s 
character may remain entirely unaffected for the better. With 
mere good intentions, hell is proverbially paved.. .A tendency to 
act only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the 
uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur, 
and the brain ‘grows’ to their use.66
Meaning is very firmly rooted in the concrete of everyday lived experience so 
now our attention turns to the conception of matter and spirit. James reproduces the 
argument between matter and spirit (spiritualism vs materialism) and reduces it to an 
argument over aesthetics. From the spiritualist point of view: “Matter is gross, coarse, 
crass, muddy; spirit is pure, elevated, noble; and since it is more consonant with the 
dignity7 of the universe to give the primacy in it to what appears superior, spirit must be 
affirmed as the ruling principle.” (50) Critical of this view, James goes on to add that:
“To treat abstract principles as finalities, before which our intellects may come to rest in
64 Bawden, p. 156.
65 Principles o f  Psychology, p. 125. 
60 Principles o f  Psychology, p. 125.
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a state of admiring contemplation, is the great rationalist failing.”(49) James challenges
this conception of matter and demonstrates the possibilities of investing a great deal of
value in “coarse” and “crass” matter:
Matter is indeed infinitely and incredibly refined. To anyone who 
has ever looked on the face of a dead child or parent the mere 
fact that matter could have taken for a time that precious form, 
ought to make matter sacred ever after. It makes no difference 
what the principle of life may be, material or immaterial, matter at 
any rate, cooperates, lends itself to all life’s purposes. That 
beloved incarnation was among matter’s possibilities. (50)
It must be remembered, however, that whilst James proclaims pragmatism as 
“empiricism regnant” it does not stop at empiricism. James put forward the pragmatic 
method as a mediator between the tough- and tender-minded. Pragmatism, James 
explains: “has no such materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under.” (40) 
Empiricism’s irreligiousness, for example, constructs a boundary to possibilities which 
may prove a hindrance in the future. In other words, by making an absolute claim about 
something—that, for example, there is no room for abstractions which favour faith over 
fact— positive results may be precluded. Pragmatism has no immediate prejudice against 
abstractions or theology so long as “they actually carry you somewhere”:
I f  theological ideas prove to have a value fo r  concrete life, they will be true, for 
pragmatism, in the sense o f being good fo r  so much. For how much more they 
are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also 
have to be acknowledged. (40)
To conclude, the emphasis in James’s philosophy is that pragmatism is “method 
only.” It is an open, investigative process that cannot abide absolute systems or inflexible 
thinking. The social (cultural habits as described in Ethics and Pragmatism) provides the 
ballast to such freedoms of thinking; the requisite tensions that exist in the consciousness 
between conformity and reformation encourage the ethical development of society. As 
Dewey and Tufts write:
In the organisation of stable character the morality of custom is 
strong on one side. The group trains its members to act in the 
ways it approves and afterwards holds them by all the agencies in 
its power. It forms habits and enforces them. Its weakness is that 
the element of habit is so large, that of freedom so small. It holds 
up the average man; it holds back the man who might forge 
ahead. It is an anchor, and a drag. (72)
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Dewey and Tufts and James have outlined the pragmatic process o f moral change 
where society is more or less stable and can develop in a slow and orderly way: “ not 
order but orderly progress.”
We will now take this pragmatic process to see how characters “ forge ahead” in 
environments where the order is far less stable, that is, during periods o f immense social 
change where typical conservative elements are absent or entirely thrown over. In the 
following analysis on the works o f Henry Lawson and Frank Moorhouse, both writers 
conceive o f worlds that have been turned upside down. As we shall see, absolute systems 
are continually exposed as flawed and typical values are inverted. To set the tone and to 
demonstrate the pragmatic spirit in operation, where values are renegotiated through 
flexibility o f mind, I will begin with an exposition o f Lawson’s “The Iron-Bark Chip” 
where we see the pragmatic mind operating within the experiential field in a rich and 
dynamic relationship.
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Part II: Henry Lawson
Chapter 1
“An Interrogatory cope, cope, cope?”:
Pragmatic Action in “The Iron-Bark Chip”
In “The Iron-Bark Chip”, Lawson demonstrates that flexibility of character is required to 
survive in an unpredictable environment. In this landscape, mental alertness and physical 
agility is paramount to participate in what Dewey and Tufts describe as “the game” of 
life, a game where exertion and reward do not exist in a stable relationship to one 
another. The importance of this game cannot be overestimated. The unstable equation of 
effort and outcome underpins the concept of the multiverse that Lawson advances. That 
cause and effect do not follow predictable lines suggests that there is no reigning, 
reasoned order but that all is in flux. Any number of unseen consequences can be 
triggered from one act and thus this unstable and ever-changing environment must be 
approached without personal rigidity. The physical responsiveness in Dave’s shape­
changing in this story, when he ingeniously swaps the chips, has a parallel in the 
functional ethical system also in operation between the working parties on the railway 
line. In this tale, Lawson contrasts stiff and flexible systems of meaning through his 
treatment of the rigid government bureaucracy as it comes into contact with the practical, 
grassroots realities of smaller communities. Lawson’s treatment of the workers’ situation 
in this story shows that standard ethical issues like honesty and deception have become 
morally neutral in the turbulence of the new environment. There are no inherent qualities 
in terms like these; the quality of an act (committing fraud or telling the truth) is felt only 
in its consequences.
“The Iron-Bark Chip” endorses a pragmatic philosophy of action, one which 
functions in contrast to the rigid, useless governmental system of order and control.
“You might move heaven and earth in vain endeavour to get the ‘Govermun’ to flutter 
an eyelash over something of the most momentous importance to yourself and mates 
and the district—even to the country.”6' The disengaged inspector represents this aloof
67 Lawson, H. “The Iron-Bark Chip.” Selected Stones. Pymble: HarperCollins. 2001. pp. 174-179. p. 175. All 
references to Henry Lawson’s stories will be to this edition and given in-text, unless otherwise stated.
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governmental authority. From the men’s point of view, the inspector is vague and lacks 
vitality. He wears a “grey suit”, rides an “ashen-grey horse” and was “like a grey kangaroo 
bothered by a new wire fence, but unsuspicious of the presence of humans.”(174) In 
other words, while he functions within the environment—indeed he is almost 
dangerously impossible to make out in the “long and grey” grass—he struggles to engage 
usefully with it: “He stooped, and with an absent air picked up a chip. He looked at it 
abstractedly for a moment, blinked his threefold blink; then, seeming to recollect an 
appointment, he woke up suddenly.” (176) In contrast to this figure of authority is the 
foreman who is, significantly, described as “a practical man”. (174) The foreman “had 
been a timber-getter himself’ and was “on winking terms with Dave Regan” and his 
“sympathies were bushy.”(174) For authority to be useful, then, it must not only be 
practical but sympathetic also. This suggests that authority should be based on 
experience, through which sympathy emerges. The inspector is a danger because no 
flexibility obtains in his nature. His only concern is that the specifics of the contract are 
absolutely adhered to and he will not permit any deviance from it.
Seen through a pragmatic perspective, the wood that is of such crucial concern in 
this tale raises two important issues: the process of moral consensus within a group and 
the unstable equation between effort and reward. The contract the men have signed 
“expressly stipulated” (174) that the hardwood ironbark is used in certain beams and 
girders but the men “came to reckon” something different: “they’d get the last girder 
from a handy tree.” (174) They reach a consensus that deceit of the contract is justified by 
the fact that iron-bark is not plentiful in that area and there would be only “one cronk 
log” anyway, plus, they were “ ‘about full o f the job and place” and had their eyes on 
“another ‘spec’”. (174) The process of consensus indicates a pragmatic approach where a 
particular course of action is taken by weighing up probable consequences. The men 
know that the inferiority of the timber they use for the final girder may create a safety 
risk, however, if all but one log is good, the compromise to safety is reduced. The low risk 
does not then justify the extreme effort required in getting the right log from a distance. 
This reckoning process focuses on value. How much difference will “one cronk log” 
make to the whole structure? If it doesn’t make a substantial difference, where is the real 
value in using iron-bark on the final girder? The real risk in the men’s minds, though, is 
the arrival of the inspector. Together, they weigh up this likelihood accordingly: “They 
had more than half hoped that, as he had visited them pretty frequently during the
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progress of the work, and knew how near it was to completion, he wouldn’t bother 
coming any more.” (175) The process of consensus shows the men’s conscientious 
valuations at work.
They take the risk. Of course, the inspector arrives. When the inspector takes a
suspect chip for further analysis, Dave becomes indignant with injustice, “it’s the only
cronk log we’ve had too!.. .If this had £a’ been the only blessed iron-bark in the whole
contract, it would have been all right.” Such is the cunning of irony—or the “regular
cussedness of things”—where exertion and reward rarely tallies. This sort of “game”
may not necessarily be equitable but, as Dewey and Tufts argue, “the very strain of the
process” of such risky ventures can develop attributes like ingenuity. Indeed, ingenuity
now becomes the key. Jack gives up the cause for dead for he was only: “quick-witted
when the track was showrn him”. (177) Dave, however, is set upon finding a solution.
He sees the inspector has put the fraudulent chip on top of a post while he talks to the
fencers. With his eyes steady on the inspector’s movements: “Dave took in the lay of
the country at a glance and thought rapidly.” (177) He sees a slim chance and the scene
opens before him like a geometric puzzle:
Now the “lay of the country” sloped generally to the line from 
both sides, and the angle between the inspector’s horse, the 
fencing party, and the culvert was well within a clear concave 
space; but a couple of hundred yards back from the line and 
parallel to it (on the side on which Dave’s party worked their 
timber) a fringe of scrub ran to within a few yards of a point 
which would be about in line with a single tree on the cleared 
slope, the horse and the fencing party. (177)
The opportunities available to Dave are far from multiple. The environment strictly 
dictates their chances; in this case, Dave’s only hope is the fortunate, yet possibly 
momentary, configurations of his lines of sight. There is no room for error. The 
contingency of the set-up leaves no time for hesitation as Dave cannot predict when the 
inspector might move. If he is going to swap the chips he has to do it now. He yells: 
“Gimme an iron-bark chip!” (177) With the chip in hand he begins the physically 
awkward, risky manoeuvre:
Dave.. .ran along the bed of the watercourse into the scrub, raced 
up the siding behind the bushes, got safely, though without 
breathing across the exposed space, and brought the tree into line 
between him and the inspector, who was talking to the fencers.
Then he began to work quickly down the slope towards the tree
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(which was a thin one), keeping it in line, his arms close to his 
sides, and working, as it were, down the trunk of the tree, as if the 
fencing party were kangaroos and Dave was trying to get a shot at 
them. (177)
The level of detailed description in this passage emphasises the kind of extraordinary 
malleability Dave requires. To further increase the pressure, the inspector keeps looking 
around to check on his flighty horse. The hint that the horse may bolt further intensifies 
the animation of the scene and the unpredictability of events. Dave must be present and 
alert in each and every moment. It must also be noted that in order to escape detection as 
he “works” his way down the trunk he must work blind. He must give over to instinct.
Dave’s particular opportunistic skills and lateral thinking provide the group with 
the opportunity to survive. This point is important because it suggests the value of 
individuation within the group setting. All, however, share in the responsibility to protect 
the group: “It was an anxious moment for all parties concerned—except the inspector. 
They didn’t want him to be perturbed.”(177) Since the unpredictability of the 
environment prevents its control—now there is also a heavy thunderstorm coming— 
Dave cannot be left to work alone for, “just as Dave reached the foot of the tree, the 
inspector finished what he had to say to the fencers, turned, and started to walk briskly 
back to his horse.” (177) Dave must now rely on the others in his group to come up with 
an ingenious solution. All available creative forces need to be mobilised: “There were 
certain prearranged signals between Dave’s party and the fencers.. .but none to meet a 
case like this” (177); therefore, the men must find a creative solution to a new problem. 
Ironically, Jack finds a solution in Andy Page, who was “the hardest grafter, but 
altogether helpless, hopeless, and useless in a crisis like this.” (176) Given that Andy grew 
nervous around “funny business”, he would usually be of no value in such a 
circumstance, but unprecedented circumstances can change the value of qualities like 
honesty. Since Andy “must have an honest excuse” Jack says: “Run, Andy! Tell him 
there’s a heavy thunderstorm coming and he’d better stay in our humpy till it’s over. Run! 
Don’t stand staring like a blanky fool. He’ll be gone!” (178) Jack’s experience of Andy 
assures him that: “It would have taken the inspector ten minutes to get at what Andy was 
driving at, whatever it was.” This forms yet another situational irony—they must now 
detain the man from whom they need the most distance. They will try to bring him
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closer— into their very tent. Jack’s plan remains undeployed, however, since there are
many forces now mobilised for Dave’s success:
[A]s luck would have it, one of the fencers started after the 
inspector, hailing him as “Hi, mister!” He wanted to be set right 
about the survey or something— or to pretend to want to be set 
right— from motives of policy which I haven’t time to explain 
here. (178)
There is no “luck” in it. Dave’s party and the fencers share in relations of sympathy which 
improves the likelihood of cooperation. This experienced understanding of local 
pressures gives the individual groups the ability to support each other: “The fencer 
explained afterwards to Dave’s party that he ‘seen what you coves was up to,’ and that’s 
why he called the inspector back.” (178)
Here, then, we have a distinct ethical system taking form. It is not reliant upon 
innate values but relationships. The integrity of action is not related to any moral 
immanence of the act itself but the relationships of actors who are immediately affected 
by the act. Thus, deception, as an act-in-itself, becomes morally neutral, whether it is a 
contractual breach or delaying a man under false pretenses. Likewise, Andy’s honesty, 
which is sometimes a liability, can also become an advantage. Deception and honesty, like 
so many acts and objects in this new land, are emptied of conventional significance.
With the absence of a concept o f innate value, stabilisation comes, firstly, through 
relationships— the mutual understanding of the likeminded—  and, secondly, through the 
build-up o f experience. Both o f these “stabilisations” are nevertheless dynamic. Firstly, 
relationships within groups retain the idiosyncrasies of each individual member leaving a 
certain area of unpredictability, as we shall see in the boss’s behaviour in “Telling Mrs 
Baker”. Yet it is this idiosyncratic element which also provides creative solutions as 
Dave’s actions prove. Secondly, experience contributes towards the ability to forecast 
likely consequences, “it’s ahvays the way”, but room must be left for chance since threats 
like the inspector appear at “unexpected times.”
In distracting the inspector, the fencer buys Dave more time. Dave then begins to 
morph into several animals. At this point, Dave is protoplasmic; he is almost pre-form 
sheer living matter. He gets down on all fours, slips round the tree and through the grass 
which “luckily” grows tall between the tree and the horse. He approaches the flighty 
horse and a bolt of fear passes through him. What if it bolts at the sight o f a man creeping
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up behind it? But Dave, in the thrust of evolution, is no longer a man. In fact, even the
horse has more human characteristics then Dave and offers thoughtful help:
Dave ventured an interrogatory “Cope, cope, cope?” The horse 
turned its head wearily and regarded him with a mild eye, as if 
he’d expected him to come, and come on all fours, and wondered 
what had kept him so long; then he went on thinking. Dave 
reached the foot of the post; the horse obligingly leaning over on 
the other leg. (178)
Through the first hurdle, Dave is now at the post upon which sits the incriminating chip. 
“Like a snake” he rears up:
his hand went up twice, swiftly—the first time he grabbed the 
inspector’s chip and the second time he put the iron-bark one in 
its place. He drew down and back, and scuttled off for the tree 
like a gigantic tailless goanna. (178-179)
In under a minute or so, Dave has passed through many forms: a hunter bearing down 
on a pack of kangaroos, a four-legged creature, a snake and a goanna. Each form has a 
different function. It serves a purpose and is then discarded as the situation demands. It 
is this ability to change that promotes community survival and is set against a rigid style 
of moral integrity such as that which Andy labours under, which can have a negative 
effect on a community crisis. (This has to be considered a provocative re-imagining of 
value from Lawson’s point of view.) Even though the inspector eventually forgets the 
chip—again destroying the expected ratio between action and consequence—Dave’s 
action is not altogether pointless. His action retains experiential value. Importantly, this 
experience contributes to his repertoire of actions for his system of coping. Furthermore, 
this experience feeds back into his own community and therein lies the significance of 
the yarn. When the danger has passed, Dave’s party and the fencers discuss it together 
afterwards. This discussion is not just for pure entertainment. It is the sharing and 
consolidation of experience that arms them for what may lie ahead.
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Chapter 2
“His Brother’s Keeper”: Provisional Securities in the Stories of 
Mitchell, M’Laughlan and “Telling Mrs Baker”
The Australian has not made up his mind about religion, and has 
never felt himself seriously challenged by it. The continent is vast 
and it is easy to escape from the inherited traditions. There are 
wide seas between Australia and the lands where the ancestral 
religious traditions were fashioned.™
The positive insistence throughout Lawson’s work is that the social is the source for 
salvation and redemption. There is no God here, and Lawson makes no attempts to fill 
that space with a monism of a different kind—not even the “bush religion” of mateship, 
for that too is scrutinised by Lawson’s irony. The order of Lawson’s vision is a social 
order where the emphasis is on critical reflection, and therefore subject to change. 
Freedom from an absolute monistic worldview does not bring with it moral anarchy (as 
some critics of pragmatism feared). The great flux of Lawson’s multiverse has ballast in 
social obligations that, importantly, are routinely tested and critiqued. The absence of a 
supreme order of morality avoids what James calls taking “moral holidays”. That is, if 
one cannot defer moral decisions to a higher system, then one must make each ethical 
decision with a fully awTare consciousness. Since the social is the source of all that might 
be called sacred in Lawson’s world, social responsibility thus becomes a key issue in 
Lawson’s stories. The extraordinary amount of (male) guilt that permeates his work 
demonstrates this relentless concern. Like the tribal patterns outlined in Ethics, Lawson’s 
moral framework for these nomadic bushmen develops from a very basic drive— 
survival. Beginning from this seed, Lawson’s characters demonstrate various stages of 
ethical development; some develop only a customary morality and others, such as Peter 
M’Laughlan and Giraffe, move towards a richer, more sophisticated morality. Most, 
however, are caught somewhere in between.
As Dewey and Tufts illustrate, ethics develop out of the practical and local 
concerns of a group. In Lawson’s fiction, two men on the track fare better than one man 
alone. A story like “That There Dog O’ Mine” clearly establishes the interdependence of
68 Bishop Burgmann, cited in Nadel, G. Australia's Colonial Culture: Ideas, Men and Institutions in Mid-Nineteenth 
Century Eastern Australia. F.W. Cheshire: Melbourne. 1957. p. 249.
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living beings. Macquarie and his dog present at a hospital for treatment after being
involved in a fight. “And this here old dog,” Macquarie tells the staff:
has follered me for—ten years; through floods and droughts, 
through fair times and—and hard—mosdy hard; and kep me 
from going mad when I had no mate nor money on the lonely 
track; and watched over me for weeks when I was drunk— 
drugged and poisoned at the cursed shanties; and saved my life 
more’n once. (43)
The dog and his master are physically dependent on one another for survival. This is the 
basic element of their relationship. However, from this basic mutual benefit grows a 
sense of duty towards one another that extends past the immediate survival instinct. 
When the hospital staff refuse to treat the dog, Macquarie is ready to forego treatment 
himself:
No. If you won’t take my dog in you don’t take me. He’s got a 
broken leg and wants fixing up just—just as much as—as I do. If 
I’m good enough to come in, he’s good enough—and—and 
better. (43)
The sacrificial element at work here valorises the relationship, raises it above mutual 
survival strategies and deepens its ethical dimension. The motivating impulse in 
Macquarie’s action is sympathy for his dog. They share a common life, face the same 
floods and droughts and engage in the same battles. Macquarie can therefore sympathise 
with the dog’s pain because they have shared the same experience. Sympathy, as the key 
principle in ethical practice, initially arises out of such mutual understanding, which then 
strengthens the impulse to cooperate. By contrast, the staff have no such automatic 
sympathy for the dog. They do not share the same dutiful obligation born out of 
common experience and are ready to turn him out of their grounds.
In Lawson’s short stories, two men together works as a survival strategy. (Of 
course, two men may actually be a man and his dog since, as Macquarie declares, his dog 
is a better man than he is himself.)69 This strategy develops into an approved custom. If 
either member fails in the contract of care, the whole system collapses for, in this 
environment, a breach of friendship can be life threatening. Given the high stakes, this 
basic bond develops into an important moral principle, a principle grown out of the
69 Ken Stewart argues that the solitary' figures who do survive, for example, Rats and the bush undertaker, 
do so by creating the illusion of this gregarious bond from objects in their surroundings. See Stewart, K. 
‘“The Loaded Dog’: A Celebration”, Australian Literary Studies. 11:1. 1983. pp. 152-61. p. 153.
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local, material world. The intimacy that grows out of this arrangement suggests that the
term “mate” can also refer to its other meaning—life partner. The intensity of the
relationship between two men on a track could be seen as a pragmatic compensation for
the absent female; “feminine” tendernesses are in abundance in the day-to-day gestures
displayed between men on the track. In “On the Edge of the Plain” as Mitchell relates
the particulars of his domestic exile to his mate, there is an insistence on “they” and
“their”, suggesting an inextricable togetherness. They look out into the endless plain,
shouldering each other as much as their own swags. In “The Story of ‘Gentleman-
Once’” " Peter M’Laughlan is the beneficiary of Mitchell’s tenderness:
About four o’clock Mitchell woke and stood up. Peter was lying 
rolled in his blanket with his face turned to the west. The moon 
was low, the shadows had shifted back, and the light was on 
Peter’s face...Then Mitchell quietly got some boughs and stuck 
them in the ground at a little distance from Peter’s head, to shade 
his face from the bright moonlight; and then he turned in again to 
sleep till the sun woke him. (42)
Although Mitchell is a highly sentimental character, the purpose of Lawson’s 
ironic excess here is to address the intensity of the fraternal bond rather than simply 
ironise Mitchell’s sentimentality. This loving tenderness runs against the style of mateship 
that Emille Salliens described in Lawson’s work. In filling the female void, Salliens 
describes the mateship: “as befits a virile society.. . [sjomewhat because of spiritual 
reserve or through fear of becoming sensitive, the bushmen’s mateship doesn’t exist 
without something raw in it; it is reminiscent of barrack fraternity.” 1 Yet there is nothing 
of a raw barrack fraternity in shading a sleeping man’s face from the moon. In the 
absence of women, the men’s behaviour modifies to fill the breach with “feminine” 
sensitivity. Likewise, women such as the drover’s wife and Mrs Spicer don men’s clothing 
and their bodies change, becoming flat-chested, wiry and gaunt, appropriating 
“masculine” roles to replace the absent men. In these absences, the pragmatic reshuffling 
of roles takes place to fill the complement of human behaviours.
70 “The Story o f Gentleman-Once”, The Complete Works ofHeniy Lawson, (ed) Cronin, L. Vol 2 A  Fantasy of 
Man Sydney: Lansdowne, 1984 pp35-42 Future references to this story will be to this edition and given in- 
text.
71 Salliens, E. “The Australian Bush and Its Poet”, (translation Roderick, C.) published in Mercure de France, 
October 1, 1910, reprinted in (ed) Roderick, C He my Lawson Criticism. 1894-1971. Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1972. pp. 147-157. p. 152.
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The relationships in Lawson’s fiction operate under an extremely powerful ethical
charge primarily because there is often little else in the outback environment. Put simply,
the fewer the people, the more pressure on each relationship. Given the intensity of the
obligation, then, it is no surprise that ethics forms a central concern of campfire
discussions and the development of ethical consciousness can be tracked through the
campfire conversations of Mitchell and his mates. A survey of the titles of many of the
Mitchell sketches show the emphasis on ethical theorising: “Mitchell Doesn’t Believe in
the Sack” (1893), “Mitchell on Matrimony” (1897), “Mitchell on Women” (1898), “The
Sex Problem Again” (1898), “Mitchell on the ‘Sex’ and Other ‘Problems’”, (1899).'"
Importantly, Mitchell’s theories revolve around action. When he berates Harry, the
“problemaniac”, for brooding too much over and taking notes on the “sex problem”
(inter-marital relations) he says: “A pocket-book’s to keep your accounts in, not to take
notes in (you take them in your head and use ‘em in your arms).” 1 In a distinctly
jamesian spirit, against the “verbal solution”, Mitchell says:
We might argue that black is white, and white is black, and neither 
of ‘em is anything, and nothing is everything; and a woman’s a 
man and a man’s a woman...we might argue that it’s a force of 
imagination, and that imagination is an unknown force, and that 
the unknown is nothing. But, when we’ve settled all that to our 
own satisfaction, how much further ahead are we? In the end 
we’ll come to the conclusion that we ain’t alive, and never existed, 
and then we’ll leave off bothering, and the world will go on just 
the same...You might argue away in any direction for a million 
miles and a million years back into the past, but you’ve got to 
come back to where you are if you wish to do any good for 
yourself, or anyone else.74
In this pragmatic speech, Mitchell’s emphasis is on the ethic in action. Answers to life are 
to be found in the physical not the abstract world; it is an ethical act to work the 
problems out in the day-to-day world because it is in the world where things happen, 
where “good” for others can be done. ‘Y'ou’ve got to come back to where you are,” he 
says in what could be described as a pragmatic creed. Mitchell has no time for abstract 
philosophising over problems; solutions need to be tested under the stress of local 
conditions, not in the overstressed mind of a “problemaniac” like Harry.
72 These stories appear in A Camp-Fire Yarn.
73 “The Sex Problem Again” A. Camp-Fire Yarn, p.545.
74 “Mitchell on the ‘Sex’ and Other ‘Problems.’” p. 614.
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Peter M’Laughlan is such a character who continually operates in the practical 
world doing good for himself and others. Unlike the inaccessible and mercenary “pianer- 
fmgered parsons” criticised in “The Bush Undertaker”, M’Laughlan shares the same 
world as these travellers and, therefore, cannot only provide practical care but practical 
advice for their personal, social redemption. He does this by continually prompting 
thoughtful reflection. He is known as the “bush missionary” and functions as a Christ 
figure in Lawson’s stories:
He had wavy dark hair, and a close, curly beard. I once heard a 
woman say that he had a beard like you see in some Bible pictures 
of Christ. Peter M’Laughlan seldom smiled; there was something 
in his big dark brown eyes that was scarcely misery, nor yet 
sadness—a sort of haunted sympathy. (“Shall We Gather at the 
River?” 472)
Peter is a very earthbound Christ and, just as Christ kept company with
prostitutes and tax collectors, Peter shepherds the drunkards and philanderers. The devils
he casts out in “The Story of Gentleman-Once”, for example, are the products of Danny
Quinn’s horrors: “Peter went to the old man and soothed him by waving off the snakes
and devils with his hands, and telling them to go.”(39) In this story, Peter M’Laughlan
challenges each of the men to review his own conscience. The party has been largely
formed by M’Laughlan who, on the way through the countryside, comes across Joe
Wilson and Jack Barnes “knocking down their cheques beautifully” (35) in a wayside
shanty. Mitchell then joins them as does Danny Quinn who, in the midst of the horrors,
“didn’t count and was supposed to be dead”:
Peter sat on a log by the fire with Joe and Jack Mitchell on one side 
and Jack Barnes on the other. Jack Mitchell sat on the grass with his 
back to the log, his knees drawn up, and his arms abroad on them: 
his most comfortable position and one which seemed to favour the 
flow of his philosophy. They talked of Bush things or reflected, 
sometimes all three together, sometimes by turns. (35)
The important emphasis in the above passage is on the men’s ability of reflection, the 
germ of moral development. Even their bodies are used for the task as they sit in ways to 
“favour the flow” of thought. While they philosophise, nostalgic songs issue from a 
camp nearby which contributes to their state of reflection. In the first song the lines, “I 
remember, I remember”, are repeated several times, forcing the men to think and this is 
not always a particularly attractive proposition for the thinkers in question: “‘I wish they
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wouldn’t play and sing those old songs,’ [Mitchell] said. ‘They make you think of damned 
old things.’” (37) As James explains, uncomfortable thoughts—thoughts that don’t 
“agree”—require rigorous attention. Presumably, these “damned old things” are 
regrettable past actions and these songs make their consciences ache. In this case, 
uncomfortable memories will promote a rethinking of past behaviour and—if 
M’Laughlan has his way—will result in the men’s resolve to reform.
M’Laughlan proceeds to tell various stories which are really moral tales or 
parables prompting the men to reconsider their own treatment of their wives and 
relations. After the stories, “Jack Barnes got up and walked slowly down the creek in the 
moonlight. He wanted to think.” Likewise, “Joe.. .wanted to think now” and Mitchell 
“wanted to reflect.” (42) Their conversation is full of the terms in which to address the 
ethics of behaviour—bad habits, repentance, fault, guilt and, importantly, the obstacles to 
and tools of redemption:
He drinks from pure selfishness.. .He drinks because he feels 
happy and jolly and clever and good-natured and brave and 
honest while he is drinking. Later on he drinks because he feels 
the reverse of all these things when he is sober. He drinks to 
drown the past and repentance. He doesn’t know that a healthy- 
minded man doesn’t waste time in repenting. He doesn’t know 
how easy it is to reform, and is too weak-willed to try. He gets a 
muddled idea that the past can’t be mended. (40)
fust as James suggests that the “morbid melancholy and apology” (111) that 
springs from deep personal reflection can hamper one’s energy to act in productive ways, 
here the narrator speaks of the ease of reform. The thoughtful energy that promotes self- 
reflection must then be redirected out into the world where reform might be of use.
Guilt, as wasted energy, can prevent redemptive acts. Importantly, in this missionary 
work there is no talk of God or the soul’s salvation; the salvation here is the 
rehabilitation of the social order.
In this sketch, there is significant emphasis placed on the role of others in one’s 
own redemption. This is physically exemplified through M’Laughlan’s nursing of Danny 
Quinn. Likewise, he is subtly coaching them all emotionally towards their own private 
corrections: “I don’t hold that a man’s salvation is always in his own hands; I’ve seen 
mates pull mates out of hell too often to think that.”(41) Here is a clear social duty: 
through interpersonal care, hell can be avoided. Furthermore, the only hell of concern
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here is in the present world. In the pertinently tided “His Brother’s Keeper,” 3 Peter 
M’Laughlan again saves Jack Barnes from the drink. When they say goodbye, Jack, 
breathing hard, says:
“I don’t know what to say, Peter.”
“Say nothing, Jack. Only promise me that you will give Clara the 
cheque as soon as you go home, and let her take care of the cash for a 
while.”
“I will,” said Jack.
Jack looked down at the ground for a while, then he lifted his head 
and looked Peter in the eyes.
“Peter,” he said, “I can’t speak. I’m ashamed to make a promise; I’ve 
broken so many. I’ll try to thank you in a year’s time from now.”
“I ask for no promises,” said Peter, and he held out his hand. Jack 
gripped it. (34)
Heseldne has argued that Peter M’Laughlan, as one of Lawson’s more virtuous
characters, does not share in the mateship bond.76 Yet, while he is not presented in
exclusive tandem with another, like Joe and jack, he is gregarious. He is not alien to the
men’s camps but a welcome member. He is also a union representative and, therefore, an
integral part of the working environment. In the network of itinerants, Peter functions as
one of the men unlike, say, the stranger in the “Union Buries Its Dead” who, being
unknown to the men, is at distinct disadvantage and of small regard:
Peter didn’t preach. He just jogged along and camped with us as if 
he were an ordinary every-day mate. He yarned about all sorts of 
things. He could tell good yarns, and when he was fairly on you 
could listen to him all night. (34)
Like his namesake apostle, Peter is working class. He has shared in the same experiences 
as those to whom he preaches. He has lived their life unlike the remote members of the 
clergy:
I am not preaching as a man who has been taught to preach 
comfortably, but as a man who has learned in the world’s school. I 
know what trouble is. Men...and women too! I have been through 
trouble as deep as any of yours—perhaps deeper. I know how you 
toil and suffer, I know what battle you fight, / know. I too fought a 
battle, perhaps as hard as any you fight. I carry' a load and am fighting 
a battle still. (“Shall we Gather at the River?” 481)
73 “His Brother’s Keeper”. A Fantasy o f  Man. pp. 26-34.
76 Heseltine, H.P. “St Henry: The Apostle o f Mateship”. Quadrant. 1960-61. p. 10.
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For Peter, the “beauty in the bush” is to be found in interrelationship. Once again, 
the gregarious bond is the crutch on which to fall. He implores these relationships be 
constantly mended and his “missionary” work is not in preaching the word of God but in 
mending and tending to these bonds. To achieve this, he is always saving men from the 
bottle and sending them home to their wives. His partiality to “drunken scamps and 
vagabonds, black-sheep and ne’er-do-wells” suggests that Peter’s missionary work is 
largely a product of his own previous waywardness. Again, the emphasis is on experience: 
“He’s got a tremendous sympathy for drunks. He’d do anything to help a drunken man. 
Ain’t it marvellous? It’s my private opinion that Peter must have been an awful boozer 
and scamp in his time.” (37) It is not, then, that he does not share in the mateships by 
being somehow above it. Rather, M’Laughlan has experienced the men’s own 
circumstances and has managed to survive. This is the source of his sympathy. He has 
guilt. Phillips writes about Lawson’s preoccupation with guilt arguing that the guilty have 
an affiliation with the downtrodden. Lawson: “used that figure because the guilty man is 
impelled to a sympathy with the defeated.” 8 In this way, the sinless Christ takes on a 
more fallible, prosaic form. Through Peter’s experience, comes the evolution of 
sympathy. It is not an exclusive sympathy but is ever widening. Lawson’s emphasis on the 
importance of sympathy is clear:
Sympathy’s a grand and glorious thing, taking it all round and looking 
at it any way you will: a litde of it makes a man think that the world’s 
a good world after all, and there’s room and hope for sinners, and 
that life’s worth living; enough of it makes him sure of it: and an 
overdose of sympathy makes a man fe e l weak and ashamed of himself, 
and so moves him to stop whining—and wining—and buck up. ;
“Teiling Mrs Baker”
This analysis has so far shown the parameters of social responsibility; it begins 
with ensuring mutual survival and it extends to accommodate unstipulated weaknesses of 
others. There is a moral parallel here with the contract in “The Iron-Bark Chip”: a rigid 
moral system (of formal contracts, etc) where what is right and wrong is clearly 
distinguishable, is contrasted with a malleable system that can accommodate subversion,
“Gentleman Once”, p. 37.
78 Phillips, A.A. Henry Lawson. New York: Twayne Publishers. 1970. pp. 94-95.
79 “The Boozer’s Home.” A  Camp-Fire Yarn. pp. 616-618. p. 616.
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unexpected behaviour, or failure. Ironically, it is this very flexibility that creates some 
stability for Lawson’s communities, and this becomes clear in “Telling Mrs Baker” .
Bob by no means deserves the efforts Andy and jack go to to protect his 
reputation in his wife’s eyes but, following Peter M’Laughlan’s imperative, merit has 
nothing to do with “pulling mates out o f hell” . The code o f mateship in the bush 
generally seems to work and it is important to maintain this coping system for these 
relationships provide stability. The lie the men tell Mrs Baker fulfils two important 
functions in two different realities: it maintains the coping system and it also maintains 
Mrs Baker’s own idealisations. It stabilises her reality too. This is an important story for 
in it Lawson explores the nature of truth and its relation to ethical action. O f prime 
consideration in this story is truth as a relation. Rather than an uncompromising ethic of 
a capital-T Truth, the conditions of truth are explored as a process, as “what works” in a 
given situation. The process o f the story shows that telling the truth need not be standard 
ethical practice. A hard and fast rule such as this cannot be pragmatic, for unbendable 
rules cannot respond to an unprecedented situation. Since we know that “ reality” is not a 
stable concept, it follows that “ truth” also lacks stability. James argues that ideas are 
truthful if they correspond with a given reality in order to get from one step to the next. 
Therefore, when the men provide Mrs Baker with a version o f events that correspond 
with her ideal o f her husband, they help her in her grieving process, and the next steps 
she has to make. It thus becomes an ethical act on their part. It must be remembered, 
however, that the lie has a double function. When Jack suggests they tell Mrs Baker what 
really happened, Andy remarks:
“You don’t know women, Jack,” said Andy quietly. “And anyway,
even if she is a sensible woman, we’ve got a dead mate to
consider as well as a living woman.” (434)
This is undoubtedly an alarming system of priorities. Andy suggests here that a 
dead, selfish, drunken, blackguard mate is o f more importance than a living woman who 
is “ o f the right stu ff’. However, whilst the dead mate is o f prime consideration here, 
Andy still has in mind the consequences for the woman. (One is more inclined to accept 
this remark as a provocative exposure o f mateship given the strength o f the ironic 
inversion. From the outset o f this story, the narrator extends much unequivocal 
sympathy for the woman for she has suffered at the hands o f a moral coward.) By finally 
committing to the lie they ensure the ongoing workability o f a code o f conduct that
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creates tentative security. Their alternative is to risk security. This situation gives rise to
the extraordinary paradox that if they can’t lie, they can’t be trusted. The task, then, is to
find a solution that will benefit both the dead mate and the living woman. The pull of
allegiances coupled with Bob’s own errant behaviour creates tension for Andy and jack.
The lie in fact becomes an ingenious solution to a hazardous double bind. Andy and
Jack, in coming back to where they are when confronting Mrs Baker, must negotiate various
truths in order to secure a reality that will supply a way to cope. To come to a final
judgment about the men’s decision to lie to the widow, we must look at the situation
pragmatically. We can only assess the ethics of the lie by its effects.
From the outset of “Telling Mrs Baker”, mateship is clearly a complex demand.
Bob, a drover on a wild bender, finally dies in the horrors on the track. He has been an
unfaithful and unworthy husband of Mrs Baker who was “of the right stuff’. He has also
been a rotten mate. However, when Andy lies, Bob’s reputation is saved but not because
he deserves saving. In no uncertain terms, Jack acknowledges Bob’s shortcomings:
He’d been a jolly, open-handed, popular man, which means that 
he’d been a selfish man as far as his wife and children were 
concerned, for they had to suffer for it in the end. Such generosity 
is often born of vanity, or moral cowardice, or both mixed. (429)
Vanity and cowardice are unequivocal moral judgments and yet Bob is protected,
not because he was a good mate but because he was weak. As with Joe’s personal
awareness in “His Brother’s Keeper” that he could easily become a “rotten mate to [his]
mate”, the narrator in this tale is aware of the ambiguities inherent in these relationships:
It’s very nice to hear the chaps sing “for he’s a jolly good fellow”, 
but you’ve mostly got to pay for it twice—first in company, and 
afterwards alone. I once heard the chaps singing that I was a jolly 
good fellow, when I was leaving a place and they were giving me a 
send-off. It thrilled me, and brought a warm gush to my eyes; but, 
all the same, I wished I had half the money I’d lent them, and 
spent on ‘em, and I wished I’d used the time I’d wasted to be a 
jolly good fellow. (429)
These narratorial qualifications which open this story resist common interpretations that 
this tale is an unbridled celebration of the mateship religion as if it is an uncomplicated 
thing. A.A. Phillips writes that it is an “evocation of sentiment” of the mateship code80; 
on the other end of the scale, Katherine Crawford argues that in this story “male loyalty
80 Phillips, p. 107.
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erases and elevates male misbehaviour/misconduct to the status of the heroic”.81 Whilst 
these critics are coming from different sides of a critical divide, I have placed them 
together because they both miss the same point. As the above excerpts show, the 
narrator is highly critical of the man they protect. He is also deeply aware of the 
complicated relationship that is mateship. Both sentimentality and the heroic are 
uncritical states. The narrator’s critical assessment is a crucial qualification to what can 
otherwise seem an apology for male misdemeanors. We must then look deeper into the 
complex operations of this mateship code.
This story undoes the propaganda of the inviolable nature of mateship yet the 
irony resists a stable reading. Lawson does not attempt to entirely dismande the mateship 
system since it is a practical solution to a social, economic and environmental problem. 
Mateship, in the sense of a Jamesian pragmatics, is a truth because it is useful. It provides 
practical security to its members. Its truth is not an inherent condition but its truth is 
borne out, or not, through the day-to-day experience of it. The closest thing to security 
that could be said to exist in this environment is mateship. Jack acknowledges: “We could 
have started on the back track at once, but, drunk or sober, mad or sane, good or bad, it 
isn’t Bush religion to desert a mate in a hole; and the Boss was a mate of ours; so we 
stuck to him.” (431)
By attaching the term “religion”, this code looks to have every characteristic of 
moral principles that function unconditionally: “drunk or sober, mad or sane, good or 
bad”. Such a system would be beneficial to its members by instituting an unconditional 
and therefore stable principle into an unstable environment. However, as Bob’s errant 
behaviour shows, there is no “unconditional”.8' An appeal to absolute rules of behaviour 
is wishing in vain. For example, when looking through Bob’s letters, Andy finds letters 
from other married women: ‘“And one of those men, at least, was an old mate of his!’ 
said Andy; in a tone of disgust.”(435) Adultery, then, is not in itself to be spurned, but you 
don’t do it to your mates. Morality is relational rather than absolute. Bob does contravene 
this “rule” but the men do not forsake him since the ethic of the code is to accept
81 Crawford, K. “Limping Heroes: Masculinity, Anxiety and Paradox in the Works o f Morris W est”. Thesis 
(Ph.D) Department o f English, Faculty o f Arts, University o f Sydney. 2001. p. 211.
82 In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that the vernacular usage o f the phrase, “not in my religion”, popular 
in days past, referred to codes o f conduct and is independent o f any religiousness. This is important in 
unlocking the concept o f the mateship “religion” from its unfortunate holy overtones that has built up 
through nationalist propaganda. “Religion” used in these contexts suggests practical and ordinary daily 
codes o f conduct.
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weakness and carry the weakness of one’s mates as if it is one’s own burden. This type of 
security relies on the idiosyncrasies of each participating member, thus forming a 
contingent security. A codified religion rarely brooks modification but in “Telling Mrs 
Baker” there is a definite critical scrutiny of the code.
The multiplication of realities is a crucial part of this story. In coming to grips 
with this concept of multiple realities, H.S. Thayer offers a tidy summary of Dewey’s 
subjectivist position: “It is not one situation that exhibits differing qualities from 
differing points of view. The differing points of view constitute different situations.”81 
Again, thinking in terms of experiential fields, the very same actions can have very7 
different qualities from situation to situation, thus, the very same qualities that contribute 
to Bob’s bonhomie amongst mates are the qualities (that is, the characteristics) of his 
selfishness in the domestic situation. Likewise, the passages quoted previously where Jack 
criticises the mentality of drinking men, shows a double reality operating. Jack is 
frustrated, if not oppressed, by the prevailing drinking customs, yet when he is the 
recipient of this mateship, a “warm gush” springs to his eyes. This is not the detached 
critique of an ironic eye; jack is also immersed in sentiment.
The multiplication of realities is in part due to what James regards as the 
discursive qualities of reality, and this is suggested in the opening line: “Most Bushmen 
who hadn’t ‘known Bob Baker to speak to’, had ‘heard tell of him’.” (429) jack’s 
reference to the painting of the meeting of Blucher and Wellington at Waterloo attests to 
the part the interpreter of action plays in the representation of experience: “I thought the 
artist had heaped up the dead a bit extra.”(439) The story, told in the first person, is 
consciously a tale being told and the subjective choices inherent within narratives suggest 
that there is no single, knowable Reality. Within the story are at least seven versions of 
Bob’s death: as Jack first relates it to the reader; as Andy outlines the new version of 
Bob’s death to Jack, thankful that he “ain’t supposed to tell a woman all the symptoms”; 
as Ned explains it to Mrs Baker in a letter; as Andy explains it to Bob’s son, Bobby; as 
Andy tells this version to Mrs Baker; as Mrs Baker adds her own information to Andy’s 
and Ned’s versions; and when Andy “comes clean” with Miss Standish, a version which 
is still limited:
“Tell me all,” she said. “It would be better for me to know.”
83 Thayer, H.S. Meaning and Action: A Critical History o f Pragmatism. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. 1981. p. 
391.
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“Come a little farther away from the house,” said Andy...and
Andy told her as much of the truth as he could. (442)
The story focuses on the tension when these differing realities clash and clashes 
require resolution. Bawden writes: “consciousness arises in conflict, but tends constantly 
toward the restoration of the organic equilibrium. It points to something beyond itself, to 
the new coordination, to a more adequate experience.”84 Regaining equilibrium is the 
goal. The disturbances have been set in motion by behaviour that is out of the ordinary 
and such an eruption sparks off a chain of consequences. Mrs Baker is worried that Bob 
is “drinking again” and exhorts Andy to look after him: I want you to promise me that 
you’ll never have a drink with him.” (430) Andy keeps the promise showing that his 
conscience is clearly activated and, importantly, ready to forego the general customs of 
men on the track: “And, no matter how the Boss persuaded, or sneered, or swore at him, 
Andy would never drink with him.” In this abstinence, Andy works with the best 
interests of others in mind, both Mrs Baker and Bob himself. He is taking into account 
the impact of his own actions and responsibilities in the network of selves that make up 
his social group. This must be kept in mind when interpreting the lie the men tell later. 
Importantly, amongst Andy’s valuations is his attitude to Mrs Baker: she was of “the 
right stuff’ and he thought she was “always a damned sight too good for the Boss.” (430) 
Andy’s valuations of Mrs Baker, that she is better than her husband, is important. His 
sympathy for her is strong so it is very unlikely that he will cease to act in her interests.
Jack’s conscience is not only activated through the plot, but it is also highly active 
in the narrative discourse. His vocabulary, especially in the critical passages cited 
previously, suggests the moral mind at work. The crucial thought he has in his ethical 
considerations is the first real turning point of the story as it identifies the clash of 
allegiances and sets out the ethical dilemma: ‘“Why not let her know the truth?’ I asked. 
‘She’s sure to hear of if sooner or later; and if she knew he was only a selfish, drunken 
blackguard she might get over it all the sooner.’”(434) The boss’s errant behaviour has 
caused a disruption in the typical male alliances of the bushmen—if this is indeed a 
“religion” surely Jack, in suggesting such a thing, commits a heresy? Jack’s true sympathy 
for Mrs Baker is clearly strong. Yet, as we have seen of the survival bonds which develop 
into custom, Jack needs the male bond equally as much as his anxious conscience spurns 
his unwanted obligations. Given these moral compromises, Lawson’s mateship ought to
84 Bawden, p. 113.
64
be considered a site o f tension which routinely creates moral ambiguities. For this reason, 
Crawford’s and Phillips’s assessments o f this story are not entirely plausible. If loyalty to 
Bob was a given, there would be no tension. This tension is expressed through the men’s 
anxiety before and during the lie. Anxiety surfaces when habits such as blind loyalties are 
disrupted. As Bawden writes:
We do not have to think when things move smoothly. Only when 
we encounter obstruction do we resort to ideas. Thinking is the 
sign o f the presence o f some emergency which we are trying to
. 8 5meet.
The men’s habits have been disrupted because they do not endorse Bob’s
behaviour. In fact, Bob’s behaviour runs contrary to the overt principles o f mateship.
jack’s initial reaction shows his antipathy to Andy’s suggestion that they lie to protect
Bob, signalling that the habit o f mateship has been disrupted.
“ I’ll have to face her— and you’ll have to come with me.”
“ Damned if I will!” I said. (433)
It is not the lie per se that has them sweating. As Andy remarks, “ I’ll have to He as I never 
Hed to a woman before” . Whilst lying to women is common enough, it is the pecuhar 
conditions o f their present situation that is disturbing their peace o f mind. Their anxiety 
about telHng the He is extreme, suggesting overwrought consciences and hyper-awareness 
of the morahty o f their situation. It results in a crisis of action. As the men approach the 
town in which Mrs Baker Hves, they practice aU the gestures that signal an unwilHngness 
to carry out the task:
Neither o f us was in a hurry to go and face Mrs Baker. “We’U go 
after dinner,” said Andy at first; then after dinner we had a drink, 
and felt sleepy— we weren’t used to big dinners o f roast-beef and 
vegetables and pudding, and, besides, it was drowsy weather— so 
we decided to have a snooze and then go. When we woke up it 
was late in the afternoon, so we thought we’d put it o ff till after 
tea. “ It wouldn’t be manners to walk in while they’re at tea,” said 
Andy— “it would look as if we only came for some grub.” (435)
Here, Andy and Jack procrastinate and invent obstacles for themselves in order to avoid 
their social obHgations. The men are finaUy sent for by Mrs Baker and they reaHse they’H 
“have to face the music now!” But not before they duck into the pub near Mrs Baker’s 
home.
85 Bawden, p. 12
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“Suppose we go and have another drink first, Andy? We might be 
kept in there an hour or two.”
“You don’t want another drink,” said Andy, rather short. ..But it 
was Andy that edged off towards the pub when we got near Mrs 
Baker’s place. “All right!” he said. “Come on! We’ll have this 
other drink, since you want it so bad.”(435-6)
As they approach Mrs Baker’s cottage, Andy repeatedly grabs Jack’s arm: a nervous
gesture which expresses fear or the need for encouragement. They are aware that each
step they take brings them closer to a worrisome moral act. The narrative becomes very
thorough in detailing every move and moment:
They wanted us to have tea, but we said we’d just had it ... There 
was something the matter with one of the children in a back 
room, and the sister went to see to it...Andy and I sat stiff and 
straight, on two chairs against the wall, and held our hats tight, 
and stared at a picture of Wellington meeting Blucher on the 
opposite wall. I thought it was lucky that that picture was there.
The child was calling “mumma”, and Mrs Baker went in to it, and 
her sister came out. (437)
The hyper-awareness in every description suggests that the men are, firstly, stalling for
time and, secondly, feel they are in such a precarious situation that they become
incredibly alert in order to stave off danger:
“Let me take your hats. Make yourselves comfortable.” She took 
the hats and put them on the sewing-machine. I wished she'd let 
us keep them, for now we had nothing to hold on to, and nothing 
to do with our hands; and as for being comfortable, we were just 
about as comfortable as two cats on wet bricks. (437)
This nervousness is typical of Lawson’s bushmen when they are negotiating difficult
terrain. They have passed beyond their own experience and are unsure of their footing.
Whilst the men’s anxiety never abates during the telling, Jack shows that they are acting
in accordance with the reality Mrs Baker has constructed, which means, pragmatically,
they are cooperating with the truth of her idealisation. In doing so, the men in fact
administer a kindness to Mrs Baker. She twice declares that the men’s story gives her
“relief’. Ken Stewart describes the men’s action as protecting Mrs Baker from “the
hardness of things.”86 Andy and Jack give Mrs Baker a way to cope:
I had seen Mrs Baker before, and remembered her as a cheerful, 
contented sort of woman, bustling about the house and getting 
the Boss’s shirts and things ready when we started North. Just the
86 Stewart, p. 155.
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sort of woman that is contented with housework and the children, 
and with nothing particular about her in the way of brains. But 
now she sat by the fire looking like the ghost of herself. I 
wouldn’t have recognised her at first. I never saw such a change 
in a woman, and it came like a shock to me. (436)
Furthermore the kindness extends all along the bush route since:
If I see any chaps that come from the North, I’ll put them up to 
it. I’ll tell M’Grath, the publican at Solong, too: he’s a straight 
man—he’ll keep his ears open and warn chaps. (434)
Witnessing Mrs Baker’s precarious emotional state, we sense that Jack no longer 
considers it prudent to tell her the actual facts of her husband’s final weeks. Where 
previously Jack had thought that “she might get over it all the sooner” and therefore it 
would be kinder to tell her the facts, seeing her thus it becomes unlikely. In fact, it would 
be more likely the final blow, a case verified by her sister’s veracity that they maintain the 
he for her sister’s “sake”. Kindness and sympathy for Mrs Baker are the driving emotions 
of Jack’s resolution to stick to Andy.
Mrs Baker not only believes the story but corroborates it: “I knew he was not 
well.” Her reality has not been shaken. In contrast, Miss Standish grows suspicious. When 
the men let her know through a wink that they are lying, she ceases her investigation. 
Later, she praises the men for their deception: “You are good men! I like the Bushmen! 
They are grand men—they are noble!” Here we have a typical Lawsonian ironic inversion 
of value. Nobility is recognised in deception. Lawson intensifies the inversion by using 
terms like grand and noble rather than stopping at “good”. Where Phillips argues that this 
speech is dangerously bordering on sentimentality, this type of excess carries with it a 
great deal of irony; yet again, however, it is ambiguous just where this irony might finally 
come to rest. The men are implicated in the irony because through deception comes 
nobility. Miss Standish, as a bulletin writer, might also be the target of the irony, as a city 
woman being swept up in the romanticisation of the bushmen, as Christopher Lee has 
argued.8 However, once again the multiple realities are operating: Miss Standish is not 
only a bulletin writer but she is also a sister counselling her sibling through grief. Miss 
Standish says explicidy: “I want to thank you for her sake.” It is for her sister’s “sake”, 
not her defunct brother-in-law’s, that she is thankful. The men’s nobility comes not from 
protecting the mate but protecting her sister, thus counteracting the more sexist
87 Lee, p. 98.
67
connotations of believing the bulletin ideal of masculinity. Again, we must look at Miss 
Standish’s role pragmatically. Miss Standish’s function in the house is to provide 
emotional support for her grieving sister. In order to perform this role, she must assist 
Mrs Baker in developing a way of coping. We must accept that both Miss Standish’s 
knowledge of her sister’s mental state (and mental agility) and her experience of the day- 
to-day reality of Mrs Baker’s grief has led her to accept the men’s discretion. If Mrs Baker 
can hardly cope with an honourable death of a loved husband, in her condition could she 
cope with his dishonourable death reeking of betrayal?
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Chapter 3 
Ritual and Meaning
The Union Buries Its Head
For Lawson, all meaning is derived from the social and “The Llnion Buries Its Dead” and 
“The Bush Undertaker” both explore how meaning might be consolidated through ritual. 
Importandy, meaning is not produced by ritual alone. In different ways through these 
stories, Lawson demonstrates that it is essential to maintain social responsibility, ritual 
and the quality of social care that this implies because that's all there is. These two stories 
are often seen as indicative of Lawson’s pessimistic nihilism because of their relendess 
observation of humanity in states of desolate isolation, poverty and decay. He seems to 
be making the point that the unique Australian conditions threaten a viable country. In 
these stories, there is no reprieve from extreme environmental oppression which 
threatens to destroy all that is meaningful to the communities in question. Furthermore, 
there is no end in sight—the dawm that finally breaks over the drover’s wife’s vigil, 
contains a sickly sun. The bush undertaker buries his mate, wipes his brow and walks 
away. If, in this light, nihilistic readings seem justified, such readings make no use of the 
progressive irony within these stories. Seen through the prism of pragmatism, one can 
see a progressive hope in the pessimism and an ironic edge to the nihilism because 
Lawson is advocating meaning through his investigation into sources of value that might 
exist outside formalised systems of meaning, such as religion or the empire. It should be 
noted that this is not to resituate Lawson as positivistic Nationalist: pragmatism’s irony 
may be positivistic but it is not prescriptive. All that pragmatic irony requires is the 
never-ending extension of self and community that, by definition, must forego anything 
as limiting as a national type.
“The L'nion Buries Its Dead” brings together the three major ethical concepts in 
Lawson’s fiction: (i) the man alone, (ii) the ambiguities within the customary morality of 
mateship, and (iii) reflective thought as the catalyst for meaningful action. Interpretations 
of this story fall into two general camps. Turner has read this story as Lawson’s 
celebration of the conventions of mateship in the observance of the funeral rituals
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despite the difficult and alienating environment.88 It has also been read as a bleak 
portrayal of the human condition given the apparent evacuation of emotional 
involvement in the burial of a fellow man.8J Both perspectives are attempts to determine 
the valuations in operation in the outback community. Neither position, however, deals 
with the narrator’s guilt as the key in determining the value of the dead man and his 
funeral, which will be the focus of this critique. The motif “nothing mattered much” 
indicates that value is a central theme to the story since it is a phrase that suggests the 
evaluation of action. This phrase, taken ironically, undoes both typical readings since the 
guilt suggests that, firsdy, the death is a failure of mateship and, secondly, guilt, as 
evaluation of action, suggests that something must matter. In building the ethical profile 
of Lawson’s fiction, this story is crucial to developing the ideas of guilt and responsibility, 
action and consequence. Furthermore, Lawson examines the narrator’s capacity for self­
reflection, which is the essential starting point for moral development in Lawson’s 
pragmatic scheme. Lawson profiles the deadening weight of guilt, that emotion which is 
ethically counterproductive in so many of his stories.
In Lawson's stories, the lone man is a danger to himself. He needs the mutual 
protection company affords for psychological as well as physical security. In “The Umon 
Buries Its Dead”, the young man working alone is at risk. His death is a direct 
consequence of his isolation from a group and the privileges of the exclusive group he 
comes up against:
While out boating one Sunday afternoon on a billabong across the 
river, we saw a young man on horseback driving some horses 
along the bank. He said it was a fine day, and asked if the water 
was deep there. The joker of our party said it was deep enough to 
drown him, and he laughed and rode farther up. We didn’t take 
much notice of him.
Next day a funeral gathered at a corner pub and asked each other 
in to have a drink while waiting for the hearse. They passed away 
some of the time dancing jigs to a piano in the bar parlour. They 
passed away the rest of the time skylarking and fighting.
The defunct was a young union labourer, about twenty-five, who 
had been drowned the previous day while trying to swim some 
horses across a billabong of the Darling. (55)
88 Turner, G. “Mateship, Individualism and the Production of Character in Australian Fiction.” Australian 
Uterary Studies. 11: 4. October, 1984. pp. 447-457.
89 Phillips, p. 93.
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The stranger is put at a disadvantage when he speaks to a group. Being outside 
the circuit of mateship here, he misses the ironic meaning put forward by the “joker of 
the party” (with no way of knowing the speaker is a joker) and, therefore, takes the man 
at his word. In the reconstruction of ironic meaning: “[i]t takes at least two to play this 
game in which the rules are reflexively established.” " Ironic meaning can only be 
reconstructed when ironist and receiver share a culturally contextualised language, 
‘culture’ meaning, in this case, a particular sub-group of men. As Wayne Booth writes: 
“even the most simple-minded irony, when it succeeds, reveals in both participants a 
kind of meeting with other minds that contradicts a great deal that gets said about who 
we are and whether we can know each other.”J1 The very pleasure of irony exists in the 
intimate arrangement of unspoken but shared assumptions of meaning. The stranger, 
however, is outside the mutually understood speaking practices of the mates. This 
intimate circuit of understanding contributes to a kind of double irony, an ironic knot 
typical of Lawson’s fiction. His ironic circuit is constructive, in that it builds intimacy, yet 
it is limited because those who understand are in and those who don’t are out. “Telling 
Mrs Baker” shows how this intimate alliance of men can bring positive results and these 
are results that can spread beyond the group to the widow. Here, however, the fraternal 
bond that promotes solidarity and safety is also a source of alienation and danger. The 
multifarious nature of mateship leads me to disagree with Graeme Turner’s assessment 
of this story when he writes:
What is being acknowledged and celebrated through the ritual of 
attending the burial is its source—the convention of mateship 
itself. In this story and others, the convention functions in order 
to provide solidarity—community—rather than opportunities for 
self-definition.92
This is to overstate the case and to underestimate the irony, given that the 
exclusive practice of mateship is a causal factor of the death. Here, Turner is mainly 
concerned with the conceptualisation of the individual within the practice of mateship. 
Turner’s argument is that, in Lawson’s fiction, the maintenance of the community is 
always prioritised over the individual self and that the subsequent importance of the 
community overwhelms any individuality that may surface, citing as an example the
90 Booth, W. The Rhetoric o f  Irony Chicago: University o f Chicago Press. 1974. p. 14.
91 Booth, p. 13.
92 Turner, p. 455.
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smoothing over of Bob Baker’s misbehaviour in order to maintain the code. Whilst this 
thesis supports the argument that protecting conventions of mateship is a top priority, 
since loyalty provides one avenue of stability and survival, it is important to clarify a 
point here. Turner’s is a valid argument but only if we view the code or convention as 
stable. Ultimately, the concept that firms in “Telling Mrs Baker” is that the code is not 
stable, principally because it is held together by idiosyncratic personalities. This, however, 
is really a site of meaning, as the analysis of “The Bush Undertaker” wtill show. Brummy 
may not be worth much in either a material or public sense but the shepherd’s dedication 
to and knowledge of Brummy brings honour to the funeral. Likewise, the same shepherd 
can dishonour another burial site through his lack of knowledge of the buried person, the 
skeleton’s lack of “self-definition”. This undervaluing is intensified in “The Union Buries 
Its Dead” because the dead man is “one of them”. Put simply, observing communal 
conventions alone does not a community make. Turner acknowledges: “in this instance, 
of course, it is clear that the rituals do not honour the individual.”' ’ If he were to ask why 
the ritual does not honour the stranger, as indeed it does not, he would need to 
acknowledge that the reason this ritual ultimately lacks integrity is because the 
individuality of the stranger is absent, a fact not unnoticed by the narrator. Furthermore, 
the omission of character is a subject of the narrator’s lament, albeit expressed in the 
negative, as we shall see. Whilst the maintenance of mateships will at times insist on 
personal compromises it does not necessarily follow that the individual must be entirely 
submerged into it as if it is a depersonalised system. We cannot accept Turner’s argument 
entirely, because the suggestion of the implied author through the ironic first-person 
narrative is that it is this very lack of individuation that is broadly dehumanising and 
destructive for the community; it is not its bolster.
Rather than consolidating community through this ritual, the playing out of the 
funeral shows a community approaching dissolution. Each gesture of the tradition is 
observed with great struggle. By the time the hearse arrives, “Two-thirds of the funeral 
were unable to follow. They were too drunk.” (55) Unlike the bush undertaker and the 
drover’s wife, these men baulk at the obstacles that make it difficult to discharge their 
social duties, precisely because they do not know the man. One drover joins the funeral and 
then is encouraged away by another mate in the pub. As the mourners peel away from 
the hearse the funeral is literally dismembered. The funeral passes three inebriates who
93 Turner, p. 455.
force themselves to pay their respects; two manage to cover their ears with their hats. 
The most drunk of the three:
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straightened himself up, stared, and reached helplessly for his hat, 
which he shoved half off and then on again. Then he made a 
great effort to pull himself together—and succeeded. He stood 
up, braced his back against the fence, knocked off his hat, and 
remorsefully placed his foot on it—to keep it off his head till the 
funeral passed. (56)
The action of standing (remorsefully) on his hat suggests the kind of generated 
force working against community maintenance. It is alcohol, heat and, importantly, 
unions in disarray. The animated hat also suggests a devaluing of the human because if a 
simple inanimate object can be thus enlivened, perhaps human life force ceases to be 
remarkable. The jumpy hat implies the great force of the drunk’s indifference to the 
deceased. The narrator can, therefore, bleakly declare: “The procession numbered 
fifteen, fourteen souls following the broken shell of a soul. Perhaps not one of the 
fourteen possessed a soul any more than the corpse did—but that doesn’t matter.”(55) 
The “broken shell” is a glimmer of a more poetically intense ideal of what matters and 
betrays the evasive narrator’s real thought. He gives us a glimpse that something of value 
is fracturing and may not be repaired. The value of the individual is under threat by that 
individual’s alienation from the communal whole; this is turn depreciates the value of the 
community because almost all of them engage in unethical behaviour. We can apply 
Dewey and Tufts’ theory on the mutual engagement of self and society here: the self is 
empowered through social recognition and society is improved by the qualities of its 
individual members. This is the main point of difference between this argument and 
Turner’s who seems to resist such notions of individualism and this conceptualisation of 
the self. Correctly, he writes that Lawson’s: “mode of characterisation.. .sees character as 
overwhelmingly the product of social and ethical determinants.”;4 We have seen this to 
be so. However, he attributes this to: “a basic suspicion of difference and of 
individuality.” Pragmatically considered, for community life to be successful and 
regenerative, individuality and difference are vital for ongoing development.
Furthermore, the negotiation of individuality and difference within the complex of any 
society—its ethics and conventions—is essential and does not represent a submersion of 
character. Lawson makes this clear in “Telling Mrs Baker” when the men resist their
1)4 Turner, p. 455.
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disapproval of Bob’s anti-social behaviour in order to shore up their ethic; it is also clear 
in “The Union Buries Its Dead,” because in the lack of value shown to the corpse, the 
community itself becomes dehumanised.
The narrator, whilst ostensibly maintaining his “nothing mattered much” attitude, 
is clearly perturbed by those who fall away and by the lack of engagement of the 
community. The circumscription of his community’s sympathy is alarming. A sentence 
like “[t]hey were too drunk” is clearly a behavioural judgment. It says they were drunker 
than they should have been on an important occasion such as this. In suggesting such, he 
undermines his counterclaim that “nothing matters”. Clearly the funeral matters if he 
sees men not behaving as they should.
It is the lack of “self-definition” of the corpse that is largely to blame. There is an 
overwhelming emphasis on the lack of relationships within the community. The defunct 
was “almost a stranger in town.” (55) Several boarders at the pub who attend in a 
borrowed trap, “were strangers to us who were on foot, and we to them.” Note that the 
comment “and we to them” is a curious redundancy; it reinforces the estrangement even 
within the union. It becomes clear in this story that their solidarity is nominal. The 
drover who momentarily joins the procession was “a stranger to the entire show.” (56) 
Following the argument that things in relation create value, it follows that if there is no 
relation, there is no value. The narrator is then correct in saying, at the primary narrative 
level (that is, its literal level):
The fall of lumps of clay on a stranger’s coffin doesn’t sound any 
different from the fall of the same things on an ordinary wooden 
box—at least I didn’t notice anything awesome or unusual in the 
sound; but, perhaps, one of us—the most sensitive—might have 
been impressed by being reminded of a burial of long ago, when 
the thump of every sod jolted his heart. (58)
This example makes it very clear that emotional involvement requires a personal 
connection of some kind. Value is a function of a relationship. It is imported into objects 
or people rather than inherently available. Even the hypothetical sensitivity of one of the 
funeral (who we are tempted to believe is the narrator himself) is sensitive only insofar as 
he is reminded of one in his past. So, contrary to Turner’s argument, a degree of self­
definition is required for the convention of mateship to be fully realised and meaningful. 
The meaning of the funeral is bought through specific knowledge of the individual. Any 
sensitive reaction to falling lumps of clay comes about through personal knowledge of
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the deceased. The self is recognisable only within a social context where it becomes in
some way effective. Its value cannot be ascertained outside of the social:
We did hear, later on, what his real name was; but if we ever 
chance to read it in the “Missing Friends Column”, we shall not 
be able to give any information to heart-broken Mother or Sister 
or Wife, nor to anyone who could let him hear something to his 
advantage—for we have already forgotten the name. (59)
In the end, the stranger’s value is determined by that aspect of his social status that can
be verified—his union credentials:
“So his name’s James Tyson,” said my drover acquaintance, 
looking at the plate.
“Why! Didn’t you know that before?” I asked.
“No; but I knew he was a union man.”
It turned out, afterwards, that J.T. wasn’t his real name—only 
“the name he went by”. (59)
Importantly, the mourners at the funeral are present not because he was a fellow
human, but because he belonged to a certain subgroup, the union. As indicated in the
title, he is specifically one of “its dead”. Phillips has written that this story’s “real
purpose” is to “declare the loneliness of the human condition and the deadliness of
human indifference,”95 but this claim is too sweeping. Specifically, the loneliness
suggested through the depersonalised funeral is a direct result of being outside groups
rather than alienation being man’s natural condition. As we have seen the primordial
condition of the human is, in fact, to be gregarious. The very real deadly indifference
addressed through corrective irony here is the indifference of a group which prizes
solidarity above all things, nowhere more directly put than in the following passage:
The secretary had very little information to give. The departed 
was a “Roman”, and the majority of the town were otherwise— 
but unionism is stronger than creed. Drink, however, is stronger 
than unionism; and when the hearse presently arrived, more than 
two-thirds of the funeral were unable to follow. They were too 
drunk. (55)
Contrary to Turner’s argument that suggests solidarity is working here, in this 
story Lawson identifies the actual stratification that existed within the working classes, 
and its deadly consequences. It is not simply an indictment of human indifference. 
Ironically, there is disunion in the union. In Studies in Classic Australian Fiction, Michael
95 Phillips, “Henry Lawson Revisited” Aleanjin. 14. 1965. pp. 5-17. p. 11.
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Wilding documents the divisions in the union bodies and how these divisions surfaced in
Lawson’s work.96 Wilding identifies the difference between those on horseback and those
on foot in the funeral procession as essentially class differences. He goes on to say that in
“The Union Buries Its Dead” Lawson represents:
the class divisions within the working classes; at the same time the 
solidarity of the labourers is stressed in their attending the funeral 
of the unknown man. So we have Lawson’s characteristic bitter­
sweet plangency, that celebration of the impulse towards 
solidarity, and the notations of the forces opposed to it. ;
We can see that Lawson makes no absolute assumptions of solidarity. The human 
fallibility that Lawson was so conscious of, and sympathetic to, is the genesis of such 
uncertainty. This uncertainty reflects the “bitter-sweet” omnidirectional pull of his irony. 
Solidarities like mateship approach their ideal but can harvest no absolute results. This is 
the tension in Lawson’s work. Yes, the members of this union contribute to the death 
and, yes, their exclusive bond has fatal results, but collective force is still seen as 
fundamental to ongoing survival. What the narrator’s hyperactive consciousness is 
driving at, or perhaps resisting, is the point that a group who have power should generate 
sympathy with those outside the group. Whilst the deceased was supposedly a part of the 
group, clearly this union has within it smaller cliques. The point of Lawson’s irony is that 
for any of the values of a group to be maintained, the group must continually renew its 
relations through the extension of sympathy. This can only be achieved by ongoing self­
reflection, a task that the narrator shies away from. Without the expansion of ethics such 
as those brought about by sympathy and self-reflection, the use or purpose of certain 
behaviours—such as funerals—become so habitual, meaning erodes.
The animosity or rivalry between workers is further present and ironised during 
the commentary throughout the burial:
A tall sentimental drover.. .asked with pathetic humour whether 
we thought the dead man’s ticket would be recognised “over 
yonder”. It was a G.L.U. ticket and the general opinion was that it 
would be recognised. (56)
When this story was published in 1893, the Shearers and General Labourers unions had 
not yet amalgamated; the tongue-in-cheek question whether the man’s General Labourers
96 Wilding, M. Studies in Classic Australian Fiction. Sydney: Sydney Association for Studies in Society and 
Culture. 1997. pp. 54-55.
97 Wilding, p. 56.
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Union ticket would be recognised questions the status of the respective unions. 
Furthermore, through the drover, Lawson makes the point more generally on the petty 
restrictions individuals face by identifying with one group or position exclusively since the 
man, by this stage, is well and truly dead. The “general opinion was that it would be 
recognised”, formalises the group’s response. When Lawson renders such a response in 
an indirect and formal tone, he establishes an ironic discursive space where what is 
articulated by the narrator is significantly different in tone (not content) to that of the 
speaker’s. Whilst Lawson still manages to maintain his “objective-reportage” edifice he is 
actually busy creating rifts between realities. This rift is important in this story because it 
is a tale of evasion. Notating speech indirectly is one way of creating a linguistic 
smokescreen and offers a chance for the narrator not only to dominate the material being 
reported but also to reinterpret it defensively. That is, it doesn’t matter what they do 
because “nothing mattered much”.
Ironic discursive spaces are continually produced in this story, which create the 
possibility of taking the narrator’s comments that “nothing mattered much” ironically. 
This is particularly important because such “linguistic smokescreens” allow for the 
narrator to evade responsibility. This smokescreen is operating from the first three 
paragraphs where the young man drowns, cited above. The first paragraph utilises the 
personal pronoun “we” and is delivered in the active voice: “we saw”, “he said” and “he 
laughed”. The waterway is referred to as “the river”, displaying familiarity with the place. 
Familiarity, the active voice and the personal pronoun generate a sense of immediacy and 
a thoughtful subjectivity. The narrator is present in the situation. We then see in the second 
paragraph a noticeable shift in perspective as the narrator distances himself from the 
drowning. The agents of this paragraph are masked behind the term “a funeral”; the 
sentence is strangely awkward, signalling a struggle to be untangled from the situation: “a 
funeral gathered at a corner pub and asked each other in to have a drink.” (55) The 
pronoun has changed from “we” to “they”. In the third paragraph, the narrator has 
become even more remote as it becomes obvious just whom they are burying. There are 
no pronouns; the paragraph is registered in the tone of objective narrative and is written 
in the passive voice: “The defunct.. .who had been drowned”. “Sunday” becomes “the 
previous day” indicating a loosening of chronological proof and, importantly, the familiar 
term “river” is removed and in its place, its proper, formal name, “the Darling”. In 
formalising the site thus, the narrator becomes more aloof and erects a psychological
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distance between “their” river and the place of the man’s death, the Darling, as if they 
were not one and the same.
These discursive distances suggest multiple meanings and it is with this in mind
that the phrase “nothing mattered much” should be taken. At the first level, the literal
level, we can take the narrator’s assessment that nothing mattered as an adequate and
bleak portrayal of the life lived in these harsh satellite communities. Even considered in
its driest pragmatic sense where we can determine “what matters” by its consequence, we
may be inclined to believe the narrator. Since the stranger’s identity cannot be confirmed
for a mourning sister, wife or mother no more may come of it. However, Lawson levels
harsh ironic blows to the shearers drunk in the public bars:
One or two pubs closed respectfully until we got past. They 
closed their bar doors and the patrons went in and out through 
some side or back entrance for a few minutes Bushmen seldom 
grumble at an inconvenience of this sort, when it is caused by a 
funeral. They have too much respect for the dead. (56)
The corrective irony active in this excerpt complicates the “nothing mattered
much” refrain. It is a damning portrayal of the bushmen’s “respect”. Lawson uses small
textual modifiers to bring out the lack of respect unequivocally. Note how Lawson uses
terms of amounts to build the ironic picture: one or two pubs (not all of them) closed for a
few  minutes (only) but the bushmen seldom grumble (but have been known to). To
heighten the contrast, the stranger’s death is described as an “inconvenience”. Lawson
completes the ironic manoeuvre by introducing the opposite amount: too much respect.
The clergyman and publican also are painted with the same brush. The publican shades
the priest from the sun, despite the fact the priest is already standing in the shade. The
publican: “couldn’t, as an ignorant and conceited ass, lose such a good opportunity7 of
asserting his faithfulness and importance to his Church.” (58) Clearly, if these men are
being criticised for their poor behaviour, something must matter. This evidence must be
taken into consideration when determining whether or not “nothing mattered” comes
from Lawson the Nihilist, as Heseltine suggests, or a self-evasive, defensive, guilty
narrator. Heseltine sees this story as a “depiction of that state of spiritual nullity”9* and:
[a] recognition of that state of spiritual paralysis which its author 
could project so tellingly upon his characters because (we must 
believe) he knew it so well himself. Every significant element in
9* Heseltine, H.P. “Between Living and Dying: The Ground o f Lawson’s A rt”. Overland. 88. July, 1982. pp. 
19-26. p. 20.
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the story testifies to this view—action, setting, comedy, social 
observation, most of all, perhaps, its rejection of the sentimental 
comfort of literary convention.. .Richer and more fully 
dramatised than “A Day on a Selection,” “The Union Buries Its 
Dead” yet takes up exacdy the same theme... These two stories 
portray with a thoroughness never surpassed in Lawson’s canon 
his sense that it is man’s lot to be held somewhere between living 
and dying."
“Spiritual nullity”, “paralysis” and “man’s lot”: these terms are too final and
defined for a pragmatic ironist such as Lawson. If, indeed, the funeral did not matter why
is it then rendered in such detail? A stronger argument for the repeated use of the phrase
is that it suggests the evasive activity7 of the narrator’s mind. It is the rhetoric of
defensiveness. When the narrator declares that “nothing mattered much” we perceive the
self-betraying irony of guilt deferral. The narrator is evasive rather than ignorant to “what
matters”. He is also absolutely aware of what is absent. If this lacklustre funeral actually
didn’t matter, why is his consciousness raised to such a hyperactive level? The narrator’s
hyperawareness suggests that this moment is full of importance, it matters incredibly.
The over-examination of the physical environment by guilty agents, is used here, as it is
used in “Telling Mrs Baker”, to indicate extreme ethical turmoil:
I noticed that one or two heathens winced slighdy when the holy 
water was sprinkled on the coffin. The drops quickly evaporated, 
and the little round black spots they left were soon dusted over; 
but the spots showed by contrast, the cheapness and shabbiness 
of the cloth with which the coffin was covered. It seemed black 
before; now it looked a dusky grey. (57)
G.A.Wilkes comments: “[the narrator’s] attitude is stoical, without illusion, and yet—in
the account of the fumbling attempts of the drunken shearers to show respect to the
corpse—there is a hint that his sensibilities are not so much blunted as held in check.”1""
His sensibilities are indeed held in check, but not through stoicism. His self-control is
meant to stay his guilty mind. Compare the extent of observation here with the narrator’s
blasé recollections of the dead man himself:
‘I didn't take any particular notice of him,’ I said. ‘He said 
something, didn’t he?’
99 Heseltine, p. 21.
100 Wilkes, G.A. “Henry Lawson Reconsidered.” Southerly. 25:4. 1965. pp. 264-275. p. 267.
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‘Yes; said it was a fine day. You’d have taken more notice if you’d 
known that he was doomed to die in the hour, and that those 
were the last words he would say to any man in this world.’(57)
But they weren’t his last words. During the last conversation this man has, he
asks about the depth of the river and in misinterpreting the ironic answer he is given,
fatally moves to its deeper parts. The narrator knows this somewhere in his
consciousness since this exchange is related to us in the first paragraph in the first
person. At the funeral, however, he conveniently seems to forget. The absence of the
man’s actual words, which would lead to the direct assignation of guilt, hangs heavy over
the entire funeral. There is nothing null and void about absence. It is a negative presence.
The narrator cannot afford to reflect fully on the circumstances of the man’s death, for
to do so, would be to accept blame. The death is a result of the men’s negligence. To
admit negligence would require a renewal of community ethos by critically reflecting on
the exclusive practices of mates-in-groups. Many of the men avoid any kind of critical
reflection on the man’s death and their responsibility to the corpse (as a fellow unionist)
by getting intoxicated. This is an active removal of a thoughtful mind. For the narrator
attending the funeral, the thoughtful energy is not so easily overcome. Rather than spend
his energy on self-reflection, however, it is almost as if that thought-energy is directed
onto other things thus emphasising the absence of responsibility. To illustrate this
absence, this tale is full, as it were, of things not there:
I have left out the wattle—because it wasn’t there. I have also 
neglected to mention the heart-broken old mate, with his grizzled 
head bowed and great pearly drops streaming down his rugged 
cheeks. He was absent...! have omitted reference to the 
suspicious moisture in the eyes of a bearded bush ruffian named 
Bill. Bill failed to turn up...I have left out the ‘sad Australian 
sunset’ because the sun was not going down at the time. (58-59)
I agree with the general critical interpretation that this assessment of the funeral 
scene is typical of Lawson’s rejection of overwrought literary artifice. However, as a 
suggestion of what is not there the wattle and absent friends are nevertheless introduced. 
They then become a negative presence and, as such, are able to evoke, albeit from a 
greater distance, the conventional symbols of literary mourning. Lawson thus conjures 
the maudlin and, as a balance to the other extreme of the mourners’ emptiness, produces 
that ironic poise that refuses to be ultimately definitive.
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Out of the two mutually exclusive positions of “nothing matters” or “something 
matters” both are plausible yet neither seem quite adequate. A claim such as that put by 
Heseltine that this story registers a “spiritual nullity” is, oddly, to miss the delicate poise 
that he himself intuits when he writes that Lawson saw man as perched between living 
and dying. The lack of human engagement at the funeral seems to be a state of spiritual 
nullity; however, we cannot ignore the overwhelming counterweight of the narrator’s 
deflected conscience. The spiritual is there by its very obvious literal absence. The 
narrator defensively defers his conscience and, in doing so, signifies his refusal to take 
part in the morality7 of the situation whereas spiritual nullity surely implies an amoral 
rather than an immoral state.
As Adrian Mitchell writes, “the fact that we recognise the irony says equally that 
there is another order, another scale of values.”101 This brings us closer to the third level 
of meaning in this phrase “nothing mattered much”: the level of the implied author. The 
values we recognise are also those which we share with Lawson, thus undoing the 
suggestion we could take this phrase to only represent a nihilistic streak in the work. It is 
there, certainly; the position is clearly plausible. But there are also forces in opposition to 
this nihilism, a state of mind which, in this story, is a defensive action to the situation; the 
force opposed to the statement is the insistence of the narrator’s conscience. Whilst 
Lawson’s work does operate through negation, that does not mean, as it may imply, a 
constant movement towards nothing. Irony, in this study on Lawson, where it is used 
philosophically, contributes to the construction of an ideal that, not yet realised, cannot 
be uttered. Putting off a positive declaration also puts off making an error of judgment. 
Whilst there are often degenerative elements in Lawson’s work, Lawson’s irony is often 
an urge towards the expansion of an ideal; a becoming rather than a constant denial or 
the degradation of that wThich is valuable. Sympathy is typically the action from which 
expansion grows and it is an irony in this story that here, in a culture built on solidarity 
and mutual support, sympathy does not prevail. We can see in this story that Lawson is 
building up a pragmatic sense of morality. His ethic is critical of exclusive groups that 
occupy closed positions and Lawson demands a sympathetic expansion of the codes of 
mateship and solidarity. It is a progressive and pragmatic ethic because of this awareness 
of the moral limitations of a non-reflective, customary morality.
101 Mitchell, A. Short Stories o f  Henry Lawson. Horizon Studies in Literature. Melbourne: Sydney University 
Press in association with Oxford University Press. 1995. p. 33.
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And Not a Soul to Meet: Making Meaning In Empty Places
All days are much the same to her; but on Sunday afternoon she 
dresses herself, tidies the children, smartens up baby, and goes for 
a lonely walk along the bush-track, pushing an old perambulator 
in front o f her. She does this every Sunday. She takes as much 
care to make herself and the children look smart as she would if 
she were going to do the block in the city. There is nothing to see, 
however, and not a soul to meet. (89-90)
This passage from “The Drover’s Wife” is representative o f the dominant urge to
practice ritual by the most destitute o f Lawson’s characters. Brian Matthews has written
that these men and women “are fighting to remain in the human race, to remain
members o f a stream of existence which, for all its faults, ennobles them, while failure to
remain members brutalises and decivilises them.” 1"- Matthews’s emphasis here is on how
Lawson investigates the value of human life. He writes:
The story implies that human attributes may well be the enabling 
and enduring consolation in a ruthless and spiritually debilitating 
environment.. .the great emphasis on humanity in “The Drover’s 
Wife” stands as a tempering influence upon such apparent 
nihilism: life remains hard, cruel, potentially tragic, but human 
worth rescues it from being a bad joke.10’
The Sunday walk to nowhere looks pointless since there is nothing to walk to and no-one 
to meet. The irony, however, is that this seemingly pointless exercise is anti-nihilistic. In 
this instance, the custom that the drover’s wife practises would have originally sprung 
from the attendance o f a church service, which, as a communal event, is as much about 
the social as it is about religious ritual. Even though neither the religious nor the social 
components are available to the woman, the walk confirms her place in the social realm, 
despite the absence o f the social. Whilst the pragmatic system copes with available means 
it does not automatically follow that the available means limit the ends. That is, when we 
decide what we want we must enter a process o f idealisation. Our choices are not only 
about what is available but what we actually want. So whilst there is nowhere to walk to 
in the Sunday best, the action gives meaning to the woman’s existence because she brings 
an ideal to fruition which frames her daily experience. It is important to keep these
102 Matthews, B. The Receding Wave. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 1972. p. 24.
103 Matthews, p. 15.
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standards of practice in place since the arbitrary dangers of her harsh existence constantly 
threaten a spiralling away from known orders.
Lawson’s investigation into the construction of social orders makes up the core 
of this study because he is always asking where value might be found and how meaning 
can be made in contingent and unstable realities. The uncanny laughter of the rabbits and 
possums and row upon row of meaningless fences in “Hungerford”, for example, shows 
that order and meaning are being contested. Yet, despite the eerie derangement in these 
isolated environments, the absence of an immediately recognisable order does not 
necessarily mean order is entirely absent. Lawson’s characters do manage to conjure an 
order of a kind and it is a social order.
“The Bush Undertaker” demonstrates how a single, alienated human adapts 
pragmatically to isolation. In this story, a dog, a skeleton and a corpse make up the 
shepherd’s social deficit. This pragmatist style secures the ethic which is represented 
through the rituals of the shepherd’s distant community. Here, rituals are maintained and 
are made manifest through any available mechanism. In this story, two rituals are 
observed—Christmas and a Christian burial—and whilst these rituals follow a 
recognisable form they have mutated. Rituals are shared social practices that confirm the 
identity of a group yet, as this story makes clear, the confirmation is temporary only. 
There is no certainty of identity and mutations occur to the rituals themselves, through 
hybridised language, the practices of social supplementation and the physical 
environment. Identities constantly shift in “The Bush Undertaker” which, pragmatically 
considered, suggests a degree of latitude in reidealisations. Here there is no sense of 
immanent value but values-in-relation and a constant reinscribing of functions, roles and 
identities. Things need to be mutable because they may be required to serve different 
functions. Mutability of identity does not necessarily denigrate value but allows it to be 
resituated as determined by practical experience. Indeed, we see in this story the elasticity 
of both identity and environment in the shepherd’s world, which is devoid of social 
ballast. That is, there is no other living human agent who might balance or hold the 
shepherd’s behaviour in check. There is potentially no limit to the morphing. For 
example, whilst performing the rituals of the undertaker, there is no reason the shepherd 
could not give the role of the pastor to a nearby tree (if there was one). There are two 
pragmatic arrangements operating here: (i) the shepherd’s rituals warp in order to fit into 
the new experience and (ii) the shepherd’s idealisations of culture adjust the environment
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to the ritual. Both of these positions revolve around the shepherd, the agent of change 
and establish the “environment” as a subjective field. Yet, not all meaning is entirely 
open for renegotiation; the shepherd’s values, which are still based on the customary 
morality of his originating culture, are not completely set adrift or deranged. In fact, the 
shepherd’s “conservative fly wheel” of cultural habit is well and truly operating (for 
better and worse). On the one hand it provides meaning for Brummy’s funeral in an 
otherwise destitute scene yet, on the other, it resists the meaning and the valuation of the 
“other”—the shepherd cannot comprehend the Aboriginal skeleton’s dignity as he does 
the dignity of his friend’s remains.
The shepherd inhabits a somewhat empty environment, described in the opening 
paragraph:
He stood just within the door of a slab-and-bark hut situated 
upon the bank of a barren creek; sheep-yards lay to the right, and 
a low line of bare brown ridges formed a suitable background to 
the scene. (115)
The barren creek, sheep-yards which, at the time of narration, are empty, and the bare 
ridges, form a picture of deficiency. A vacant environment is a stage for a contest of 
order. Thematically, the physical barrenness is a “suitable” backdrop, the objective 
correlative to the shepherd’s lack of human contact. For the shepherd in his sparse 
surroundings, what does remain must modify to supply all that is needed. In a pragmatist 
context, the constant identity slippage in this story can be read as allowing for such re­
idealisations. Typical communal orders have been loosened and reordering has 
commenced. Importandy, the shepherd needs company. The environment is more than a 
psychological symbol of lack; it is the weighty agent of loneliness. It must be read as a 
participant in the drama effecting the shepherd, the subjective mind of the experiential 
field.
The term “experiential field” conjures the sense of the “immense and operative 
world of diverse and interacting elements”1’4 of one’s surroundings. Dewey privileges the 
term “experience” over “environment” or “world” to suggest what these terms omit, 
“namely, an actual focusing of the world at one point in a focus of immediate shining 
apparency.”113 Importandy: “How an environment is determined, i.e. interpreted, given
1(14 Dewey, J. Essays in ExperimentalLogic New York: Dover Publications. 1916. pp. 6-7.
105 Dewey, p. 7.
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meaning, is relative to the sensibility of organisms engaged in activities in that 
environment. The organism ‘selects’ and picks out what constitutes the ‘environment’.”"’6
In this story, Lawson shows how the shepherd exerts influence over his 
environment in order to make it work with his idealisations. It is Christmas Day so, as a 
character with gregarious instinct, the shepherd must people the scene for the 
celebration. As James explains, the self is recognisable in the social realm; it is in this 
realm that it is both acknowledged and empowered. It is then furthered in ritual, the 
idealising social act which confirms the place of the self in the social realm. Social rituals 
build up notions of self because they establish mutual understanding between people of 
the same group thus providing a reflection and acknowledgment of self. Rituals allocate 
value to the individual through their participation in the social and the group is accorded 
value through the participation of the individual. In the interests of self-preservation, the 
shepherd, in order to perpetuate a sense of his own value, must participate in social acts. 
Since he is alone, he must create some supplementary social material which will 
reciprocate his gestures of ritual.
The shepherd’s supplementary social material is found in the figures of Five Bob 
and Brummy. In their roles as social agents, they become the only reflection of the 
shepherd’s own humanity and, as such, gain in value in relation to the shepherd. It is an 
unsettling irony then that both names represent very low values, suggesting a destabilised 
human economy. The value/identity relation is at the fore in this story, given narrative 
priority in the opening line. “Five Bob!” In short, the dog, the shepherd’s only living 
mate, is named in relation to what the man has paid for him. Initially worth five bob, the 
dog’s value, not being immanent but relative to experience, has expanded. Likewise, the 
shepherd’s deceased mate, Brummy, is also known by his ostensible worth. Adrian 
Mitchell points out that “‘Brummy,’ a contraction of Birmingham—by reputation the 
producer of cheap and shoddy goods—is a nickname for a counterfeit coin.”"’
Importantly, a counterfeit coin, if it is passed off, still functions as a coin despite its 
lack of “actual” or registered value. In “The Bush Undertaker” if Brummy’s value equals 
that of a counterfeit coin, he is worth less in the metaphorical financial terms than the 
shepherd’s dog; the dog is alive, at least. However, when the shepherd buries the man, he 
says “theere oughter be somethin’ sed.. .tain’t right to put ’im under like a dog.” (122)
106 Thayer, critiquing Herbert Mead, p. 265.
107 Mitchell, p.18.
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Clearly, then, the man retains a different kind of value. From this we can say that there 
are different modes of value operating, modes which are subjectively managed. As a 
counterfeit coin has value when it functions, so, too, Brummy has value to the shepherd 
even when defunct.
In accordance to custom recognisable to us, the shepherd is arranging to have a 
holiday in the afternoon to celebrate Christmas. That the behaviour is recognisable is 
important in that it establishes the connection the shepherd is maintaining with 
civilisation just as the drover’s wife’s Sunday stroll establishes her place. The shepherd’s 
behaviour that pursues social ideals undermines the “hatter” tag. Whilst his social 
resources are not typical, he follows a typical form. He has skimmed his rations for weeks 
in preparation for the day so that he and his “four-legged mate” might have extra for 
their Christmas meal and he sets about the preparations of the meal with care and skill: “I 
likes to keep it jist on the sizzle,” he said in explanation to himself; “hard bilin’ makes it 
tough—I’ll keep it jist a-simmerin’.”(l 15) Whilst there is an immediate irony constructed 
with our expectations of the feasts of a Christmas holiday and what the shepherd is 
actually cooking, the reader can easily appreciate the urge that is operating.
The shepherd fulfils the criteria of celebration by sharing the meal: “Dinner 
proceeded very quietly, except when the carver paused to ask the dog how some tasty 
morsel went with him, and Five Bob’s tail declared that it went very well indeed.” (116) 
This reciprocity of gesture is, like ritual, a mutual acknowledgment of presence.1"8 It 
confirms that a mutually understood language is operating: “This speech was 
accompanied by a gesture evidently intelligible, for the dog retired as though he 
understood English.” (115) This agreed meaning suggests commonality of experience 
and, in this context, the dog has been humanised through the process. Five Bob is 
humanised because the shepherd needs him to be “human”. Talking to one’s dogs is not 
necessarily a sign of madness but there are signs here that suggest the discursive 
relationship goes beyond that of dog and master. It is during an early conversation with 
the dog that the narrator refers to the shepherd as “the hatter” (heretofore he had been 
known as “the old man” and “the master”). Christopher Lee writes that this discourse 
with the dog is an early example of the “weird” in this story given “the lack of modifying 
irony on [the shepherd’s] part” when talking to the dog:
108 Thayer, pp242-258
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There is an accepted discourse between humans and animals but 
it is a discourse which signals the recognitions of its own illusion 
through the device of irony. The deployment of irony allows at 
once the illusion that the inarticulate is nevertheless cognizant, 
while at the same time it distances itself from a position which it 
knows to be illusory, weird, perhaps even ‘mad’. .. The absence of 
irony in the hatter’s discourse indicates a person who has lost the 
ability to make this distinction and undermines his rational 
credibility.109
The shepherd’s rational credibility has indeed been questioned but, as with Rats who can 
talk rationally of bush matters between bouts with his swag, we cannot dismiss his order 
out of hand. Lawson’s use of the words “weird” and “eccentric” are well meant because 
whilst the shepherd’s behaviour is outside the “normal” range of behaviours, it is not 
quite insane, since it does follow an order. The intent with which the shepherd acts 
suggests that he has control of his mental faculties. The shepherd conducts his duties on 
the property in a highly organised and pragmatic way. To achieve this, he must be 
mentally present and engaged directly with his environment. In the opening of the story, 
he, as “master”, is issuing instructions to Five Bob, and the dog obeys his commands. He 
is aware of the time and date. He cooks. He cleans. For a table he uses the lid of a gin 
case. To preserve his resources, he washes the dishes in the cooking water. He holds 
down a job and he knows how to put one over on his boss. He knows his way around 
the bush, which to many would be unreadable. He can shoot straight, even when he’s 
had the better part of a bottle of rum. And, importantly, he remains extraordinarily aware 
of his social duties and the obligations of friendship. When he comes across Brummy, he 
constructs a stretcher out of bark and secures it by using strips of cloth from his shirt 
which he will later reattach as he cannot spare the shirt. So, whilst he talks to his dog as if 
he is human, he is simply applying the gregarious form to an animate organism with 
which he can relate in some way. He and his dog share the same life through which 
solidarity surfaces through commonality, represented here in the collective terms “we” 
and “our”: “We’ll yard ‘em early and have the afternoon to ourselves.. .We’ll get dinner.” 
(115)
109 Lee, C. “What Colour are the Dead? Madness, Race and the National Gaze in Henry Lawson’s ‘The 
Bush Undertaker’” Kunapipi. 13.3, 1992. pp. 14-25 p. 16.
87
The shepherd relates to Brummy’s corpse in the same way. Again, without any 
modifying irony on the shepherd’s part, the corpse is frequendy addressed as if  he is 
cognisant:
“Brummy! by gosh!— busted up at last!”
“I tole yer so, Brummy,” he said impressively, addressing the 
corpse, “I allers told yer as how it ‘ud be—an’ here y’are, you 
thundering jumpt-up cuss-o’-God fool. Yer cud earn mor’n any 
man in the colony, but yer’d lush it all away. I allers sed as how it 
‘ud end, an’ now yer kin see fur y ’self..
“I spect yer was a-comin’ t’me t’get fixt up an’ set straight agin; 
then yer was agoin’ to swear off, same as yer allers did; an’ here 
y ’are, an’now I expect I’ll have t’fix yer up for the last time an’ 
make yer decent, for ‘twon’t do t’ leave yer a’lyin’ out here like a 
dead sheep.”(117)
Once Brummy’s identity7 has been established, the shepherd relaxes into an easy address. 
He is under no illusions as to Brummy’s state. That is, whilst he talks as if Brummy were 
listening he remains perfectly aware that Brummy is dead. His “I told you so” speech is 
directed at Brummy’s mortality7 itself. In the shepherd’s eyes, the state of death hasn’t 
changed much given the extent and intensity of his own idealisations. Just as in 
“Hungerford” where a rabbit-proof fence has rabbits on both sides of it, typical borders 
do not guarantee identity7 or status. Here, in the same way, the borders between life and 
death are not assured:
There’s scarcely an old bushman alive— or dead, for the matter of 
that—who hasn’t been dead a few times in his life— or reported 
dead, which amounts to the same thing for a while. In my time 
there was as many live men in the bush who was supposed to be 
dead as there was dead men who was supposed to be alive— 
though it’s the other way about now. (“Brummy Usen” 272)
It seems as if the mortal status of the entire population is under question. As with 
Brummy Usen’s frequent deaths, this is a land where people don’t necessarily stay dead 
and if they are well and truly dead they may still communicate. The shepherd is startled 
by the “awful scrutiny” from the rotting sockets of Brummy’s eyes. Crucial in the above 
excerpt is the statement that a ‘reported’ death “amounts to the same thing” as an actual 
death. The question and quality of existence is subjective. Heseltine has described this as 
a life-in-death state.11" Here Heseltine is referring to the living as if  Lawson’s characters 
were suspended in a purgatorial field in which they may as well be dead. Mrs Spicer
11(1 Heseltine, p.20
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provides a good example: “Mrs Spicer looked very litde different from what she did 
when I last saw her alive. It was some time before we could believe that she was dead. 
But she was ‘past carin’ right enough.” (352) We might reorient this phrase and say that 
where there is this death in life, there is conversely a lot of life in Lawson’s dead 
characters:
On reaching the hut the old man dumped the corpse against the 
wall, wrong end up...but he had not placed Brummy at the 
correct angle, and, consequendy, that individual fell forward and 
struck him a violent blow on the shoulder with the iron toes of 
his Blucher boots. (119)
In fact, that ‘jumpt-up’ Brummy is a “delinquent” practical joker. As Brummy slips and
slides around, the shepherd has cause to reprimand him:
I don’t want to pick a row with yer...but if you starts playin’ any 
of yer jumpt-up pranktical jokes on me, and a-scarin’ of me after 
a-humpin’ of yer ‘ome, by the ‘oly frost I’ll kick yer to jim-rags, so 
I wdl.” (120)
In a Freudian analysis of this story, O’Neill writes, “the uncanny leads to an 
animistic conception of the world.”111 This animatism112 suggests the shepherd has 
developed the habit of finding even a redection of his own consciousness in any other 
body. In such a charged experiential field, it is little wonder that the goanna is multiplied 
in the shepherd’s mind as a flock. To make up the deficiency in the shepherd’s social 
poverty, many things begin to “talk”. Just as the dog’s tail “declared” the dinner went 
well, so too Brummy’s clothing “proclaimed” his European identity. The land itself is 
personified, becoming a “nurse and tutor” and, in such intimate roles, becomes another 
substitute for human company, compensating for the lack of company it itself has 
imposed.
In relation to this story, O’Neill asks the question: “How does the settler in a 
strange new land minimise the strangeness, appropriate the new land, and make himself
111 O’Neill, P. “Aborigines and Women in Lawson’s ‘The Bush Undertaker’.” Australian and New Zealand 
Studies in Canada. 8. 1992. pp. 59-70 p. 61.
112 I prefer to use the word “animatism” here, rather than “animism” since the former term suggests the 
“attribution o f consciousness to inanimate objects”, rather than “the belief that all natural objects and the 
universe itself possesses a soul.” (The Macquare Dictionary: Second Edition. 1991. p. 66.) The shepherd may not 
have a belief structure that conceives o f the world arumistically, but he certainly attributes consciousness to 
inanimate things— a side-effect o f his social isolation rather than his philosophic conceptions o f the
universe.
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feel at home?”11 ’ I would argue that it is achieved in two major ways here: firsdy, by 
projecting the human onto the non-human or deceased; and, secondly, through the 
deployment of ritual. Transporting ritual is one sure way to familiarise the environment, 
which is, of course, subjective and open to reinterpretation. Yet whilst both O’Neill and 
Lee argue that the practice of ritual suggests a drive to assert Imperial, masculinist or 
nationalist power over the land, the results are not quite so stable.
Brummy’s burial completes the spectrum of the shepherd’s repertoire of ritual. If 
Christmas is a symbol of the birth of the Christian heritage, Brummy’s interment 
expresses its final rites/rights. Both O’Neill and Lee have argued that this burial and its 
relation to the exhumation of the Aboriginal remains points towards the assertion of a 
colonising power in a new land. Whilst this is an important perspective in relation to the 
skeleton (more about which will be said later) both critics overlook the fact that the ritual 
itself has been warped. In varying ways, both writers argue that within the burial process, 
difference is vanquished and with it, the rejection of “new, local subjectivities”114. O’Neill 
writes that the burial of Brummy, as a blackened “mummy”, suggests a fear of 
miscegenation by a colonising male power, while Lee argues that it is a subjugation of the 
“weird” from both the Imperialist and nationalist gazes. There are two major points that 
arise in both analyses that need reconsidering. Firsdy, the act of burial establishes an 
intense valuing of the buried subject—“‘Arter all,’ he murmured sadly, ‘arter all— it were 
Brummy.’” (122) And, secondly, the form the ritual takes is a hybridised form of the 
ritual from the originating culture: “Once or twice he muttered the words, ‘I am the 
rassaraction.’” (122) I would suggest that the shepherd is himself an example of the new, 
local subjectivity and the originating European culture is itself in process of modification. 
O’Neill warns that approaching the shepherd as the new subjectivity is too “positivistic” 
and leans towards a reading of the “celebration of the nationalist Lawson”. Indeed, the 
common interpretation of Lawson and his nationalist “types” does have a problematic 
result, given the “failure of the possibility of either a unitary stable Imperial or national 
self.”115 However, the problem with this point and why I diverge from O’Neill’s 
argument is that the “stable se lf ’ is not the automatic result in locating the shepherd as a 
new subjectivity. The overriding point of Lawson’s fiction, particularly expressed in this
113 O’Neill, p. 60.
114 O’Neill, p. 66.
115 O’Neill, p. 67.
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tale, is that certainty or stability of self is only ever momentarily assured and always 
subject to review since the self is always in dynamic relation to that which surrounds it.
O’Neill writes that the ashes-to-ashes prayer said over Brummy’s grave, is “not 
just conventionally solemn” but comes from the 16th century Book o f Common Prayer.
Thus, he writes, it “confirmjs] a univocal identity for English speakers.. .because such 
shared language provides a sense of community.”116 It is very difficult to see how the 
shepherd’s actual speech could confirm univocal identity with other English speakers of 
the Imperium given his speech is not exactly the Queen’s English. It has hybridised and, 
furthermore, Lawson imbues it with a strong comic element: “Hashes ter hashes, dus ter 
dus, Brummy, — an’ —an’ in hopes of great an’ gerlorious rassaraction!” (122) Whilst 
shared language does provide a sense of community7 we must keep in mind with whom 
the shepherd now shares a language (his dog). Furthermore, Brummy is hardly joining 
the ranks of those who have received this final rite so that they receive the eternal life 
promised by the Christian faith. Given the habits of Lawson’s dead, Brummy’s 
“gerlorious rassaraction” may instead mean his “jumpt-up” corpse may pop out of the 
grave at any moment. O’Neill concludes that “[t]he ritual demands of Christian 
civilization and Empire are met once the unsetding, condensed figure of Brummy has 
been safely buried.”11 But who is to say he’ll stay dead?
Rather than abstract the funeral ritual into the realm of theory as other critics 
have done, it is worth looking at the ritual in the context of the shepherd’s experiential 
field. What does this ritual mean to the shepherd? Why, during such hot days, would he 
bother if, as he himself declares “nothin’ didn’t ever matter”? For the shepherd, engaging 
in this ritual positions him within an historical tradition. Whilst it has undergone radical 
change (from, for example, the 16th Century Book o f Prayer) it takes place along a 
continuum:
Moreover, behaviour directed to certain interests of ends-in-view 
as goals are conditioned in fairly elaborate ways by past 
experience, failures and successes, and socially approved modes 
of action. Thus an anticipated future and patterns of past 
experience impinge upon occurring situations to give the present 
a historical character and temporal depth in which past and future 
events relate to those presently happening. In short, situations are 
complicated not only as temporal processes of events, ie as a 
process is of greater complexity than any one of its parts or
116 O ’Neill, p. 66.
117 O ’Neill, p. 67.
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stages, but also because of the element of human behaviour in 
which past and future (possible) events serve to influence present 
conduct."K
As mad as the shepherd seems to be, there is a strong ethic running through his 
treatment of Brummy and it is embedded in his language of “ought”, what is “right” and 
what “twon’t do”: “Theer oughter be somethin’ sed,” muttered the old man, “tain’t right 
to put £im under like a dog. There oughter to be some sort ‘o sarmin.” Since “ought” 
cannot be derived from fact but is culturally defined, we can see that whilst the language 
and funeral service has been hybridised, the shepherd is still continuing to operate out of 
a particular tradition, albeit a tradition which is undergoing local modification. It signifies 
that despite the modifications, even under the pressure of extreme poverty, the social, 
manifesting through the personal, still is the arbiter of value. The value comes not from 
an institutionalised authority since “none o’ them theer pianer-fingered parsons is a-goin’ 
ter take the trouble ter travel out inter this God-forgotten part to hold sarvice over him, 
seein’ as how his last cheque’s blued.” (121) The value comes from a particular act by a 
particular participant through whom the ethics of a society appear."" The shepherd 
declares he’ll “do jestice to it, and see that Brummy has a good comfortable buryin’—and 
more’s unpossible.” (121)
It is important to point out that there is a clear distinction between religious piety 
and the ethic which guides the shepherd’s actions. It is less about observing a religious 
ritual than it is about a social one. The “pianer-fingered parsons” are mercenary and, 
thus, the “mad” shepherd, in doing justice to Brummy’s remains, operates on a higher 
ethical order.
Undermining his refrain that “nothing never did matter”, the shepherd practices 
his valuations despite his poverty. The value of a ritual is located in the expression of an 
ideal. As an ideal it can be enacted in circumstances or environments that may appear to 
be resistant or inappropriate. It secures, just for a time, some tentative identity. An act is 
powerful because it is an idealising agency.1'" The value of the act of retrieving the body 
and burying it can be ascertained by the energy expended to complete the task. In an 
extreme environment such as this, where one must cover large distances in the boiling
118 Thayer, p. 391.
119 In its Chnstian context, burying the dead is considered as “one o f the works o f mercy” along with 
teaching, feeding the hungry, visiting the sick, etc. The shepherd may be “mad” but Lawson is suggesting 
that this is certainly nothing compared to the mercilessness o f the mercenary parsons.
12(1 Emerson, p. 29.
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heat, any act undertaken will be considered in the light of whether it is worth doing. The
minute details of each action recorded here bring the reader’s awareness to the effort
required by the shepherd to complete his task:
Looking round, his eyes lit up with satisfaction as he saw some 
wastes bits of bark...He picked up two pieces, one about four 
and the other six feet long, and each about two feet wide, and 
brought them over to the body. He laid the longest strip by the 
side of the corpse, which he proceeded to lift on to it...Then he 
placed the other strip on top, with the hollow side downwards— 
thus sandwiching the defunct between the two pieces—removed 
the saddle strap, which he wore for a belt, and buckled it round 
one end, while he tried to think of something with which to tie up
the other__He up-ended Brummy, and placing his shoulder
against the middle of the lower sheet of bark, lifted the corpse to 
a horizontal position; then taking the bag of bones in this hand, 
started for home. (118)
The pragmatic indelicacy of the burial itself is just as complete in description. The 
ungraceful machinations ironically bring attention to the real social grace behind the 
action:
“It’s time yer turned in, Brum,” he said, lifting the body down.
He carried it to the grave and dropped it into one corner like a 
post. He arranged the bark so as to cover the face, and, by means 
of a piece of clothes-line, lowered the body to a horizontal 
position. Then he threw in an armful of gum leaves, and then, 
very reluctantly, took the shovel and dropped in a few shovelfuls 
of earth. (121)
So that the funeral can be carried out in its entirety, the shepherd, as pragmatist, 
takes the roles of the undertaker, the gravedigger, the parson and the pallbearer. Yet, for 
this ritual to be truly social there must be a witness and once again the dog meets the 
social deficit that makes up the parish. Furthermore, it seems Five Bob clearly 
understands the implications of the burial: “The dog rose, with ears erect, and looked 
anxiously first at his master, and then into the grave.” This understanding is necessary 
for the ritual to be a complete recognition of the human. The dog becomes aware—and 
anxious about—the shepherd’s mortality. The shepherd is also forced into recognition of
“Brummy,” he said at last, “It’s all over now; nothin’ matters 
now—nothin’ didn’t ever matter, nor—nor don’t. You uster say 
as how it ‘ud be all right termorrer” (pause); “termorrers’s come, 
Brummy—come fur you—it ain’t come fur me yet, but—it’s a- 
comin’.”
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He threw in some more earth.
“Yer don’t remember, Brummy, an’ mebbe yer don’t want to 
remember— /  don’t want to remember— but— well, but, yer see 
that’s where yer got the pull on me.” (122)
This reflection denotes a true engagement with the scene. It is a moment o f self-
consciousness. It is an unwanted thought because it is confronting, but it is unavoidable
since truly ethical action is that which is thought through.
Adrian Mitchell writes: “What the story represents at the end is the struggle to
retrieve some aspect o f that common humanity; or, to find a place for the ordinary
decencies that ought to define our relation to each other.” 1“1 However, it must be
remembered that the shepherd has earlier desecrated an Aboriginal grave. His concept of
an “ ordinary decency” is an effect o f his customary morality. Within his own customary
morality, he knows what he “ ought” to do and what his duties are to those who fall
within this morality. His observation o f social ritual confirms his place in a specific
context. Richard Rorty argues that solidarity is contingent upon local similarities rather
than the status as “ human being” , therefore, solidarity is grounded in “ a historically
contingent final vocabulary.” 1-" His sympathies thus circumscribed, the shepherd is
unable to register the human value o f the Aboriginal remains while he registers the value
of the white man’s corpse. The irony operating in this story prompts the investigation
into boundaries o f sympathy within customary morality. It is impossible to ignore the
irony of the unthinking exhumation o f one body juxtaposed with the serious
contemplation that follows the interment o f another.
The first telling challenge to an expected order o f human value occurs during the
shepherd’s simultaneous ruminations on the potatoes and the exhumation; ruminations
accorded equal narrative status. The shepherd, having issued his commands to his dog
and begun their Christmas dinner, says:
“ I’ll take a pick an’ shovel with me an’ root up that old 
blackfellow,” mused the shepherd, evidendy following up a recent 
train of thought; “ I reckon it’ll do now. I’ll put in the spuds.”
The last sentence referred to the cooking; the first to a supposed 
blackfellow’s grave about which he was curious. (115)
121 Mitchell, p. 17.
122 Rorty, R. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989. pp. 191-192. 
Rorty’s “ final vocabulary” refers to the specific discourses (cultural, religious, metaphysical etc) through 
which the world is m interpreted.
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As Lee explains, the zeugmatic phrase, “I reckon it’ll do now” unexpectedly 
levels the exhumation and the meal as the referent “it” could possibly relate to either 
object.12’ The contrast is unsettling and the reader is confronted by an entirely 
destabilised system of value. We must note, however, that in such poverty, the potato is 
in fact a revered object. It is equally correct to say that the potatoes have been promoted 
as it is to say the bones have been demoted. The unascertainability of these valuations is 
proof that all value systems are locally realised. In this question between the two objects, 
we are deep into the investigation of the shepherd’s own values.
Lee writes that this inability to understand the shepherd’s motivations is faced by 
the narrator, who “copes with the subversive implications of this transgression by failing 
to show any signs of curiosity or concern over the elusive motivation for the hatter’s 
actions.” He writes: “The narrative gaze reduces its scope to the purely visual in an effort 
to demarcate a territory which is small enough to police.”1-4 Whilst I dispute the 
reduction of the narrative voice that Lee claims, the point he makes regarding the general 
demarcations of territory is a helpful way to articulate the scope of customary morality. 
What is effective in the narrative voice is precisely the descriptions of action without any 
overt interpretation of the shepherd’s motivations. In this way, the irony of the situation 
is allowed to speak for itself. The limitation of the shepherd’s ethic is made clear. In fact, 
the irony of the narrative voice outlines the territory the shepherd has marked out for 
himself, one which is small enough for him to police. To cope in such an expanse of 
uncharted territory, the shepherd sets his moral boundaries in order to relate back to his 
originating culture. This proscribed ethic prevents him from seeing the irony of this 
action (as Lee explains, the shepherd lacks self-modifying irony). His disgust at the 
goanna, which makes a Christmas meal of Brummy is ironic in the same way, since the 
shepherd’s behaviour towards the Aboriginal bones is motivated by self-interest also. 
Whilst the shepherd does treat the bones with care, he does not have any human 
sympathy towards them. The exhumation undermines the dignity of the later burial 
ceremony and suggests that the ethic operating in the shepherd’s sendee is limited. The 
shepherd can’t relate to the identity of the skeleton. It is significant that he cannot tell the 
race or sex of the bones. In Dewey’s work, “values originate, are located, and persist or 
pass away among the relations of human beings to one another and to environing
123 Lee, p. 16.
124 Lee, p. 17.
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conditions.” 125 These are the relations of sympathy and have been explored in “The 
Union Buries Its Dead” where Lawson extends his treatment of the irony o f the 
limitations o f customary morality. (By looking at these stories from this perspective, it 
becomes clear that these relations are not only defined along racial lines but lines o f sub­
cultural custom also, as already seen in “The Iron-Bark Chip” .) Unlike the burial of 
Brummy, the shepherd’s relation to the skeleton does not prompt reflective thought.
And yet like the business with Brummy, the shepherd does go to some effort to retrieve 
the bones. The question is why does he do this? What is to be gained if the bones do not 
have Brummy’s value?
The relationship between the Christmas meal and bones established in the 
language o f the shepherd puts the exhumation in context o f the Christmas holiday. As a 
site about which he had been “ curious” , the grave is a novelty. The exhumation becomes 
his chosen leisure activity. This is its value to the shepherd who has evidently spent some 
time considering his Christmas activities. When he says, “ I ain’t spending sech a dull 
Christmas after all,” (118) it indicates that he has given forethought to the day and has 
experienced some reservations about its predicted dullness. The fact that he has given it 
previous thought as the day approached also suggests the importance to him of 
observing the ritual. The shepherd lays out the bones and “ amused himself’. When he 
finds a second set o f remains, he is joyous: “Me luck’s in this Christmas, an’ no mistake!” 
(117) Not only does he fmd a second body, but a bottle o f rum in the dead man’s hands. 
Despite its macabre nature, the shepherd is experiencing the bounty o f Christmas. In 
interpreting his experiential field this way, the “ treasure trove o f death” 12'1 is re-idealised 
as the gifts o f the season and thus completes the rituals o f the Christmas tradition, weird 
though they seem.
125 Thayer, p. 390.
126 Mitchell, p. 14.
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Chapter 4
Social form and empowerment in 
“Joe Wilson’s Courtship” and “A Double Buggy at Lahey’s Creek”
The extended length of the Joe Wilson sequence allows Lawson to further investigate 
several of his continuing concerns: the functioning and the ongoing development of the 
individual within the social realm; the development of just relations with the “other”; and 
anxiety and the relationship between action and consequence. In the two Joe Wilson 
stories under discussion here, Lawson’s development of a pragmatist ethic is seen in two 
significant ways: (i) the pragmatic conception of self through socialising agencies: and (ii) 
the imaginative expansion of ideas through engagement with the other. Also of 
importance here is the concern with justice and responsibility within the ethics of family 
as they are practised (or neglected) within the bush paradigm. When Lawson tackles this 
idea of justice in other stories, notably “Send Round the Hat” and “The Union Buries Its 
Dead”, the lines of difference which dictate sympathetic understanding of the other are 
challenged and these sympathies are limited by tilings like class, race or geography. In the 
Joe Wilson series, Lawson looks at the boundaries staked out by gender when the 
“other” is not the stranger but the spouse. Joe is daunted by the ethics of family and as 
such develops a fatalistic approach to this particular social group. Joe is often crippled by 
his self-absorption, the impact of which is felt by his wife and child. These are the 
primary “others” with whom he needs to relate but the weight of his anxieties, born of 
an overactive and sensitive mind, largely prevent him from doing so. His insecurities 
about his own masculinity, as it is socially constructed, together with his general 
resistance to Mary’s efforts to understand him, create successive and alienating failures to 
communicate and act effectively. To a frustrating degree, we are privy to Joe’s endless 
and mostly fruitless ruminating via the first-person technique, a narrative style which also 
brings to mind the natural boundaries of any one perspective and the limitations when 
such a self-absorbed personality cannot accommodate the perspective of the other.
These limitations of self-consciousness are expressed through action and inaction and it 
is when Joe’s own social desires force his self-consciousness to abate that he experiences 
successful action. Importantly Joe’s triumphs occur when his male instincts achieve social 
form as suitor, husband or father, for it is only through the social that the individual is 
empowered. The various social frames depicted in the series function as empowering 
forms of self-idealisation and as vivid, if not romantic, social visions of the other. It is in
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these moments when Joe best achieves his place in the social realm and is relieved, if only 
temporarily, from his self-imposed position as misunderstood outsider. The pragmatic 
conception of self, that is, the self as a social entity is thoroughly investigated in this 
series. Joe’s successes in self-realisation through the social realm are constantly set against 
another conception of self, what Turner confesses as a “bourgeouis individualism”1"7; 
that romantic concept of self that somehow exists beyond the social (to which Joe is 
particularly susceptible).
The first-person narrative functions on two time scales: the retrospective voice of
an older Joe and the voice of Joe as he is conscious in the past action. This in itself
multiplies points of view and highlights the contingent, changing nature of the self. This
structure allows for a personal assessment of his past behaviour as he struggles to come
to terms with his failures and ethical shortcomings. The older voiced narrative also
attempts to function as an apology, documenting the conditions of failure, which are
both external to Joe (economic and environmental) and internal, being what he considers
the natural weaknesses of his personal constitution:
I wasn’t a healthy-minded, average boy: I reckon I was bom for a 
poet by mistake, and grew up to be a Bushman, and didn’t know 
what was the matter with me—or the world—but that’s got 
nothing to do with it. (272)
Through the first-person narrative, Lawson emphasises Joe’s brooding, 
hyperactive consciousness and obsessive sensitivity, yet this can only win him a limited 
sympathy because he often misses opportunities to remedy his situation. Barnes argues: 
“[a]s he tells of the past, his own emotions are his central concern—one expects a self- 
discovery and change, and he knows he is selfish in it, yet he does not change.”1"8 In 
contrast, Wilkes has suggested that it is Lawson’s intention to win sympathy through this 
technique. He writes: “Joe’s readiness to admit his faults and blame himself becomes 
almost his way of recommending himself to us, like his constant references to his 
sensitive temperament,”:
Although Joe Wilson’s melancholy is meant to be inherent, 
something is lost from the presentation of “man in his 
comparative weakness versus the bush in its formidable strength”
[quoting Cecil Mann] if the man is given the appearance of a 
professional defeatist, determined to be unhappy whatever the 
circumstances. The stories seem to be asking for an attitude of
127 Turner, p. 448.
128 Barnes, J. Henry Lawson’s Short Stones. Melbourne: Shillington House. 1985. pp. 34-35.
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sympathy and indulgence to Joe Wilson that he himself has 
scarcely earned.” 1-;
Obviously it is Joe’s aim as narrator to appeal to the reader’s sympathy but it is 
the ironic structure o f the entire series that disallows our indulgences. It is clear that 
whilst Joe is overly self-conscious he is far from self-aware. Therefore, corrective irony 
appears through the rift between narrator and implied author. This is important for 
Lawson’s continual issue of moral development: Joe knows he has to correct his 
behaviour though he rarely does. This theme emphasises the need for critical reflection 
that must be followed by action, as James insists, if the thought is to have any value at all. 
Joe’s indulgent guilt does not earn him respect. He does earn it, however, when he acts, 
particularly when he purchases the double-buggy for Mary and finally fulfils his promise 
to her.
Once again, the social is required to achieve temporary stability in this dilemma.
The intimate portrayal o f the sensitive mind as it grapples with the external world
illustrates the workings o f social frames and their role in stabilising the changing self in a
multiverse. In “Joe Wilson’s Courtship” these frames distil social images o f both Mary
and Joe that allow them, Joe in particular, to overcome the barriers of his oversensitive
mind. They act to externalise his person, thus neutralising his overwhelming
internalisation and the idea that there was “ something the matter” with him.
As Joe admits, he was “always shy with women” . This results in inaction. “Jack
had been my successful rival, only he didn’t know it— I don’t think his wife knew it
either.” (275) Joe’s fruitless sensitivity ends in paranoia. He indulges in scornful
interrogations of women’s motivations:
I haven’t time to explain why, but somehow, whenever a girl took 
any notice of me I took it for granted that she was only playing 
with me, and felt nasty about it. I made one or two mistakes, 
but— ah well! (275)
Similarly, when Joe meets Mary he “ reckoned that it was only just going to be a hopeless, 
heart-breaking, stand-far-off-and-worship affair, as far as I was concerned— like my first 
love affair.. .1 was tired o f being pitied by good girls. You see, I didn’t know women 
then.” (281)
129 Wilkes, pp. 274-275.
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The first-person narrative functions as a frame through which we are continually
privy to the distortions of foe’s thoughts and the rift between his perceptions and of
those around him. These glimpses into Joe’s paranoid perceptions show how the internal
processes dictate external processes and perpetuate his own failings. He is out of touch
with his surroundings and this manifests in an inability to interpret both the spoken and
unspoken languages in operation. When Joe is helping Mary hang out her washing, he
offers to hang out the last of the things in Mary’s basket but she refuses:
“Oh, those things are not ready yet,” she said, “they’re not 
rinsed,” and she grabbed the basket and held it away from me.
The things looked the same to me as the rest on the line; they 
looked rinsed enough and blued too. I reckoned that she didn't 
want me to take the trouble, or thought that I mightn't like to be 
seen hanging out clothes, and was only doing it out of kindness.
(283)
It is clear to the reader that the last few items must be her underwear and for modesty’s 
sake she refuses his help. Her embarrassment compounds with his to produce an utterly 
awkward social interaction. Joe is ill-equipped to participate successfully in a dynamic 
reality where points of view merge to produce a complex reality. Joe’s shortcomings in 
understanding this complex reality show itself in his dependence on the face value 
meaning of Maty’s words. Joe later realises his mistake but, importantly, the reason for 
her refusal is left implied: “[I] saw Mary hanging out the rest of the things—she thought 
that we were out of sight. Then I understood why those things weren’t ready while we 
were round.” (283) The reason is not positively identified and yet the reader understands 
precisely even before Joe himself does. This demonstrates the processes of implied 
knowledge and the complexity of social arrangements, joe has much to learn before he 
can be fully effective in the social scheme and, in turn, be empowered by it. His 
inexperience shows he is unversed in many languages and shows an inability to read the 
other. When dealing with Maty7 he often: “blunderjs] round.. .feeling like a man feels 
when he’s just made an ass of himself in public.” (279) For joe, the social is a source of 
anxiety; his dysfunctional relation to society—the realm of doing and the realm of the 
empowered self—causes his ineffective action, social blunders and the like. He begins to 
avoid action altogether.
jack, on the other hand, is socially well-versed: “[he] knows all those dodges” and 
proceeds to create Joe’s strategy himself, jack works hard to present joe to Mary in the 
best light. He says: “Make a looking-glass of that window, Joe,”:
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That window reflected the laundry window: the room was dark 
inside and there was a good clear reflection; and presendy I saw 
Mary come to the laundry window and stand with her hands 
behind her back, thoughtfully watching me. The laundry window 
had an old-fashioned hinged sash, and I like that sort of 
window—there’s more romance about it, I think. There was thick 
dark-green ivy all round the window, and Mary looked prettier 
than a picture. I squared up my shoulders and put my heels 
together and put as much style as I could into the work. I couldn’t 
have turned round to save my life. (277)
In holding up the window, both Joe and Mary are framed for each other, a double 
representation of self. By squaring his shoulders he attempts to present himself as made 
from the stuff of a strong man. Similarly, Mary looks a model wife. Importantly, it is 
through ritualised social representations of self (in this case, a romantic stereotype) that 
encourages intimacy between people. Joe is made attractive by taking on a recognisable 
type, in this case, a strong, hard-working suitor. This doubling is entrenched in the 
narrative with the switching not only between the old and young voice of Joe, but also 
Joe’s thinking self and Joe’s social self. The negotiation between these selves is a natural 
one, although it is typically badly handled by Joe and deteriorates throughout the 
sequence. In order to have any success at all with Mary during the courtship he must 
manage this negotiation properly. It is important to note, too, that through Joe’s 
complicated relationship with typical versions of masculinity: “[LawsonJ interrogates the 
social construction of gender.”1" The pressure Joe Wilson experiences in attempting to 
conform to the masculinist type (promoted by a nationalist agenda) also suggests that 
these types—as social forms—must also be subject to change. Here, when Joe does 
conform to a type of gendered behaviour it is a roleplay that facilitates effective action 
rather than an endorsement that the type itself is the singular way to be.
Lawson plays with the romantic stereotypes of courtship; here, machismo 
masculinity is emphasised in Jack’s presentation of Joe to Mary:
“Did you tell her I was in jail?” I growled.
“No, by Gum! I forgot that. But never mind. I’ll fix that up all 
right. I’ll tell her that you got two years’ hard for horse-stealing.
That ought to make her interested in you, if she isn’t 
already.. .Oh, I told her that you were a holy terror amongst the 
girls,” said Jack. (281)
130 Stewart, The 1890s. p. 19.
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Mary, too, is specifically “framed”. Joe’s memory of his first sighting of Mary and 
subsequent seminal moments in their courting has all the hallmarks of a great romance. 
Again the ivy frames the view:
There was a wide, old-fashioned, brick-floored verandah in front, 
with an open end; there was ivy climbing up the verandah post on 
one side and a baby-rose on the other, and a grape-vine near the 
chimney. We rode up to the end of the verandah, and Jack called 
to see if there was anyone at home, and Mary came trotting out; 
so it was in the frame of vines that I first saw her. (276)
The types of staging we see here are meant to induce the courting couple to
regard each other as suitable. They have to “fit” the picture of a romantic mate. Jack’s
staging of Joe sets the course but the staging must have substance if it is to work. The
frames Jack creates for Joe can not take hold until they actually become a true
representation of Joe’s social form. The smallest setback sends Joe into feeling
“comfortably miserable” and prevents him from acting and becoming successful in these
forms. It is not until Romany insults Mary’s honour that Joe is chivalrously roused into
definitive action.'jl This is another gesture of the romantic stereotype that is used to
galvanise their emerging relationship:
“I’ve met her sort before. She?s setting he cap at that jackeroo 
now. Some girls will run after anything with trousers on,” and he 
stood up.
Jack Barnes must have felt what was coming, for he grabbed my 
arm and whispered, “Sit still, Joe, damn you! He’s too good for 
you!” but I was on my feet and facing Romany as if a giant hand 
had reached down and wrenched me off the log and set me there.
“You’re a damned crawler, Romany!” I said. (290)
And the fight is on. Joe’s mates all doubt his ability to fight: “I knew I was reckoned 
pretty soft.” (291) This situation is different from any Joe has been in before; in Joe’s 
mind this fight represents an opportunity to become a different kind of man, fit to marry 
Mary. The situation is new to him for he hasn’t been in a fight since he was a boy. We see 
Joe discarding old habits of behaviour and experimenting with new ways of being. His 
desire (to wed Mary) fuels the impulse to act and the force of this impulse overwhelms
131 Whilst the fight has the successful effect of enhancing Joe’s self-image, Lawson also makes it clear that 
Romany is something of a fall-guy to gain this effect. Being an even greater outsider than Joe is himself, he 
is susceptible to the larger, more powerful male group. Joe is sympathetic to Romany’s position too, but 
the social requirements o f the romantic stereotype urge him on.
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his otherwise nagging self-conscious commentary. The “giant hand” propelling him into
action shows the force of his externalised energy:
I knew something that they didn’t know. I knew that it was going 
to be a fight to a finish, one way or the other...I kept saying to 
myself, “You’ll have to go through with it now, Joe old man! It’s 
the turning-point of your life.” If I won the fight, I’d set to work 
and win Mary; if I lost, I’d leave the district forever. A man thinks 
a lot in a flash sometimes.. .1 looked ahead; I wouldn’t be able to 
marry a girl who could look back and remember when her 
husband was beaten by another man—no matter what sort of 
brute the other man was. (291)
The concern here, that Mary couldn’t marry a man who lost such a fight, is a
social concern. Likewise, the impulse to “win Maty” is more than sexual for he is
explicidy thinking about marriage, a social form. The references to the social dimensions
of their relationship and his self-concept are important—Joe’s crippling self-
consciousness is overcome through the efficacy of the social form. Significandy, the fight
is also carefully staged and it follows a deliberate social form. The impulses to act are
harnessed by the social and through this process Joe gains prestige. The harnessed force
gives power to Joe in a recognisable (social) setting: “There was a little clear flat down by
the river and plenty of light there, so we decided to go down there and have it out.” (290)
The men keep strictly to the customary rules of fighting:
It seemed an understood thing with the men that if I went out 
first round Jack would fight Romany; and if Jack knocked him out 
somebody else would fight Jack to square matters. Jim Bullock 
wouldn’t mind obliging for one; he was a mate of Jack’s but he 
didn’t mind who he fought so long as it was for the sake of fair 
play—or “peace and quietness”, he said. Jim was very good- 
natured. He backed Romany, and of course Jack backed me. (291 - 
292)
When Jim volunteers to second Romany, we see the socialised form of fighting 
taking precedence over the very men involved. It is important because this validates the 
fight and, by extension, validates the winner. The customary rules must be obeyed. It is 
“an understood thing”. This is indeed a major turning point in Joe’s life. Where 
previously he has lamented he was born a bushman by mistake and as such is eternally 
out of place in his social environment, during the fight he acknowledges that he becomes 
this version of himself:
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I had the bushman up in me now, and wasn’t going to be beaten 
while I could think. I was wonderfully cool, and learning to fight.
There’s nothing like a fight to teach a man...While I was getting 
my wind I could hear through the moonlight and still air the 
sound of Mary’s voice singing up at the house. I thought hard 
into the future, even as I fought. The fight only seemed 
something that was passing. (293)
}oe is liberated from his oppressive sensitivities: “I went down early in the round. 
But it did me good; the blow and the look I’d seen in Romany’s eyes knocked all the 
sentiment out of me.” (292) The impact of }oe’s socially realised triumph is felt the very 
next night outside the dance. Jack has set things up that Mary and Joe meet down at the 
moonlit river and Joe must do the rest. Far from being a “stand-off-and-worship” affair, 
he begins to act to gain Mary’s hand. The emphasis here is on doing—“I put”, “I 
pressed”, I slipped”:
I put my arm round her shoulders, but she didn’t seem to notice 
it...I pressed my hand on her shoulder, just a litde, so as she 
couldn’t pretend not to know it was there. But she didn’t seem to 
notice.. .1 slipped my arm round her waist, under her arm.
“Mary,” I said.
“Yes,” she said.
“Call me Joe,” I said.
“I—I don’t like to,” she said. “I don’t think it would be right.”
So I just turned her face round and kissed her. (299)
Yet, Joe’s social self falters slightly at the last moment, anticipating his future
struggle with intention and action:
“Why won’t you kiss me, Mary? Don’t you love me?”
“Because,” she said, “because—because I —I don’t—I don’t think 
it’s right for—for a girl to—to kiss a man unless she’s going to be 
his wife.”
Then it dawned on me! I’d forgot all about proposing. (301)
In conclusion to this section, it is clear that Joe’s private self is enhanced when it 
is influenced by his public roles. Joe’s self need not be restricted to his melancholy 
meditation that he was a poet born a bushman by mistake, for we see in this story the 
successful effects of submitting to the social forms available to him. He performs 
dynamically in his experiential field and his sense of self is pragmatically constructed 
through social rituals and experience. It is important to keep in mind that the “life- 
changing moments” may come without warning. Joe shows remarkable agility and 
flexibility in accepting the fight to save Mary’s honour and it is in these situations where
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ethical impulses overtake his melancholy outlook, that he becomes effective as a social 
individual.
“A Double Buggy At Lahey’s Creek”
In “A Double Buggy At Lahey’s Creek” }oe triumphantly breaks out of his forlorn,
withdrawn mentality which has dogged his marriage. Importandy, it is with Mary’s
intervention. Mary shows how to harness and use imaginative force and insists that Joe
start to deal with their immediate situation creatively. This is in contrast to Joe, whose
imagination takes him into a dream world of what might have been. Mary says:
“Look here, Joe; the farmers out here never seem to get a new 
idea: they don’t seem to me ever to try and find out beforehand 
what the market is going to be like—they just go on farming the 
same old way and putting in the same old crops year after year.”
(355)
Mary’s criticises bad farming practices such as those described by Lawson in “A 
Day on a Selection”. From a pragmatic perspective it is significant in the selection sketch 
that the farmer: “who knows little or nothing about farming, would seem by his 
conversation to have read up all the great social and political questions of the day.” (40) 
Here, theory and practice are not in a dynamic, useful relationship to the actual 
environment. The farmers’ lack of critical reflection and ingenuity destroy the farm: “The 
selector does not know what makes the [cows’]teats sore but he has an unquestioning 
faith in a certain ointment recommended to him by a man who knows less about cows 
then he does himself.” (36-37) The lack of dynamism in this sketch establishes how new 
problems must be met with new solutions. Mary, as a pragmatic thinker, is aware that 
there are no fresh ideas coming into the farms to meet the demands of a fluctuating 
market. As the pragmatic drover’s wife demonstrates, with her makeshift guns and scare 
tactics, ever-changing circumstances must be met with new ideas. Mary suggests that Joe 
try sowing potatoes and when Joe refuses saying the ground is not right, Mary replies: 
“But you haven’t tried to grow potatoes there yet, Joe. How do you know.” (356) In other 
words, Maty insists that Joe’s knowledge ought to come from personal experience of 
their particular plot of land, not what other farmers have tried on their plots of land. This 
is the pragmatic spirit needed to make a selection work. If no outcomes can be 
adequately forecast, then many actions have the potential to succeed just as they have the
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potential to fail: “Just try one crop. It might rain for weeks, and then you’ll be sorry you 
didn’t take my advice.”
When Joe steps out into this new territory of a more novel way of approaching
the farm, something tremendous begins to happen. It does indeed rain. Not only does
the potato crop prosper but also the grass grows and they take advantage of a poor
selector who has to sell off his livestock:
The drought was blazing all round and out back, and I think that 
my corner of the ridges was the only place where there was any 
grass to speak of. We had another shower or two, and the grass 
held out. Chaps began to talk of ‘Joe Wilson’s luck’. (360)
The financial success that began with the potato crop has triggered a string of other, 
bigger transactions that give him greater freedom to act in creative ways. With the money 
from the potatoes he buys the neighbour’s sheep. The wool price rises and he sells the 
sheep on. On top of the profit, out of that money, Mary’s brother ]ames is able to buy a 
gun. From there, he is able to buy more blocks of land and farm more sheep. All the 
while, Mary is reminding him of buying a buggy. Yet, once again, Joe’s nerves begin to 
take over. He is continually reminded of the possibilities of drought which fill him with 
the dread of action. Yet it seems that it is only in risk-taking that opportunities to prosper 
appear. The roll of the dice is value-free and it is in Joe’s accepting that it might rain, 
rather than it might not rain, that he learns to make the dynamics of his environment work 
for him. It is important that he engages with the perspective of the other, in this case 
Mary, to broaden the pool of ideas of what may work. In short, it is the opportunistic 
spirit crucial to the pioneer.
A more discomfiting engagement with Mary’s perspective, however, comes in the 
sub-section of this story titled “The Ghost of Maty’s Sacrifice”. Even in this title, we can 
see that the substance of Mary’s life has really come home to Joe, embedded in this word 
“sacrifice”. The word “ghost” suggests the guilty paranoia of his married life: that Mary 
could have and should have done better. He will be forever haunted by it if he does 
nothing to release this ghost. He has arrived at another turning point. As with the fight in 
“Joe Wilson’s Courtship” and the race to save Jim’s life in “Brighten’s Sister-in-Law”, 
this emotion to change and to act must be stronger than the overwhelming pressure of 
his self-conscious mind. As with the fight, it is his social sense of his masculinity under 
fire which stirs an impulse to act. Here, the force that prompts him to action is seeing
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Maty’s previous suitor, young Black, the well-to-do squatter, pulling past him on the 
street. It hurts his masculine pride. At the sight of what Mary might have had, Joe starts 
“feeling things”. Usually, he would simply brood, but the thought that Mary could have 
been the “mistress of Haviland” draws him into immense sympathy for her. Significantly, 
he puts himself in her position:
I thought of the hardships she went through in the first year...of 
the time she was alone with James and Jim sick; and of the 
loneliness she fought through out there. I thought of Mary, 
outside in the blazing heat, with an old-print dress and a felt hat, 
and pair of ‘lastic-sides of mine on, doing the work of a station 
manager as well as that of a housewife and mother. And her 
cheeks were getting thin, and her colour was going: I thought of 
the gaunt, brick-brown, saw-file voiced, hopeless and spiritless 
Bushwomen I knew—and some of them not much older than 
Mary. (366-367)
Importantly, he does not think about these hardships through the retrospective 
eye of the older narrator. He thinks these things in the moment he sees Black: “The goods 
clerk must have thought that Joe Wilson was pretty grumpy that day. I was thinking of 
Mary, out there in the lonely hut on a barren creek in the Bush.” (366) This realisation, in 
the moment rather than in retrospect, means he has the chance to act. He acts 
immediately: “When I went back into the town I had a drink with Bill Galletly at the 
Royal, and that settled the buggy.”
His decision to act, based on his awakened ethic of sympathy for Mary and his 
responsibility to her, has reaped rich rewards. So often, Joe has routinely fallen short of 
even the smallest of Mary’s needs, yet this time he is far exceeding them. Rather than 
buying a second-hand single buggy, he brings her a brand new double buggy and the 
excess does not stop there:
Mary dived for the buggy. There was a dozen of lemonade and 
ginger-beer in a candle-box from Galletly.. .there was a ‘little bit 
of a ham’ from Pat Murphy...it was the biggest I ever saw; there 
were three loaves of baker’s bread, a cake, and a dozen yards of 
something ‘to make up for the children’, . . .there was a fresh-water 
cod, that long Dave Regan had caught the night before.. .there 
was a holland suit for the black boy, with red braid to trim it; and 
there was a jar of preserved ginger, and some lollies.. .(“for the lil’ 
boy”), and a rum-looking Chinese doll and a rattle (“for the lil’ 
girl”) from Sun Tong Lee.. .And James said that the people would 
have loaded the buggy with ‘rubbish’ if he’d waited. They all
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seemed glad to see Joe Wilson getting on—and these things did 
me good. (372)
The multiplication of gifts is overwhelming and indicates that social potential has been
unlocked. The entrepreneuring spirit that takes a chance on a humble potato has
generated a huge, socially positive force: “They all seemed glad to see )oe Wilson getting
on—and these things did me good.” A double buggy is literally a vehicle for socialisation.
As Mary’s sister hinted to Joe: “Now if Mary had a comfortable buggy, she could drive in
with the children oftener. Then she wouldn’t feel the loneliness so much.” (363) Not
only does the buggy close the isolating distances but also it allows more people to
simultaneously do so. The buggy7 also functions as the symbol of the promises of their
marriage: “Ever since we were married it had been Mary’s great ambition to have a
buggy.” (353) It had been relegated to the “Ah well, some day” corner of Joe’s thinking.
The rich rewards Joe and Mary receive endorse the pragmatic spirit driving their success
and implicitly criticises the brooding, non-generative side of his personality. Importantly
when this pragmatic spirit is able to flourish, it enhances the social unit; in this case, the
family is rewarded and becomes the target of the broader community’s good will. In the
purchase of the buggy, not only does Joe declare a social intention (and one which is
richly responded to by his society) but he fulfils a hope of his marriage so gently
considered in the closing paragraphs of the series:
Then we sat, side by side, on the edge of the verandah, and talked 
more than we’d done for years—and there was a good deal of 
“Do you remember?” in it—and I think we got to understand 
each other better that night.
And at last Mar}7 said, “Do you know, Joe, why, I feel tonight 
just—just like I did the day we were married.”
And somehow I had that strange, shy sort of feeling too. (373)
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Bridging the Gap: Bringing Lawson and Moorhouse Together
The writing of Henry Lawson and Frank Moorhouse shares significant similarities in 
theme, approach and form. They can be placed together, also, as writers concerned with 
charting moral development in a world of relative values, instability and change. For 
Lawson’s time, issues such as the troubled economy, union defeats, the suffragette 
movement and immigration, to say nothing of the physical obstacles like drought, had 
their effect on notions of (principally male) personal security and stability. Moorhouse’s 
generation was also confronted by an equally challenging period of change. Bruce 
Bennett includes the following issues as pivotal to the time: Whidam’s election after the 
“ice age” of 23 years of conservative government, the Vietnam War moratorium protests, 
green issues, obscenity changes and the anti-censorship movement, the liberalisation of 
divorce laws, the first gay and lesbian Mardi Gras (1978) and the first test-tube baby 
(1980).132 Bennett writes that these events, “contributed to a climate of feeling which 
affected thinking Australians at this time. Instability, excitement, dislocation, anxiety and 
fear were among the responses to these events.”133 The “contemporary experiences of 
uncertainty and dislocation”114 that he sees influencing Moorhouse’s work are also 
present in Lawson’s. The specific issues may differ but the core sense of instability 
remains. As with Lawson’s men, many of Moorhouse’s characters perpetually endure the 
anxiety of an uncertain state. On reflecting upon his own life during these periods of 
social upheaval, Moorhouse himself remarks: “the freedom we were discovering then 
brought massive anxiety—we didn’t know what the f ... we were doing.”115 Perpetual 
uncertainty produces a need to stabilise the experiential field in some way. Lawson’s men 
find tentative security in the pull of human obligations rather than in higher orders of 
absolute systems of meaning. Also, the continued practice of ritual produces meaning in 
an otherwise destitute environment. These ideas also function in Moorhouse. He goes 
further than Lawson in his investigation into human obligation and produces some 
interesting results. Like Lawson, however, Moorhouse’s irony is driven by a suspicion of 
formalised systems of meaning and he also focuses on the uses of ritual in meaning-
132 Bennett, B. Australian Short Fiction: A History. St Lucia: University o f Queensland Press. 2002. p. 180-181.
133 Bennett, p. 180.
134 Bennett, p. 181.
135 Chenery, S. “Full, Frank and Finally.” The Australian Magazine. 28-29 August, 1993. pp. 10-15. p. 10. 
[original ellipsis]
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making. For Moorhouse, ritual and role-play momentarily stabilise the otherwise unstable 
self and also allow for experiments of self. Here, the conventional family might be 
rejected but certain similar domestic apparatus are pursued regardless. Moorhouse’s 
principal male narrator craves constandy the anonymity7 and ahistoricity which can be 
obtained through the rental car, the motel room and the call girl but these forms are 
comforting because they mimic certain domestic conventions—the car, the home, the 
wife. These rituals provide ballast whilst the social landscape changes or is rejected 
outright.
On the surface, a comparison between the philosophical attitudes of Moorhouse 
and Lawson may almost seem outlandish, particularly given the agenda of Moorhouse’s 
early career:
In my late 20s I rebelled against Steele Rudd, Lawson, Paterson 
and the Bush Tradition. Young Australian writers wanted now to 
be urban sophisticates and to write for the New Yorker and Paris 
Review.136
Moorhouse’s attitude, however, can easily be read as the rejection of the Bush Tradition 
in the context of its role in the oppressive, singular Nationalism prevalent in 
Moorhouse’s early writing career. Wilding makes this point in The Tabloid Story Pocket 
Book: “What we rejected were the false uses of the Lawson tradition and the dubious 
nationalism.”1 ’ One could go so far as to say that, at the time, Moorhouse was, in fact, 
pursuing a Lawsonian style against the then trends, such as Peter Carey’s and Murray 
Bail’s experimentations with fabulism.138 As Bennett notes: “Moorhouse is a renovator of 
realism, in a mimetic tradition extending back to Lawson and Rudd, rather than a 
revolutionary technical innovator.”1^  Elizabeth Webby also draws a strong comparison 
between Moorhouse and Lawson, arguing for several stylistic similarities, including a 
“rejection of objective realism”, the “conscious recognition of the reader”, and a 
“fondness for a type of first-person narrative which directs considerable irony at the 
narrator himself.”14"
136 Moorhouse, F. “Finding Steele Rudd: The Back Door to Australian Folkore.” Bulletin. December 24.31, 
1985. pp. 62-66. p. 63.
137 Wilding, M. “The Tabloid Short Story.” The Tabloid Story Pocket Book. Glebe: Wild and Woolley. 1978. 
pp. 295-316. p. 306.
138 Bennett, B. “Frank Moorhouse and the New Journalsism”. Overland. 70. 1978. p. 6.
139 Bennett, Australian Short Fiction, p. 184.
140 W ebby, E. “Australian Short Fiction from While the Billy Boils to The Everlasting Secret Family. Australian 
Literary Studies. 10: 2. October, 1981. pp. 147-158. p. 155.
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Common to both Lawson and Moorhouse are their writing apprenticeships in 
journalism, out of which comes writing with a contemporary social orientation. 141 Their 
wridng is concerned with human action, its responsibilities and consequences under the 
pressure of contemporary value shifts. Fiction under the influence of journalism locates 
particular types or sub-groups and shows how those types function in the social scene. 
The mobilisation of these sub-groups produces ironic contrast, and this strategy shows a 
similarity in function to the antipodean/utopian literatures that challenge the standing 
order through the mobilisation of totally new—or back-to front—positions. Old values 
are thus tested and contemporary movements assessed.
In the works of both writers, the impact of journalism is felt in content and form. 
Bruce Bennett notes that Moorhouse’s early fiction in particular shows the influences of 
journalism through:
close attention to manners and social setting, an ear for dialogue 
and a clipped, understated, carefully sub-edited style in the 
Hemingway manner, implying more than it states. 142
The same could be said for Lawson, whose early stories especially followed the bulletin’s 
early editorial credo of “Boil it down. ” 141 Importantly for both of these writers, the 
concise approach of the journalistic style facilitates the tightly controlled punches of 
satire. As Bennett notes, this style implies more than it states. “Boiled down” work does 
not necessarily become simplified; in the hands of writers like Lawson and Moorhouse, 
the fibres of irony are tightened.
To illustrate the moves of particular sub-groups within the broader social sphere, 
both Lawson and Moorhouse use short stories that, while being discrete, are often 
peopled by the same characters and thus invite appraisals within a broader context. 144 
These characters reappear at different ages, under different pressures or at different 
stages along a line of consequences. In this sense, Moorhouse’s so-called discontinuous 
narrative is really a new name for work Lawson had already begun with his string of 
familiar characters operating in ever-unfamiliar situations, and appearing in stories which 
do not necessarily need to function in a particular chronological fashion.
141 It is important to note that this style o f writing, at least in Lawson’s case, earned him the title o f 
“objective realist” but, as Webby notes, “he was never a realist in the Zolaesque sense o f that term.” p. 154.
142 Bennett, p. 186.
143 For an interesting discussion on the aesthetic agenda o f the bulletin see D.R. Jarvis, “The Development 
o f an Egalitarian Poetics in the Bulletin, 1880-1890”, Australian Uterary Studies. 10:1. 1981. pp. 22-34.
144 Moorhouse draws this comparison in an interview in Speaking l  Plumes, p.163.
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The journalistic impulse is to record social action. Lawson and Moorhouse both
record what goes on in the public space. Moorhouse extends this inquiry into what can be
public. The censorship Moorhouse faced early in his career indicates the morally
confrontational nature of his work at that time; yet, there is more to this than mere shock
value. Old social mores may have been robusdy and controversially rejected but in their
place a new kind of ethic emerges. After all, the “discipline of indiscipline”145 is still a
discipline. On Yutiliy and Other Animals, Wilding writes:
Behind all these stories lies the ethic of being true to oneself, 
breaking with delusions and deceits: the occasional three- and 
four-letter words, the occasionally aberrant activities, are all in the 
sendee of this quest for the honest way, are presented to us not to 
shock, but to ask for a new, truer, fairer way of life. His characters 
would probably arraign him for it, but the impulse behind their 
writer is that of the moralist.14^
Moorhouse’s work on the urban tribe plots this quest—and its anxieties—with particular
regard to sexual relations and identity. In the unstable worlds of both Lawson and
Moorhouse gender ambiguities and the questions of identity are complex and in both
these writers we see personal identities continually redefined in relation to other persons
or situations rather than in preordained types. Whilst the issues at stake are different,
Moorhouse and Lawson share a pragmatic attitude towards identity construction. In
short, this dynamic mesh of selves creates reality. Again, this attitude that seems to
emerge as a trend in Australian literature, has its parallel with the American pragmatists.
Of James’s position, McDermott writes:
The perspective of other persons is partially constitutive of their 
reality and, therefore, by shared custom, partially constitutive of 
ours as well. If there is no single vantage point from which the 
world can be seen or interpreted or experientially had as whole, 
then every person makes his or her contribution to the ongoing 
statement as to how it is with the world, and how the world 
comes to be for me is in some way due to how the world has 
come to be for the other, for you.14
Crucial here is the concept of decentralisation. Being devoid of any “right” single 
point of view, the universe is really a multiverse, brimming with diversity and in constant 
evolution. This conceptualisation is commonly seen as a “new world” ethic and is
145 Forty-Seventeen, p. 8.
146 Wilding, M. “Living in the Inner City” Southerly. 33.3. 1969. pp. 231-236. p. 236.
147 McDermott, p. 112.
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usefully discussed in Baudrillard’s America. In constant contrasts to a European mind-set,
he writes that Europe will never enjoy: “the concrete, flexible, functional, active freedom
we see at work in American institutions and [in each citizen]. Our conception of freedom
will never be able to rival their spatial, mobile conception, which derives from the fact
that at a certain point they freed themselves from that historical centrality.”14” When
Baudrillard defines American attitudes, he is describing the pragmatic mind-set. It is a
mind-set that is also present in the writers under discussion here. Decentralisation shows
itself in a: “primary, visceral, unbounded vitality7, springing not from rootedness, but
from the lack of roots, a metabolic vitality, in sex and bodies, as well as in work and
buying and selling.”149 In contrast, he writes that in Europe, diversification becomes
nearly impossible, “centralised by a solid historical process.”131 ’ Freedom from “historical
centrality” opens up the future for further evolution. This is the focus of Moorhouse’s
work. The sense of creative momentum present in “The Iron-Bark Chip” is elaborately
recast in Moorhouse where the male narrator of the later stories is on the road to what
Baudrillard describes as: “the point of no return. This is the key.. .The journey has no
end.. .there is no longer any reason for it to come to an end.”LS1 He continues:
The very possibility of the Eternal Return is becoming precarious: 
that marvelous perspective presupposes that things unfold in a 
necessary, predestined order, the sense of which lies beyond 
them. There is nothing like that today; things merely follow on in 
a flabby order that leads nowhere.1
For Baudrillard’s European eye, things might seem to lead nowhere but it is a 
premise of this thesis that through this process of decentralisation and through the rejection 
of absolute meanings, true moral development may start to occur. The journey may have 
no end but it has this definite aim. The ever-modifying pragmatic, relational sense of self 
has consequences for moral action. In Moorhouse, the practical position, even when it is 
ironised in works like The Electrical Experience, is always favoured over the abstract 
position. As with Lawson, Moorhouse’s work all the time shows that moral decisions are 
made under pressure within the reality of changing circumstance. That is, decisions are 
made with the awareness that one’s knowledge is limited. The process of inquiry,
148 Baudrillard, J. (trans. Turner, C.) America. London: Verso. 1988. p. 81.
149 Baudrillard p. 7.
150 Baudrillard, p. 83.
1dI Baudrillard, p. 10.
132 Baudrillard, p. 72.
reflection and analysis is vital to ensure ethical responses. The dilemma is that 
knowledge, values and perspectives can change, yet action produces binding 
consequences that may be more or less permanent. This is potentially paralysing. To 
investigate these dilemmas of action, Moorhouse’s scope is wide. His span covers the 
moral turmoil that issues when a Rotarian is aroused by a dark-eyed gypsy girl on the 
New South Wales south coast, to the negotiation between post-colonial guilt and rape 
the land called Conference-ville, to diplomacy on an international scale in Geneva.
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Part III Frank Moorhouse
Chapter 1
“The Ethics and Good Fellowship of this Home”:
Inheriting George McDowell’s Pragmatism
In The Electrical Experience Moorhouse presents a tiny world under construction; a small 
town, vulnerably perched on the edge of the “endless bush” is struggling to come to life 
under the pioneering eye and hand of T. George McDowell, self-made soft drinks 
manufacturer:
He kept seeing in his mind the scattered smoky houses, the long 
green grass of the unbuilt-on blocks, the shops which still didn’t 
link to make a solid row, his factory, and the two saw mills 
nibbling away at the huge endless bush surrounding the town, 
turning it into building planks. Always in the bush he realised 
impatiendy how litde a hold they had yet on the coast. The thin 
white line of dusty habitation between the sea and the unsettled 
mountains. He urgently wanted for the land to be cleared and the 
roads properly made. (74)
George is constructing a new world guided by the “ethics and good fellowship” of
his home, yet, even in the process of doing so, the relevance of his world is a poor match
for the march of time and social change: “The Bohemian Problem had enveloped his
own daughter, Terri.” (2) His world is increasingly vulnerable to change which his ethics
cannot accommodate. George’s attitude of pioneering progress, clearly expressed in the
above quotation, is in part produced by the sense of experiment and opportunity that
also makes up his character as a pragmatic small-businessman. It is also fuelled by his fear
of the unknown other that lies just beyond the scope of his control. He is eager to
subdue what is still beyond the boundaries of his civilisation in order to shore up
stability, a security which is clearly lacking, signified in his impatience about “how litde a
hold they had”. The fragility of the small town is set against the “endless bush”. George
displays a general anxiety about the finite when it is placed this precariously within the
infinite and there is a parallel here with what Lee sees as the vulnerability of civilisation in
Lawson’s work, when joe Wilson takes his family into the bush. He writes:
If the domestic is both structured and signified through the 
presence of the domestic apparatus within the domestic space, 
then the Bush is located through the absence of not just the 
domestic or public, but the possibility of making any of the
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distinctions which might be associated with civilisation.. .The 
Bush is absence, the absence of civilisation, the absence of home, 
the absence of the personal.151
George’s impatience with the slow pace of progress in his town demonstrates this 
very concern about making the distinctions associated with civilisation. To make a 
distinction is to make a valuation and if civilisation and its values are absent or 
precarious, where will value now be found? Rather than pursue new valuations, as a 
pragmatic pioneer might, George’s reaction is to exert massive control in order to claim 
or cling to what are his own bedrock values. Despite his pioneering insistence that he is 
“always on the side of the new” he inadvertently stems the flow of his own moral 
progress; this analysis will focus on the irony of his condition. The insistent pressure of 
the untamed bush reminds George just how much continues to exist outside his 
restricted worldview, threatening the validity7 of his own beliefs. George’s character is 
essentially ironic because he has the attributes of the pioneer in his general 
resourcefulness, ingenuity and readiness to find new ways for new times, yet these skills 
are hampered by a rigid moral system, the boundaries of which must be protected at all 
costs.
George’s moral system is heavily influenced by an American pragmatic business 
ethic and this is shown through George’s excessive admiration for the American style.
He has visited the States seventeen times, he tells Becker, and he admires their “mental 
tidiness” (133) and the “positive American approach of the Digest.” (137) An attitude of 
mental tidiness fits in with a philosophy of practical solutions, unhindered by “verbal 
solutions” and abstract ideas. George gravitates towards this style through the shared 
experience of the self-made man at work in the “new world” which is liberated from “the 
historical centrality” Baudrillard attributes to the old. For example, Becker clings to his 
motel life because it keeps him “a today-man because there was no yesterday around in a 
motel. Yesterday held you back.” (125) Likewise, George claims that: “To move with 
Progress one had to shake free of the clutching, bony hand of the past. Men always
thought in terms of the past__Inventive men knew how to give the past the slip.” (49)
George considers himself a philosopher, but not one who spends time in the abstract 
world. George proclaims to Becker: “But I do not care for words in top hats. I believe in 
shirt-sleeve words. I believe in getting the job done. We’re like that on the coast. We
133 Lee, “Looking for Mr Backbone”, p. 101.
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believe in the right technique and the right machine.” (8) Here, there are none of what 
Baudrillard considers the abstractions and idealisations of Europe. This is the pragmatic, 
new world philosophy at work on the south coast.
As discussed in the introduction, Pragmatism allows for réévaluations to occur in
the daily activities of the new world outside the traditional value hierarchies of Europe.
In this novel Moorhouse takes this pragmatic progression of value to the extreme using
the irony of excess to inquire into this new mode of evaluation. When George is asked:
“Haven’t you worried about your purpose in creation—about man’s place in nature?”
(75) George simply says: “I make things people want.” (76) In so doing, his existence is
justified every day. His value is secured (for as long as his products are valued). George’s
conceptualisation of self here is a hard-line, literal pragmatism; a man is only what he
does and his meaning and value is derived from fulfilling this function. As James says,
however: “Pragmatism is method only.” There are many ways to value what one does
and pragmatism has no part in determining this criteria. For George, his valuations derive
from the business ethic: that is, if a person runs a successful business, then that person’s
value is assured. It is beyond his imagination that other people gain their valuations from
different sources; to this end, Terri acts as a counterweight in this discussion of value.
The Bohemian set, like the endless bush, is the unfathomable other, which cannot be
contained by the “ethics and good fellowship” of George’s home. Significantly, George
does not critically reflect upon his own ethical system and it is this very blind spot that
prevents his ability to evolve as times change. Through the pragmatic perspective, the
inability to accept and critique specific cultural limitations creates a stalled ethic that is
non-progressive and the boundaries of culture harden. It is an irony that, George, being
“on the side of the new” and an advocate for progress, wonders:
When and why did a man lose the faculty of change? Was it some 
point in the dying of the mind and body. A hardening of the 
nervous system. He practised keeping his mind agile. Daily he 
made himself think thoughts he had not thought before. He 
forced himself to consider the worst. He practised considering the 
opposite. He tried always to imagine at least two other possible 
ways of doing something. He fed his mind with maxims and 
precepts—the how-to-do-it manual of the mind. (49)
Significantly — and this is the source of the irony — his inventive, pragmatic style is 
hampered by a stern personal ethics which reduces the morally creative drive that
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facilitates future becoming. In contrast to the vibrant shape-changing pioneers of “The
Iron-Bark Chip”, George lacks spontaneity. Whilst he admits his sternness suggests a
“strong character” which appeals to him: “[h]e diligendy learned jokes to tell so as to put
people at ease, especially staff and such, but, no, he was a stiff man.” (60) The structure
of the novel builds, from the outset, the irony of George’s pragmatic practice. The novel
opens with George’s complaints of the values of the new generation. Through George’s
retrospective eye, Moorhouse demonstrates how George, in his old age, stiffens and is no
longer able to adapt, bend or respond to the new despite his continuing rhetoric to the
opposite. A cycle emerges through this story and, indeed, through much of Moorhouse’s
fiction, where the progressive new reaches a point of stiffness and those characters “on
the side of the new” lose their capability of change. This cycle offers a clue in decoding
Moorhouse’s description of Australia as “the ever-renewing country”. As one
generation’s borders firm and stiffen, the next generation attempts to revolt against these
boundaries only to then stiffen again. The building work is never complete. George’s
drive to put down or simply deny difference circumscribes his experiential field, thus
robbing him of the regenerative, future-oriented position his pragmatic mindset might
otherwise offer; he hampers the momentum that creative energy can generate and this is
expressed through his battles with the “protestations of his soul.”
George’s stringent business formulae, under the influences of Rotary, Freemasonry
and the free market, are applied to all moral problems he encounters. Both the public
and private are steeped in the discourse of economics, with an emphasis on
modernisation and the enduring value of the self-made man. The productive traits of the
businessman are continually cited as man’s highest development and business is exalted
through George’s lofty idealisations. Advertising is the “poetry of commerce”, the speech
and the business letter are its “practical arts” and even God Himself is described as the
“Great Chairman in the Other Country.” George’s excessive application of the rules
makes him the target of much irony, yet it is a curious double irony since we are left with
the sense that George’s conceptualisation is often as necessary as it is ridiculous if his
world is to retain any order or meaning at all. For George, community itself is
corporatised requiring a hierarchical structure of discipline and order:
He had been elected District Scout Master. In his speech he had 
said that the supreme challenge of each generation was ‘holding’ 
the next generation. Keeping control of the young. That it was 
possible for a generation to be ‘lost’, for control to slip and for
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civilization to be without a generation to take over...nevertheless, 
while membership of a family can ensure that the values of that 
family inhere in the children of that family, Community 
Organizations had to police this and to ensure that ‘replacement 
parts’ were available for those families lacking values. (15)
Here, community is a corporation and George, as elected managing director, polices the 
values of his subordinates. The generational “take over” may only occur when the next 
generation is trained in the right values. If a problem is discovered within the community 
machine, a mechanical solution is found: “replacement parts” will be provided where a 
fault occurs. The point of policing values is to avoid diversification of value systems; 
George’s concept of community is based on similarity and cannot tolerate difference. All 
social solutions are based on the submersion of the other into the majority. The 
“problem of the coloured races,” for example, will be solved with “a skin bleach for 
blackfellows” (83)
The leading ideal in George McDowell’s ethics is the principle of fellowship and
fellowship is the framework for both the Rotary and Masonry platforms. Significantly,
however, membership for both organisations is limited. It is a tribal fellowship and as such
generally secures localised interests, yet does not guarantee broader community cohesion,
even in a small country town. George believes that fellowship is the general prerequisite
for social and familial harmony (since the family is a microcosm of society.) Significandy,
George’s emphasis on familial fellowship is based on certain restrictions:
The sacredness and survival of the family, 1 argue, is largely 
dependent on the environment of Fellowship that is made around 
it. That’s what Rotary and life are about. Complexes cannot live in 
the Rotary home... A complex is when people aggravate their 
differences, while Fellowship is generally interpreted as a 
development of the principles on which there can be agreement.
One is the seeking of conflict: the odier harmony. (136)
Whilst social harmony is desirable, George’s formulation suggests a repression of 
difference and a denial of conflict rather than its resolution. “The incident you so 
painfully bring up”, he writes in a letter to Terri, “had all but been forgotten by me, and I 
see no reason or purpose in your raising it again or telling it to the psychiatrist. I feel 
these childish acts are best kept within the family.” (128) For George, Terri’s adoption of 
a Bohemian lifestyle runs contrary to the ethics of his home because as he sees it, those 
“artistic types” were “people who put themselves apart.” In placing themselves apart,
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fellowship is broken. George grows anxious about social difference because the 
availability of different lifestyles indicates that there is no standard behaviour which will 
bind the larger community together. The emerging Bohemia direcdy challenges the 
validity and sustainability of old standards of behaviour.
It is one of the ironies of George’s constitution that he bridles against social 
difference and change and yet he is a pioneer: “Where there is conflict between the new 
and the old, I’d always be with the new.” (76) He is resistant to certain types of attitudinal 
change yet, as someone on the settled fringes, his living depends on his ability to adapt: 
“Move with the Times or be moved over by the Times.” (48) He is on the frontier: 
“headed for the uncharted territory.” (73). Men who become set in old ways of doing 
business or who fail to “modernise” disappoint him. It is therefore strange that 
throughout the Electrical Experience, George never changes his mind. He is totally 
unyielding.
The hardness of George’s business ethic is disconcertingly clear when Tutman, 
his long-time friend, approaches him for a loan so that he may avoid bankruptcy. 
Tutman’s ice business is failing because of the new age of refrigeration and so to George, 
it seems that the Times are rolling over Tutman. George considers, somewhat coldly, that 
since Tutman’s “vocation” as ice-maker was no longer relevant given the advances in 
refrigeration: “[i]t was the closing of the bank doors for )im. What he had learned in life 
was no longer valid currency.” The man therefore has served his purpose and it seems he 
is no longer valuable because he is no longer useful: “A man was nothing more than what 
he knew and what he could do.” (46) For George, success in business translates into life 
value.
In the terms of pragmatist theory, this scene sets out the difference between an 
economic-style of pragmatism based on expediency and profitability and a pragmatic 
morality that is founded upon mutual responsibility and progressive inclusion. George 
feels entirely satisfied that he has no moral requirement to help Tutman because it does 
not follow the logic of his ethical model—to be on the side of progress, to advance, to 
modernise:
“We are but the engine-drivers of progress,” T. George
McDowell said, moving a paperweight as if by calculation, as it if
were a driving-lever, a switch, a throtde.
“Is friendship superseded?” (45)
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George evades the issue of friendship altogether and one might ask whether this 
resistance contravenes George’s rules of “fellowship”. Tutman says: “You and your 
damned Rotary guff about the Brotherhood of Business.” (47) In his anger, Tutman 
smashes a photo of them both that was taken in “the rosy days of friendship and the 
allegiance of equals.” In this phrase, “the allegiance of equals,” George assesses that the 
moral obligation to help Tutman has passed because they are no longer equals. 
Fellowship, for George, is predicated on a peer group of the same values and, by 
extension, the same successes. Tutman has dropped out of George’s peer group and, 
therefore, can be excluded from his very limited, tribal fellowship: “Tutman had sunk 
personally through business and other difficulties, maintaining a false sense of superiority 
by mixing now with inferiors in the public bars.” (62) It is clear that George’s 
“fellowship” is very limited indeed.
By describing a man’s knowledge and life’s work as either valid or invalid
“currency” it is clear how immersed George’s worldview is in the discourse of
economics. The consequence of this is a distancing of the personal. George can only
maintain this economic perspective by avoiding the personal and when Tutman suicides,
a direct consequence of George’s refusal to help, the narrative does not show George
engaging directly in the news. The narrative facilitates George’s evasion of responsibility
in a manner reminiscent of “The Union Buries Its Dead”, where the acceptance of guilt
is avoided through evasive narrative acts, fust as the “linguistic smokescreens”
surrounding the drowning and funeral show the increasing emotional distances in order
to avoid responsibility, George’s thoughts are likewise plotted with varying degrees of
distance. When Tutman is initially only reported as missing, the news is indirectly
narrated through George’s consciousness:
He learned by telephone message next day that fames Tutman 
had disappeared during the night, leaving his wife, his two almost 
grown children, and a bankrupt ice-making business.
He was, as a man of feeling, disturbed by the news. It was quite a 
knock. But as a realist he was somewhat relieved.. .He did not 
admire himself for his sense of relief, but on the other hand, did 
not relish facing Tutman in the street or seeing him decline into 
god-knows-what. Somehow it was best, he felt in the hours 
following the news, that Tutman rule off the book at this point.
The town could care for his wife.
Tutman was a lesson. (52)
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Here, the news is clearly filtered through George’s perception. It’s “a knock” but it is also
a source of relief. However, when Tutman’s body is recovered, George shows an absence
of emotion. The narrative becomes neutral. The typical markers of indirect discourse are
removed, for George has removed himself as a participant in the drama. Reflections that
might be accorded to George are noticeably absent suggesting an evasion of
responsibility, of guilt. It is strange that George, “as a man of feeling” who had felt “a
knock” that Tutman had disappeared, seems to experience no emotion, knocks or
otherwise, at the same man’s suicide. His presence, however, is certainly again felt in the
last line of the chapter: “The local paper incorrectly stated that Tutman had invented the
block of ice.” (53) In so saying, George steadies his ship by focusing upon a mistake
made by someone else, in this case the local journalist, and in turn divesting Tutman of
any value at all. 154 If he “was” only what he “did” and that was reported incorrecdy, then
he did nothing and therefore was nothing and thus was not a life worth restoring or
preserving. He is a “lesson”, tut tut. Similarly in “The Union Buries Its Dead” the absence
of a correct name for the deceased, together with the absence of grieving relatives,
threatens to nullify the life. As with the “Union Buries Its Dead”, the damning evasions
in this episode imply that more should have been done. Moorhouse, like Lawson, clearly
illustrates the deadly consequences of limited, unsympathetic fellowships. Through their
ironic treatment of episodes like this, both writers imply that through freedom from
typical ethical practices, agents like George would be able to act with more ethical
competence, not less. Both writers are suggesting that true moral competence is brought
about through rigorous testing and re-testing of standing ethical practice. In not coming
to Tutman’s aid, George takes what James calls a “moral holiday”; that is, he defers
making a decision and instead relies on his business ethic. To clarify this idea, the risks of
responsibility are usefully discussed in Kierkegaard: The Self in Society, where, borrowing
from Derrida, Mark Dooley writes that:
ethical action should never be simply governed by a ritual rule; a 
responsible decision demands risking the madness and anxiety 
which the either/or decision requires...A decision that didn’t go 
through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free 
decision, it would only be a calculable process. It might be legal; it 
would not be just.155
154 It is also a horrific reality o f George’s worldview wherein the suicide is the logical conclusion for a man 
who no longer has life-value.
155 Dooley, M. “Risking Responsibility: A  Politics o f the Emigre.” Kierkegaard: The S elf in Society, (ed) 
Pattison, G. & Shakespeare, S. London: Macmillan Press. 1998. pp. 139-155. p. 144.
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This is the moral pragmatist’s burden: since each moral experience is unique, it must be
approached on its own merits. Strict allegiance to systems of meaning—“moral
holidays”—denies the ethical development of the moral agent. Importandy, sympathy for
the other is reduced and this episode, in particular, shows that George’s life formula
neutralises the human element of life. This excess of control on the emotion leads to
excessive repression of human feeling. It damages his frequent assertion that he tries “to
walk the path of goodwill.” It is goodwill extended only to a limited male membership. It
is the final irony of this situation, that is not levelled until the closing chapter, that we
find out George’s factory has gone to ruin after being sold and Tutman’s sons make a
thriving business from selling ice to petrol stations. This final twist acts as a reminder
that at any time, fortunes may change and anything might happen.
George’s lack of spontaneity does not cope with such contingencies. He
understands the vicissitudes of life but he attempts to cope with this state of life through
immense control. For George, success can only be die product of emotional and mental
control, coordination and order. I will refer to this as George’s “theory of coordination”.
The theory of coordination holds that if the smallest working units are well conceived
and in order then everything will run smoothly. George bases his life principle on the
idea that the large (be it a machine, a principle or a Life Question) is a sum of its parts. It
is thus a source of bemusement that this theory of coordination, applied to the rearing of
his children, did not produce a perfect child. This theory relies on the fact that life can be
mechanically conceived and controlled:
No, I don’t ask [the big questions]. I live by the rules inherent in 
the job at hand. Every trade has its own rules inherent in 
it...Every Science too, and every Craft—even, say, the Science of 
aerated drinks has its rules inherent. I suppose I believe that when 
you follow the rules of the craft, the big questions look after 
themselves. That when you arrive at the Big Questions, if you’ve 
followed the rules inherent in your craft, the answers will be 
obvious. (75)
Harmony—from the private to the global—relies on locally coordinated systems of 
action and behaviour. It grows from the private into the public and begins at the physical 
level:
Packing the car, he jarred his thumb on the door. He could hardly 
bear it. He hopped about blowing warm air on his hand, damning 
and blasting and f-dashing. It hurt like the blazes. It was a bad
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sign, lack of inner co-ordination.. .He had a flat at Fitzroy Falls 
and skinned his knuckle changing the wheel. He almost wept with 
the feeling of being so jangled, so rattled. It was the body turning 
on itself. (38-39)
The multiple effects of George’s obsessive application of his theory of control and 
coordination are demonstrated when Moorhouse describes George’s and Thelma’s 
domestic arrangements and their intimate relationship. George lies in bed contently 
thinking over his “new house [that] was finished in detail right down to the built-in 
holder for toilet-paper rolls.” (15) He goes to sleep happy that everything in his life was 
“being correctly done.” (14) This emphasis on being correct down to the very last detail 
demonstrates this theory of coordination. Everything must be in order. George even 
thinks of his sexual performance in terms of a successful small-businessman: “you are a 
good tradesman, George, and you clean up after the job.” (19) When Moorhouse depicts 
George and Thelma’s intimacies, they are trying for a third child because three “seemed 
to him to be a manageable and modem number.” (12) Family planning is akin to business 
planning. Of their family plan, George thinks: “He himself was a precautionary man, 
although it w’as true that all business did involve risk-taking.” (12) To exaggerate George 
and Thelma’s system of controls and restraints in their intimate life, Moorhouse lists their 
excessive methods of birth control and the rules of their intercourse. Thelma uses a 
diaphragm and also asks that George wear a condom “just in case”. Then, “[a]fter, 
because of germ life, they usually washed, she first, and he second,” and she insists that 
the condom be flushed down the toilet “immediately after”. Clearly, Thelma’s 
precautions are for more than birth control. For Thelma, sex is a messy business and it 
must be contained as far as possible. Curiously, these restraints and rules have a positive 
effect on George’s desire:
He observed that the limitations and restrictions on the matter of 
sexual indulgence, placed by Thelma in their marriage, sometimes 
aroused him, her unwillingness, he had perhaps that sort of 
personality which was, which savoured, well, the restraint she 
imposed, the limitations on when, and her refusals.. .It had to do, 
he speculated, with the basic economic principle of scarcity. (13)
Whilst George’s personality may savour restraint, such restriction also has a negative 
effect. The imposed restraints, which are dedicated to maintaining that everything “was 
being correctly done”, cause a repression of desire and passion that threatens to erupt
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out of all of George’s known order. As George lies in bed contemplating his correctness,
a darker thought creeps in—a close encounter with the gypsies in a field outside of town.
The gypsies come to represent the mysterious and unbridled sensuality which George
attempts to organise and control out of existence. During the encounter in the field,
however, it almost becomes too strong to resist:
A rather pretty gypsy girl just out of childhood, her hair half 
covering her dark face, and close up he could not judge her age— 
thirteen?—had flagged him down. Gypsy girl. Had smiled at him 
in a certain way. He rather thought, self-control slipping, 
that...maybe...the gypsy girl...would...he had lost his self-control 
for that instant, she called her mother, his hand on her arm, she 
had called her modier, groin against her, she called her mother, 
and the mother was morbidly attractive too, aroused in his 
trousers, he wanted to offer money to lie down in the bushes with 
the gypsy girl...maybe an arrangement, but he could go no further 
than £1. (16)
The gypsies appear in the twilight like sirens, swarming his car, confusing him.
Before he can suggest any “arrangement”, the mother, taking things from George’s
pockets, begins to tell his fortune: “The coming of a female figure, a child, a female dark
and of a troubled nature. Thoughts of suicide.” (16) It is thus, in the afternoon dark, in
the atmosphere of an illicit sensuality, that Terri emerges. Moorhouse seems to be
making the point that the repressive control of sexuality breeds the opposite effect; here,
for example, it threatens to lead to paedophilia. These haunting thoughts of the illicit and
unrestricted are contrasted with Thelma’s control of their intercourse to the point where
the reader develops a sympathy for George’s desire. This restricted sexuality is a symbol
for the denial or removal of spontaneity and creative energy. What becomes clear in this
scene is that what is repressed must eventually erupt and here it erupts through fantasy.
As the thought of the gypsy girl returns to him, George is aroused:
“Again?” his wife queried, as he rubbed himself against her.
“I feel like it again,” he whispered.
“All right,” she said, moving apart her legs. “It’s not like you.”
(17)
It is, therefore, under the influence of these illicit passions that Terri is conceived and she 
thus becomes the physical manifestation of George’s hidden sensuality. Ironically, it is 
the very strict order his self-discipline imposes which gives birth to a child who will go 
through life determined “to use the senses 100 per cent.” (148) Terri is George’s own
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repressed spirit released in the tempest of her birth. She represents that part of him 
which lies outside the sphere of his coordinated control.
In order to counter the hardening effects of excessive restraints on George’s 
personality, Tutman encourages an affair between George and the policeman’s widow:
“It might soften you up, George.” But George resists and notes to himself: “The flesh, 
the passions have no special rights or claims on the behaviour.” When this passion 
between the widow and George does emerge it is quickly put down, for the unpredictable 
nature of passion runs contrary to George’s life plans. When he falters, he proposes 
harsher restraints to recover; he determines to never acknowledge her again: “despite the 
roaring protests of his body.” (48) Likewise, he forbids the gypsies admission to local 
fairs in order to resist the temptations stirred within him. Avoiding temptation may very 
well be a sensible solution to maintain his marital fidelity; however, this situation also 
needs to be taken metaphorically. Through the perspective of pragmatism, George is 
refusing to admit ideas that confront him and that would challenge his customary 
standards. The “roaring protests” of body and soul signal the widening gap between his 
life theory and his daily experiences. His theories are not holding out yet, rather than re­
examine his standards, he turns his back on the new. From the pragmatist’s view, when a 
troubling thought arises, the mind seeks to resolve this disturbance in order to regain 
equilibrium. The flexible mind is able to achieve this by testing new ideas in order to 
advance the previously held idea that no longer works. In Lawson and Moorhouse, 
however, these challenging ideas are often avoided rather than confronted. The drunken 
men in “The Union Buries Its Dead” drown their guilty minds. Similarly, when 
Moorhouse’s narrator in Conference-mile gains a disturbing insight into his behaviour, he 
seeks the solace of alcohol: “My mind kept touching the red-hot word in my central 
consciousness.. .My mind kept going back to see if the word had gone, or if it was only a 
self-lacerating mistake.”136 Rather than reflect upon the image with a view to self­
correction, the narrator decides to get “bitterly drunk. Specially and privately drunk in the 
inner room of my head.” With the help of alcohol, he “recasts the insight” (90) rather 
than attempt to recast himself. Similarly, when George is faced with a “miserable” insight 
that would aid his self-development, he wrestles it down (although without the aid of 
alcohol):
156 Moorhouse, F. Conference-ville. Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 1976. p. 87 All future references will be to 
this edition.
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He had a thought about himself which made him miserable.
It was this: I am a man held in my interlocking restraints: I am not 
free to enjoy the fruits of pleasures.. .Sometimes his spirit cried 
out, wept, he wanted sometimes to be, just for one day, indolent. 
To say, drink alcohol, like some of the others. To lay down the 
burden.. .He was locked in place. In the yoke. He feared rules. He 
was frightened that relaxation was irreversible. That, once relaxed, 
the rules would not return to place. A slide would begin. Into 
what? What did he fear?...
He pulled himself together.
Up again, he washed his face, wetted his hair, parted it and went 
downstairs. (37-38)
George’s excessive control is contrasted with several other figures, notably Mr 
Scribner who is a source of bemusement to George. Moorhouse offers these contrasts in 
order to test various states of being and evaluate them. Mr Scribner does not follow any 
life plan yet, to George’s amazement, functions regardless. Where George attempts to 
control as many forces as possible, Scribner seeks to control none:
“Who told you I was planning a trip to the city, Mr Scribner?”
“O I came across you simply by chance. Mr McDowell. I was
taking a stroll.”
That was the whole damn’ difference between himself and
Scribner. Scribner daily placed himself in the hands of fate. He,
on the other hand, worked at making fate do what he wanted.
The whole damn’ difference.
Yet here they were, in the same car, going to the same destination.
(97)157
Significantly, George finds himself enjoying Scribner’s company when he is 
feeling in “a truant mood”: “He usually fought against this truancy in himself, but yet it 
did relax him—when he allowed himself to go like a balloon in the breeze. Babbling on 
with fantasy and speculation.” (95) What surfaces in this contrast is the effect of 
George’s self-imposed restraints. He believes so strongly in the need to curb and control 
for the success of plans, that the opposing desire stirs tension within him. Not only does 
he wish to remove the gypsies and the widow from his daily world, he actually wants to 
play truant from himself.
The difference between George and Scribner is important because, despite their 
radically different mindsets, they find themselves in the same place at the same time.
I:>7 The punctuation of damn’ is significant as this is George’s thought represented indirectly. Moorhouse 
includes the punctuation marker for the purposes o f excess. Even in George’s mind “damn”, as an 
abbreviation, must be correcdy used and considered.
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George is confronted with the idea that there are many valid ways of being. Scribner’s life 
is unstructured and, in being so, is open to the opportunities of chance. Scribner declares: 
“we must not undervalue the spontaneous, the ephemeral, the extemporaneous. Why 
don’t people take Delight?” (99) To George’s amazement, Scribner’s loose playing with 
chance and the unstructured pays off: “He noticed to his surprise that although Scribner 
was not a Mason, the doorman at the club knew him and tipped his cap. Extraordinary.” 
(103)
The pull of George’s buried desires climaxes when he is named as the executor of
H.C. Crowhurst’s will (“Old Harry”). George is presented with a unique task that will
satisfy his desires but remain within the confines of official correctness. Old Harry’s will
states that upon his death, his house and all its contents must be burned. In the town,
there is a general resistance to the will with townspeople arguing the house could be
given to an unemployed family, and its library could be donated to the School of Arts.
Certainly these options are both ethically charged by virtue of their being of great benefit
to the community. George disagrees and even though he “had at first made some
remarks, along with the rest, about the seemingly wanton destruction,” he “inwardly
found the commission emotionally quickening, lured by its abnormality.” (61) As with his
reaction to the gypsy girl, his desire is awakened by what falls outside of general patterns
of respectability yet here he allows himself to act on his desire because, despite the
perversity, the act is legally sanctioned.
The act goes against his general vision for the town because such destruction
runs against community benefit. In this sense the act is contrary to George’s own ethic:
“Such an unnatural act for the town, striving as it was to shape itself.. .to make itself a
normal town along with the rest of the State.” (61) But this situation comes with legal
validation so, in these rather unique circumstances, his desire can for once override his
otherwise rigid ethic of construction and progress because he has been “irrevocably
deputed.” (65) When he drenches the books with petrol, the local journalist remarks:
“A crime, George. Give them to the School of Arts.”
He respected reading and agreed with Backhouse about the crime, 
thinking as he did that he had never committed a crime, and 
thinking then that this was not legally a crime, yet resembled 
criminality. However, he told Backhouse, one undertook a 
commission in every detail and to the detail, or not at all. “I’m 
that sort of person.”
“I know you’re that sort of person, George.” (62)
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George’s actions during this episode show the destructive power when repressed 
passions erupt. The driving force of his action is to satiate his desire — to “give in” to the 
impulse to play truant from all that is ethically desirable in a small community and this 
passion is expressed through the complete thoroughness of the “drenching”. The use of 
kerosene is excessive for the act has: “opened a throttle in him.” He has let himself go: 
“[H]e vibrated inwardly whth the complete unnaturalness of it, the permitted 
unnaturalness of it.” (63) He drenches lace doilies, rotted brown flowers and receipts and 
dockets on their bill spikes. He drenches the stamp collections (“opened for easier 
burning”) and douses random pages. Even this is not enough. George positions large 
bales of hay throughout the house and he drenches those too.
Importantly, the task also fulfils a second function: “It was, after all, an official 
act.” (66) The deputation—the social role—empowers George. Like Joe Wilson’s fist- 
fight, George sees this act as a turning point in overcoming self-consciousness. The 
burning was: “[the] one event, more than all others in his life, [that] had seemed to 
diminish his shyness, terrorise it even, so that it receded as a factor in his life.” (61) The 
effect for George is palpable: “His spirit, far from quailing, was empowered.” (63) As in 
“Joe Wilson’s Courtship”, here the self is pragmatically realised as it is empowered 
through changing social roles, although, in pragmatic terms, here a severe rupture has 
occurred, in the transaction between self and society. In committing this act George may 
well have cured some of his shyness, but his actions have had a high social cost. George’s 
tunnel vision for his own personal development prevents him from seeing his real social 
responsibilities; he only sees his formal social responsibilities. From a pragmatist point of 
view, for the social dynamic to work effectively the self who is empowered by social roles 
must in some way enhance the social. George sees that the act has “helped to burn away 
his shyness.” (68) Thelma, however, takes a different perspective: “Thelma said, some 
people thought he’d become hard and unyielding because of the burning.” (68) 
Importantly, Thelma’s speaks on behalf of society. From a moral pragmatist viewpoint, 
the ability to be flexible is the key principle in ongoing self-development but, here,
George has hardened. The “hardening of the nervous system” he has previously decried 
in other men is setting in.
Metaphorically, the tire George has ignited has wreaked social destruction. A 
second fire occurs in The Electrical Experience which is also blamed for destroying the
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social fabric. George’s passionate nature, which he constantly seeks to repress, fully 
erupts into full physical manifestation when Terri is born. In apocalyptic fashion, there is 
a terrible bushfire on the day of her birth: “The temperature was 105. Black Saturday.
The sky turned black. The sun could not be properly seen. There was something 
unnaturally fearful about losing sight o f the sun.. .Some mentioned the end o f the 
world.” (3) Homes are burned to the ground and the utterly destructive path o f the fire 
turns social objects inside out: “The sight and smell o f burned clothes unsetded him.. .It 
was as though the occupant’s personal odour was being let loose instead o f being kept 
privately within the four walls o f a house. Burned personal things.. .A family burned out 
and exposed.” (5) George thinks: “ die day had affected Terri.. .disturbed her forever.” (4) 
Terri, as George’s “modern” number three is modem in more ways than George 
could have anticipated: “Terri, even as a child, had a will o f her own.” (2) She has the 
urge to question the prevailing ethic o f her family home in contradistinction from her 
parents and older sister. She is “ suffocated” by church and Sunday school and we can 
extrapolate from this that she has an aversion to formal systems o f morality in general. 
Her sister Gweneth asks the question: “Why do some ideas grab a hold on some people 
and not others?” (149) Ironically, in her pursuit o f new ideas, Terri shows a distinct 
similarity to her father. She has, in fact, inherited his dominant trait. It is George who 
complains o f the narrow-minded thinkers in his community: “They do not allow certain 
thinking to come out because o f their tighdy closed demeanour.. .Some people frighten 
ideas away.” (102) George’s new ideas develop to secure a successful business. He 
experiments with drinks, flavours, gathers information from “great men” and travel.
Terri on the other hand, experiments with lifestyle: “alcohol, speeding in cars, sex, and at 
one time, Yoga.” (148) Becker’s experiences o f the homes o f both Terri and her parents 
are similar:
Becker wondered how he could fit himself into the McDowell 
house, so much carpet, so much bric-à-brac, so many pieces of 
furniture, so many clocks, so many standard lamps, so many 
travel souvenirs, so many barometers, pianos, and palms. (133)
George surrounds himself with items that reflect his values. Here the phrase “ so many” 
indicates an excessive collection of goods which not only suggests wealth and success but 
an obsession with certain influences. In particular, George is “ travel-proud” . His travel 
souvenirs speak loudly. The esteem he has for America and Americans is reflected in
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these goods. Terri also demonstrates this trait but her personal effects display alternative 
influences. Again, this is taken from Becker’s point of view, a man who prefers life 
without such history:
Her flat asked too much for Becker’s liking. Not that he objected 
to art. Or fad art. But he found that he was most at ease in an 
electronic, twenty-four-hour, functional motel. Nothing talking 
back at you. In Terri’s place everything was talking at you.
Everything she’d done to the place was a message. From the time 
he stepped in, he was warding them off. The pottery, the 
artefacts, the prints, the posters, the sketches, the photographs, 
the pinned-up clippings, the dyed drapes, the books, were all like 
yelping dogs or crying children. Sunburst symbols, assorted 
carved statuettes from the East, huge signs, and a hashbag hung 
from a small hookah. (125)
We can see here that both Terri and George attempt to articulate a sense of self 
through their acquired artifacts. Given the distinct difference between these two sets of 
personal artifacts, we can also see Terri’s very definite rebellion against her father’s 
values. This is made most explicit when she says to Becker, “I shouldn’t like you.. .1 
don’t like Americans theoretically.” (127). It is no small irony that not only does she fall 
for an American, but one who represents the idealisation of George’s life endeavour; 
Becker is a soft drinks man too and Coca-Cola the pure expression of business success.
In this context, Becker’s following reflection on Terri could be read ironically: “The 
apple is said to fall not far from the tree. But in this case it seemed to.” (138) Rather, it is 
clear how closely this apple has fallen. In pursuing this American soft-drinks man, Terri 
pursues George’s highest idealisation.
Like George, Becker’s work is a measure of himself. He: “believed, among other 
things, in prowess and the pursuit of excellence.” (141) His work is: “doing my simple 
self-appointed task of selling the best damned soft drink in the world, the best damned 
way I know how.” (141) These similarities, particularly between Terri and her father, are 
rather curious given, firstly, Terri’s rejection of her father’s lifestyle and, secondly, 
George’s belief that her generation is “lost.” What does this mean for future cultural 
development as Terri leaves the small town and enters the city? In this “ever-renewing 
country” will George’s shortcomings be renewed and perpetuated? The following section 
will look at Moorhouse’s urban tribe as they find “replacement parts” for the values of 
their parents and negotiate the terms of their new existence.
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Chapter 2
Visiting Strange Territory:
Balmain and the “Full Anti-Convention Bit”
How, in bed early Thursday morning, do you explain to your 
father and your mother who you have lived with for twenty-three 
years, that you do not want to go to work and that you do not 
want to see your friends? How do you explain that you’d rather 
not see them, too? How do you explain that the idea of working 
and the idea of seeing your friends makes you feel sick in the 
head? How do you explain that you want to lie down somewhere 
on your own?158
The paragraph quoted here, the opening to “Walking Out”, signals a moment of 
conceptual change for a young man named Thomas. It is the moment when Thomas 
begins to challenge his prevailing culture and, as such, is the first crucial moral turning 
point of his young life. The moment is charged with ethical uncertainty, recognised in the 
repeated emphasis of “how” Thomas might explain himself to his principal social 
connections—friends and family. Thomas’s sick-in-the-head malaise is prompting a new 
way of life, a moment replayed in the lives of Moorhouse’s young men and women as 
they flee the family home, its values and mores, and strike out into new, uncharted 
territory. They cluster together in the inner city, in the terraces and public bars, with the 
desire to fashion a new way of living. In grouping together like this they have been 
described as the “urban tribe” and they are recognised through the shared customs they 
develop. They are a pioneering people whose self-professed task is to push out the moral 
frontier. Thomas knows he cannot explain his feelings or his departure to his parents or 
friends firsdy because he is still very unsure of what they are and where to go. More 
importandy, however, he knows that they will not understand. Their conceptual 
boundaries are closed and firm and Thomas’s are only just starting to open.
“Walking Out” appears in futility and Other Animals, under the section tided 
“Braver}7”, and whilst Thomas slips out cowardly without confrontation, without a word 
to his parents or his fiancée, Marj, he has made this decision to act. He is turning his back 
on all he knows in order to explore a new mode of being rather than hide from his 
challenging thoughts. In allowing the possibilities of being, Thomas opens himself to the
158 Moorhouse, F. “Walking Out”. Futility and Other Animals. Sydney: Angus & Robertson. 1988. p. 91. All 
future references are to this edition and will be shown in-text.
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pragmatic mode. He is allowing the unknown and uncertain to enter his consciousness to 
challenge the known and certain. Thomas is accepting the necessity of engaging with the 
unknown and developing new practices of being and, significandy, to reevaluate the 
values he has heretofore accepted. Until this point he has resisted these challenging, 
discomfiting thoughts having no other system of behaviour to turn to. He has reached 
the point, however, where he realises his current habits of behaviour are just not working 
and can no longer accept their limitations. In doing so, he accepts the challenge of a 
more fluid, non-systematised universe: “Having something strange to do or say always 
bothered me and I would rather shrug out of it if I could. But this time I wasn’t going to 
do that.” (91) With this he signals an attempt to see beyond the reigning standard. He 
challenges the authority and the value system of the parental home:
’'Time to get up, Thomas. Father’s up.’
Father was always up. How could I tell her? She would be puzzled 
and scared. Father would come. He would ask what all the 
nonsense was about me not going to work. He’d be quivering 
around the lips. (93)
Thomas’s parents’ world is regulated and follows expected patterns of behaviour. Like 
George McDowell, they cannot brook diversity or even a shift in work routine. Their life 
follows a plan. His mother lived: “as if she worked by the cogs and springs of the clock.” 
(91)
In pragmatic terms, Thomas’s aversions have kickstarted his reflective thought. 
He begins to test his old habits of thought against new thoughts. Here, Thomas overrules 
his habits of work, the habits prescribed by his father: “I told myself that when I stopped 
work I could loaf about. And this is just what I wanted to do because I’m a lazy bastard 
at heart.” (91) Such a momentous decision to go against the family value system and 
custom is ironically contrasted with his real want: to do nothing much with his freedom 
at all. The alternative Thomas chooses reveals his work ethic and a moral evaluation 
(“lazy bastard”). Here the reader is also invited to make a moral valuation about 
Thomas’s desired style of living. As we witness Thomas walking away, we evaluate his 
moral act along with him. One of the questions here is: is walking away an act of bravery 
or cowardice? He calls himself a coward in this soundless disappearance, yet it also must 
be brave. Accepting the demands of progressive thought requires bravery since, by 
rejecting the community standard, one is automatically isolated from the social group. 
Moorhouse does not allow Thomas full sympathy and support, however, suggesting
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perhaps that there might be better ways to deal with those who will be affected by this 
change. But Thomas is not yet this sophisticated. This negativity towards Thomas’s 
perspective is demonstrated through his self-description that he is a “bastard” and his 
comment that the innocent and devoted Marj is just “a silly bitch”. He is, at least, aware 
of the serious ethical dimension his actions have and he thus “enjoyed condemning 
himself’.
Marj. I wormed back in the bed away from thinking of her. ..but 
Christ she drove me up the wall at other times. Then I realised 
that I had not let the thought about her driving me up the wall 
come into my head before, or if I had, I more or less pretended 
that I hadn’t seen it. I’d hidden away from the idea.. .Perhaps I 
didn’t really love her. I nodded to myself in bed and felt relieved 
that the idea of not loving her had come into my head and stayed.
My brain had never really let in ideas against Marj before. My 
brain keeps telling lies. No, it wasn’t always like that—I hadn’t 
been game enough to ask my brain direct questions. Of course,
I’d known my brain was lying but I’d been too weak to stop it. It 
was easier to let it use me and my mouth. (92)
The true cowardice here is in having previously “hid” from ideas. He was not
“game” to confront his true feelings. In avoiding his challenging thoughts, he has created
false social ties and, as with George McDowell, ignoring troubling thoughts brings moral
and personal retardation. Perhaps it is more unethical to perpetuate his standing social
ties rather than abruptly abandon them. Even if this is true, it is not resolved—nor is he
absolved—by the act of walking away. Thomas does not solve his confusion by merely
acknowledging his hidden thoughts. Something must happen and Moorhouse does not
rest in a romantic solution of a self-awakening that leads one to be wholly true to oneself.
Instead, Thomas finds himself faced with a double personality: “I’m two people.. .one of
me is a Liar and the other a coward.” (93) There are two reasons for his confused or dual
sense of self. Firstly, he is unknown to himself—he has been resistant to his
consciousness until this point. Secondly, he is faced with the complicated nature of truth.
As he packs his things to go, he spots a framed quotation given to him by an uncle, a
Rotarian, no less: “This above all: to thine ownself be true, And it must follow, as the
night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man.”
As I read it I thought it was a beaut saying. It was bloody true.. .1 
read it again and a bloody strange thing happened—it didn’t 
make sense...I knew what it meant one minute and the next I 
didn’t...I supposed it meant that you had to tell yourself when
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you were bullshitting. If you did this then you wouldn’t bullshit to 
others. But this wasn’t right. Sometimes a thing was bullshit at 
one time and not another. I told Marj I loved her when we were 
loving up and I meant it. But this morning for instance, it had 
been bullshit. It was hard to catch yourself being honest. (97)
Thomas is forced to see that the truth is no absolute, stable thing. Likewise, the 
idea of self is equally flexible. Thomas is confounded and confronted by the problem of 
the changeable nature of the self. He is approaching the idea that an inherent, absolute 
self does not work because the self functions in the highly changeable world of the social 
environment. Since the self is socially constituted, as the social scene changes, demands 
are made on the interacting selves. There are many different aspects of self. How can 
Thomas define the absolute “ownself ’ to whom he must be true? Who is Thomas when 
his society falls away? Thomas’s dissatisfaction in this scene stems from the type of self 
he takes on in the social position he occupies. He says: “I was a bullshit artist and I wrote 
bullshit letters. I was false to every bloody man.” (97) However, walking away provokes 
new and even more problematic concerns regarding the constitution of self. In short, he 
may be dissatisfied with the “bullshit” self he feels himself to be but, as yet, it is the only 
self that exists.
The social component of the self is of crucial concern in “Walking Away”. 
Thomas treats his mother and Marj with disdain when he describes their conversations: 
“Some of the things didn’t mean anything. I think they only talked to let each other know 
they wrere still around.” (93) Yet, he has identified one of the central ways in which we 
achieve recognition of self: through social interaction. His contempt issues from the fact 
he does not value their conversation and also has little respect for the communicating 
selves. He treats this need to be recognised and in-community as a weakness but his 
contempt is ultimately ironised. As Thomas leaves his social group he is turning away 
from any recognition of his self. As he slips away he laughs out loud. He is “feeling free 
but nervous”. Despite his devil-may-care laughter he admits: “I knew that I had been 
laughing to hear myself, like Marj and Mother. Making noises to show myself I was still 
there.” (98) He crunches loudly on an apple as he walks to the bus stop. Significantly he 
catches public transport, a public scene in which he is unknown. He quietly takes his 
place in a bus which is full of “silent, hunched people.” (98)
Thomas is already aware that the condition of flexibility has its problems. He is 
now vulnerable to all the fluctuations in self that fluidity implies. That is, he is no longer
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constrained by his former social network and obligations and this raises the danger of a
complete unravelling of self. Humans need the connections he is turning away from and
his sense of self is quickly rupturing as he leaves everything that he knows. Thomas will
need new social ballast if he is to survive.
In the story “What Can You Say?”,159 we see Thomas thrown into the inner-city
scene and finding his peers. To demonstrate his loss of self experienced in “Walking
Out”, this story opens with the line, “When I first met Jimmy I was nothing.” (15) He is
nothing because his self is outside the social scene. He is nothing because, as yet, he
occupies no place. He first sets up in Kings Cross— “the full bit”—and proceeds to
immerse himself into the new society: “I first met people in coffee shops and pubs,
including a couple of queers who I prompdy pissed off. I was very square then.” (15) He
begins frequenting the Royal George (the famed haunt of the Sydney Push)1'" “where
beatniks go.” He is naive to the scene, exemplified by his homophobia, yet he is starting
to experiment with experiences, testing the waters of Bohemia, in order to create a social
pattern that works for him. To achieve this, Thomas operates with an unstructured
openness which entertains most influences. This is demonstrated by his reading material
and the indiscriminate way he goes about finding it: “Must have read two million
magazines. I joined the library.. .They had racks of magazines.” (15-16) In
contradistinction to the required reading of the anarchist set, he reads without
discrimination or a “programme” of the kind followed by the radicals he will meet.
(Overexposure to too many magazines is a continuing “fault” of many of Moorhouse’s
narrators. Elsewhere, Milton says to the narrator, “It’s really piteous how much media
you take in .. .You should get one magazine and stick to it.”161) jimmy first approaches
Thomas when he is sitting at the George alone reading:
‘Is Miller out in paperbook now?’
I said: "What? Who’s he?’
‘Henry Miller—the book you’re reading.’
‘Oh, this book,’ I said, looking at the cover. ‘I just picked it up at 
the newsagents. I didn’t look to see who wrote it.’
The fellow with the beard seemed to think this was very 
funny. . .But he sat down and told me a few things about Henry 
Miller. Evidently Miller is bigtime. (16)
159 ¥utility and Other Animals, pp. 15-21.
160 por a discussion on this milieu, see Coombs, A. Sex and Anarchy: The Life and Death o f the Sydney Tush. 
Ringwood: Viking. 1996.
16! “Hilton Turns Against Champagne”. Tale o f Mystery and Romance, p. 87.
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To Jimmy, Thomas is a “bona fide primitive anarchist” , an empty but willing 
vessel for his radical ideas: “ [H]e spent hours telling me about [anarchism] because he 
said that I was an anarchist although I didn’t know it.” (17) Thomas seems to belong in 
this milieu although he lacks Jimmy’s articulate nature: “ [Jimmy] talked like a lecturer 
sometimes.” (The articulate nature of the group is an extremely important feature o f their 
culture and is routinely ironised in these stories.) As yet, Thomas does not have the same 
verbal skills:
Jimmy took me to parties where I met other people including 
girls. And they’d talk to you...For quite a few parties I was fairly 
miserable, though...I had nothing much to say. I couldn’t argue.
I’d just listen. Sometimes when I did start to talk it would be so 
corny and out o f place that they’d say: ‘Hold on, I want to get a 
drink, I’ll be back.’ But they wouldn’t come back. (19)
The question is will Jimmy’s definition of Thomas be yet another conferred form
of behaviour for Thomas, like the suburban domesticity he has just left? Or because he
“ doesn’t know it” , will Jimmy be the catalyst for Thomas’s self-awakening? Moorhouse
leaves the question open as Jimmy begins to initiate Thomas into the urban tribe,
teaching him their values and mores. He is immersed into the political and social scene as
Jimmy’s lectures map out the terrain of this strange new land: “ He said that a person who
fought against authority was an anarchist.” (17)
It doesn’t matter whether it’s a dictator or a boss or the beloved 
majority, it is still an imposition on you— you’re being pushed 
around. That’s why anarchists are against democracy and the 
boss-worker situation.
The introduction to the scene also extends to sexual initiation and this is
important to these urban tales, as sex is posited as the vital site o f difference to the
previous generation. It is a crucial part o f the social differentiation since it goes to the
heart o f domestic units and the foundations o f home:
Jimmy changed my ideas about sex...In his slow, lecturer’s voice, 
he said: ‘There are a diversity of personalities requiring a diversity 
o f sexual relationships. This society says there is only one—  
marriage. All right so you want to raise a family— find a girl and 
go ahead. But it doesn’t follow that you have to sleep with her 
only or she only with you.’
I used to say that I couldn’t understand how some o f his friends 
could let other fellows get off with their girls. I said it would give 
me a pain in the gut.
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But Jimmy would say: ‘You have to overcome jealousy. It’s like 
bad temper—you learn to control it.’ (18)
The irony in this speech on sexual practice is that what is promoted as freedom comes
with serious controls. You must learn to “control” yourself in order to survive the new
doctrine. The sexual world of the anarchists is weighted by as much control as the
suburban domesticity they all resist. Thomas must deny his “pain in the gut” reaction just
as George McDowell resists the “protestations of his soul” that roar against his own
controls. Described this way, as a gut pain, hints that this pain may be instinctive and
primal rather than conferred by a more conservative culture. The new doctrine imposes the
requirement to curb the natural impulses. This is absolutely contrary to their overt
principles of freedom, particularly sexual freedom. If Jimmy’s anarchists disdain all forms
of imposition and control yet formalise their sexual reactions, the principle is inherently
flawed. Furthermore, Jimmy shows that action must be divorced from feeling which, in
pragmatic terms, signals a breakdown in the dynamic relationship between thoughts,
action and the environment in which they take place. For Jimmy, the high-level thought
processes he has been honing—a signal of progress in the pragmatic process—has
abstracted to such a level that they risk no longer being valid in the practical world. There
is the misconception amongst the tribe that highly rationalised theory on every aspect of
the living process makes their position valid but, as becomes evident through the stories,
the further Moorhouse’s characters abstract their position, the more meaningless and
invalid they become. A comparison can be drawn here between this intellectual group
and Lawson’s witless farmers in “A Day on a Selection.” They too are well versed in the
economic theories of the day but, because those imported theories do not necessarily
work in their distinct environment, their farms crumble.
Eventually, Jimmy’s act collapses. The rationale that guides his life opens up the
door to meaninglessness. Just as George McDowell suffers a “stumble, not a fall” when a
crisis exposes a weakness in his intellectual posture, (“Tell Churchill T.George McDowell
is on His Feet” 107-118) Jimmy is defeated by his own dogma:
There is a point.. .when your experience is wide enough and your 
grasp of reality such, that you feel you have either experienced the 
sweetest of joys and some of the deepest of misery, or that you 
can at least imagine these, and it is then that you see life as a 
succession of these joys and miseries spaced by petty, 
intermediate, dullness. The prospect of this no longer excites you.
It just tires you. I’m tired. (19-20)
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Jimmy’s claims to a sophisticated “grasp of reality” and wide experience which 
leaves him in despair suggests limited powers rather than extended powers. To resist all 
authority and imposition for the sake of it is to resist the social adhesive. In pragmatist 
terms, by resisting all social habits as imposition, Jimmy foregoes the only source of 
meaning. By losing faith in the day-to-day joys and miseries of life, Jimmy loses the only 
source of the “sacred” which might give his life meaning. This is the challenge for 
Lawson’s and Moorhouse’s characters—to find meaning in a world that has no 
“historical centrality” and must be gained by other means. Up until this point of crisis, 
Jimmy has lived by the following precept: “tilings were self-justifying. That things don’t 
have to be anything or mean anything.. .a good relationship with a woman was enough.” 
(20) Interestingly, Jimmy comes to reject this precept and gives away two crucial 
revelations: ‘“That’s irrelevant,’ he said “except the part about the woman.’” Firsdy, by 
rejecting his initial claim, he is now implying that things do have to mean something. 
Secondly, in conceding the importance of relationships he accepts that human 
relationships provide ballast and meaning. His tone, however, is significant and undercuts 
the potency of Jimmy’s revelation: “He sounded as if he was correcting an essay.” Jimmy 
maintains a mental distance and detachment, which would preclude the real engagement 
with a woman that will supposedly provide meaning. Jimmy is still bound to speak in the 
language of a logic which does not assuage his despair. Just as Thomas, in “Walking 
Out”, had previously felt resistant to new, challenging thoughts because of their effect 
upon his life’s meaning, we see Jimmy confronting the limitations his intellectual mode 
has imposed: “All my rational life I have lived as an intellectual Arab in a mental tent on 
the border of two countries. The countries of futility and hope.”(19) Jimmy is caught 
between mental states and because of this can no longer act decisively. This is why he is 
passed out, drugged and drunk, immobile. He is defeated by his own limited thought 
processes.
Jimmy’s final appraisal of social interaction runs thus: “[A]ll people do or want to 
do is push someone around.” Ironically, this appraisal includes the dogmatic libertarians 
themselves. Jimmy’s “lectures” are an attempt to indoctrinate Thomas. Given the 
dogmatic drive of the libertarian scene, which will be illustrated more fully in later 
discussion, Moorhouse is clearly making a pun on the word “push”. The anarchists, the 
Sydney Push, armed with all the impulses to fight the conventions of the previous
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generation, became equally authoritarian, particularly in the relations between men and 
women.
The Freedom Police
Armed with new ideals, Moorhouse’s characters wage war on the conventional groups
they have emerged from. Given their articulate nature, the war they wage is a verbal one.
This is intensely ironised in “The Machine Gun”162, where the revolution the libertarians
refer to and wait for is exposed as hot air. The drama unfolds between the familiar figure
of Kim, a schoolteacher and verbal revolutionist, and Turvey, a conspiracy-obsessed
revolutionary poet. Here, Moorhouse clearly draws the line between the theory of the
revolution and its material reality:
‘Here are the magazines from Cuba.’
He handed Turvey the magazines.
Turvey tossed them on the table which was obliterated by other 
papers, magazines and books—all of it looked like postponed 
reading...
‘Where’s your revolutionary zeal?’
Turvey shrugged, pulled out a book from the nearest case, as if at 
random, didn’t open it, put it back, and with a wild turn, broke 
out, ‘I want to show you something.’ (101-102)
Turvey returns with a machine gun. When asked why he has it, he says: “Things 
could get hot.” With sheer disbelief, his comrade replies: “You’ve got to be joking.” (102) 
The machine gun is a monstrous absurdity. Its physicality turns talk of “revolution” on 
its head (topsy-‘Turvey’). The idea that it might ever be put to its intended purpose is 
painted as plainly ridiculous. Like mischievous boys, the two men decide to test out the 
gun and take it to the national park, Kim acknowledging that: “[i]t was easier to imagine 
himself back with the school cadets than guerilla fighting in the streets.” (103) Turvey 
takes two magazines for ammunition. This is a very telling pun: these magazines, full of 
bullets, are very different from the magazines the revolutionists are familiar with, which 
he on Turvey’s table unread. The printed magazines are the fodder for their verbal war. A 
magazine for a machine gun is a different prospect altogether: “They loaded the 
magazines. The realness of the bullets almost convinced him of the rest, as though the 
existence of the material of revolution was evidence of its reality. They loaded them very 
quickly.” (104)
162 Moorhouse, F. The Americans, Baby. Sydney: HarperCollinsPublishers. 1992. pp. 101-111.
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On their way to the park, the suburban presence of family picnics is in stark 
contrast with their radical agenda; the fact that people are freely picnicking deflates any 
revolutionary urgency. They take the gun to an isolated spot and point it “overlooking 
the empty Tasman Sea.” (105) Its emptiness once again ironises Turvey’s expectations of 
the coming revolution and Kim’s theory. There is nothing coming. When they tire of 
firing at nothing they seek out something real to shoot. Kim goes into the scrub and 
finds some cans and botdes. As he searches through the “bones of a picnic”, Kim 
imagines the conversations of picnics past: “Here’s a nice spot, Kim. Find some 
firewood. I hope somebody remembered the salt.” (105) Not only is foraging for 
shootable items reminiscent of children playing with an air rifle, but the picnic itself 
suggests the unlikelihood of street fighting. Here the biggest crisis is forgetting the salt 
and the only bones are those of leftovers.
When they take the gun to a party, and Turvey drunkly waves it around: “[Kim] 
couldn’t quite take in the incongruity of it—the suburban house—the party at a 
standstill, except for the record player, two shouting drunks, and noises from the other 
room.” (109) He concedes to Turvey: “Our revolutionary legend’s a bit weak.”
In “Anti-bureaucratisation and the Apparatchiki”161, Kim’s revolutionary 2eal is 
ironised from the point of view of his girlfriend, the country" girl Dell. Her innocence of 
theory is contrast with his knowledge. Like Jimmy, Kim takes on the task of theoretical 
instruction:
‘Why do you bother with a girl like me?’ she said... ‘I don’t know 
anything.’
‘You’re unformed,’ he said, ‘a peasant girl, that’s why.’
Yfou don’t love me, though,’ she said sadly, wondering how he 
thought it was a compliment to call her a ‘peasant girl’. Probably 
had something to do with him being a Trotskyist. Trotsky- 
snotsky.
‘Love has too much bourgeois content,’ he said, lying back with 
his eyes shut.
Of course it would. There’d have to be something wrong with it.
Lordy.
‘I said you didn’t have to marry me,’ she said, petulantly thinking 
she wouldn’t marry him in a hundred years.
‘We’ll have to give you a progressive morality,’ he said, eyes still 
shut. (220-221)
163 The Americans, Baby. pp. 217-232.
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Her education and “progressive morality” consists of learning communist theory and all
the words for sex. The story opens with his sexual demand: “Fellatio.” “She thought she
heard something like, ‘Hell’s art below’. . .He was pushing her head down.. .He was so
unfeeling—expecting her to know all the words.” (217) Kim’s social project is to break
all taboos and this forms the impetus behind his demands. Dell becomes for him “a case
history of sexual taboo.” (230) Kim is completely disengaged from Dell emotionally and
this disengagement manifests through his discourse of social and political science when
she is the subject of discussion. He speaks about her as if she isn’t there:
‘Dell and I were just having a talk about contraception.’ Kim said.
‘It’s amazing—she knows nothing—A perfect example of sexual 
taboo.’ Kim told Carl, tapping his cigar ash into the
fireplace__They went on talking about the broad masses and
progressivist education. (229)
The new progressive life, as Kim lives it, precludes any real personal engagement
due to its overbearing theoretical consciousness. It is not that theory has been divorced
from action—a certain amount of their practice is theory based, as the opening fellatio
scene illustrates—however, there is a rift between their theory in general and its practical
purposes. Dell exposes this rift when she rehearses her communist rhetoric and, in doing
so, evacuates all meaning from it. After their instructional lovemaking, Kim reads to her
about Lenin. She is bored. He admonishes her for not listening and, as a retort, she
quotes a passage back at him she has previously learnt by rote:
‘Well,’ he said, somewhat surprised, ‘at least you’ve learned 
something.’ He seemed a little dazed.
That was from the earlier days when they’d just met. She’d 
learned that off by heart. But already she was forgetting it. God 
knew what it all meant. And he was impressed. Would you believe 
it?
‘You’ll be a good worker for the revolution yet,’ he said. (223)
Here Moorhouse makes the point that to be a “good worker”, low critical 
faculties are an advantage. This attitude is a long way from a progressive morality which 
can only be acquired by rigorous reflective thinking. In pragmatist terms, Kim’s morality 
is more correctly a customary morality where unreflective, habitual and rote thinking is 
required. Here the so-called progressive life is ironised since it is a limited 
progressiveness, given that the boundaries of the new lifestyle are zealously guarded. It is 
a clipped and illusory progressiveness since it is founded upon dogma symbolised by the
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same militaristic dress (Cuban army shirts) Kim and Carl both wear. As a result, Kim 
becomes as authoritarian as the middle class conventional lifestyle he is reacting against. 
We are reminded here of a principle of Dewey and Tufts’ pragmatism, which emphasises 
at all times moral progress: “Not order but orderly progress.” In other words, as soon as 
a system of thought or pattern of behaviour becomes an established order, the potential 
for moral progress is stunted. From this position of authority, two inevitable problems 
arise. Firstly, Kim seeks to exert this power over others, namely Dell; and, secondly, he 
so blindly accepts the position he inhabits that it precludes him from understanding the 
other. An unwillingness to see things from Dell’s point of view limits any sympathy that 
may develop and, as Dewey discusses, an ever-widening circle of sympathy is a crucial 
aspect of moral progressiveness. Rather than challenge his own thinking to incorporate 
the legitimacy of another position he seeks to subjugate it. In moral terms, this is clearly 
unprogressive. These issues of power are exemplified in his and Dell’s debate over 
contraception. Firstly, Kim takes his power over her for granted. He takes it upon 
himself to make her an appointment with a doctor “to get you on the Pill.” She refuses 
to go:
“You can’t be ‘against pills’,’ he said.
‘I can be if I want to be.’
‘You can’t be,’ he screamed, ‘you can’t be ‘against pills.’
She’d had enough. She left the dishes in the suds and pushed past 
him.
He followed her to the bedroom. ‘I just want to know,’ he said, 
with this bitingly quiet voice, ‘what special information you have 
about the Pill that medical science doesn’t.’
She felt trapped in the conversation. He kept putting words in 
front of her like road blocks. He often forced her to answer 
questions she didn’t want to answer or which were the wrong 
questions anyhow.
‘You only take pills if there is something wrong with you,’ she 
said, ‘and there is nothing wrong with me.’ (226)
Kim’s exasperation comes from the tight bounds of his conventions and 
assumptions. He is so utterly convinced about his own theories of behaviour that he 
suffers the blind spots inherent in any total system. In the passage above, he repeats the 
phrase “you can’t be” three times whereas Dell’s position is much more free and fluid: “I 
can be if I want to be.” Authoritative phrases like Kim’s reveal him to be a hard-line 
rationalist, struggling for control and resisting an idea that, to him, is too illogical to even 
contemplate. Ethically, he has stalled. He has this in common with his predecessor
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George McDowell, who also claims to be “on the side of progress”. Kim may feel he is
progressive, but he is unable to cope with difference and, as such, will never achieve a
reflective morality. He claims to have a “progressive morality” but his definition of such
is a poor one. To him, progressive simply means different to the last generation’s code of
behaviour, but “progressive” suggests ongoing change. Kim’s brand of “progressiveness”
has been untested until now. Until now, the group has accepted the customs so no
reworking or reevaluating of the prevailing custom has been required. Kim takes it for
granted that Dell will take oral contraception. Dell tests his moral sophistication by
rejecting his values and cultural assumptions that all women should take the Pill:
‘How are we going to have a good sex life if you don’t take the 
Pill?’
For once she seemed to be winning.
‘Didn’t people have good sex lives before the Pill?’
He didn’t reply. (227)
Kim sees her resistance as ignorance. It is true that Dell does not understand all
die physical functions and she doesn’t “know all the words”, however the core of her
resistance is towards his exertion of power over her:
‘I suppose you could have a diaphragm fitted,’ he said tiredly.
Oh my God, she thought, oh my God, what’s he going to have 
done to me now? She saw him and his friends holding her down 
on the bed and fitting something into her. (227)
Dell’s experience of this society is in contrast to their teachings to fight authority. She 
vividly imagines the men “holding her down”, jimmy’s depressed assessment fits all too 
well: “[A]ll people do or want to do is push someone around.” In this case, despite the 
so-called progressive consciousness and anti-authoritarianism, the men are simply 
attempting to push the women around.
Moorhouse deals with contraception again in “The First Story of Nature”164, but 
from another perspective. In this story, we again see the male attempt to assert his power 
over the woman and to do so via the controls of verbal war. In this instance, the Pill is 
the symbol of women’s independence from men and, in retaliation, Hugo has thrown 
Cindy’s contraception out. Looked at pragmatically, “Anti-bureaucratisation and the
164 In Futility and Other Animals there are three stories o f nature: “The First Story o f Nature” appears in the 
section titled ‘Confusion’. This story7 also appears in the later publication The Americans, Baity under the title, 
“The Story o f Nature” and shows textual changes. I will largely refer to the edition in FOA since it has 
been published with and in relation to the linked stories I also refer to: “The Second Story7 o f Nature” and 
“The Third Story o f Nature” which also appear in FOA under the section ‘Bravery’.
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Apparatchiki” and “The First story of Nature” taken together, suggest that it is not a thing 
per se (oral contraception, for example) that has moral valency but the thing as it junctions 
in relation to other things, that is, a situation.
This is an important distinction since it emphasises that moral values are 
imported into objects, not inherent within them. In Hugo’s attempt to justify his 
behaviour, he weights contraception with moral import by showing that his decision 
comes from his deep care for Cindy’s wellbeing. He says: “‘I hate contraceptives.. .1 hate 
to think of your body being twisted by chemicals.’” (53-54) In an effort to boost his 
argument and to further load it wtith its ethical dimension, he also supplies a theory of 
love, and an equation:
‘Love goes bad between people when they don’t want children,’ 
he said. ‘Contraception is a rejection. A rejection of me as a 
father. It’s hesitancy.. .Love implies children,’ he said, buttressing 
his words with a heavy definiteness. ‘Children are the other part 
of the equation.’(54)
The reality is Hugo wants dependants, Cindy included, over whom he can have 
paternalistic power. He wants control over Cindy’s body by removing the other 
control—contraception. By attempting to give contraception an absolute value (anti­
love), rather than a relative one, Hugo, like Kim, reveals an assumption of power and a 
superior and rigid moral position. In response, Cindy calls him an “authoritarian shit”: 
“you’re—you’re like all men—you think we can be used for your—fantasies.” When 
Cindy processes this confrontation, the narrative becomes a blend of theoretical rhetoric 
and emotional reaction. In the following quote, Moorhouse uses a blend of italics and 
plain type to show the fusion of thought:
It was male domination. And she was humiliated by the demoralising 
power of the things he had said. But they were cra2y things. His 
attitude was authoritarian. He resented the independence that the Pill gave 
women. She wouldn’t become involved again—she would have 
lovers—but not the involvement of domesticity. One didn 7 have to 
have children. In a mental skip she was nauseated by the thought of 
the sexual act. Instantly she was embarrassed by guilt and severely 
expurgated the nausea from her mind. She gathered her principles 
and theories around her like bedclothes. She almost ran down the 
street in emotional panic. (55)
The text rendered in italics enunciates the kinds of principles and theories Cindy 
wraps herself in; the text in plain type represents her actual emotional reaction.
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Moohouse’s constant irony is operating here but it is gently applied; even in the midst of 
a desperate, “emotional panic”, the self-conscious and articulate Cindy still interprets the 
events in highly theoretical terms. The difference here, however, is that for once, the 
theory is holding out. In this case, theory and experience support each other. We can see 
that her theory of masculine power is useful in assessing her actual situation and creating 
the verbal armour required for self-preservation. She fortifies her position with theory 
which also becomes the blankets of comfort.
Moorhouse’s characters fight on a verbal battlefield complete with “traps” and 
“tactics” and the battles are fought and won through definitions. Hugo equates children 
with love, ergo Cindy’s rejection of children is a rejection of love. In the later edition of 
the story, Hugo says: “Trap you?.. .1 suppose you think love is a trap—and that wouldn’t 
surprise me—you’re so hung-up on modern crap about independence—which you 
mistake as being neuter—that you can’t love.”165 Cindy may have saved herself from the 
first trap—having Hugo’s children—but she falls for the second one: his definition of 
love. She is clearly trapped by his definition because through this interaction she resolves 
to avoid future domestic involvement with any man. It must be “all men” because she 
has already trapped herself in an earlier definition of “all men” being the same: “you’re— 
you’re like all men”. Hugo has revealed himself as an “authoritarian shit” and since Cindy 
believes he is now the same as “all men”, she has to accept all men are authoritarian and 
all domestic involvement must be avoided.
Hugo sees Cindy as a victim in the thrall of “modern crap about independence”, 
yet he is also under the heavy influences of his own ideals. Earlier in the story Cindy is 
doing some housework and Hugo kisses her and says: “It warms me to see you cleaning 
the cave.” (52) On cooking, he says: “I argue that there is too much confusion of flavour 
and too much spicing in modern cooking. I like the meals of the pioneers and the 
peasants.” (49) In favouring peasant ways, the rejection of the new spicing is a rejection 
of cosmopolitanism and the influences of the other. (The new spices Cindy uses come 
from Cooking Greek Style) Hugo’s ideal is to go hunting and for Cindy to cook what he 
has killed. (50) He idealises the peasant life. He is indeed suffering under the very 
fantasies Cindy charges him with and is using her for these projections. He says to Cindy: 
“I like your simple clothes and I like your graceful wrays. I know precisely how you will
165 This quote is from the later version in The Americans Baby, where the phrase “modern crap about 
independence” has been added, p. 59.
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dress our children and how they’ll imitate their mother’s grace.” (53) Cindy “gag[s] an 
outcry which rose in her” (52) when he makes such comments. The conflict between the 
lovers is a conflict between systems of thought. It is not, as Hugo would believe, a debate 
between normalcy versus “modern crap”. He is simply blind to his own system of 
thought which sees “modern crap” as a fraudulent way of being. He rejects more 
complicated influences in favour of simpleness. His complaint about spices is telling: 
“there is too much confusion of flavour”.(49) This is a complaint against the increasing 
complexity of influences changing his way of life. It is an attempt to limit the degree of 
difference he will allow to infiltrate his life-system. He resists the changes taking place, 
particularly amongst the women of this new generation.
The social upheavals which Moorhouse’s characters generate—a wave which they 
then must ride unsure of the future consequences—cause considerable tension between 
men and women. This tension is made most explicit in “The Girl Who Met Simone de 
Beauvoir in Paris”166 where Moorhouse specifically addresses the male anxieties regarding 
female independence and empowerment:
‘Mia says she met Simone de Beauvoir in Paris,’ she told him.
‘So?’
He was curled in his womb chair. She was reading the Elizabeth 
David cookbook, Summer Cooking. He didn’t want to be told 
about Mia meeting Simone de Beauvoir in Paris. Simone de 
Beauvoir was a cold draft against his frail, invalid masculinity.
But he wasn’t going to venture that information. (163)
He is in his “womb chair”, a cradle from which he is not ready to emerge. He can also be 
seen as a conservative old man, an invalid, whose norms have been invalidated. Both as a 
child and an old man, he requires the constant attention of a— preferably female— 
caretaker, either the adoring mother or diligent wife. He is threatened by any other 
female role. That Mia was even in Paris unsetties him: “He resented it. He resented talk 
like that which mockingly reminded him of the rich world beyond.. .Why should a 
waitress be able to casually say ‘Rue Schoelcher in Montparnasse’?” (165)
As with Hugo, the male focus of this story is averse to external influences on 
women. Moorhouse again uses cooking as a way to demonstrate the new influences 
appearing in women’s lives and that they should come through the kitchen is a marvelous 
irony. The symbol of female domesticity comes to symbolise a doorway to richly spiced
166 The Americans, Baby. pp. 163-176.
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worlds beyond. The he of this story protests against Elizabeth David as a way to deflect
the tension rising from discussion of de Beavoir:
He shouldn’t have said, ‘So?’ It didn’t invite discussion—it rang 
the bell for a round. The sort of action he could do without.
He tried interception and diversion, ‘I’m against Elizabeth David 
cookbooks,’ he said, interestingly. ‘I rather like the idea of women 
compiling their own cookbooks from their own experience and 
their grandmother’s—handwritten and pasted together.’ (163-164)
The ideal of the simplistic and domestically accomplished woman Hugo has 
previously fantasised about, is mirrored in this story. Here, this man’s “idea of women” is 
clearly outlined with an emphasis on natural and unsophisticated processes. A tribal 
pattern is suggested where all knowledge is passed down through generations, though, 
significantly, he bypasses the mother who is presumably still the enemy. The book should 
be handwritten and pasted together which is both representative of a low-level mode of 
production and also would have the benefit of keeping a woman’s home crafts up to 
date. Furthermore, the time spent over such an occupation is time diligendy spent on the 
domestic arrangement. Rather conveniently, a woman would have little time to read and 
be influenced by Simone de Beauvoir or Elizabeth David if she was busy pasting her own 
book together.
The verbal war is, again, clearly waged. Despite that the argument is merely a 
diversionary tactic, his resistance to Elizabeth David is telling. Firstly, and more generally, 
it is clear that he resists the influences and authority of other women unless it is from 
within the comforting folk confines of family wisdom. Elizabeth David’s cookbook is 
not handwritten but rather given the authority of the mass produced printed article. He is 
afraid of how far this unknown woman’s powers of influence will extend, just as Simone 
de Beauvoir worries him. Secondly, and more specifically, Elizabeth David was directly 
responsible for bringing foreign cooking influences into post-war British kitchens, with 
titles such as Mediterranean Food (1950) and French Country Cooking (1951).ir’ His resistance 
to Elizabeth David is a resistance to foreign influences that may change the way women 
act. From where he sits, rocking in his womb chair, men are fast losing their grip on 
power and control.
167 See Elizabeth David Classics: Mediterranean Food, French Country Cooking Summer Cooking. London: Grub 
Street. 1999.
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His anxiety stems from the fact that “you couldn’t change the role of women
without changing the role of men.” (168) He harasses and goads Mia over a series of
encounters and becomes more and more adamant and “hung up.” Mia meeting de
Beauvoir is a threat—a direct attack—to his masculinity and the conditions of social
control. In desperation, he says to Mia: “You can’t change the female role without
consulting us.” (172) The situation is hopeless. With the battle all but over, the only
answer for him and his male friends, Stockwell and Cooper, is retreat:
Later they were drinking brandy in Stockwell’s study beneath the 
defeated stare of the antlered head of a buck, their feet on the fur 
of the bear, lying back low in the leather armchairs, when a 
banging began on the front door...
‘How long can we hold out?’ Cooper said to Stockwell, who was 
white. ‘The women have really got us holed up,’ Cooper said 
grimly, looking through the curtain into the garden, ‘is there a 
back way out?’
‘Yes, there is a back passage,’ Stockwell said with desperate hope.
(176)
The retreat is into homosociality and homosexuality. The sexual pun “back 
passage” suggests a desperate hope that women can be bypassed altogether. The men will 
find both social and sexual satisfaction away from women who refuse to play the roles 
men desire. Together, these men will attempt to address the full complement of 
behaviours in the closing circle of the “Moses E Herzog lunch club” (164). The buck is 
hunted and defeated; the accoutrements of their masculinity are deflated like the “fur of 
the bear”. In this story, “he” rests back in the “womb chair”, a cradle that finally falls to 
the ground while, in contrast, her “voice had the cock of a gun about it.” (165)
Similar gender role reversals prevail in Lawson; however, Moorhouse’s role 
reversals are a response to a very different stimulus than in Lawson’s fiction. Whilst 
Lawson’s men do retreat into homosociality when the responsibilities of domesticity 
become too much to bear, Lawson’s men often take on feminine characteristics and roles 
on the track as a response to the absence of women. Likewise, women on isolated 
selections must take on masculine roles and characteristics to compensate for absent 
men. In this Moorhouse story, however, the men reject the feminine outright. Femininity 
is in the process of change and will be a direct threat to their power. If women change, 
the men must also change. The source of anxiety for the men is the question of what will 
they change into? Rather than face this unknown courageously, they retreat. They do not
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reevaluate past ideals and rework them; they compensate for the absent ideal female by 
finding a feminine component within each other. The women are left wondering: “Why 
are the men around us so infantile?... [W]here are the men with pricks like studguns?” 
(164)
The Balmain tribe faces a civil war of attrition. Returning to “The First Story of
Nature”, the tense standoff finishes with separation. This situation is a clash of value
systems but it is not a battle with a clear victor. Cindy’s position is a tense one because
she cannot fully relinquish the traditional controls of the past:
She was not a squaw. Yet when he had said it she had felt a warm 
emotional touch and had roughly and intellectually pushed it 
away. She was going to be an academic, not just a woman—and 
never a squaw. She was a woman biologically—because she had a 
vagina.. .She was going to be an intellectual with a vagina—like de 
Beauvoir. She w’as not going to be like other poor, deluded things.
(53)
Cindy feels warmed by the comforting confines of the male-guarded cave yet she 
“roughly and intellectually” pushes this feeling away. Her theory cannot accommodate it 
and her reaction is to create a false binary of self. To accept this warming feeling is high 
treason against her theoretical agenda and thus she places a limit on her feelings and the 
experiences she will open herself to. Again there is the uncomfortable pull of tense, inner 
relations. As seen with Thomas, the self can accommodate conflicting truths 
simultaneously, but here Cindy has reached her conceptual boundaries. She cannot 
tolerate her dissenting feelings and so smothers them. Cindy further strengthens this 
binary when she sees herself as an “intellectual with a vagina”. This reinforces the 
perception that the typical intellectual is a man, severely threatening the quality of her 
feminism. She regards the vagina as a qualification of the standard intellectual: ‘“I don’t 
want to be a woman,’ she yelled, sensing too late that it was a bad tactical admission.”(59) 
Cindy enforces the division between mind and matter within the body thus creating a 
non-dynamic and abstract field in which she will live out her life as a “serious thinker”. 
She approaches her life as an experiment, a contrived field of play. Cindy’s decision to 
live with Hugo is an experiment, just as Kim’s social engagements in the “Aparatchiki” 
story are like science experiments. This intellectual distancing compromises the quality of 
the engagement:
She felt that Hugo seriously wanted a ‘cohabitating 
relationship’—strongly and without nonsense. And she wanted it.
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She felt that she had made adequate allowances for her 
infatuation with him and that the decision was basically 
rational.. .It offered her things—experience and a close human 
relationship etc. (48)
Cindy has a conscientious objective to seek out “experience”. She approaches
things like “a close human relationship” as if it was a place of interest to mark off on an
itinerary. The self-consciousness this requires would surely work against developing any
real closeness since Hugo is fodder for her experience. The enormously ironic “etc”
suggests that characters that inhabit this social group keep a mental list of situations that
need to be experienced. The group experiences a high level of self-consciousness because
the rules of behaving are in the process of change and each “experience” is embarked on
conscientiously. In this story Cindy is “sweet twenty” and is undergoing the shift into
adulthood in a highly self-conscious way:
Although she wanted to become a historian—or, as she 
sometimes told herself, a serious thinker—she led an impulsive 
sort of life and was glad that she could. She was glad that there 
was still some of the child in her, that she hadn’t frozen into a stiff 
Apollonian. That would come, she guessed. Her impulse to act 
would be slowed down and increasingly restrained by questions of 
whether it would be wise. Had she considered alternatives 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz? Was she succumbing to the 
seduction of mood? Didn’t she have responsibilities. All these 
sorts of questions. Or perhaps people never became coldly 
rational but simply replaced impulse and spontaneity with habit, 
patterns of living, and styles of life. But rational questions raised 
their frowning heads at her even now. She could act on impulse, 
but sometimes, say in the morning while showering, or riding the 
bus to university, she would find herself face-to-face with one of 
the frowning questions. They frowned like her father. Even 
thinking like this now after having made an impulsive decision 
was a sign that the frowning person in her was working against 
the giggling person—against her decision to live with Hugo. But 
she had expected it to come. Perhaps all this meant was that she 
was becoming an intellectual—becoming aware of herself. She 
would not let it bother her. (47)
Here Cindy faces a conflict of values. Her self is in crisis. Torn between the 
giggling and frowning persons she has created an internal contradiction. Her decision to 
live with Hugo is impulsive and satisfies the devil-may-care quotient the new milieu 
values, being in antipathy to the “frowning father”-style decisions they are rebelling 
against. The problem arises when other values surface from within. This is the value of
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the rationalising intellectual she also must recognise if she is to evolve into a “serious 
thinker”. She lives with Hugo to experience a certain relationship and she is at pains to 
remove the emotional content from this decision, for emotional content would de-value 
her rationalisation and, therefore, disqualify her from becoming her idealised self: “But 
no, the decision to live with him had been impulsive. The analysis came afterwards and 
was a summary.” (48)
Cindy has made for herself a very tight bind. In her mind, to become a true 
intellectual, who she thinks must be a rationalist, she must become her “frowning 
father”. She does not see that her assessments of consequences can be creative. She 
equates the consideration of consequences with being responsible to the point of being 
stiff. But it is only in the consideration of future consequences that we can really start to 
act with any competence at all. When she considers abcdejg. .. she is assessing the quality 
of her action when it is matched against its forecast consequences. This is ethical 
decision-making and has little to do with the “frowning father”-style figure Moorhouse 
so often depicts. Moorhouse’s frowning father is most often uncreative and not as 
analytical as Cindy’s projection of her own ethical development. It is a mistake to equate 
cold rationalisations with the pondering of consequences, since to ponder circumstance 
and consider alternatives and solutions is a creative and imaginative act. The urban 
society, in breaking away from previous traditions, is attempting to create a new ethic. 
They are developing a new morality. But in wanting to remain a “giggling,” impulsive 
person, Cindy’s behaviour cannot really be regarded as ethical since actions only become 
ethical when the interaction of people and consequences are considered. When positions 
become rigid like this—frowning versus giggling—value systems will invariably clash, 
leaving the agent of the drama struggling for stability. Cindy feels the very palpable shock 
of “emotional panic” when she leaves Hugo: ‘“I had no alternative,’ she said, and she 
herself heard how positive and how desperate it sounded and the sound frightened her. 
Oh shit, Oh Christ.” (55) To have no alternative is not a high-level conclusion. It is a 
failure of the imagination.
The Orphan Generation
Cindy takes on a more creative, open position in “The Second Story of Nature,” and here 
she loosens her habits of behaviour and experiences new freedoms by removing all 
constraint. Then, in the “The Third Story of Nature”, she must face the vulnerabilities
152
such an open system of decision-making brings. In these stories Moorhouse again
explores freedom through the issue of contraception. As we have seen, in the first story
Cindy secures her freedom by using contraception. In “The Second Story of Nature”
Cindy is in a new cohabitation with Roger and she herself throws the Pill away. Seized by
passion, she feels as if “ she was no longer drugged down or as though her legs were no
longer tied.” (151) She tries to convince herself of the “foolish, foolish reaction” but is
“overcome”. Roger, too, is aroused by the possibilities. Not only do they simply cease to
care about preventing conception, they crave it as a symbol of their freedom:
This was the first time like this. She had furiously cared at all 
times before this and had never taken a risk—not for years—no, 
not ever. The problem flickered around outside her mind, just 
outside her concern. She saw that it was kept away from her by 
the heat of a kind of pleasure and the pleasure was that of feeling 
unconstrained. (151)
fust as with George McDowell, the feeling of breaking through the constraints of 
contraception is an arousing and eruptive force. The increasing similarity concerning 
freedom and constraint between George and the new generation is no small irony. Like 
George, Cindy pulls herself up mentally when her mind wanders too far from her 
theoretical line:
Women are freer now because they control contraception and it is 
premeditated contraception and they can be free of the fear of 
pregnancy and unhampered by devices and totally relaxed about 
it, but it means a daily sexual routine, a medical regimen, and it’s a 
policing of the body and now suddenly I’ve broken the regimen 
and lost the freedom and am exposed to pregnancy and I feel a 
new freedom, a new free feeling, and it comes from being 
exposed to pregnancy and giving up control of my body and 
becoming reliant on a man to care for me, to be my...hunter and 
my soldier.. .(152)
The excessive length of the first sentence of this quotation symbolises the complete 
unravelling of Cindy’s previous dogma. She allows herself to confront her regular beliefs 
with a bold “but”. She exposes the authoritarian impositions of her new world when she 
uses words like “routine”, “regimen” and “policing”. This is shocking to her. Here, once 
again, is the uncomfortable pull between old and new ways of life. When Hugo had 
talked of hunting and primitivism, she had “gagged”, and stifled any feelings she may 
have had to the contrary; now in the throes of passion, she craves the world where she 
will be under the man’s protection. Moorhouse returns to these primitive impulses time
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and again. “The Story of the Knife” is another example where traditional roles of a man
and woman are played out and their actions are erotically charged because the previous
styles of man- and woman-hood have become old-fashioned: “Was he playing with
manhood or something? Or was she playing with womanhood?.. .But Christ, feeling this
way wasn’t a fetish. This was the way he should feel. Like man, it’s the real thing.”168 The
traditional roles the characters take on are erotically charged precisely because in the
current scene, it is subversive behaviour. The lovers go against the grain of their
contemporary mores by returning to more traditional role-plays and thus the traditional
becomes the subversive. Since constant subversion is the reigning ideology of the
generation, Moorhouse turns the traditional into the radical. Cindy does not allow herself
to ponder an existence such as this for long. “Mentally she slapped herself, shocked at
the words which had come from her. Irrational and mawkish and sickening. I am still for
free loving and against conventional marriage and remain firmly so.” (152) This return to
her corrective and rigid line stabilises her world for a time. But there will be a
consequence to Roger and Cindy’s contraception-free lovemaking and this produces
perhaps an irreconcilable crisis for the third and final story of nature.
In “The Third Story of Nature” Cindy’s mother is cleaning Cindy’s flat while she
sits cross-legged on her bed, cradling her pregnant stomach. In snapping on her rubber
gloves, the mother attempts to establish in the flat the order and values of her own
middle-class suburbia. For Cindy’s mother, if order can be maintained in the home
almost all disasters can be prevented. She and Cindy discuss a recent road accident which
killed a friend’s son: “The road accident was the unpredictable terror in an otherwise
predictable society.. .The siren was the way we announced the conflict between order
and disaster.” (170) For Cindy’s mother, the accident had become “a folk drama” about
chaos against which she stands with “her hands on her aproned hips,”:
‘Next time I come I’ll bring my new detergent. It’s really 
excellent.. .Father brought it from the factory. It’s for industrial 
use. I use it around the house.’ . . .Her mother’s virtue for 
cleanliness had become a violent, acidic thing...One day her 
mother would find a detergent which would keep all things 
permanently and deeply clean. Her mother would bring it to her 
and wash out her life and bathe her in it. From then on she would 
never be able to again feel dirty or have a sweating fuck. (166)
168 “The Story of the Knife.” Futility and Other Animals, pp. 1-14.
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Whilst the mother’s control is emphasised here, she is not alone in her need to 
remove chaos. This story is about Cindy’s secret desire for her mother’s securities. 
Despite the implicit critique of her “mother’s sterilised existence” in its rejection of the 
sensual and its excessive controls (her mother buys Cindy clothes from David Jones to 
“serve as a uniform and a correction”), this passage also introduces the comforts and 
temptations of such a minutely controlled life. The paragraph concludes: “But at least the 
soles of her feet would not be gritty after walking from the bath to the bed. That would 
be something.” An extreme tension exists between the old and the new. Moorhouse 
often depicts the young, adventurous generation as casualties as much as they are 
cavalier. Cindy worries about the social rupture they have created: “Were you in the 
vanguard or simply impatiendy running on ahead—to find yourself without society— 
isolated and scared with other isolated and scared people?”(165) Cindy is standing at the 
frontier, “without society”, faced with the absence of long-standing tradition. It is in this 
moment that she realises the quality of custom. On the one hand, the conventions of 
previous generations are repressive but on the other, they provide security through form. 
Cindy and Roger have turned their back on these conventional patterns of love but, in 
doing so, forfeit the rights and obligations that have been developed within the 
established social pattern.
The abandonment of long-standing custom contributes to the constant anxieties
Moorhouse writes about in his short stories. Cindy’s mother is equally anxious for her
daughter and grandchild who will have to cope in this unstable environment:
“The little mite should have the protection of marriage—even if 
you don’t want it.”
“What protection is that?”
“Legal protection. Just in case something happened.”
“What legal protection?”
“Well dear, I don’t like broaching these things but we have to be 
practical. What, for instance, if Roger left you. I’m not saying that 
he ever would—but there’s nothing holding him, is there?” (170)
The practicalities of the legal obligations of care are contrasted with Cindy’s more
idealistic vision of love and cohabitation. “For God’s sake, laws don’t hold people
together.. .And who wants money that has to be forced out of someone you love?” (171)
Her mother refused to concede Roger the rights of a husband. In 
his casual way Roger didn’t claim them and in the formal sense he 
wasn’t a husband. What rights? The old trap again. The trap of 
looking for established patterns of rights and explanations.
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Established patterns were used by people whose relationships 
were too weak to generate their own living patterns. Or perhaps 
all human relationships were too weak to do this? Did they all 
require social patterns. Was it childish arrogance to think 
otherwise? Were social patterns congealed wisdom? Social 
patterns changed. And some people changed faster than social 
patterns. (164-165)
Cindy is realising here that social patterns, as “congealed wisdom,” may in fact be
the only source of meaning and stability. Upon pondering this, Cindy feels, despite
herself, an attraction to the middle-class securities of her parents. Those concerns hover
and tempt throughout, haunting the heavily pregnant Cindy with their assurances. She
practices her mantra of non-conformity throughout in order to remind herself of her
choices: “Established patterns were used by people whose relationships were too weak to
generate their own living patterns.” “ [M]arried people hampered themselves.” Statements
like these delivered as authoritative statements in the third-person narrative reveal
Cindy’s anxieties, her need to reassure herself through doctrine and theory, that in
settling her mind her emotional core may be silenced. However, this disturbed emotional
core erupts through her theory several times, breaking the sureness of her academic
arguments about marriage: “What was so great about nonconformity? What was so great
about independence? What was so good about strange paths?” (169) Her vulnerable
position causes her to question the intelligence of her generation’s new orthodoxy.
Importantly, however, the mother’s position is so thoroughly ironised, with her
obsessions with detergents, gloves and aprons, that her way of life is hardly an
alternative: “Perhaps we are creating an orphan generation— no parents and no God.”
(169) She kicks her mother out; there can be no retreat into the previous generation’s
values. The question for Cindy is—where to from here?
Roger would be home soon. Or would he? Would this be the 
night when he did not come home— the night he would be with 
some other girl? It would be only for a night or two— she was 
sure of that. Was she sure of that? He never had got off but the 
possibility was always there, built into the relationship. She 
needed Roger not to get off now, of all times. Her conventional 
breeding cried for conventional comfort. At least for a make- 
believe security. Sad she needed to make believe that she was as 
safe as her mother. She wanted to make believe.. .1 am frightened.
Mother, she thought, and I do fearfully wish there was a 
document which would guarantee love. And if you had asked one
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more time perhaps I would have gone home with you, Mother.
(172-173)
The Redfern Delegation
Years later, Cindy reappears in even more dramatic circumstances, this time trapped by 
the conditions of justice. When she is raped by a group of Aboriginal men at an academic 
conference, legal justice, street justice and historical justice all compete for sympathetic 
reaction. Here, the nature of responsibility becomes paramount since the decisions Cindy 
must make have wide-ranging implications. On the one hand, she becomes responsible 
for public safety, but to secure it she fears a perpetuation of racial prejudice and 
stereotyping. Cindy has finally become Dr Broughton, the “serious thinker” and is 
attending a conference in Queensland. She does not feel justified in reporting the rape 
after “what we did to the aboriginals for two centuries.”(97) The drama is played out 
over several main stories in The Everlasting Secret Family. “Yesterday Stone Age, Today 
Space Age”, “Stockholm Syndrome?”, “Yes, the Stockholm Syndrome, I Think”, “Only 
the Interaction of Complex Things” and “Only the Interaction of Confusing Things”. A 
male friend, Cindy’s ex-lover, narrates these stories.
In the story that precedes the rape sequence, “Dance of the Chairs” (83-90), 
Moorhouse begins to set up the complexity of race relations. Chairs become symbols of 
submission, authority or equality, depending upon where they are located in relation to 
the speaker. The consternation regarding the chairs is a “white” fixation and the session 
stalls as the “white” conference-goers question whether the positioning of the chairs is 
“feudal” or not. Bisi, an African observer deflates the argument by taking over: “I will 
chair”. The narrator observes that a white person would “never have got away with” 
taking over the session in such a way. The chairs become locations of power and, later, 
Bisi uses them to spark a machismo contest. He holds a chair high above his head in one 
hand, saying: “Who is the chairman!” The small group of men who have remained 
drinking all do the same. It becomes a contest of masculine strength. During the contest 
Bisi calls out a Swahili war cry and the Australians sing an old football song. Bisi then 
suggests more competitions between the black and white men, to be carried out in the 
local brothels. “Then we shall see, white man.” (90) This episode is critical to the rape 
stories in the sense that, to the narrator, the black men attending the conference are not 
victims of white colonialism but display their male power with pride. Bisi is certainly no
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figure for post-colonial sympathy and is disdainful of what he sees as the patronising
allowances his white counterparts offer the black participants at conferences such as
these. A sense of black agency is critical in looking at Cindy’s rape situation.
Bisi’s chair competition occurs after all the women have returned to their rooms
for the evening. It is, therefore, an exclusive male group attempting to prove their
masculinity to one another. This competition will then be contested in the sexual arena:
like the chairs, the bodies of prostitutes will become a site of male prowess and power.
The exclusive group is of central concern to the narrator who explains his current writing
obsession to a fellow conference-goer:
Oh, I’m obsessed at present with what might be called ‘exclusive 
groups’, people who live a certain way or believe certain things 
that they don’t want to be made public, don’t want others to 
know. I think we’re more and more like that... [including] 
revolutionaries, sects, religious sects including some aboriginals.
Sexually aberrant clubs and secret societies, Elitist groups.. .(86- 
87)
There are also exclusive groupings within that male group: black versus white.
The result for the narrator is confusion: “I bluffed on, not knowing what the hell we
were talking about precisely.” (90) The confusion stems from the implicit understandings
of exclusive groups. The narrator, ignorant of Bisi’s suggestions, represents the figure of
the outside other. As such, he is at a disadvantage to the exclusive group. This is a
recurring arrangement in the rape sequence when, for example, Cindy is put at
disadvantage with the Redfern Delegation. Later she herself forms a secret alliance with
the delegation and the narrator, once again on the outer, is left wondering.
“Yesterday Stone Age, Today Space Age” (91-99) explores the division of groups,
a division which culminates in an excessive abstraction of the other and, at this
conference, manifests as idealisation of non-white cultures. Farman, the poet, takes on
this figure in a highly ironic way with his conscientious “mixing” amongst groups that, in
the narrator’s eyes, is practised like a “virtue”:
When Farman joined us the jokes about the coloured delegates 
stopped. He’d probably been drinking with them and had, in turn, 
stopped their whitey jokes. There was probably a whole reality 
from which someone like Farman was excluded because people 
knew that he was a ‘Hfe-affirming’ poet and would tirelessly take 
issue, would misunderstand certain styles of humour. (91-92)
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A woman at the conference pulls him up, accusing him of continuous
“negritude”: “But that stuff today about Bali, my dear, claiming that they, the Balinese,
have no stress, no hangups, are something outside the human conditions—that’s pure
idealisation, no better than the nineteenth century fiction. The idyllic South Sea islands.”
(92) Moorhouse makes it clear, in his treatment of the humourless “life-affirming poet”,
complete with “A-line shirt and ethnic sandals”, that the continuing Western
patronisation and romanticisation of the non-Westem world continues. It has changed
only in terms of approach. Instead of seeking to correct, improve or dismande tribal
cultures, poets like Farman uncritically endorse and idealise older cultures: “‘I’m trying to
find my way back to pre-literate modes,” he said. “We’ve lost so much.’” (93) By
positioning Farman thus, Moorhouse establishes degrees of negritude along a sliding
scale. At one end we have Farman, at the other sits Charles, the arch-conservative, who
opposes the constant allowances made for minority groups:
‘You’re just middle-class do-gooding,’ Charles called out at Cindy, 
not bothering to stand, ‘taking your basket of revolutionary 
groceries to the poor.. .trying to irradiate your bland existence by 
associating with.. .outgroups.’ (“Yes, the Stockholm Syndrome, I 
Think”, 111)
Cindy and the narrator struggle to take a position somewhere between these extremes. In 
the end, the narrator, more so than Cindy, is caught in the tension of not being able to 
define a position at all, taking refuge in the escape that “it was not my rape.” Cindy, on 
the other hand, must take a position for she is called on to act.
It is after the evening drinks described in “Yesterday Stone Age...” that the 
narrator stumbles upon the rape scene. He is outside Cindy’s room and hears the 
“muffled scream” and Cindy’s panic. When Cindy tells him she has been raped, the 
narrator’s response is doubt: “I wondered if she were using the word loosely or 
figuratively.” (93) This aside again brings our attention to the problems created within a 
milieu whose environment continually seems exclusively verbal. The narrator questions 
how she might be using the word but for Cindy, suddenly, the word is intended in all its 
physical brutality. She has been dislodged from her talking, academic world into a 
harsher, physical reality where it is actual experience which provides knowledge rather 
than her theories of culture and behaviour. She wryly quotes Okot p’Bitek, a writer under 
discussion at the conference: “When a girl moves away from the protective confines of 
her family and village she is defenceless.”(94) Up until this point, such a statement would
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have been taken almost as an impossibility for Cindy. Its context is a distant East African 
locale and, to a modern “intellectual with a vagina” like Cindy, would sound like a fairly 
primidve and easily avoidable fate for a woman such as she. A great rift has appeared 
between her expectations and her actual reality: ‘“I always thought—I had these elaborate 
scenarios—dark lanes. I had these elaborate coping techniques’.” Her confidence in a 
projected rape scene has left her vulnerable. Her coping techniques, however elaborate, 
were for a different scenario and therefore she has limited her ability to cope in the given 
situation. Furthermore, she discounts direct warnings from female peers, a warning she 
labels as racist:
I was even warned—this was a danger for nice girls who mixed 
with drunken, resentful, angry aboriginal men. I was even warned 
by another woman, an anthropologist, and I thought, and I 
thought she was full of racist rape fantasies. (97)
Cindy’s quickness to judge another person’s racism leaves her blind to the contributing 
factors of her rape situation:
‘The full story: we’d been drinking down at the pub and we came 
back to my room—at my suggestion—and drank the inevitable 
flagon and then it all began to happen, unlike any rape scenario I 
had. They actually held me down.’
She asked for some tea.
Why had she taken them to her room? Why not the college 
lounge?
‘Christ,’ I said, ‘why did you go to your room?’
‘I knew them!’ she said. ‘I worked with the bastards at the Centre 
last year. And anyhow, why shouldn’t I take people to my room?’
(96-97)
From a racial perspective, this exchange summarises a no-win predicament. The 
narrator is incredulous that Cindy should take “them” to her room. We are forced to 
assume that the narrator’s discomfort with Cindy’s invitation comes from the group’s 
aboriginality. After all, the narrator himself was dropping in on Cindy, deviating on his 
way back to his own room. If he could expect to be entertained, one way or another, in 
her room there can be no inherent danger in extending invitations to one’s room. His 
aversion is a racial one. In terms of Moorhouse’s exclusive groups, however, perhaps it is 
not an aversion to Aboriginal men per se but an aversion to difference. Cindy is put at a 
disadvantage simply by mixing with an exclusive group, since she and that group cannot 
rely on shared cultural assumptions.
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When she reveals to the narrator who her rapists are the dilemma is fully realised. 
The narrator is instandy drawn into the dilemma of resolving the situation: “I can see 
your problem.. .about doing anything about it.”(97) The hyper-sensitivity and self- 
consciousness regarding race relations activates this dilemma and, because of this, the 
Aboriginal men responsible for the crime are stripped of individual identity and agency 
and are immediately cast as the vicdms of the drama. For Cindy to take this position, she 
must see herself as the moral arbiter. She says: “I couldn’t bring in the police, not after 
what we did to the aboriginals for two centuries.”
True to her academic style, Cindy refers to the situation as “a classic textbook 
dilemma... if you look at it—feminism and racism.” Cindy is resolved not to go to the 
police and it is significant, as Brian Kieman points out, that this dilemma occurs in 
Queensland, “where the police have a reputation for brutality and racism.”16; This 
location further funds the impulse to keep the police out of it. Yet the real impulse is 
Cindy’s own guilt about the injustices inflicted upon Aboriginal people, who, for Cindy, 
must always be read as continual victims of colonial enterprise. She does not see that 
here, she too is a victim. For Cindy, any action against the Delegation at all is racist:
AVe could take some private action—get someone like Harvey to
heavy them. Street justice.’
Wou’ll have me a racist soon. I even find it tempting.’ (98)
If every possible reaction to the rape is branded as racist, what can she possibly 
do? From what position can she justifiably act when each position she might take is made 
more farcical by her constant academic posturing? As Cindy slips into sleep, the narrator 
considers this: “But it seemed that something had to happen after this, something had to 
follow from this.. .crime. I could not feel that it was all over.” (98) The issue here is one 
of consequences. It is Cindy’s turn to act. What will be the consequences of the actions 
she decides to take? Is the narrator correct when he wonders if the rape only exists in the 
five minds of those involved?
Cindy tracks two of the Redfern Delegation down and, in what the narrator 
describes as “faddish therapy”, they come to some form of resolution that the narrator 
and, by extension, the reader is not privy too. He resents the exclusive group Cindy and 
the Delegation have become, locked away in Cindy’s hotel room. The narrator can only 
fantasise about what the outcomes of their discussions might be. Being outside the
169 Kiernan, B. Studies in  A u stra lia n  U te ra ry  H istory. Sydney: Shoestring Press. 1997. pp. 186-187.
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privileges of Cindy’s group, we are drawn into judgment of Cindy’s subsequent behaviour 
only through the narrator’s observances. This becomes the subject for the later stories of 
the sequence. It is important to look at the narrator’s ethically charged assessments of her 
relations with the Delegation.
In “Stockholm Syndrome?” a firm contrast is drawn between the narrator’s and 
Cindy’s attitude to problem-solving on the morning following the rape. She demands 
smoked salmon for breakfast and to the narrator, this is “spoiled-brat capriciousness.” It 
is against his “style” to enforce his pre-conceived notions (such as a preferred meal) 
onto a situation: “Or anyhow it was against my adult style, of living within the conditions 
of a given situation or something. Of ambling through life, or, as Cindy might have said, 
sneaking through life.” (102) Here is a distinct attitudinal difference between the two. 
Cindy is prepared to exert her own idealisations onto a given environment—to make it 
do what she wants it to—whereas the narrator more dynamically exists in a given 
situation. It is not so much a decision between whose reckoning of reality is more 
correct. What Cindy must realise is that even though she orders smoked salmon 
specifically with no capers and no onion rings—her projected, idealised breakfast—the 
capers and onion rings arrive regardless. In other words, in spite of her demands and 
attempts at control she may still get more than she bargained for. In contrast, there is less 
chance of shock for the narrator if things go awry, because he is living within the 
conditions of a situation.
The possibilities of the day are manifold. Will the attackers still be at the 
conference? The narrator assumes they won’t be there: “‘Surely they will have left.’ I was 
about to add, ‘in all decency’, but realised that the expression belonged to some sort of 
class attitude.” (102-103) There is a very sensitive consciousness occurring that is 
comical:
In the cab back to the conference she commented sourly that she 
had probably got VD from last night. “And that’s a racist thing to 
say too. That’s another stage of racism—realising that as you say 
something that it’s racist—but still it indicates a rising 
consciousness, I suppose.”
Then she amended it again, saying that maybe it wasn’t a racist 
thing to have said, given the statistically higher incidence of VD 
among black people—introduced by the whites. (103)
Cindy argues an apologist case to make her anxieties over venereal disease more 
acceptable. It is the whites who gave it to the blacks; she must ensure that all
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responsibility must come back to the colonial aggressor. By continually falling back on 
statistics and academic arguments, she heightens the absurd rift between feeling and 
action in processing a violent and violating crime. She is the intellectual with a vagina, 
stressing two mutually exclusive realities. Her rising consciousness is thus restricted.
Since Cindy has decided not to go to the police, there are many turns the 
situation could take. The narrator runs through the possibilities in order to arm himself 
for what may happen next:
I felt some trepidation myself about how we would handle it if 
they hadn’t left. How much aggression would be there in them if 
they were unrepentant. What if they were arrogandy confident of 
her not calling the police and paraded this confidence. Or took 
not calling the police as Cindy’s acceptance of the rape, even her 
passive consent. Or what if they feared she might still call the 
police and became intimidatory towards her. (103)
The narrator becomes frustrated with Cindy’s excessive sympathy for her rapists’ 
position. She is concerned the delegation will be worried that the police are involved. She 
wants to tell them not to worry:
‘No,’ I said, ‘you don’t owe them a damned thing. Let them 
sweat.’
‘The bastards have done enough sweating. Historically.’ (104)
Cindy confronts Alan, one of the rapists, who reappears at the conference. He
says it “was the drink, the drink took away our heads.” (106) She doesn’t accept this and
they go away to talk. When she doesn’t reappear later, the narrator calls the motel and
discovers that at least one of them is back in her room. Since we are outside the closed
circle of Cindy and the men, our attention must turn to the narrator’s reaction. The terms
he uses to describe the turn of events are drenched with judgement. This time, the
judgements are aimed at her, a typical twist in rape scenarios:
And I felt held away, discarded, piqued. I faced then my sense of 
appall at the idea of them together in the motel—all right, middle- 
class abhorrence. I pictured the flagon of wine, the loosening of 
formality as what started as a ‘dialogue’, self-conscious, faddish 
therapy, weakened into male-female drinking, joking around, 
undertones of sexuality there all the time, cigarette litter, room- 
service plates, sprawling on the floor, cigarette smoke, spillings of 
drink, intoxication. A scene I’d witnessed with Cindy and her 
friends in the past many times, had participated in. It was not only 
that they were aboriginals from way outside her social group—my 
god, they were aboriginal rapists. (107)
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The narrator feels abhorrence; he is judging Cindy’s reaction under the influence 
of his own middle-class subjectivity and even though he is conscious of it, this self- 
awareness does nothing to change his perception. He is only ironically and 
uncomfortably aware of it. Later in “Yes, the Stockholm Syndrome, I Think”, when 
Cindy sits with the Delegation at the conference, he admits he found her “fraternising 
with them lurid and vexing”. It is no longer Farman’s ironic ‘mixing’ as before: it is 
fraternising, a term which suggests that Cindy is courting disaster, flirting with them even. 
Her behaviour is therefore ‘lurid’ and incomprehensible. Here, Moorhouse invites the 
reader to question the narrator’s judgement. Clearly, being “vexed”, the narrator is at the 
absolute limit of his experience. He has no way of understanding this situation. He is 
pushed into a conservative position. He attempts to take refuge in the possibility of a 
theoretical explanation but it proves unsatisfying: “While I had read of the Stockholm 
Syndrome and believed that was a part explanation for what was happening with her, I 
found this not quite manageable in first-hand living fact.” (109)170 Again, a rift has 
appeared between the only theory he can think of which may explain Cindy’s behaviour, 
and the physical situation itself. The situation offends his sensibilities. Cindy rejects his 
help and does not explain her behaviour to him, giving him only the very glib line that 
“life’s very complicated,” (106):
Life was complicated enough but Cindy wasn’t the sort of person 
who used that as a reason for trying to simplify. She used it as a 
release from order, as a reason for allowing complication to 
multiply and enmesh. (108)
The narrator’s confusion and resistance to this “release from order” is ironic
given his Libertarian heritage. The narrator has previously reflected that he is equipped to
“living within the conditions of a given situation”; however, here he is clearly unable to
accept these conditions. He is at the boundary of what he considers respectable. Perhaps
he is even reaching the conclusion that Cindy is, to put it in the vernacular, asking fo r  it
Maybe, and this was another thought not previously allowed, 
maybe Cindy was not all that honest. Maybe she had, in a drunken 
lapse of control, that night gone past the code and restrictions of 
her lifestyle and temperament, gone with the situation there in her 
college room and allowed, encouraged, the dark forces, the lower 
depths, to take over. (108)
170 He earlier attaches the Stockholm Syndrome to her behaviour, where “aggressor and the victim form a 
special bond, a puzzling alliance.” p. 107.
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Typically during this reasoning, the narrator pulls himself up, becoming uncomfortably
aware of his conservatism. He turns the questioning upon himself:
I say against her lifestyle because, although she led a free life, was 
sexually permissive, I did not consider this sort of situation.. .Why 
not? Group sex situations occurred. Why not she? Why was this 
out of the question? (108)
His resistance to the idea clearly issues from the fact that Cindy is “way outside 
her own group.” It seems that the group sex situation is permissible within one’s own 
group and there is a clear boundary around their radicalism. To the narrator’s taste, to 
experience group sex with three young aboriginal men would be to go “past the code” 
and “into the lower depths.” These “other directions” the narrator’s thoughts take us, 
unveil his prejudices and his own limitations in terms of their sexually permissive 
lifestyle. Just as their “progressiveness” is limited, so is their “permissiveness”.
Appalled, the narrator retreats. In “Yes, the Stockholm Syndrome, I Think” he 
sits with Charles, the arch conservative: “[in retreat] towards his conservative style away 
from Cindy’s flabergasting behaviour.” (109) Positioned thus, he is in direct opposition 
to Cindy who takes her position to extreme. During a conference session, Cindy 
announces she wants to “challenge the format” to “grant more time for aboriginal and 
other colonial victims, who had, she claimed, not received proportionate 
time.. .‘compensatory time’ for historical wrongs.” (110) The narrator reads this as a 
displacement of “the intolerable experience of the rape, asking for sympathy and 
compensation for those who’d done it to her because she could not ask for it herself’. 
Alternatively, Cindy’s plan might also suggest she sees herself as having made a sacrifice: 
“rape in a good cause” (101). It will only be a worthwhile sacrifice if some good comes of 
it, in this instance, more time devoted to their “statements, poems, or whatever”. Cindy’s 
reaction to Charles’s resistance shows her extreme emotional volatility. Such a reaction 
reveals that her suggestion to restructure the conference is for more than academic ends. 
She screams at him: “you conservative deadshit” and pelts him with a chalkboard duster 
and bursts into tears. This reaction is far from an academic submission.
Again, Bisi stands to contribute, making the significant comment that perhaps 
white Australia is also a victim: “May I suggest that time be set aside for the white 
Australians to consider their confusion, their wounds?”(l 13)
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‘The question to which the white Australians, including Dr 
Broughton, might address themselves is this. Do they know, do 
they have comprehension, of just how much they themselves are 
injured? How much they are the real victims to colonialism? That 
they, as the abandoned children of the colonisers, have wounds 
that they cannot see, that they, having not yet gained a true 
independence not having, so to speak, been through fire and 
anger and violence against the metropolitan country, have not yet 
experienced the anguish of true independence. Have not, as we in 
Africa, and the United States, historically, and India has, have not 
yet found an identity through independent behaviour in world 
politics...” (112)
It is a timely comment for Cindy, given that she is a rape victim who does not seek 
justice for her injuries. Cindy is quick to take up Bisi’s opinion: “I really think we are 
basically in agreement—I’ll amend that to whatever you think.” (112) Bisi rejects the idea 
they are in agreement thus demonstrating Cindy’s anxiety about always being on “their” 
side. She is ready to change her ideas to “whatever Bisi thinks”. Given this admission,
Bisi is certainly right when he says: “Before you white Australians start offering to heal 
us, or the black people of this country, I might suggest that you are more in need of 
political healing, of liberation, of growth, that in many ways you remain political 
children.” (112)
The lack of independent thought Cindy displays is very childlike: “I didn’t mean 
to be patronising, quite rightly, I should have included ourselves, I mean...” (113)
Clearly, she has not felt the full significance of Bisi’s statement: she is literally an injured 
colonial victim. She is close to breaking point. Her position has not been firmed by 
rigorous argument; for the first time she lacks a strong academic position the very 
moment it becomes crucial. She is in an environment where intellectual rigour is the main 
criteria. As before, where she finds herself in a physical reality7 far beyond her academic 
imagination, she is taken off guard and out of sorts; here, where intellectual position 
makes the environment, her emotional position disallows her proper participation.
Charles says: “We have a program to which we should stick unless there are obvious 
intellectual reasons why we shouldn’t . . .And you, Dr Broughton, should not need to be 
told that.” (111) Further on, Charles says: “And anyhow, you know as well as I do that 
oppressed groups have to be the instruments—the authors of their own advancement. 
That’s not our job.” (111) The statements “you should not need to be told” and “you 
know as well as I do” are a firm indication that Cindy has fallen below the expectations
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of this environment and her position is easily weakened with these parental phrases. She 
remains the “political child” under Bisi and Charles.
Despite these well-argued cases against Cindy’s amendments, the suggestion is 
taken up by the other political children: “So much for intellectual rigour—the African 
takes the mickey out of them but they go on with political games.” (113) Cindy’s 
supporters meet Charles’s criticism with militancy, shouting to Charles: “Don’t get in a 
lift with us—if you have any sense.” (115) The point Moorhouse makes through the 
upshot of the academic spat is that the continuing guilt that is driving Cindy’s agenda 
(and her supporters) blinds her to her continuing patronage of “colonial victims”. There 
is no room for dissent. There is no room for critical assessment of “post colonialism”. 
Moorhouse puts this term in quotations marks to emphasise that it is an intellectual style. 
To Bisi’s objections, she apologises for seeming patronising yet when Charles objects, he 
is automatically branded a racist. Cindy cannot see that she, herself, is such a victim and 
further, and more condemningly, that she is perpetuating the disempowerment of the 
black people she is speaking for. She stands in the way of letting the oppressed become 
their own instrument with her constant apologising and patronising position.
Cindy places herself in the same bind she places Charles: if she reports her rape 
she will be a racist but if she doesn’t she is an apologist. By not reporting the crime, the 
attackers avoid taking responsibility for their actions thus leaving them in a childlike state 
of unaccountability. Cindy’s decision has further ramifications, however, and it is here 
her benevolence, as it were, takes a terrible turn. The crime does not only exist in five 
minds, “wondered about by those minds, and left at that” (99) as the narrator previously 
pondered. Here, Moorhouse turns the final screw. The police become involved despite 
Cindy’s and the narrator’s silence and the third attacker is in custody. They go to the 
police station to bail him out and, to do so, Cindy must give a statement that she and her 
attacker had consensual sex. Not only this, they give him $50 upon his release. After he 
walks away Cindy reveals to the narrator what the police told her. This attacker has a 
record of child-sex offences. Her decision not to report the rape will more than likely 
lead to future crimes: “Their parting remark was that they hoped I’d watch the 
newspapers for news of his next rape.” (139) What is the limit to her moral obligation?
To what extent is she responsible for his future crimes? Under what system is she obliged 
to make her moral decisions? As a “lady radical” or as a mother herself? “When you have 
a child you think simultaneously of their interests.” (139) She doesn’t ask the young man
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if it is true. “No, I didn’t want to know.” She doesn’t want to know because such 
knowledge would surely require a different response and a different level of obligation.
Importandy, the twist at the end of this series emphasises the crucial point that, 
at any time, our moral decisions are made with limited knowledge and, therefore, the 
consequences of our actions are not fully predictable. There is always an element of risk. 
The final two stories in the sequence, “The Interaction of Complex Things”, and “The 
Interaction of Confusing Things”, sets this moral conundrum against the work of John 
Anderson, head of the Sydney University philosophy department between 1927 and 
1958, who greatly influenced the Libertarian movement, albeit through “pub- 
Andersonianism”. Significantly for this study, Anderson was influenced by James. From 
James and pragmatism, Anderson took “the idea that truth entails certain regular ways of 
‘working’ in the world, and that the pursuit of knowledge is always a provisional, risk­
taking activity that can never produce absolute certainty.”1 1 Anderson writes that realism, 
“rid o f ‘meanings’ and ‘purposes’ and other products o f ‘vicious
intellectualism’. . .proposes as the formal solution of any problem the interaction o f complex 
things.”172 Anderson, as a realist, rejects the notion of a “total system”.
The narrator in “Complex Things” is following a lecture on Anderson while 
observing Cindy in the audience. His two observations (the lecture and Cindy), spliced 
together, offer a theoretical perspective through which to view Cindy’s situation and her 
dramatic decisions: “For the concept of total system Anderson substituted, one might be 
tempted to say, the concept of space-time. To be is to have a place not in the unfolding 
of the spirit, but simply in time and space.” (125) In other words, there is no total system 
that might validate Cindy’s decisions. She is under the apprehension that she can use the 
rape to firm up her position in her total system: “Rape in a good cause, the inevitable fate 
of a lady radical.” In order to remain within the parameters of her post-colonial position, 
that is, in order to avoid rupturing her value system, she needs to excuse the rape as an 
“inevitable fate.” Yet, if we look at her position within the context of Andersonianism, 
we can see that she is attempting to keep her experiences within the bounds of the total 
system she has constructed for herself. But, as fames might say, this experience has 
“boiled over” her present knowledge and expectation. Cindy must find a way to make
171 Kennedy, B. A Passion to Oppose: John Anderson, Philosopher. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
1995. p. 67.
172 Anderson, J. “Realism and Some of Its Critics.” Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Sydney: Angus & 
Robertson. 1962. p. 59.
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this new experiential truth ‘fit’ or ‘work’ with her world view. Her reaction is to squash
the experience so that it fits into her value system. In the close of the sequence, she (and
the narrator) take the libertarian-style pose that the authorities (in this case the police)
must be defied and distrusted as a matter of course, especially in Queensland because “in
this state they can do anything.”(138) They take jack’s side when he is arrested:
“But we could take some action—file a complaint with the 
Attorney-General. And what about jack—false arrest?”
“Shut up,” she cried, “just shut up—you don’t know...in a final 
effort to get me to lay charges—because he had admitted to the 
rape—they came up with his record. He had a record including a 
sex crime with a child. He was released six months ago...But I 
had to play it through, I just took a deep breath and prayed they 
were lying. I decided to put my trust in the aboriginal—for no 
good reason.” (138)
The final comment, “for no good reason” is symbolic of the lack of rational decision 
making on Cindy’s part. She is blindly following her post-colonial customary morality 
that maintains the concept of victimisation of Aboriginal people by white authorities, 
here given the form of the menacing Queensland Police Force. Finally she can see that 
her reactions, funded by theory, are based on “no good reason.” This concession may be 
the “rising consciousness” she thought she had previously discovered.
The key to pragmatist thinking is allowing experience to dictate knowledge and 
truths. For example, it is an experience-funded truth that leads a female anthropologist to 
warn Cindy about a rape possibility. Cindy’s theoretical knowledge and “middle class do- 
gooding” sympathy discounts this experience as a racist rape fantasy. Now, she grimly 
says, “she can talk from the field.”
With every turn in this drama, a new fact appears that must force a 
reconsideration of future action and also an assessment of previous action. Moorhouse 
indeed draws a picture of the complex interactivity of elements of experience that makes 
it impossible to take a position with any degree of certainty. The tension remains 
between the binding decisions that take place in space and time—such as a statement to 
the police—and the shifting relations of elements within a situation. Only a reflective 
morality, which is prepared to relinquish previous values in light of new information, will 
enable agents to proceed with any confidence into this unstable environment. Customary 
morality is the perpetuation of cultural blind spots that hinder successful liberation from 
a total system. Even the narrator comes to the ironic realisation that “we had made
169
Libertarianism a total system.” (125) By subscribing to total systems, a conscious mind 
takes a “moral holiday” (127)1 By following a total system, subscribers can defer moral 
decision-making to that system. In Forty-Seventeen, somebody admits, “Sydney Anarchism 
eradicated moralism and replaced it with Higher Libertarianism.” (8)
173 The “moral holiday”, quoted in the lecture, is a Jamesian term, taken from “What Pragmatism Means” 
(Pragmatism: 41) and demonstrates James’s influences on Anderson’s thought.
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Chapter 3
The Radical Pragmatist Takes Flight:
Tales of Mystery and Romance
In contrast to Cindy’s style of an intellectual reality, Moorhouse offers another version of
reality, a polymorphous and ever-expanding vision of the world. In Tales o f Mystery and
Ko/nance the fluid self of the pragmatist is taken to the extreme in the figure of the
narrator. This radical pragmatist is set against various other types such as Milton, a more
conservative pragmatist who, whilst he continues to locate meaning through systems,
does so with the awareness that ideas-systems are subject to revision. The narrator’s
lifestyle is also set against his ex-wife’s, whose interpersonal relationships create order in
her life. The narrator’s position is summed up in the story, “The Airport, The Pizzeria,
The Motel, The Rented Car and The Mysteries of Life” (55-63) when he thinks to
himself: “How clever the living process was. Oh bloody clever. You couldn't really make
a mistake. Whatever you did, wherever you ended up, the mind reshaped to
accommodate and even celebrate it.” (62)
Moorhouse’s emphasis here is on the plasticity of the experiential field. As
situations change, the mind reshapes. There is no totality or overall order to living, only
action and response, which may or may not be predictable. Moorhouse is arguing the
necessity to live outside total systems because of the changeability of the environment
and suggests living independently from System. It is only outside systems that his
characters are more capable of restyling themselves to cope with ever-changing
circumstances. All things are in flux in this non-teleological universe, including the self,
given the ability the mind has to reshape itself. It is significant, in the story “A Cat Called
Teleosis”, that the word teleosis is scrubbed from a conference chalkboard but its faint
outline remains. The word becomes like a mascot (a cat) to the conference. But it is a
mascot that has vanished. The narrator remarks:
Teleology, I knew, was the study of final causes. I was later to 
read that Zollman in 1740 said that teleology was one of the parts 
of philosophy in which there had been little progress made. No 
progress made in 1740 into final causes and into the design and
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purpose of nature—I liked that. (The Everlasting Secret Family.
140)174
To accommodate an ever-modifiying reality, a collection of Moorhouse's 
characters continually role-play and restyle themselves. This is to practice skills and build 
up repertoires of action which may be required at any point. Role-playing, which is 
behavioural testing, is a necessary part of learning, especially in a new moral world where 
all values are shifting and resettling. It is also a core component of the underlying 
Bohemian philosophy. That is, in reaction to staid values and a customary morality7, his 
characters are philosophically required to push the boundaries of behaviour. A primary 
goal of the experiments into behavioural styles is to discover what works best in this new 
environment, therefore, role-playing and sty ling can also be seen as a pragmatic mandate. 
So far, we have seen how the dogma of the authoritarian left creates a new customary 
morality intolerant of dissent and subversion in the figures of Kim and Cindy.
Moorhouse also offers other possibilities of being in reaction to the previous generation's 
value system. This alternative style is fluid and, as a style, is always changeable and so 
avoids becoming bogged in dogma.
We turn now to the Milton stories where experiments of being are constantly 
conducted. The ever-present unnamed male narrator, who will be the focus of this 
section, is in varying stages of relations with Milton, his close male friend, and their 
friendship ultimately dwindles. Narratively, they are set against one another as shown in 
the following exchange between the narrator and Hestia in “The Oracular Story”. The 
narrator says:
‘Well, you could live by unpredictability.’
‘Milton tries to sell me predictability and you want to sell me
unpredictability. Men.’ (96)
Milton is dismissive of both the narrator and Hestia because they do not have “a 
coherent critique” yet, as we have seen, coherent critiques can become problematic. Like 
Hestia, we are faced with the prospect of choosing which position is better. Is the 
narrator’s position “incoherent” when contrasted with Milton’s? Here the coherency of a 
theoretical position is set against the seemingly incoherent position of the radical 
pragmatist, yet, Milton is unlike Moorhouse’s dogmatists. Milton differs from characters
174 A link can be made here between the narrator’s anti-teleological penchant and Baudrillard’s discussion 
of the “journey without end” previously quoted. The new world (and new age) is liberated from these 
historical ideas o f final ends.
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like Kim in that he is generally ready to explore different positions and he recognizes the 
need to maintain a degree of flexibility. Milton, like the narrator, is continually in the 
process of remaking himself; here he is shown as perpetually donning the theories of the 
young in order to stay relevant or intellectually viable: “He wants to wait and catch the 
next cycle, as it were, the next cycle into the station. He is always waiting, saying no, I'll 
catch the next ‘younger’ ideas-system. I keep wanting to say, come on, Milton, get 
aboard, we have to proceed to our destination.” (“Ritual of the Photograph”, 106)
The distinction between the two rests in their approach to theoretical positions. 
Whilst Milton is ready to change systems, he wishes to operate inside systems to find 
which works satisfactorily. His position is far more flexible than Kim’s but far less 
flexible than the narrator’s:
‘What do you support then?’ Milton asked, with a casual 
aggressiveness.
‘I obey the imperatives of the personality,’ I said.
‘Meaning what? Meaning bloody what?’
‘A man’s got to .. . ’
‘. . .do what a man’s got to do,’ he cut in. ‘Shit.’
‘Some formative values,’ I began, ‘some modified values, some 
ideal values, some compromises with everyday reality—survival.’
‘In other words, you lack theory,’ he said, ‘you have no coherent 
critique.’
Milton orders his living pattern through theoretical perspectives. He is frustrated 
by the narrator’s willingness to forego “coherency” in favour of survival tactics and the 
endless modifications to values. When Milton turns to Zen and mysticism a deep rift is 
created between him and the narrator. This rift is emphasized through discursive means; 
Milton’s conversation is littered with new words: “‘The only concession I’ll make,’ I say, 
‘is that fads, like Zen, refresh the vocabulary. We need new words and expressions. Even 
if the things we talk about don’t change.’”(108) The narrator, however, is excluded from 
these new discussions because he does not know how to use these new terms: “He 
gently, laughingly, criticizes my misuse of counter culture jargon. He says I am dated. I 
get the emphases wrong. My constructions are wrong. Where is his authority for this?” 
(107) By never fully endorsing a new theoretical perspective the narrator is left outside 
this exclusive group. Again, the group cannot admit dissidents into its ranks. Milton 
patronises his outcast state: “‘Just about every one of your friends has now gone through 
to satori, meditation, deep relaxation. That’s very sad for you,’ he says with gloating 
sympathy.” Here, the emphasis on Milton’s jargon along with narratorial asides, like
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“gloating”, ironises the Western take-up of ideas like Zen. Milton’s so-called peace has 
the quality of “gloating” and his supporters are “arse-lickers”. The narrator makes the 
point:
‘If you people have satori it doesn’t show,’ I say, ‘you appear no 
different, you do the same things. You drink as much.’
‘Ah, but it is our relationship to what we do,’ says Milton wisely,
‘the why and how.’
Hestia’s brother, the wheedling arse-licker, says to Milton, ‘How 
to explain the taste of sugar to he who has not tasted sugar?’ (113)
The narrator cannot discern any real effects of the new ideology amongst his
friends. This raises the pragmatic test: if no difference is noticeable, where is the value in
Milton’s ideology? Are Milton’s and his sycophant’s answers useful or simply verbal? We
can apply Charles Peirce’s often quoted statement here:
Thus, we come down to what is tangible and practical, as the root 
of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may 
be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in 
anything but a possible difference of practice. 175
If there is no tangible difference brought about by their new approach to alcohol,
does this approach have any real value? The ironic suggestion, of course, is that it is
merely verbal. Moorhouse places a high degree of ironic emphasis on the verbal aspects
of new positions. In one case, the narrator and Milton discuss luck, luck being part of a
risky, non-systematised universe. The verbosity of Milton’s universe is apparent when he
says: “Lucky things happen to people who have supraliminal empathy.” (89) As an aside,
whilst the arrow is pointed at Milton’s heavily laden discourse, the reference to
supraliminal empathy raises an interesting point and deepens the irony. A person with the
ability to empathise with what is beyond the threshold of consciousness would be a
pragmatist who cannot sustain coherent critique since that which is beyond
consciousness may not necessarily be contained in any present critique.
In an effort to counter Milton’s complaint about his lack of coherency, the
narrator appeals to his own bush skills in an attempt to pin his character to something that
approaches systematized behaviour. Milton replies:
The much vaunted bushmanship - sure we all know you’re an 
expert bushman.. .But that’s just the mechanics. You don’t know 
the soul of it. You don’t even approach the fourth dimension.
175 Peirce, C. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, Pragmatism: A. Contemporary Reader, pp. 37-49. p. 43.
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You are way way way back in the third. (“Milton Turns Against 
Champagne”, 87)
The narrator is stunned by such a revelation and Milton leaves him pondering “in the 
wind of self-inspection.” The sensitive reflection Milton provokes in the narrator is then 
brilliantly punctuated by Moorhouse’s relentless ironic observation: “[Milton] went 
briefly into the university bookshop .. .1 watched him moving his colleagues’ books back 
and bringing his own forward.” Here, Milton manipulates the books for personal gain, 
possibly even vanity. This is a very different Milton who elsewhere claims his developed 
ability of personal detachment:
I was listening to you just then without identifying—totally 
detached with regard to my personal life—I was enjoying an 
absolute truce—no intervening voice concerned with my own 
cares or personal preoccupations—my attention was then 
removed from you and I saw that bus stop in a way that I never 
habitually do—it gave me simultaneously a knowledge of the 
outside world and of myself—no separation between the world 
and self. (105)
The narrator protests over the Hare Krishnas dancing in the street and Milton 
defends them, saying, “at least they have a Way.” To which the narrator replies: ‘“All 
beliefs work’ I say, straightening my bow-tie, ‘they all give you something to ^ .’”(114) 
This is of course the narrator’s central problem. If he is to resist all Ways, who will he be 
and what is his place in the social scene? Since the narrator is outside his friends’ realm of 
beliefs they become an exclusive group and he is unwelcome. Once again, the exclusive 
group or, as Dewey and Tufts would say, the “charmed circle” shuns the other and is 
resistant to the narrator’s reflections, criticism and dissent. He is left on the outside, and 
he jumps up to see through the windows of their “commune” or, more correctly, their 
“simple experiment in shared living with a poly-functional endospace.” (“The Commune 
Doesn’t Want You”, 121)
The exclusive groupings Moorhouse routinely comes back to set up targets of 
irony. An exclusive group has distinct boundaries of behaviour which ensures its 
cohesiveness and exclusivity. For entry into such a group, there must be a submission of 
complete independence in order to be aligned with group interests. The result is dogmatic 
practice and, importantly, is non-\iomc. This creates a dangerous imbalance. A sense of 
irony is important in belief systems. Irony is: “the bringing in of the opposite, the
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complementary impulses’ in order to achieve a balanced poise.”176 A “balancing self­
irony” or, we might say, an ironic poise, “anticipates and guards against a potential (ironic) 
attack from without.”1 Without such balance, the group exposes itself to the fallibility of 
total systems that can be produced when two total systems clash. This clash of meanings 
produces part of the irony of total systems. That is, to be convinced one Way is right and 
justified is to imply this Way is better than other ways; it is a judgement of value of other 
systems of belief. The successes of other systems threaten the validation of any one total 
system being the best. If an ironic arrow manages to breach the zealously guarded 
boundary, the system weakens and its fallibility is exposed.
When the narrator breaches the walls of the “poly-functional endospace”, he tries 
to make conversation with the stem, self-absorbed woman he finds inside. She says:
‘I’m a dancer.’
‘Oh yes?’
‘I’m learning Theatre of the Noh.’1'8
‘It’s a rich world—I'm learning Theatre of the Maybe Not.’
‘Is that some sort of put down?’ (123)
The narrator immediately provokes a defensive reaction, suggesting the woman 
lacks a certain amount of self-critique. She approaches her theatrical endeavours with 
utter conviction and it is this absence of all doubt that leaves her open to the narrator’s 
ironic barb. Furthermore, her certainty is encoded in the word “Noh” and the narrator’s 
resistance to certainty is explicit and ambivalent: Maybe Not. The narrator will always 
take the path of maybe, whereas Milton and his followers look for systems that require 
belief and investment of self. It is unclear which path will lead to contentment and 
fulfillment, or at the very least, satisfying experience and a sense of meaningfulness, if 
that indeed is the goal.
Despite his resistance to Ways of Being1 his description of the early Libertarian 
scene suggests that a sense of meaning is an approximate goal. In “The Interaction of 
Complex Things”, the lecturer suggests “the assumption of meaninglessness can itself be 
a defence mechanism”. The narrator thinks:
Libertarianism was an exit visa to avoid the complications of a
fully operational life, many of us closed down, rationalised the
176 Richards, I.A. cited in Muecke, D.C. Irony and the Ironic'. Methuen: London. 1982. p. 26.
177 Muecke, p. 26.
178 Learning Noh Theatre is a curious act of appropriation, for this traditional Japanese dance is primarily a 
male art form.
179 Note that the narrator’s resistance to total Ways o f Being is very different to Edith Campbell Berry’s 
formulations o f Ways of Going, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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closure of our abilities and our alcoholism by professing a belief 
in philosophical absurdity and the futility of endeavour. We 
promoted a sense of futility to excuse a deficient life, we were 
even deficient at being hedonist. We thought it wrong to care 
about what we did. (127)
“Deficient”, repeated twice, suggests the absence of something required. If the
Libertarian life is deficient, and the Libertarian style was the response to the previous
generation’s conservatism, then what next?
When you turn away from convention, further from the 
expectations of family and your first childhood friends, those 
expectations which lay out, landscape, our direction in life, which 
glue us together as a ‘person’ so that we know what we are 
‘supposed to do’ and ‘to be’, you find that the land becomes bare, 
directions indistinct, and the paths and their turnings of no 
consequence one way or another, not one more imperative than 
another, only passivity is left, nothing much happens, except 
quandary. A cold quandary blows permanently on the moors of 
abnormality. The cheery lighted house of normality is a distant 
stage-set. (83-84)
The meaning encoded in the “cheery lighted house” of normalcy has eroded and 
the narrator has found that meaninglessness is an unsatisfactory defensive reaction to this 
erosion. Milton and his cohorts fill the space left by the cheery-lighted house by 
exploring new systems of meaning but the narrator is too conscious of the ironic 
undercurrent in any meaning-system. How then can the narrator proceed with any 
satisfaction?
Negotiating Style: The Fabric of the Self
The final section of this chapter will look at style as a reference point for self. The 
question surfaces: If there is no inherent self, but a socially constituted self, is the human 
being style and context only? Milton denies the narrator’s “imperatives of the 
personality”, saying: “Individuality is an illusion—you are purely interaction with others. 
Your behaviour is purely interaction.” (98) Whilst his argument might feasibly support 
the thesis of the socially recognised self—there is certainly this negotiable aspect of 
self—the self is a little more complicated than “pure interaction.” Either Milton’s 
position is influenced by an anti-ego Zen philosophy, or perhaps it is Milton’s way of 
justifying his constant repositioning. In contrast, the narrator never takes on a position 
which has a coherent critique and so never needs to change the ‘position’ he takes.
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Anderson has described this approach as that of the artist (significandy, Moorhouse’s 
narrator is a writer):
Seize hold of things, hammer out the issues, abjure dilettantism in 
any shape. This is the true attitude of the artist, whose 
mind.. .permits no ideals or taboos to come between him [sic] 
and a direct handling of things themselves. No sentimental 
attachments, no higher meanings, no irrelevant antecedents or 
consequences, are allowed to affect the positive treatment of 
things, their presentation as a balance of forces or sequence of 
phases.tH"
Anderson’s idea of the “direct handling of things themselves” points to a crucial 
part of his philosophy and whose influence may distinguish the narrator from Milton. 
Anderson, as a realist, resisted relativism and insisted that things do have distinctive, 
independent qualities and do not just become known through relation, for the simple 
reason that if things didn’t have distinctive qualities there would be nothing to have 
relations with. If we follow this reasoning, Milton’s claim is untenable when he says “you 
are simply interaction.” Interaction is no simple thing. The qualities of things-in- 
themselves, their value and the way situations occur is complicated. This present study 
has emphasised that values are found in things-in-relation. That is, a value of a thing is 
subjectively found when it is related to another thing for specific purposes. Because 
purposes change, values of things change. This, however, is not in opposition to 
Anderson’s claim about qualities of things. To avoid confusion, we can apply the term 
“attributes” instead of “qualities” since “quality” has strong value connotations. Value, in 
this study, is suggestive of what things become in situations but that is not to say these 
things do not exist outside of situations. If we apply this idea to the nature of 
individuality as Milton sees it, we must disprove him: outside of social relations, the 
attributes of self—a thinking, conscious mind— is still at work in a body that occupies a 
place in space and time. Remember Thomas from “Walking Out” who, when he leaves 
his social group, must remind himself he is still there by laughing out loud. He is still 
there, but not functioning as a social unit. His function is therefore limited but his 
potential to function is not limited. Indeed, his potential has expanded because he has 
begun developing a reflective consciousness by critically analysing his original social 
group. Likewise, when Moorhouse’s narrator is locked out of the commune, and 
consequentially locked out of interaction with the being with whom he craves interaction
180 Anderson, p. 43.
178
(Milton), he still exists. His existence is not illusory. His consciousness is still activated 
and, given the level of irony which is operating in his thought, his critical faculties are 
operating at a rather high level.
So, if he cannot take a position like Milton’s, but still exists, what informs his
actions? He puts it thus: “I do have answers. Make an arbitrary decision. Respond then to
the challenges set in motion by the arbitrary decision.” (99) In saying so, Moorhouse's
narrator becomes what James termed the “radical pragmatist.” The following two
quotations, taken from the earlier section on William James, are repeated here to
approximately define the type of character Moorhouse presents us with:
A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot 
of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns 
away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, 
from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, 
and pretended absolutes and origins...It means the open air and 
possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the 
pretence of finality in truth. (31)
And:
The rationalist mind, radically taken, is of a doctrinaire and 
authoritative complexion: the phrase '‘must be’ is ever on its lips.
The belly-band of its universe must be tight. A radical pragmatist 
on the other hand is a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of creature.
(124)
Moorhouse has provided his reader with countless examples of the restrictive 
nature of authoritarian total systems and, importantly, it is not only characters like 
George McDowell who subscribe to a total and coherent ‘blueprint’ for behaviour. It is 
the characters from the narrator’s own milieu—Kim, Carl, Milton and Cindy—who fall 
back into the habits of referring to total systems, despite the schooling they “received” in 
Andersonianism. James’s description of the “must be” rationalist is akin to Kim's “you 
can’t be”. Perhaps it is the nature of “pub-Andersonianism,” where points are made 
under the influences of shouting booziness and the machismo of the Sydney Push scene, 
simply to bring down one authority and replace it with another. Nevertheless,
Moorhouse presents us with the irony that the philosophy that spurned total systems 
became a total system and the narrator who resists is left outside, alone. We now turn to 
this narrator’s style and actions to assess his success or failure when pursuing the life of 
the radical pragmatist.
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The principle criticism of the narrator’s style, in the eyes of his peers, is directed 
towards his lack of true engagement with those around him. The narrator typically resists 
relationship forms which require ongoing obligations. Thorough engagement within 
these relationships requires impositions of a kind because, as Dewey and Tufts point out, 
ethical human relationships can only be established when both rights and obligations 
operate. This narrator, howTever, is a radical pragmatist, with an emphasis on “radical”; as 
such this “anarchistic sort of creature” provides a perfect contrast to the authoritarians of 
his peer group. Milton criticises the narrator’s detachment in ethical terms, suggesting his 
conversations are deceptive:
cYou never experience anything, do you,’ he says to me 
thoughtfully, but I know the malice is there, ‘you are able to 
mimic by using stage props, you mimic the experience but you 
don’t live it. Your conversations, for instance, are not real - they 
are imitations of conversations.’
‘But fairly perfect imitations,’ I say in defence.
‘Yes, I’ll concede that,’ he says, ‘and I'll admit that they can be 
sometimes as enjoyable as real conversations, more so, because 
real conversations are often not as well ordered as your imitations.
Most people can’t tell the difference between real conversation 
and your conversation. But I can.’ (108)
Milton suggests that the narrator’s conversations are illegitimate as social
interaction because they are simulations rather than real experiences. Whilst the narrator
admits to this, his style is more than simulacra. The term virtual may be more useful here
since the narrator’s mimicking is regenerative. His virtual persona fulfils a vital social
function in that he reflects social values back into the social group. Mackenzie Wark’s
definition of ‘virtual’, in his book The X/irtual Republic, is useful in elaborating this point.
Wark describes the derivation of virtual as having its roots in ‘vir’ (man). The three words
he draws our attention to are virtue, virtuoso and virtual. Virtue relates to the best
qualities of a person, (despite the values of those qualities changing over time and over
culture); virtuoso, as having a highly developed quality of a particular kind; and thirdly
virtual, a reflected image of a thing. Wark suggests that our contemporary age:
can only converse.. .in a virtual space composed of media, rather 
than in the public square of the old renaissance republics. It is this 
virtual conversation that produces our sense of the public thing.
It is through the virtual that we discuss and confirm what is real 
to us. Not least the reality of who we are. 181
181 Wark, M. The Virtual Republic: Australia's Culture Wars oj the 1990s. St Leonards: Allen and Unwin. 1997. 
pp. xv-xvii.
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Whilst Wark is intending that various media become the agent for such virtuality,
there is no reason we cannot apply the same definition to this narrator who is almost
sheer public vessel in the way that he conduits and replays public events such as
conversations. Through his varied role-plays, from camp homosexual to accomplished
bushman, the narrator confirms styles of being that are real for the community at large. It
is for this reason that, firstly, I want to apply Wark’s ideas of the virtual and, secondly,
argue that through this narrator there is potential for a community of selves to become
free to re-imagine ways of being. Wark writes:
[T]he whole point of [the virtual republic] is to create a people 
aware of itself as a people. Not a people bound to any fixed idea 
of itself, but which knows something of the many pasts from 
which it descends to the present. A people aware of its potential, 
of the things it can make of itself, the things it can do and be.
This is a third sense of the word virtual, and the hardest to grasp.
We oscillate between the euphoria of thinking ourselves 
absolutely free and capable of anything; and the pessimism of 
thinking our lives absolutely determined, ground between the 
wheels of inexorable laws of history or nature. Neither view is 
justified. Both views trap us into obedience to someone else: 
those who claim to lead us to a radical remaking of country in the 
image of their rational schemes; those who claim to be privy to 
the secret laws that limit all our futures to be pale copies of our 
past. In contrast to both, the virtual is that world of potential
ways of life of which the way things actually are is just an
182instance.
This is essentially the position of a socially principled pragmatist and this idea of 
image reflection is similar to Dewey and Tufts’ description of the role that art has in 
assisting a community’s development. In Ethics, the arts and crafts are “idealising 
agencies” since they are beyond the essential habits of community survival and, 
furthermore, Dewey and Tufts write: “[t]hose who see or hear are having constantly 
suggested to them ideas and values which bring more meaning into life and elevate its 
interests.” (42) It may be said that Milton’s recalcitrant friend, given the time and effort 
he spends in reconstructing perfect imitations of conversations, has valorised that aspect 
of community living. He has instigated an artistic practice since, under rational and 
aesthetic considerations, he has given order and form to an otherwise potentially 
unstructured yet habitual social thing. It is not that he necessarily makes better
182 Wark, p. xvii.
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conversation but he turns a general habit into an artistic moment thus reflecting a pattern 
of behaviour and elevating it as a form per se. Through his artistic enactment of the 
conversational form he valorises one of our most valuable and distinctive human 
behaviours. This is why Milton “enjoys” it more. It is an artistic experience. The 
conversation has been thought about; it has form and order.
Of course, the pure amelioration of society is rather too large a claim for a 
narrator who, in “The Oracular Story”, lubricates Hestia whilst she is heavily drugged 
and has intercourse with her sleeping body. “Moral advancement” here means the sense 
of freeing the conscious self from total systems in order to test and evaluate habitual 
customs of behaviour. It is deep into this circumspect character we must now travel. It 
should be noted that the nameless male narrator I refer to across these stories is 
conflated as one. Since the voice is consistent throughout and he holds relations with the 
same characters across the stories it seems justifiable to read the “I” as a consistent 
entity.
The circumstances of a reenacted or ritualised event must pass through the 
conscious agent’s mind and, in doing so, become virtual events reflective of the 
originating cultural norms. In so celebrating the style of a culture, one becomes 
enmeshed in it. This is clear in Lawson’s bush undertaker who, in the landscape empty of 
all cultural signposts, enacts a Christian burial complete with pastor and parish (himself 
and the dog) in order to project onto his dead mate the dignity of human life even in that 
wasteland. In so doing, the bushman links himself and Brummy to their originating 
culture, taking part in communal life in order to salvage and express the meaning of their 
own lives through the ritual. In Dewey, ritual, as with art, reflects the society back to its 
participants; it reaffirms its values and strengthens the bonds of those who take part 
through shared meaning. A similar situation occurs here when Moorhouse’s narrator 
consciously enacts social rituals. Yet, it is a hyper-consciousness that enacts these rituals, 
which raises some interesting problems for the narrator in terms of the ritual’s eventual 
meaning and his investment in it. He wonders whether meaning is accentuated or 
lessened by a situation’s similarity to countless screenplays.
In “Letters To An Ex-Wife Concerning A Reunion in Portugal” and “The Loss 
of a Friend by Cablegram” (Tales o f  Mystery and Romance), Moorhouse specifically 
addresses the issue of intertextuality and social role-plays in an age of endlessly reflected 
and enacted situations. The question the narrator asks is: where does meaning lie if a
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situation takes on the character of a stage-set? Does it have human significance through
or despite its similarity to what Moorhouse elsewhere describes as a “bad radio play”?
The narrator’s love of airports may be an answer to this question:
I love airports. I love the opera of airports. People weeping, and 
how soon people stop their tears. The flare of excessive interest in 
someone because they are coming or going. Everyone audience to 
the person. Speechy conversation which no one can remember 
afterwards, everyone over-laughing.. .When the airport sanctuary 
is left, the automatic doors open into the sweaty heat and blown 
litter, and they also re-open the wounds of the family and the dust 
blows into the lacerations. (57)
The opera, the high-art melodrama of airports, heightens emotion and, in doing
so, sanctifies relationship ties. In participating in this ritual, ties with one another are
reaffirmed through the social stage-set. These melodramas occur in a removed, almost
holy, environment where bad blood is not welcome. For this reason, there is a purifying
element to greeting or farewelling loved ones in this way. Relationships are idealised in
this environment and their meaning confirmed.
The narrator practices many acts of idealisation. Contact with his ex-wife triggers
his reminiscences about their youthful sexual experiences:
Picnic love making on a flat rock in hot river bushland, shrilling 
like a whistle.. .Were we doing it because of the idea of it—love­
making-in-bush? But not only were the passions indistinctly felt 
but we also shied away from precise observation of ourselves. I 
did things partly, and maybe still do, I realise, because of the idea 
of it, to experience something described by other human 
beings...a ritual for instance.. .Do I do it as a way of knowing 
others by doing what others have done? Is it an attempt to 
identify with ‘humanity’ or sometimes ‘the great’; or to gain 
‘humanity’? I bet I had read of love-making-in-bush. She always 
said I was missing ‘something’ because I wouldn’t let myself be 
ordinary. (17)
The young lovers enact these scenes in order to pretend “by bravado that 
nothing was being done by us for the first time.. .If only we could have admitted we 
didn’t know and have relaxed in each other’s ignorance. Why do the innocent detest 
innocence?” (17) Certainly there is the element of bravado, of wanting to take on the 
skills exhibited in sex scenes in books, yet there is something else operating here as well. 
The narrator wants to “experience something described” in order to relate to broader 
human experience. Children constantly do this, when they play “grown-ups”: doctors and 
nurses, mummies and daddies, school or church. They enact situations they are in some
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way familiar with but take on the roles of others in the situation. Instead of being the 
child they are the parent or the teacher, instead of the patient, the doctor. In this way 
they practice the skills they see others use who are competent in their position of 
experience and authority. By mimicking, we fill out our repertoire of human actions; in 
this way we become prepared for future situations. The two young lovers in this scene 
are certainly afraid of being exposed as innocent and ill-experienced. To overcome this, 
they take on the attitudes of those they have seen, read or heard about, and recreate 
those situations. This can be an empowering experience. Recall Joe Wilson entering into 
the fight. He was not a fighter and yet the stage was set to fight and through winning the 
fight he becomes a different person, the kind of person fit to marry Mary. Only by 
copying behaviour he has witnessed does he pass through this initiation. He is personally 
empowered through the staging of this man-play. The difference here is that 
Moorhouse’s characters are even more self-conscious than Joe is. When Joe participates 
in the fight, his self-consciousness abates; indeed, he grows strong because his self- 
consciousness withdraws during the action. In Moorhouse’s universe, there are so many 
more styles of adulthood to choose from that his characters rarely obtain this relief. Even 
in Milton’s mystical happiness he is dissatisfied, “frightened of being accused o f ‘being 
happy’ because everyone in our group is supposed to be non-happy, in crisis, freaking- 
out, traumatised.”(106) Social comparisons and copying have oppressive aspects such as 
this, but copying also prevents us having to reinvent the wheel of social behaviours. 
Moorhouse’s characters experiment with different “Ways” by copying. It is what happens 
after the rudimentary skills are tried, tested and laid down, that may change the course of 
human behaviour.
When the narrator seems to have his rudimentary sexual skills under control, he 
moves onto the next set of behaviours he wants to experiment with. Milton and he 
experiment with homosexuality and again, the emphasis is on building up repertoires of 
behaviour. He questions himself whether “making love” was indeed what they were 
attempting:
Milton fell out of bed...Among other things I suppose we were 
trying to overcome what we talked about as ‘our inhibition’—on 
principle; to resolve what we felt to be a discrepancy between our 
feelings and our behaviour; to defy the limitations of our 
upbringing; explore further what was happening between us and 
advance it; find a new pleasure; visit strange territory, down 
among the dark forces.. .(“The Alter-Ego Interpretation”, Tales,
12.)
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The narrator and Milton “try on” homosexuality not only for the experiment of
homosexuality itself and to consummate their mutual feelings but also to fulfil their
philosophical requirements of experimental behaviour per se. No behaviour can be off
limits; otherwise they cannot consider themselves progressive. The attempt fails. The
narrator objects to Milton’s “form”. “It was not the way to go about it”:
He tried to fuck me up the arse. I sucked his penis but he didn’t 
relax there. We kissed, fondled nervously. He was erect alright. I 
could’ve become erect—not that I care that much—if he’d 
calmed. We should perhaps have gendy, slowly masturbated each 
other. But he scrambled at everything at once. Like a scavenger 
race. Tried to sample the infinite variety of male sex. It was all too 
grasping and worried. (12)
The experience is not unlike the love-making in the bush role-play. It is an 
experiment with assumed forms of love-making. In the bush scenario, it is not until the 
narrator reminisces about this scene that he wonders: “Did it hurt her backside?” (17) He 
could not have worried over this fact during the time of his youth because his self- 
consciousness was concerned with historical, love-making forms rather than physical 
actualities and personal investment. The passions are “indistinctly felt” because of the 
level of concentration on “form” and a style of doing. If the feeling is absent and the 
style fails to satisfy, is there any lasting meaning in the action? For the narrator, the 
meaning rests in having participated in a human act repeated many times over. It 
emphasises to him his place in the scheme of things. In experiencing, as others have 
experienced before him, he becomes linked to the greater field of human drama. He 
draws his human meaning from this.
Rather than theoretical systems of meaning, the narrator develops methods of
living. He has certain preferred modes of operating even though all experience is open to
new and ever-changing circumstance. His methods are highly reasoned, thus lending
some critical coherency to them. In other words, his living is thoughtful and reflective
even though he exists independently of total systems:
In the rented car I breathed freely. A rented car is not an 
extension of self in quite the same way as a car you own. You are 
free of the bonds of ownership. The rented car is not your ego, 
rusting away, corroding, scratched. A rented car renews itself at 
each renting and renews you with it. Certain things, I said, can be 
best and freely used when not owned. People? Then they are not 
tangled with your ego. (“Airport, Pizzeria.. Tales, 63)
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It is interesting that while the narrator avoids the personal entanglements of the
ego, resisting the obligations of human interrelationship, he enjoys the forms of
customized behaviour. These forms are thus still endowed with value. The narrator still
pursues them but he prefers the rental car, the hotel and the call girl rather than the
owned car, the home and the wife. The value he actively searches out suits this transient
life. The narrator announces to his ex-wife in Portugal that, under the influence of
Anatole France, he believes the only solace in life is volupté: “Sensual pleasure! Evil
sensuality!” (Tales, 62) She pities him: “[B]ut so much pleasure in life comes from having
commitments and trials and worries.” (62) Together these two characters symbolise the
extremes of an ethic. The narrator has a “free life” and, in contrast, his ex-wife invests
herself into relationships, deriving life’s meaning from the ties that bind: “all she sought
from life.. .was the warmth of the hearth and ‘the sticky fingers of loving children.”’(62)
The difference between these two perspectives is one of moral obligation: the ex-wife
welcomes the commitment of what the narrator scornfully describes as “loving
interpersonal relationships”; she welcomes the obligations commitments bring,
supporting Dewey and Tufts’ contention that obligations are the cement of society.
Commitments to others in the social network are the social bind; in being so bound, a
sense of self is achieved since this placing confers identity. It is this sense of self the
narrator is without: he is free but solitary. The source of this lonely prescription may be
found in a diary entry in “The Loss of a Friend By Cablegram”. Here, the narrator’s
aversion to the exclusive group is articulated and has arisen through his formative human
relationships. It might be argued that his resistance to these ties—and the constant
longing for their forms regardless—come through unsatisfactory early human relations:
My family— it was not their opinions which made me feel sick, 
scalding me with frustration, but the delivery of their opinions 
which was done in such a manner that it was made clear by their 
manner that anything I had to say would be of no value. I was of 
no value. This was the dead baby buried there in every 
conversation. Their conversation was ritualized self-endorsement,
(but aren’t all group conversations) but there was something else.
I was not included. (73-74)
The narrator thus turns his back, formulating a new way of being that works with 
his chosen environments and perhaps might protect his ego from the humiliating and 
demoralizing experience of being excluded from longed-for groups. He strips the
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personal from his methodology and develops coping strategies that do not depend on 
obligatory ties:
I guess I’d call it Sydney anarchism—or Backhouse Mountain 
anarchism. An interest-conflict interpretation of life rather than a 
moral interpretation. But taking into consideration that 
‘moralities’ are a fact and operate in the lives of some people. My 
own and only revolutionary pre-condition is total freedom of 
communication and increasing flexibility in economic, working, 
arrangements away from authoritarian family patterns. (22)
Of course, the narrator has the advantage over the ex-wife—and women in 
general— in being able to pursue this life away from typical family patterns. He has 
fathered a child with her and has always denied this responsibility. A child is a pressing 
consequence of action and would threaten his laissez-faire style. The child links his sexual 
action to real consequence and so he refuses to see her because that would require some 
engagement and set up a moral obligation. He does not allow himself to think “my 
child”:
I know that if I allowed myself to think of it as ‘my child’ I would 
have had this fruitless obsession, to see and know the 
child.. .Even now I am uneasy about admitting its existence to my 
conscious mind. I have a child. I fathered a child. (21)
It is the ex-wife who draws recognition of self through her commitments to her children 
and friends. The narrator, on the other hand, refuses these “tangles” of ego. Or so he 
thinks:
Disconsolation joined me at the bar some 15 or 20 minutes later 
when I began to ponder on how difficult and confounding it was 
to find volupté which Anatole France said was the only solace.
I pulled my Breton cap over my disconsolate brow.
Where was this volupté when you needed it??? (63)
He is forced to face the shortcoming of his style. He repeats the name of his
quoted source, Anatole France, as if to reaffirm the quality or intellectual integrity of his
chosen path. Being let down by the reality of it confounds him. The Breton cap, another
appeal to a distinct style of being, is pulled more tightly but cannot dispel the
disconsolation. He must face dissatisfaction. The outcome of his radical pragmatism is
that, being largely outside the bonds of a social network, his self may completely unravel.
His ex-wife sees this possibility and delivers her verdict:
‘One -you arrive on a day’s notice after an absence o f  seven years. Two -you 
spend an hour with me, mainly insulting me, and then sneak o ff out o f the
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motel room without telling me and y e t  return again, the next day. Three -you  
refuse to see you r daughter. Tour -you insist on sleeping with me. You beg me 
to sleep with you  - psychologically blackmail me. Fire -you order an expensive 
crate o f port. Six - an international cablegram arrives fo r  you  from some dirty 
little homosexual tellingyou he never wants to see you  again in his life. Seven 
- 1 read in your note book that you  think y o u ’re a woman. Thought you  were 
a woman when you  were married to me. I f  I understand it. Tight -you leave 
me again, after sleeping with me, hamng spent less than forty-eight hours in 
Portugal. Nine -your last words to me are “send the port airfreight”. Is this 
what happened? Pinch me. You have moved to the very edge o f the real world.
You are at the very edge. Do you  know that??? (78)
Milton perceives the same weakness in the narrator’s style:
Milton talked to me in his new~ quiet way, ‘You don’t truly play - 
you only play because you fear that too much work will make you 
a dull boy, you don't play for play’s sake...Your dabbling in 
effeminacy doesn’t interest me. But I'll tell you another thing it 
isn’t - it isn’t dodging being a real person by hiding in irony, self- 
concealing humour, hiding behind ambiguity, double-edged 
humour, switching of persona, self-deprecation — that’s all so 
much shit.’
‘Is that style finished?’
‘That’s all finished.’ (85-86)
Through “The Loss of a Friend By Cablegram” the irony encircling the narrator
becomes most evident. He becomes unstuck as a result of Milton breaking off their
friendship. Clearly, this association is very important to him and demonstrates that he
does not have the cavalier attitude towards his relationships he thought he had. The
incredible importance of the telegram and its contents is made clear through the style of
the scene. His reality “stumbles into a dramatic posture and gives off sensations of being,
well, an epiphany, a manifestation.” (67)
At first I thought it a shimmeringly pregnant moment.. .it ‘looked’ 
unreally vivid. She was standing in a white, hooded towelling 
bathrobe with the hood fallen back at the bedroom door with an 
international telegram in her hand. She was tousled from our love 
making... “It’s for you.”...At first I thought this tableau with 
those standard words had the feel of an ‘epiphany’ but I had a 
second sensation which decided me that it felt that way because it 
came from somewhere else, from another story or maybe a film.
The narrator feels like he is in a “painting, a photograph” and this “overawareness” 
irritates him. The tableau—woman in the doorway, man propped up on elbow in a messy 
bed, the words “it’s for you” and “no one knows I’m here”—follows the style of hotel- 
room revelations and it is this awareness of the genre that threatens to block the narrator
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from fully experiencing the moment. Yet we can also say that the virtual is operating here
rather than a banal sense of a couple acting out a movie scenario. The virtual sense here
is that these forms of interaction—which are repeatedly replayed in stories and films—
serve to give weight to the unfolding situation. By becoming this virtual scene,
participants in the scene feel the vital nature of the situation. In this telegram, Milton is
announcing that the relationship is over. The narrator begins to cry: “I was hit. I was
bleeding. I was emotionallv blocked out. I was banging on the door again.” (69)
The narrator’s upset is the chink in the armour of his personal style. The ex-wife,
who believes she has “a right”, sees him weakened and takes the opportunity to
thoroughly analyse his character. She reads through his notebook. She asks: “Do you
think you’re fully honest with any one person—or just partially honest with a lot of
people?” (69) In this conflict, they do not talk as they usually would:
There was a retreat to formality. Or stage language. Or magazine 
language. Had I become strange, my image disorganised, because 
of the telegram and its implications? Maybe because I openly 
wept.. .Had I been right about the epiphany, the tableau. (69-70)
The notebook uncovers the flexible nature of his self and his pragmatic style: his negative
reaction to any sense of certainty, the strong presence of femininity within him that
contributes to his flexible persona, and his inventive, analytical mind:
They [ideas] became a passing flash, someone passing by the 
window, a direction which had to be let go because he did not 
have the time to follow up. These things, along with a high 
consciousness of his own ignorance, excited him rather than 
demoralised him because he could now ‘imagine’ the knowledge 
which could be found, and brought to bear, on an intriguing 
phenomenon. He knew now the ‘types’ of insights which were 
almost inevitably available if you knew where to look, which 
wasn't hard, and the time, the energy, the life. (75)
This inventive mind, however, also displays an alarming atavistic streak: his is like 
his father. The narrator’s father shares the same inventive streak as the father figure of 
George in The Electrical Experience. In his notebook the narrator ponders several 
inventions: “say a wrist counter attached to the watch to count drinks, exercises, calories, 
small calculations.” (77) His ex-wife shrieks: “You’re becoming like your father.” Thus 
the cycle has continued just as it did in The Electrical Experience. Moorhouse seems to be 
suggesting that despite seeming progress, human behaviour may never ultimately 
progress to a new state. In his notebook, the narrator considers the generational paradox:
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__there are two age-ego-centric positions, (find a good word for
this???) one that Youth is making a fresh beginning with higher 
values and original ideas—the genesis illusion—and a second, the 
illusion that we belong to the Last Generation that a tradition, a 
style, a virtue, a grandeur, a ‘better way’ will end with us. (71)
He has become the Last Generation. His Australia is, after all, an “ever-renewing 
country.”
Despite the bravado of the narrator and his radical pragmatism he has an 
unnerving reservation. Whilst he celebrates a flexible living process he regrets “the 
intrusion, now and then, of ideal forms. Our tormented gift of being able to visualise 
perfection.” (62) This reflection articulates the limits of a radical pragmatism but it also 
holds the clue to a more effective pragmatic method that the narrator does not seem to 
grasp. For him, the ability to imagine an ideal form, or perfection, goes against the 
concept of a universe that is not pre-fabricated and that which is always in creation. He 
does not see that these two ideas do not need to be mutually exclusive. As a 
consequence, he locks himself out of that which may satisfy. Whilst the universe is in 
such flux, human agency, amongst other things, impacts upon the direction of this flux.
In order to make decisions that affect the experiential field, thinking beings reason why 
certain actions are better than others. We must have some idea of how we want things to 
be or how we want to change present circumstances. That is, we decide to act through a 
process of idealization. In order to achieve this ideal, actions must be thoughtfully and 
responsibly taken and this brings us to the ethical decision. This narrator, as the 
pragmatist writ large, is a man who cannot accept ordering processes, preferring to cope 
with each situation as it presents itself. He sees ideals as contrary to this fluid position. 
Our gift of visualizing perfection is, of course, the germ of moral action.
The narrator may act without regard to higher ideals but whilst he acts, he 
engages physically in a world, he makes changes, and is responsible for them. He may 
avoid taking on idealizations but he may not necessarily escape the consequences of his 
actions. His actions have consequences and even though he does not like to admit it, 
guilt plagues him throughout the stories. The presence of guilt also signals that he does 
indeed have a “moral interpretation” of life. The relationship of action and consequence 
is a haunting problem throughout Moorhouse’s work. For example, in “Jesus Said to 
Watch for 28 Signs” {The Americans, Baby, 233-240) the “signs” Becker refers to are those 
particular actions that, one after another, spell his downfall. In the end of the sequence of
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signs, he is taking LSD with Terri, having been fired from Coca-Cola for being seen in
the male toilets with Terri, a “relief’ worker in more ways than one. “Becker could list
the twenty-eight steps which led him to his first trip and his first mixing with drugs of
any kind—Old Crow bourbon excluded”:
The first had been during High School when he’d learned to play 
piano from a coupon course mailed from the back of a comic 
book.
The second had been reading the poems of the Earl of Rochester 
at college.
The third had been carrying the poems of the Earl of Rochester 
in his head, after college.
The fourth had been a semester of Existentialism which led him 
to ponder destiny and life. (235)
And so it continues until Becker names all twenty-eight signs which ordinarily 
would not fit together along a path of cause and effect. Other signs included are “seven 
hundred miserable Rotary lunches” and “the heat of the forsaken summer of the 
forsaken country”. Becker’s reality is indeed the interaction of complex things. 
Importandy, he also sees his as an inevitable fate of being far from his native country. 
“He’d read of cases. People died from being isolated from their intimates and people lost 
control that way.” (233) Becker has lost control of himself because he is far from his peer 
group, who, through the social ties of mutual obligation, would help him control his 
“lust”. Despite what he sees as his downfall, Becker is free to live out his dream of 
playing ja2z piano for a living. (The process has been a liberating one. Becker has broken 
free of a George-style cycle.)
The cause-and-consequence relationship is not so positive in the novel Forty-
Seventeen where the middle-aged narrator is ultimately left with the haunting suspicion that
he may have been responsible for his ex-wife’s cancer. When he learns of Robyn’s
cancer, he says: “‘Does she say I gave her the cancer?’ It was a joking toughness to block
the shock and the pity which were reaching him. ‘[She] blamed me for everything else.’”
This is more than what could be called the crabby humour of the divorcee.
Firsdy, it is an immediate defensive reaction to a more general sense of guilt at having
failed in the marriage. Secondly, and more specifically however, there is cause for a
legitimate concern of guilt since the cervical cancer she is suffering is caused by a sexually
transmitted virus. While he and Robyn reminisce together she says:
I sometimes wonder what gave me the cancer, was it—this is silly 
I know but I have to say it—could it have been men’s penises not
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being clean enough?...I don’t mean you...you were a good 
middle-class boy and clean, but well, others.. .others after you 
weren’t always good middle-class boys.” (156)
This is not completely true, however, even though she and the narrator were
married as teenagers. The narrator had moved away a year before Robyn left school, and
while they were both still virgins. In her early letters, (collected in the story, “A Portrait
of a Virgin Girl”), Robyn writes: “And what is the mysterious story you won’t show me?
When will I ever ‘be ready’?” (128). The story which follows “Portrait”, “The Story Not
Shown”—a story within Forty-Seventeen that has been written by the narrator and withheld
from Robyn— charts an evening in Kings Cross where two young men are eager “to
have experience.” They seek out prostitutes and Ian (the narrator’s persona in the story7)
sums up the woman whose house he enters as “ugly, fat and degenerate.” The room is
dirty and badly lit. She “produced a basin of water and roughly washed [his] penis” and
then washes him again after intercourse. (135) The story finishes with the narrator
“thinking about VD.” (136) The story within the larger stories is suggestive of the
experiences the narrator is having while away in Sydney. His soon-to-be-wife is eager to
hear of his experiences but she is not privy to this one. The point here—which can only
be intimated by its inclusion in this collection of stories—is that the narrator has a
legitimate guilt. He may well have passed on a virus to his girlfriend and he was not the
“clean” middle-class boy she thought he was. Importandy, the links between these stories
are never made explicit and the story not shown is, after all, only a story. The narrator
distances himself in two ways. He does not consciously connect the two situations (they
are not placed near each other in the collection) and, secondly, he keeps emotional
distance by leaving the story as a slightly distanced fiction. This is similar to the structure
of “The Union Buries Its Dead” where all the blameworthy evidence about die events is
available to the reader through a narrator who does not consciously accept his guilt.
His more general emotional distance is made clearer through his general
emotional reactions to his relationships. During “Disposal”, when he hears from a
younger lover that she has become a prostitute, he reacts thus:
He supposed he felt he should have an emotionally devastating 
concussion from all this and was more worried that he seemed 
deficient than he was worried about her. He’d reacted lubriciously 
to the conversation—that also worried him. Or he worried that 
he should be worried about it and wasn’t. His personal code had 
no response ready for him. He was uncomfortably skewered by it 
but could not react. Skewered. (96)
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Likewise, his reactions to his wife’s death leave him uncomfortable: “He had not
been satisfied by his reactions to her death.. .His reactions had seemed somehow
deficient.” (147) Once again, the overwhelming focus is on him and his reactions. His
over-developed ego precludes real experience. In the story “Beirut”, one of several
stories in which the narrator is a diplomat, (a set of stories which are the prelude to Grand
Days and Dark Palace) the narrator laments:
he awoke and met the familiar emotional condition which settled 
on him before every expedition of his adult life. It was a numbed 
control. There was none of the nervous excitement of childhood.
He knew he was over-controlled but that no effort of will could 
break him free from that. His mind, as he lay there, sensibly 
prepared lists, rehearsed for exigencies. As he showered he looked 
at ways the day might possibly go; he would have made a good 
staff officer. But he had a yearning to be able to enter experience 
thoughtlessly, to be able to expose himself without armour or 
caution—to deal with exigencies as they arrived with what was at 
hand, to meet the world with surprise and then to perform in 
ways that surprised him. (142)
It should be no surprise that such a hyperactive self-consciousness should finally 
be symbolised through the diplomat, where the private self is controlled and all 
interaction is negotiation. For the narrator “the weary exhilaration of negotiation” and 
“the lateral elegance of the deal” is “compensation for angst.” (14) In his “life lessons” 
he accepts the “imperfect self’ and the “imperfect world” and considers it wise to work 
out how much of this “you have to accommodate” to live with any satisfaction. At forty, 
he regrets to realise that:
[N]o person with a system of knowledge is going to release you 
from intellectual dilemma. No book will now come along to 
seriously alter your life. You feel that you have a fair grasp of the 
current limitations of knowledge and reason, and the necessary, 
compromising uses of faith. You recognise that your personal, 
unstable formulations are held without much confidence to stave 
off the sands of chaotic reality7, that a refinement might take their 
place but you also fear that the rational shoring might one day 
give way entirely. You are daily made aware of how little reason 
and knowledge altered the course of affairs. (74-75)
To progress then, or to even just exist day to day, negotiations between and 
amongst systems must take place. Volupte, as the only legitimate pursuit, has lost its 
attraction: “the excesses of life are too easily achieved, are not heroic, and yield less and 
less.” Therefore, he must pull back from his radicalism yet not cave into Last Generation
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conservatism. It could be that Milton’s style, of taking on systems to form ideals, then 
changing when new ideas come to take their place, is at least an effective way of 
negotiating a volatile moral field. It is the practice of negotiation between conscious 
minds which facilitate “not order but orderly progress”. We will now mm to these skills 
of diplomacy in the figure of Edith and her adventures in Grand Days.
194
Chapter 4
The Way of Imperfection: Edith Campbell Berry and Grand Days
Edith Campbell Berry is on a train from Paris to Geneva. She is travelling to the League 
of Nations where she will take up a junior posting. The year is 1926. It is no coincidence 
that she, like the century, is 26 years old, because Edith Campbell Berry is striving to be a 
woman of her time. She is leaving behind her provincial Australian past and is plunging 
headlong into a larger, foreign world of unstable order. It is a world of diplomatic risk 
and personal daring and she must find her ‘Way’. Edith’s Ways are underpinned by 
Rationalism, the philosophy she has inherited from her mother and father and also her 
political tutor John Latham. Grand Days works as a critique of Rationalism as a “Way of 
Going” and also hints at an alternative way, the way of imperfection. This pointed literary 
allusion to St Theresa de Avila’s work The Way o f Perfection states clearly Moorhouse’s 
position on absolute systems of meaning. Any way of perfection, whether it is divine or 
rationalist, suggests a unity of purpose and being within a /////verse of rational, monistic 
order. It is immaterial for this study whether the rational order issues from one divine 
being, or from an idea that the world is ordered by irrefutable laws that might be 
scientifically proven. It is the idea of a centralised source of rational order per se that is 
contested. In the absence of absolute order, inconsistencies and unpredictable 
consequences abound, leading Moorhouse to write in Grand Days-. “Life was a series of 
agile responses. How to modify the response precisely enough was the trick.”(238)
Whilst one may not be able to plan for the unforseeable, one must be prepared for it by 
arming oneself with a large repertoire of actions that work. Just as Dave Regan and his 
men from “The Iron-Bark Chip” respond to each new circumstance with increasing 
agility, so too must Edith Campbell Berry expand her experiences to a point where she 
might cope with anything. This is the “knack and artistry” needed to move through life.
In one instance at the League where world peace is seriously compromised, her plans are 
changed dramatically: “She had learned something about planning. When planning failed, 
one worked through the emerging events, making order with agility and intuition.” (244) 
Competing influences within a dynamic field are the source of the unpredictable. 
Moorhouse always stresses the environment as a dynamic field of play where, at any 
moment, all expectations may change or the ground might shift. Edith shows all the skills
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required of the pragmatist yet, for a large part, she is bound by the Rationalist ideal that 
order should prevail. When the world tumbles into the Second World War and then, 
when the League crumbles, (the subject of Dark Palace) Edith’s faith in order is 
destroyed. She must then live in the world that remains. Edith eventually learns that 
order, at best, is only tentatively secured for a particular time and a particular purpose. 
This is a hard-won lesson and comes at the price of all she ever worked for: her beloved 
League of Nations, which she always imagined had the power to implement a lasting 
world peace.
Edith’s strong loyalty and love for the League is evident throughout:
While not herself being exactly what someone might describe as a 
nun devoted to Holy Orders, she had, she sometimes thought to 
herself, taken vocational vows. There was a clericature to her life.
If there had been a League of Nations vow, she would have taken 
it. It was more that she was, perhaps, a courtier—maybe a 
priestess—and needed to live in a Palais, if not a temple. She 
wished the Secretariat could all live in the Palais—not, though, she 
smiled, as if in a monastery—and she had been disappointed 
when she learned.. .that this was not to be. (153)
Whilst Edith’s love for the League may be testament to her ideal of global harmony, the 
nature of her love creates a blinding, total system. This is not to say that the progressive, 
open mind cannot permit ideals. James and Dewey both state that ideals are necessary to 
motivate action which may be then deemed good. Ideals create a superstructure for 
ethical action. Ideals form reasons for doing. However, Edith’s main difficulty arises out 
of an unsuspected clash between her reigning ideal of the League in its ability to promote 
peace, and her Rationalist philosophy, the drive of which is unification (in the sense of 
universal thought based on a single method of ordering thought). Not only does her 
Rationalism leave her unprepared for the often chaotic and random condition of the 
universe but she is also blind to the limitations of her ideal. That is, she cannot fault the 
deeply held prejudices that instruct her Rationalism.
Throughout his work, Moorhouse has continually depicted a world where there 
can be no absolute, agreed-upon World System. He then peoples this world with many 
characters who, nevertheless, pursue an absolute worldview. This is true for Grand Days 
where Edith insists that the League is the higher order, that is, she conceives a world that 
has a centralised source of authority. In Grand Days hierarchies of order are stripped 
down, thus decentralising power and authority, whereupon power and authority are 
reconfigured and relocated in the negotiation process. In the absence of an absolute,
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agreed-upon World System, negotiations must continually take place between competing
needs, desires and perspectives. We shall see how the social weaknesses of Edith’s initial
rationalist posturing demonstrates that the absence of a universal moral standard is
actually beneficial for moral progress. To show this, we must first look at Edith’s
understanding of unity and then, secondly, at Moorhouse’s concept of disunity and
difference. We have repeatedly seen that it is through negotiating difference, the moral
process is invigorated. That is, if all peoples, as if in a tribe, are unified, moral systems
become customary. When the environment changes, as change it must, that morality
must become reflective if a group is to be able to change within a changing environment.
Change and difference, therefore, are vital for moral progress. The importance difference
has gathers momentum throughout the novel as a more competent worldview. The ‘third
position’ thus emerges and it is this ‘position’, which Moorhouse has hinted at in
previous work, that is finally seen in its full potency in the League of Nations novels.
Moorhouse alerts us to Edith’s quest for global unity in the first scene when she
first meets Major Ambrose Westwood. In this first meeting, Ambrose hints at the nature
of his sexuality and does so through the metaphor of the borderline. The borderline is a
structuring motif for the text as borderlines — national, moral, those of the self — create
and maintain relevant identities. At this point, it is useful to recall Lawson’s
preoccupation with borders in the story of ‘Hungerford’, where identity distinctions
between man and beast, like the identity between New South Wales and Queensland, are
hopelessly futile because of the precariousness of those particular borderlines. We see in
that story not only the futile pretense of the prevailing borders but of what we are left
with when they disintegrate — no recognisable reasons for living. The borderline is a
complex metaphor and Edith’s early attitude towards borders betrays her idealistic
naivety. Ambrose speaks of homosexuality, a subject far beyond Edith’s experience, and,
further, describes the “devilish” zones of the transgendered self, saying, “Oh, there are
men who can cross the line back and forth, so to speak”:
The crossing of the borders. She was nonplussed.. .This was not 
an idea she had confronted before, that men might love both men 
and women.
‘And there are those who live damned near the border but just to 
one side of it. There is another devilish zone there.. .The free city 
of Danzig.’
She took his reference, a city belonging to no country, and maybe 
also the private meaning he was giving it. And, now, now, now, 
he was talking of himself. (26)
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As a credit to her code that requires her to “go to a new place in ideas” (27)
Edith begins a liaison with him although she is unsure of what this might mean. After
they kiss, “she wondered what a lady should do to give pleasure to a gendeman who
inhabited this border place. And did she not believe in the ending of national borders?”
(29) This final thought provides a clue to her youthful idealism. By removing national
borders, difference is also erased. This may have an egalitarian and humanitarian ring to
it, but the dissolution of borders dispenses with a complex moral universe. How could a
more simplified morality cope with a man like Ambrose and his so-called feminine
disorder? Over the course of the novel we see that dissolving borders is not such a useful
ideal to pursue. Whilst Edith has enough daring to cross lines and explore various modes
of being, she initially does so with an idea that, one day, all may be united.
In order to accelerate the dissolution of her own boundaries, Edith is driven to
relinquish her Australian identity in order to become international, a “citizen of the
world”. To this end, she routinely makes time to reflect on her personal progress. In the
following example of self-reflection, Edith has already been in Geneva a short while. She
is sitting alone in an outdoor café in the “old city”, drinking coffee:
Edith tested herself to see if she indeed felt international, in any 
bodily way or perhaps, and this was not so silly, whether she was 
different in style of movement from, say, those at the other table.
She moved her mouth to an expression of resolution, cleared her 
mind of self-consciousness, and when her mind had settled to 
blankness, she let it pounce on herself. She then looked to the 
paws of her mind. Though surely such a change in the national 
sense of oneself and the detaching of oneself would mean a 
difference in the way she carried herself. Didn’t ministers of 
religion move in ways different to laymen? Didn’t royalty move 
differently? Didn’t sporting people? Surely, then, an international 
civil servant also comported differently. (74)
For the analytical self to pounce on itself at an un-self-conscious moment is an 
absurdity7. Here Moorhouse uses an exaggerated style to emphasise the rigorous methods 
of development Edith subjects herself to. This peculiar, exaggerated self-consciousness is 
a constant feature of the characterisation in both Moorhouse and Lawson. This is one 
fate of the pioneer because old habits of behaviour do not work in the new environment 
and new actions must be tested. All actions are exaggerated because, as yet, none come 
naturally. (Here, the term ‘pioneer’ points to social pioneering as much as a life lived on 
physical frontiers; Edith sees herself as a new ‘breed’ just as the Balmain and nomadic
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bushman ‘tribes’ do.) Edith’s construction of self is a highly conscientious practice and 
this is routinely exaggerated and ironised by Moorhouse throughout the novel. Her 
conscientious formulations of self are apparent from the opening scene. She is on the 
train and the gong for the dining car sounds. As she responds, she moves in “what she 
felt was a gathered-together way” and, in doing so, puts into practice one of her newly 
formulated Ways of Going. She remembers not to leave anything valuable at her seat 
whilst maintaining free hands:
To have free hands allowed her to ward and hold, which she 
considered important in the technique of travelling.. .she wanted 
to be a holding person and not always a warding person, and 
would describe herself as a holding person in all its meaning, 
which she would one day list. (3)
Quite literally, then, her Self is something she wishes to list, to work out on 
paper, like a mathematical formulation. She will later come to realise that the self is too 
slippery for that. For now, however, she attempts to build her identity through strict 
‘inner-management’. This management is necessary for the plethora of first experiences 
she now faces. The emphasis in this opening chapter is, indeed, on firsts. This is her “first 
sitting and her first lunch in a railway car”, a fact she repeats to herself several times. As 
James explains, the unfamiliar is by nature rather daunting. In pragmatist terms, we reach 
out into the unfamiliar armed with what we can take from our familiar experiences. Since 
everything Edith will now be facing will be unfamiliar, she designs for herself some Ways 
of Going so that she might navigate the new terrain. It is significant that these Ways of 
Going have only been very recently formulated. “She had developed most of the Ways 
on the voyage over from Australia but they now needed refinement and further practice.” 
(3)18’ This is a pragmatic method par excellence-, her new circumstances are surpassing any 
habits of action she has heretofore practised. In response, she develops provisional 
procedures which will be refined by new experience or, if found to be useless, would not 
be applied. Her relocation from Australia is terribly significant for this process. In 
comparison to the Europe she is entering, Australia is still very new and, to her, without 
history. Such history would give Edith already substantial habits of behaviour. She is
183 These Ways include but are certainly not restricted to: Way o f Companionable Confession (6); Way o f 
the Silent Void (12) (to overcome disadvantages o f knowledge, teasing); Tip It All Up (13); Way o f All 
Doors (15); Way o f Companionable Directness (17); Way o f Compulsive Revelation (23) (“not a way, 
strictly speaking, because it didn’t have to be taken— it occurred...) Way o f  Cowardly Flight (27) Way o f  
Numbers. (56).
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devoid of those because of her Australian-ness. She is ready to start from scratch on the 
new continent.
Back home, she’d grown up in a brand-new house. Her parents 
had grown up in a brand-new house, and so had her 
grandparents. No one had ever lived in old houses. There were no 
old houses. She yearned to live in a house where people had lived 
for ‘generations’. She wanted ruins which spoke of former 
habitation, of the sense of habitation built upon habitation over 
centuries, and lost worlds around her and under her feet. The 
building beneath the building. Musty cellars of wine. Attics of old 
things. Home had been without cellars and attics. Her life had 
lacked the Gothic and the sublime. She had to confess to herself 
that the aged world of Europe consummated her in some way and 
that at the same time she couldn’t bathe in this feeling yet—she 
had to fight off pangs of disloyalty to Australia when she felt this 
way. (77)
For Moorhouse, Australian-ness is a very condition that encourages a pragmatic
way of being. The very newness—and self-renewing—nature of the country invites a
constant fashioning of self having no long history of white civilisation on which to fall
back. George McDowell, who reappears in Grand Days as an old school friend of Edith’s,
is likewise in the process of self-fashioning. When George appears in Geneva, Edith
notes to herself that, “He had a rapid manner, reminding her, in recollection, of some of
the earlier, jerky motion pictures.” (279) George has a naturally awkward manner because
habits have not had generations to form. Thus, when overseas, his private moments are
spent practising to overcome his graceless nature, gracelessness he attributes to being
Australian. “After we get things straightened out we’ll go in for grace.” He works out in
his hotel room for the stamina that he not only needs to build Australia but to “wresde
down [his] shyness.” (299) (Note that shyness is a symptom of self-consciousness.)
With his breathing broken by exertion, he said that his life did not 
have time for grace — just yet — but it did have a need for stamina.
Stamina was his objective.
‘You, Edith, you can afford the time here in Europe for grace.
Australia is a country in a hurry — and for hurrying you need 
stamina.’ (299)
George agrees with Edith when she says, ‘“[I]sn’t the possibility of regeneration 
part of our birthright as Australians -  the privilege of being able to fashion ourselves.’” 
George, however, adds a warning. “‘I too am a man refashioning himself. In that
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refashioning, we take risks. You take your life, and you work on it with your hands.. .It’s 
as dangerous as self-surgery.’” (295)
What will be the outcome of Edith’s self-surgery? The question that troubles 
George when they meet in Geneva is who might Edith eventually become? It is a 
question which we see her devote much time to over the course of Grand Days and this 
journey begins—as gracefully as she can in the early days manage—on the train from 
Paris to Geneva. “[A]s she moved along the swaying train, trying not to need to use her 
hands or to lose her balance, Edith considered that she conducted her body well. In 
travel and in life. So far.” (3) Edith’s hands-free balancing act on a swaying train has the 
potential for an awkward disaster. Edith successfully manages the risk and, significantly, 
does so in an open, positive way (holding) rather than a defensive tactic (warding). This 
tells us that she is prepared to take risks to pursue her ideal of self-development.
Edith’s goal is to become international and to become international requires not 
only that she cross national borderlines but that she cross her borderline of being 
‘Australian’ into some other place altogether. To do this she must forego the defensive 
warding that an Australian in an entirely foreign place may practice. She has, for example, 
been advised by her fellow countryman John Latham to avoid eating soup on the train in 
case of an embarrassing spill. As soon as she sits down to dine, however, she is 
encouraged to order the soup, something she wouldn’t have attempted without the 
direction of a more experienced guide than her Ways alone could provide. (Later John 
Latham comments to her: “You’ve left behind my sober colonial precautions about 
eating soup.” (262)) It is without caution, then, that her relationship with the elegant 
Major Ambrose Westwood begins. They are seated at a dining table together and he 
invites her to join him in a sherry before lunch. Their conversation is her first negotiation 
on the continent and as such the first opportunity to try out new behaviours. They take 
an alcoholic drink together and in this “willingness to take a small, subde risk” they 
embark upon their shared life of caprice. Edith begins to change.
Edith believes it is imperative for a League officer to become international. Being 
so will assist the dissolution of borders through example. Being international also 
represents an unprecedented moment in the conduct of world affairs. The League signals 
an end to war and national rivalries by promoting a sense of collective action amongst 
the nations of the world. In her quest for global unity, Edith sees that she too must 
become more global. She must forego national identification to achieve her aim. The
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internationalist she seeks to become is a human identity without precedent. “She was one 
of a new breed.” (75) The emphasis here is on the unprecedented and comes with the 
question: if the state of being is new, how is one to act in accordance to this new state? 
Previous behaviours may not apply. The lack of precedence is, at once, an advantage and 
disadvantage for Edith. Imaginative thinking is required in unprecedented situations and 
Edith shows she is progressively open to many ideas and she is willing to experiment 
widely. However, she also becomes vulnerable to bad ideas, as we shall see when she 
meets Captain Strongbow. We routinely see that her zeal for the League is stronger than 
her discretionary powers which she learns may only be acquired through experience. She 
has a long journey ahead of her. As Edith begins to ‘transmute’ into this new breed, she 
faces many conflicts in style. Each tiny gesture and action is recorded and analysed so 
that its style might be properly distinguished, just as a scientist might in the process of 
nomenclature.
Yet drinking Italian-style coffee outdoors in the old city on a 
clean spring afternoon was more cosmopolitan than international.
That was another transformation. She would also like to be seen 
as cosmopolitan. She questioned herself about having sugar in the 
coffee and whether it was cosmopolitan to have it or not to have 
it. She would have to observe what cosmopolitan ladies did about 
sugar. (75)
Edith does not see this as a problem with her identity but a necessary step in 
“becoming.” “I am not confused, she said, I am transmuting. Coming forth. That in itself 
may be an odd feeling, but it is not the feeling called discord.”(78) The exaggerated 
analysis here clearly shows the strength of her internationalist fervour. The exaggerated 
observances of the small detail like sugar is also a cue to Moorhouse’s irony through 
which he suggests that perhaps her conscientiousness may be over enthusiastic if not 
misguided. Edith’s progress is being self-checked zealously. Zeal, as Moorhouse shows us 
time and again, creates a blind spot in one’s behaviour. Edith is being led by and making 
decisions based on a pure ideal. To Edith, the League of Nations stands for peace and 
world harmony; it is the “centre of the political world” from which all good will flow, 
spreading out to all corners of the earth.
Rather than seeing the League as the point of negotiation among different 
peoples, Edith believes that the League could produce global unity rather than global 
cooperation, the idea being that if all peoples shared the same moral values, peace may be 
secured forever. War could be “outlawed.” Edith’s drive to become an internationalist is
a symbol of her greater dream of world unity. This unity would also require this same 
internationalist fervour from all peoples and Edith expects other nations to dismantle
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their own cultures in order to adopt a globally progressive one:
It was obvious that for the world to work together it had to have 
one calendar. It was just as obvious that all cars should travel on 
the same side of the road in every country so that people could 
use one set of road rules wherever they were. The League could 
not achieve agreement even on that. Sometimes she despaired.
China had its own calendar and was totally opposed to calendar 
reform and the Pope didn’t want to fix Easter. (248)
Moorhouse’s repeated use of the word ‘obvious’ through Edith’s perspective
drives home his ironic play; it is something like a truth universally acknowledged. Edith’s
unwillingness here to allow for difference, being insensitive to Chinese and Catholic
cultures, shows that the drive for unity is a repressive one. Like George in The Electrical
Experience, the unity Edith craves cannot countenance diversity for diversity is an implicit
challenge to the moral values upon which unity might be based. Unity is values-based
and to reach a universal unity, a process of testing the best behaviours would have to
occur. The problem here, of course, is one of authority. Who decides? Edith makes it
clear that it would largely be from the practices of a civilised Europe that unity might be
forged. Edith’s drive to achieve unity through the League is a drive for a universal
morality; her comment about Ambrose and the ending of national borders shows she is
using this term ‘border’ with metaphorical intent. That is, the ending of national borders
is more than a physical task. It is the dissolution of difference. The unity Edith wishes for
is based upon shared morality which shows itself through action and culture. She is all
the time proclaiming that the League should set the moral standard for the world:
[T]he League was a working model for these things, a machine 
energising the good forces of the world, an example of how the 
craft could be practised at its highest level. If the Secretariat had 
no real power, it still had the power of example. Of setting 
standards. Standards contained values. (400)
This quote demonstrates that Edith sees the League as the universe’s moral hub. 
She feels also that this is justified. When she arrives in Geneva and is dealing with what 
seem to be the riddles of an alien place, she evidently feels like Alice in Wonderland and 
has an ongoing mental dialogue with the Queen. During one of these imagined 
conversations, her assumptions of the structure of the world are made clear: “This, she 
thought, is the very centre of the political universe.’ ‘But only if you think the world is
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made up of a centre with all else being periphery.’ The Queen commented.” (34) Edith 
does not take the question of a decentred reality7 too far. Moorhouse uses the Queen’s 
comment as the theoretical alternative through which he ironises Edith’s Rationalist, and 
narrow, worldview. It is only through the complications of experience that Edith begins 
to question and refine her position but it is a process which takes many years. Initially, 
however, Edith desires that the League set the example for all the world. If she can 
achieve this prestigious world place for the League, all difference will be obliterated. Yet, 
as we have seen in The Electrical Experience and the Balmain stories, when differences are 
completely dissolved under the influence of one stirring ideal, moral progress stalls into a 
customary morality.
When George McDowell reappears in this novel he, like Edith, is fascinated with
foreign differences that confront him during his trip through Europe. (At this stage of
his life, he is not yet married. The difficulties with difference he comes up against
domestically in The Electrical Experience have not yet taken their toll). When he visits Edith,
he shares some of his consternation:
Back home when travelling I always carry a strong electric light 
bulb because the bulbs in hotels are too weak. But the world has 
foiled me. Each darned country has a different sort of socket and 
different voltage. I’ve turned it into a lesson. I will put that light 
bulb on my desk back home to remind me.’ (286-287)
It is clear that at this point in George’s small-town life he has not witnessed very much 
cultural difference. In recalling these good old days in The Electrical Experience, he 
remembers:
[Y]ou were known as a person. If you wanted something done 
you knew who to see, if someone said they wTould do something it 
got done, you knew who you were dealing with and they knew 
you, and if you had something on your mind you said it. The 
street was filled with faces you knew—Bishops, Youngs, Millers,
Ferriers, Watts...The telephone was partly to blame. Before the 
war you could always get to see the boss of the show and not 
some underling. Now people didn’t go out to see the problem for 
themselves, they “got on the telephone.” (The Electrical Experience,
2)
Clearly, George’s experience is of a white-‘bred’ monoculture peopled by 
Bishops, Youngs and Ferriers. People understand each other in this culture because 
everyone operates under the influence of the same cultural history and information. In 
short, they share the same values. George’s terror is provoked from the disunity7 that
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comes with cultures that do not implicitly understand each other and, more importantly, 
do not seem interested in simplifying life to the simple face-to-face dealings which typify 
his business experiences. Language barriers are troubling for George. George says that 
learning another language simply means “‘having to learn two words for the same thing.” 
(290) He says:
‘It is not the differences in locks and key and taps and switches 
that worries me. What gets me down, from time to time, is that 
people love their differences too much,’ he said ruefully. ‘And, 
believe it or not, I think the world could learn something from 
Australia.’ (287)
George thinks that the world can learn from Australia because, in his experience, 
a lack of cultural difference is the basis for a strong morality: “[Y]ou knew who you were 
dealing with and they knew you.” More specifically, George’s growing intolerance is to 
racial difference. When he talks of the days when businessmen conducted forthright 
dealings, he is speaking of men of English heritage, “the Bishops, Youngs, Ferriers, 
Watts.” Cross-cultural differences bring about the potential for misunderstanding. 
George fears being misunderstood on a continent with many languages. He says to 
Edith:
‘I don’t know about the language of Europe. The one language I 
do know about that all peoples understand is the language of 
Usefulness,’ George said smiling. ‘I can get across to people as 
long as they know I am a man of use to them.’ (288)
Differences are not confined to business. George also says it’s related to beauty:
‘An example: take this key.’ He went to the door and removed the 
key. ‘The teeth of this key might be the same as in other 
countries; the shank is the same; but in every country I have 
visited the finger-turning part is different. Why is that?’
‘I’ve really never thought about it, George.’
‘It has to do with different countries’ ideas of what looks good.
Beauty.’
She’d never heard him talk of beauty. (286)
Differing ideals of beauty show differences in valuation. The perplexing question that
gathers momentum for Edith is: “What are the values to be pursued?” As she becomes
increasingly open to choice, new values and moralities compete for her attention:
Somehow good taste in Australia was so much easier because the 
choice, say, of tea, was so much more limited.. .She had 
discovered that Europe had not only more options but also more 
ways of deciding which options to take...Maybe good taste and
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good living were about making good choices within what was 
materially available to you...and within your learning to date.
(467)
The problem that arises from such a revelation is the arbitrary nature of who one came 
to be: “It was a matter of interacting parts. You began with a vague blueprint from your 
mother and father and then life presented you with options.. .But that could hardly be 
called a ‘plan’.” (467)
While conversing with George, Edith sees these limited values from a different
point of view, that is, through her critical eye on George. She was not keen to meet
George in Geneva and the provincial past which she feels he symbolises. Thus, she vets
his point of view with this perspective in mind. It is possible that she does not see that
she shares this desire for unity wdth George due to her League blindspot but, whatever
the case, Edith comes to realise something of the potential that exists within cultural
differences and this runs contrary to her youthful drive for global unity. For the self, the
primary advantage of a borderline is the ability it gives one to experiment with ways of
being. One is able to cross a border of behaviour and to be changed by that crossing. She
has found, for example, that through living on the continent and mastering French, she
has liberated various aspects of her sexuality. Her experience with Jerome the black jazz
musician in a club in Paris is an example.
Here in this jazz club Edith is exhilarated by the power of scat singing, a
‘language’ she has never heard before: “It was the voice trying to say something which
was beyond words. A sort of warbling. The woman was not singing words at all. She was
singing sounds in between the music and words of the song.”(187) A sound “in
between” suggests a state liberated from defined borders. Edith, by this time in a rather
drunken state, becomes animated by the revelation of scat singing. She has been looking
for ways to slip across cultural borders and she thinks scat is the answer. Ambrose invites
a member of the band, Jerome, over to their table during a set break to decipher this new
sound. Jerome describes scat as a way of “saying the feelings.” She considers:
[Scat] linked to life back at the League...The work at the League 
was often a use of language that wasn’t argument or even the 
making of negotiation — it was a way, perhaps, of expressing a 
presence. Affirmative noise, questing without knowing the 
questions, hot air. They could turn the hot air to this scat singing.’
(192)
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For Edith, scat singing might interpret the “inexpressible emotions” thus creating 
a space in which all peoples might understand each other on a human level, since, as 
Edith says rather archly to a detractor, “Some things in life, Caroline, cannot be done by 
the Translating and Interpretation Service.” (196) Edith’s obsessive interest in scat 
singing reveals the ruling ideals of her character. Firsdy, there must be a level at which all 
things, despite cultural colourings, might be truthfully understood (in the sense of Truth). 
She fervendy agrees with Liverright’s drunken quotation of Blake: “If only the perception 
could be cleaned — correction, cleansed — all things could then be seen as they are, as they 
truly are — infinite.” (193) The infinite is the order that Edith pins her Rationalism to.
The Infinite Truth suggests a unity of reason and within this rationale there can only be 
one single, correct way of looking at the universe. Secondly, Edith expects the League to 
supply this single truth, to be the cornerstone of reason. To Edith’s mind, the League 
“was a unique entity and of a distinctively higher order than anything else in the world.” 
(495) [my emphasis]
In this elevated state, with her sights set on introducing the League to the one 
language that would cross all borders, she staggers to the bathrooms. There she deeply 
inhales the “smell of Paris and the smell of women and the smell of animal life .. .the 
smell of the human beast coming up from the depths of the ancient city.” (197-198) Her 
willing submersion into the cultural depths of other places thus becomes erotically 
charged and it is on the way back from the toilet that she finds Jerome, in “the room 
A r t i s t e She enters the room and closes the door, drinks from his flask then sits on his 
knee. “Time and movement then became slippery” and “in no time at all” she has 
finished performing fellatio on him. He offers the hip flask as a gift and she leaves the 
room. She then rejoins her friends and the somewhat suspicious Ambrose.
The following morning, she “permitted herself to face how outrageously she’d 
behaved.. . ”
[She] examined her inner state and found that she did not feel 
ashamed. On the contrary, she felt absolutely amazed. Amazed at 
herself, and at her audacity, and at her carnality. And, 
furthermore, she said to herself, looking again at her inner state, I 
think that I am proud of my carnality. She would never do it in 
Geneva, but she was glad she had been bold enough to do it just 
this once. With a complete stranger. In Paris. With a black man.
Where better to do it than in Paris? With a black man. (202)
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In the morning, she realises the unlikelihood of scat becoming a new 
international language. It was “fanciful” and the idea disappears. Is it only because she 
has sobered up? Or because the potential of borders has in some way become more 
meaningful to her? She could not have behaved in this audacious way in Geneva and is 
glad to have gone to Paris. Yet, for Edith, Geneva and the League is the source of “all 
the good forces”. It is from Geneva that the world’s standards must come. Surely if this 
is to be achieved, the amazing behaviours that Paris allows might be forever banished. 
This is the essential inconsistency in Edith’s make-up: she follows a code that requires 
her to always go to “new places in ideas” yet, if she were to achieve the total unity she 
craves, she would reach the end of inquiry. The very distinctions between Geneva and 
Paris are vital for her erotic experience. So, too, is the difference between white and black 
skin. To follow a code to go to new places in ideas, Edith knows she will need audacity 
and, here in this situation, the main proof of Edith’s audacity is that Jerome is black. Not 
only is he a stranger, but he is black. The emphasis on the exotic other in fact suggests 
that unity even for Edith is a long way off. If achieved, however, it will be a white- 
governed unity since despite their apparent international sophistication, Jerome is a 
difference that would not be borne publicly as becomes clearer in Dark Palace. In this 
novel, a scandal over a relationship between a society woman and a black man 
demonstrates the racial divide. In Grand Days, Edith confesses her actions with Jerome to 
her fiance, Robert Dole. He never fully recovers from the confession because the 
stranger in Edith’s story is black. “It was Jerome’s blackness that unsetded him as it had 
allured her.” (645)184 As long as those of a different race represent the exotic other, 
valuations will be skewed. Any idea of unity that Edith entertains could not 
accommodate the other in an equal role.
The racial overtones in Edith’s pursuit for unity — a cohesive and close-to-perfect 
human race — is further identified by her interest in eugenics and, with Adolf Hider 
appearing in the background, we must read Edith’s interest in eugenics in the darkening 
shadow of the Nazis. She “accepted that it was a move in the right direction, as long as 
the weak were sheltered and not ‘driven to the wall’. . .She thought about it and then said, 
‘I suppose it’s only sensible to be concerned with racial hygiene.’” (650-651) She later 
says: “Well, we can’t go on spoiling the human race.” (651) Edith’s idea of unity,
184 VCTilst it is beyond the scope of my argument to fully pursue Moorhouse’s ideas o f post-colonialism and 
sexuality, this situation is an intriguing re-working o f Cindy’s rape experience with the Redfem Delegation 
and the narrator’s resistance to her subsequent “fraternising” with the Aboriginal men.
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contextualised in this way, once again shows that unity is value-based. Eugenics is the
“right” direction and prevents “spoiling”. Clearly Edith is concerned with what is going
to be best, without showing any awareness at all that her position is a relative one. What
are the criteria for perfection in the human race? Her ideals for unity will be based on a
sense of superiority of class and race. The values involved here show Edith’s prevailing
ethic. Her Rationalism gives her the sense that firsdy there is a higher order of the world
that must prevail and, given her sense of racial superiority, this higher order will be
obtained through cultivating the power of her own race and culture. Her strong opinions
reflect this. She is prepared to resign from the League if they do not look into the issue
of global population control. This higher order she is convinced of may be brought
about through the correct breeding. She admits to herself early on that: “ [Although she
was an egalitarian through and through, she did not mind the well-bred look or what she
took to be a well-bred look. She was, after all, well-bred.” (4) Again, the emphasis on
“through and through” undermines the credibility of her egalitarianism.
If white European civilisation is a primary source of good then other cultures
threaten to be more ‘sinister’ sources. Just as Edith was able to explore deeper parts of
her sexuality through her experience of Paris, she wonders what might turn up in her
personality if influenced by other cultures:
What of the sinister, nastier traits which might sneak out through 
the speaking of another language? What if she were speaking one 
of the less cultivated languages—what would come out then?
(290)
Primarily, at work here is Edith’s fear of the unknown parts of herself rather than the 
threat of other cultures. She knows that language is the “key to the door of another 
culture” and provides “a way of slipping across the border.” She is aware that other 
cultures, occupying often radically different worldviews, can unlock elements of self. It is 
an unfortunate irony of her character that she often reaps the benefits of such border 
crossings yet continues a false sense of proper order. Her relationship with Ambrose will 
challenge this and, in Dark Palace, this relationship ultimately frees her from her sense of 
predetermined, ‘proper’ order.
A universe with no predetermined order holds many risks. For Edith, the 
ordering prospects of the League are desirable and her love for the League helps her to 
choose her goals. There are, however, significant problems: firsdy, the League is an 
unprecedented entity and, secondly, this is exacerbated by her own culture still being in
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its infancy. Therefore, Edith cannot follow prescribed ways of behaving. To navigate this 
terrain, Edith falls back on her science background and her Rationalism, which states 
ethics must be experienced-based. She thus sets about ‘testing’ ideas in an experimental 
fashion. She is convinced that the League will bring with it a new style of global living 
and, therefore, no previous styles of world relations will satisfy her. There is the 
diplomacy of old-world Europe, but at this stage of Edith’s career, she has too much of 
the “country-girl” about her to submit to this more protracted way of business. Edith 
brings an enthusiastic, pioneering spirit to her work at the League. It is both the daring 
and vulnerable part of her self. Enter Captain Strongbow who approaches Edith as she is 
meditating on what cosmopolitan ladies did about sugar. She makes it clear to this 
stranger, who appears on the scene in a chauffeur-driven, disarmed tank and approaches 
her in the street, that she is “not that sort of woman”.
‘Ma’am... We are looking for a woman to help us in a very special
mission. We are hiring. What we are about is legitimate business.’
(80)
The irony here is that she is indeed an “available woman” in the sense that she is 
excessively open to all new ideas. Strongbow’s business is too tempting to refuse as he 
outlines his concerns for the League. He argues that the League needs the protection of 
an international police force to guard the League against its enemies. Strongbow also 
suggests a “people’s ballot” which Edith finds immediately appealing. Strongbow’s 
subordinate explains that the ballot would “give the League a direct mandate—an 
empowering more direct than any mandate which any government of a nation state could 
ever have.” (84) Edith is impressed with the idea. “Why hadn’t someone at the League 
come up with that? Why, with a people’s ballot, you could override national boundaries.” 
(84) He discusses the uniforms and insignias he has already designed for the army. The 
incongruity of the disarmed vehicle together with the emphasis on the designed uniforms 
makes her cautious of Strongbow’s agenda. “She had reservations about people who 
designed uniforms and flags, unasked.. .the League had encountered a number of people 
who designed flags unasked and they were rarely, somehow—well, on the right track.” 
(82) (Ironically, later she spends much of her private time designing her own League 
uniforms. This shows that her allegiance to a System has lost all of the important self­
modifying irony and self-critique necessary to ensure the ongoing feasibility of that 
particular mode of being.)
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Edith becomes “perplexed about where reasonableness began and ended in the 
conversation of Captain Strongbow.” (84) Strongbow is planning a cavalcade through the 
streets of Geneva to promote the people’s ballot. His convoy of vehicles would: “tour 
the world, growing ever larger, to convey the message of a world court backed with a 
world force. On the way round the world we will conduct a ballot.. .the people of the 
world will vote together.” (83) He invites Edith to join one of the vehicles. Despite the 
absurdity of the proposal, Edith is intrigued by the idea and, indeed, caught up by 
Captain Strongbow’s charisma and audacity. “Strongbow had an American flair and that 
was something else. She could join with the American flair more readily than she could 
join with the diplomacy of the old world.” (100-101) Edith is swept up in Strongbow’s 
audacious enthusiasm.
When Athena, the woman from Strongbow’s team, explains that the women who
ride in die procession are to dress in “national costume” Edith almost loses her nerve.
She had anticipated “a sober parade of serious concern.” (102) Instead, she is given the
choice of joining the parade as either a cowgirl or hula girl. Athena explained: “There was
a time for attracting attention to an idea and that anything that served this purpose was
right.” In short, “[tjhese were show business times” and it was time “to put on a show.”
(102) Furthermore, the very logic of her scientific rationale demands that Edith
participate in Strongbow’s scheme. Since the League is unprecedented, all previous
diplomatic action will be of limited use. For Edith, an entirely new way must be forged.
The habits of the “old world” can no longer stand.
She told herself that she had until the next day to change her 
mind, but she knew that if she did change her mind she would 
feel that she had betrayed herself and the quest for a new 
diplomacy. If she did not do this, did not go out into the field and 
test the situation one more step, she would never know whether 
the ideas were tenable or not.
Edith is in frontier territory; in order to strike out and create the new world order, she
becomes vulnerable to all new ideas. She does not know how to judge new ideas for if all
is unprecedented there is no standard against which she can test them.
She had been waiting for places in the conversation to apply the 
tests, feeling a growing apprehension that she would not be able 
to find convincing answers which would allow her behaviour to 
proceed with prudent certainty. Maybe behaviour could only 
proceed with confidence, never certainty. Maybe behaviour 
proceeded on the footing of something even less than confidence.
She saw now why people needed doctrines and dogma and
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effrontery to propel them into action. Maybe the will to action 
went by hunch and by lurch more than by the Way of Numbers.
(99)
Edith realises here that certainty is illusory. If hunches and lurches have more
influence over action rather than statistical evidence or reliable tests, how will she make
decisions with any confidence of their outcome? Given the risks embedded in the hunch,
the unruly element of chance is as much part of a situation as scientific analysis. Whilst
this is a point of mild anxiety, Edith is, after all, a pioneer. It is the risky nature of the
enterprise that also kindles Edith’s interest:
She had also to honour her audacious self, the country girl. She 
did not want to lose that part of herself. Not yet. There was 
betrayal enough in her desire to be disguised, but the wilder self 
was satisfied with that. (103)
Again, it is the “country girl”—the Australian element—within her which responds to 
risk. She is frustrated with the League’s lack of “enterprise” in “unprecedented” times.
As we saw with Lawson, the bush breeds a certain pragmatic mind-set which allows and 
encourages risk-taking. Indeed, it is vital for survival. The risk-taking part of self, being 
“wild”, cannot inhabit a place within the confines of old-world practices and habits. 
Whilst she makes naive choices—indeed, she regrets not being able to tell the difference 
between a good idea or a bad one—the advantage of Edith’s nature is a preparedness to 
trial new solutions, in order to become: “a person who could arbitrate and respond to a 
vital idea of the times.” (95)
A certain amount of audacity is required to find or respond to unprecedented
solutions to unprecedented problems. Edith’s country-girl audacity gives her freedoms
not available to her European friends who are more curtailed by traditions, codes of
behaviour and cultures developed over centuries. She responds to the novelty of new
situations: “She was interested in Ideas Ahead of Their Time and Ideas Whose Time Had
Arrived, as well as Seizing the Moment.” (95)
Of one thing I am certain, she said to herself: that this is a 
historically unprecedented action—an officer of the League 
dressed as a cowgirl sitting on the back of an open touring motor­
car in the interests of the ballot for world government. (104)
In this episode, Moorhouse ironises Edith’s style of decision-making by taking it to the 
extreme. This exaggeration is a typical strategy in Grand Days for it is under extreme 
conditions where ethics are fully tested. Edith has created such a strong ethic around
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testing new ideas that she cannot back out of Strongbow’s proposal. When she is shown 
the costume, “Edith was about to get up and go, once again, and once again she was 
filled with exasperation, disappointed with her reserve.”(102) Compare the image of 
Edith, the cosmo-intemational sophisticate, drinking coffee in the old city and who was 
“not that sort of woman” to the Edith dressed as a cowgirl who, in the parade, blows 
kisses from the motorcar:
She put on the long blue denim trousers, Mexican boots with 
hand-tooled designs, leather chaps which tied behind the legs, an 
embroidered satin shirt with pearl buttons, a leather waistcoat and 
a bandanna. Edith tried to assure herself that there were times 
when one had to live at a high pitch... [Athena] fitted a blonde 
wig over Edith’s red hair and changed her make-up quite 
dramatically, though not in a direction that a genteel woman 
would normally go with make-up. Still, Edith reminded herself, it 
was all show business.. .The final touch for the cowgirl costume 
was a coiled stockwhip which she was to carry over her shoulder.
(105)
The gamble Edith takes is that the idea is either Before Its Time or completely
ridiculous. Edith remains troubled by the conundrum. How do you tell a good idea from
a bad one when it is entirely new and cannot be compared to any past ideas? “She
wanted to know about the assessing of ideas which were ‘unprecedented’.”(94)
She prayed that the disguise would work, though should a bullet 
strike her breast, or if a bomb should take her life, she would be 
revealed as Edith Campbell Berry of Internal Administration,
League of Nations Secretariat. Heroine. Or Nincompoop? (103)
We continually see this moral dualism in Moorhouse’s writing. As previously
shown in the story “Walking Away”, Thomas can either be seen as a coward or a hero
when he leaves home. Again we see that the moral truth of an action is subjective, yet it
is far more complicated than the difference between single subjective positions.
Moorhouse is at pains to emphasise the quantity of positions within the self. Edith has a
self that is an international diplomat, a self clearly in opposition to her wild and
audacious self. The costume she wears hides the first self and brings out the second:
The wig and the make-up brought both a sense of hiding to Edith 
and oddly, a sense of becoming some other ‘Edith’. But then 
Edith felt she became ‘different’ every time she had her hair styled 
by a hairdresser. (104)
Further in the novel, George McDowell comments:
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‘I suppose, though, that truly we are a Federation of Selves.
There’s the person within us who goes about the daily affairs and 
there’s the person who goes in to sleep at night alone... All our 
inner voices must be listened to, paid their due. The final action 
of the whole must be decided after listening to all...Even the 
small nasty voices. (294)
One might ask if the Federation of Selves rarely enjoys unity, how could it be 
achieved outside the self? Rather than unity, the cohesive self, the negotiating 
relationship between the states of the Federation produces progress. For example, 
despite its ultimate absurdity7, the cowgirl episode is essential to Edith’s diplomatic 
development within the logic of her code. She has paid heed to all her ‘inner voices’ in 
order to take the “final action of the whole.” The experiment comes to conclusion not 
with the end of the parade but with the evaluation of the data. “She at least established 
for herself something about the feasibility of it all [world ballot]. That had been the value 
and success of her audacity.” (108) For an action to be turned from mere movement into 
a developmental and meaningful occurrence, this reflection is necessary7. These 
reflections throughout the novel give shape to the stockpile of Edith’s experiences and 
give her the tools necessary to advance into the uncharted waters of her new 
internationalism.
Edith is philosophically bound to submit all her assumptions to the tests of
experience and to acquire knowledge only through experiential means. This is the legacy
of the inveterate Rationalism of her parents and mentor [ohn Latham. In the historical
notes Moorhouse provides, he explains the movement:
[Rationalists] stated their position as the adoption of ‘those 
mental attitudes which unreservedly accept the supremacy of 
reason and aim at establishing a system of philosophy and ethics 
verifiable by experience and independent of all arbitrary 
assumptions or authority.’ (679)
We can see here a similarity between Rationalism and Pragmatism; both 
philosophies are experience-based. The crucial difference here, however, is the 
Rationalists’ idea of the supremacy of reason. Over the course of the companion novels, 
Moorhouse critiques Rationalism by exposing the primacy of reason as a weakness. As 
discussed in James, with particular reference to his essays “What Pragmatism Means” and 
“The One and The Many”, the Rationalists’ emphasis suggests a unified reason for the 
progress of the world. In the cowgirl episode, Edith’s quest to prove the veracity of an 
idea leads her to an ultimatum: she will either be a heroine nincompoop. If the idea is
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right, she will be the former; if it is wrong she will be the latter. There is no room in her 
assessment of the idea for her to be both at the same time. For Edith to find an idea to be 
decidedly right or wrong, she must be making this determination in accordance with a 
single standard of truth. Edith believes that this truth will ultimately lead the world to 
unification. (The people’s ballot will cross over national boundaries; it will provide the 
world with a single mandate.) Despite the directions of all her experiences, she has yet to 
question her leading principle, that is, is world unification and the dissolution of all 
borders a good?
Crossing the Border
Moorhouse dramatises the importance of borders through Edith’s intimate relationship 
with Ambrose whose public and private personalities are seemingly at odds with one 
another. After Edith dresses up as a cowgirl, she takes the costume home to dress up for 
Ambrose that evening. It is here that Ambrose reveals his secret proclivities, hinted at 
during their first meeting:
As they danced she sensed that he wasn’t only reacting from a 
sense of fun. She became aware of something about her being in 
costume and the wig which was not simple ‘fun’. Not only a 
lark...The fun of the costume had turned now to something 
entirely different. She didn’t quite understand it...She’d thought 
that dressing up as a cowgirl would be a lark but she had not 
really thought it through. (110)
The “costume party for two” that Edith has orchestrated takes a twist into a place 
unknown to Edith for it has created an opportunity for Ambrose to reveal a part of his 
more private self, tentatively sought out in his question: “May I dress up too?” (111) He 
explains he’d like to wear her underpants and corset. ‘“Of course,’ she said, more from 
not having any ready reply than from consent, or from any clear understanding of the 
enchantment which was in play in his mind.” (111-112) Although Ambrose hints, on 
their first meeting, that he may occupy the borderline between two places, she does not 
have the experience to forecast just what that might mean. She must release any pre­
conceived notions and relinquish her expectations of a known, dependable order. “She 
also felt intensely that she was on the Continent and all unthinkable and arcane things 
were possible. And were they also permissible?” (113)
As she watches Ambrose apply make-up to his face, special qualities of role- 
playing are revealed: “She saw the exhaustion creases from the War disappear, the make-
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up made him, once again, youthful, and at the same time, became a mask which
unbridled him.” (113) just as Edith is free to become “some other ‘Edith’” when she
dresses as a cowgirl, so too Ambrose becomes another part of himself when he dresses
as a woman. This is important. He is becoming another part of himself rather than
abandoning his own nature and assuming that of a woman. The woman he dresses as is
already a part of him just as the woman Edith experiences herself as with Jerome is
irrefutably part of her. In Paris she thought: “She had flexed her own temerity, had taken
voluptuous pleasure intuitively and at will. Deep in the situation, her body had known
what she wanted to do, and that impressed her. She had been able to confound and
ambush herself, confound all her proper feelings.” (202) The emphasis in Paris and in
Edith’s apartment with the feminised Ambrose is on intuition. ‘Proper’ feelings and order
are released and the intuitive self comes through, which is to say, the self that appears is
latent, not instituted through a false role-play. In this text, role-playing is an activity that
expresses the latent or, for social reasons, hidden parts of oneself. Ambrose crosses die
border of masculine and feminine but, importantly, the border has to be there for the
experiment to take place. It is an important act of liberation for them both:
She found his newly released effeminacy softened their coupling, 
and she felt freed from expectations by the collapse of all 
decorum and at the same time she gained a sureness in her touch 
and movement. She surrendered to the release which flowed from 
their costumes, from the surging perversity of the atmosphere and 
the image of them both, which she kept glimpsing as she opened
and closed her eyes__There was also an embrace of herself by
herself, her embrace of Ambrose in her underwear which 
suggested her image back to her...Much merging and confusing 
of selves and identities overtook them and pleasured them both 
as they lost themselves in a moaning and discharging which 
seemed out of time, and way, way outside of their orthodox world 
and the world she had known. (114)
Whilst Edith finds that she slips easily into this style of liasion, her competing 
ethics surrounding transvestitism are continually tested throughout her relationship with 
Ambrose. The atmosphere in this first encounter, for example, is ‘perverse’. Although 
the action is perverse in the sense that it is an act which willfully goes against expectation 
and cultural mores, one cannot read Edith’s word ‘perverse’ without all of the moral 
judgement it typically implies. Edith must come to terms with the reorganisation of both 
of their identities, for when Ambrose modifies his identity, hers must change perforce, a 
point Moorhouse repeatedly makes in emphasising the dynamic characteristics of
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interrelationship. This dynamic repositioning is not only a negotiation between selves but 
within the self:
Sometimes, in fact, with Ambrose she was more the bridegroom 
than the bride. Although it was sometimes said that the modern 
bride, or any bride at any time, had to be something of a 
courtesan as well as wife and mother to the man. (151-152)
Edith’s perceptions of their new relationship are further confounded when 
Ambrose takes her to the Molly Club, a secret, underground club for travesti in Geneva. 
When they are dressing, Edith’s more traditional values appear for she is still very much 
unfamiliar with these particular ways of the world. Ambrose is trying to explain to her the 
tone of the evening and the appropriate attire:
‘Oh — anything goes, really.’
She did not like the sound of that. ‘Do you mean a costume 
party?’
‘You could say that. But not fancy dress in the sense of a 
fancy-dress ball.’
She was having difficulty imagining what it would be ‘like’.
Her last fancy-dress ball had been as a child in the School of Arts 
at Nowra. She’d gone as a grasshopper. Maybe she would go to 
this club as a grasshopper.’ (312)
Edith’s apprehension stems from a fear of the unfamiliar. The coming event lies 
far outside not only what she has experienced but it is beyond anything she can even 
imagine: “‘I am sure there is no such place in Sydney. Definitely not in Melbourne.’ She 
rose and poured herself another sherry.” (313) Ambrose is not so sure of this; Edith’s 
comment suggests her naivety rather than her local knowledge. She adds:
‘And I’m sure that if there’d been such a place, the men I 
knew would not have been habitues.’
He became silent, and she saw how he could be taking her 
remark as a reproach, as implying that Australian men had a more 
dependable masculinity... ‘I didn’t mean it in any derogatory way,’ 
she said. ‘I just mean Australian men aren’t like that. The ones I 
know, I mean.’ (313)
Edith self-consciously puts away her “patriotic moralism” in order to regain her 
sympathy for Ambrose and this is a definitive ethical act. By describing her moralism as 
“patriotic” she acknowledges the rigid boundaries of that morality. Patriotism is a limited, 
unsophisticated morality and she knows it. Through sheer personal will, Edith is able to 
wrestle down her “conflicting notions”. (314) The struggle shows the strain of her ethical 
dilemma:
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Toil think I’m a little.. .disordered.. .as a person?’
That might very well have been the word she would have 
used. ‘I think you’re a litde feminine and I don’t think femininity 
is a disorder. No, you’re not ‘disordered’, dear.’
‘If it’s not in the right body, femininity is a disorder.’
She moved to sit near him and to touch him, to reassure him, 
regardless of what conflicting notions moved in her about this 
matter... ‘We have to live with it, if it’s in the wrong body. If we 
find we are the one with that body,’ she said, trying to ease him.
‘Some of us have to live with it.’
‘And some of us have to live with those who have to live with 
it. The secret is, I suppose, for all those involved, one way or 
another, to enjoy it.’
‘I like your answers,’ he said, returning the affection.
‘I’m sometimes too good at making answers,’ she said. She 
thought about her wider life. Was she glib? Was she too good at 
self-justification?’ (313-4)
This conversation concentrates on the concept of “disorder”. It is the exact word 
Edith would have used because, despite her growing experience of the complexity of 
reality, she still operates under the presumption of set orders. Both she and Ambrose use 
the terms “right” and “wrong” and this, together with the kindness she shows to 
Ambrose in order to placate him, suggests competing moral forces. That is, her presiding 
ethic is based on what seems to be a natural order of men and women but her 
compassion for Ambrose supercedes this. The point here is that she has decided to take 
the more complex ethical road. Privately, she is disinclined to accept Ambrose’s 
difference for it is too far outside her realm of experience to really understand. If 
something is very difficult to imagine or understand, one is unlikely to tolerate it well. 
Yet, rather than judge Ambrose by the morality which issues from her own narrow 
experience, she chooses the path of compassion. As we saw in Lawson, the moral hero is 
not the one who lives and dies by one great standard of morality but the one who can 
accept people in their difference, the social outcast, or accept those in their weakness or, 
in this case, their so-called “perversity”. Edith comes up with a “good answer” for 
Ambrose to calm the anxieties he has over her potential judgements.
Edith’s ‘good answer’ is a pragmatic solution; that is, she changes her attitude 
towards an element of her environment that she cannot alter in order for her to cope with 
it. She wonders whether she was “too good at self-justification” but it is more than this. 
Edith’s ability to reorient her ideas signals a pragmatic agility. She uses truth instnimentally.; 
that is she can take: “Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will
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carry7 us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking
things satisfactorily, true in so far forth, true instmmentally.”185 These are the experiences
that, finally in the end of Dark Palace, lead Edith away from a concept of a universal
Truth and the existence of an entirely rational universe. It does take time, however, and
despite her ability to placate Ambrose and reorient her own perspective regarding him,
she has still to experience the club. And this will take even more strength:
Edith sat at a table waiting for Ambrose to return from looking 
around for another ‘couple’ whom he had planned to meet at the 
club. She felt insecure, because once in the club, he’d begun 
relinquishing the male role of looking after things, and she’d had 
to find a table. She wasn’t going to look after things. Not in a club 
like this, where everything was inverted. It was his club, not her 
club. What happened at the toilet door? Who went where? She 
supposed they didn’t care. She suspected that when the time 
came, she would care. She would care dreadfully. (315)
Now that Ambrose has relinquished his masculine duties, Edith must take them
up, again emphasising the ever-shifting dynamic of relationship. Edith is ‘insecure’
because all stable reference points have disappeared. Not only is she witnessing a mass
border crossing, she is facing the final frontier where things that were unimaginable
hours before are now permissible:
[S]he saw every possible combination: there were men dancing 
with men, women with women, and men dressed as women 
dancing with men, and dancing with women. And inclinations, 
about which she was not sure...The more she looked, the more 
she realised that it was a very mixed club indeed, and perhaps 
more normal, not as confused as she’d first thought. Surely there 
could not be too many confused people in Geneva? (315)
The Molly Club provokes “many quandaries” (320). She tries to imagine 
Ambrose with a male lover both dressed as women and wonders “What did they do with 
their male parts?” Whilst she “made herself imagine the difference” she has no reference 
point from which to imagine this scene. She is thus adrift in her new experience. All lines 
have been moved, crossed or broken. Seemingly, nothing is where it should be. Here she 
meets Mr Hunneus, “the Deputy President and Ambassador-at-large for the Republic of 
Azerbaijan”. (330) Edith wonders about his masculinity but Mr Hunneus as a 
“government in exile”, comes to the club for different reasons:
He said, ‘I relax in this place because here all is lost too.’
1K5 James, “What Pragmatism Means” p. 34.
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‘I suppose so. How, though, do you mean, “lost”?’
‘These people are outside of it all, lost from the ordained 
paths...I am lost from the soil of my nation. But these 
people... they are lost from the natural world. This is a 
netherworld.. .1 am a man of normal feelings. And here, here I 
feel double exile and that takes me beyond the pain of the first 
exile. I am a normal man in pain.’ (325)
Mr Hunneus’s speech illustrates the value of borders. Borders are required for 
identity. In the absence of identity, whether sexual, national or any other, a feeling of 
‘loss’ ensues. In the ‘netherworld’ of the Molly Club, however, traditional borders are not 
without value. That sexual borders are routinely crossed or subverted does not mitigate 
the value of the border; it is the value of the border that makes the act of crossing it 
valuable or meaningful. Ambrose does not cross the gender boundary to sabotage or 
devalue his manhood. He clearly enjoys being a man. Yet, in crossing the border into his 
feminine self, he is able to experience what is valuable on the other side. It is an act of 
valuing the feminine rather than devaluing the masculine.
These relocations of value and dislocations of order and authority are 
dramatically complicated, however, by the arrival of vigilantes, the Action Civique, who 
enter the club and harass the clientele. The group represents a very masculine order 
which clearly destabilises the culture of the Molly and power shifts awkwardly between 
the members of the club.
‘Now look here!’ Ambrose said, rising to his feet and stepping 
forward. ‘Easy on.’
His English male voice came through the lipstick and makeup 
ludicrously and ineffectually. Edith felt embarrassed for him.
The leader lifted Ambrose’s dress to reveal his lace underwear and 
then jabbed at his genitals with the baton. Ambrose instinctively 
recoiled and pushed his dress down, his hands covering his 
genitals. One of the youths gave a cry of triumph at the 
unmasking. In a diminished voice, Ambrose said, ‘Please stop!’
She saw that Ambrose had lost his male authority, his English 
authority. She felt that even she might have more authority as a 
woman than he did now as a man dressed as a woman. (330)
The action of the vigilantes raises yet another quandary for Edith. Despite their 
violent means, she is almost on side with them in that they want to preserve the dignity 
of Geneva. Later: “[s]he nearly said, harshly, that the Action Civique were just trying to 
clean up the town, to keep Geneva decent.” (342) Yet what is the criteria for ‘decent’? 
Again: “[w]hat are the values to be pursued?” (461) After the violent episode in the Club,
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the regular clientele organise a meeting to decide what action to take. Ambrose asks 
Edith to attend. Edith is still confused as to who has the greater moral case, the Action 
Civique or the transvestites:
Approached from another position, maybe she had a democratic 
obligation to go to the club and stand up to Action Civique. The 
Molly Club was not part of the toy town. It could be argued that 
it was all very well for her to be fighting for world order and 
peace with letters and memos. What about the threats of disorder 
now, here and now, in her own life or at least, in Ambrose’s, her 
friend’s life? In the town in which she lived. But which was the 
disorder? The travesti who contradicted their nature? Or the 
Action Civique?.. .She saw that if  she continued to think like this 
she would have to go to the meeting. Didn’t she already give 
enough to the bloody world?.. .Throughout the day she felt she 
was dodging the moral dilemma of attending the Molly Club 
meeting by hiding behind her personal hurt. She was then more 
annoyed that she should be troubled by it as some sort of moral 
dilemma. (344)
A moral dilemma surfaces when a situation houses competing interests within the 
self and when one finds oneself at the border line of clashing moral systems. The Molly 
Club defies all of Edith’s known order and so she must now learn to operate on this 
precipitous frontier. The entire situation, along with her relationship to the ‘disordered’ 
Ambrose, asks her to question her guiding principle in life wEich is that all things, 
however small, must be addressed with the larger goals in mind. “The thing she found 
sticky and displeasing was that all this had nothing to do with the League. She wanted no 
outside untidiness or demand in her life. The League was too urgent. She had no time for 
other things, let alone messy and murky things.” (343) This brings us back to the theory 
of coordination first described in The Electrical Experience. Like George, Edith orders her 
world around the rationale that for good outcomes ever}7 detail must be pursued with this 
good in mind. The Molly Club perplexes her because it is not something she could align 
herself with publicly. Does this, then, undermine her credibility as a person? Does it 
affect the internal workings of her integrity? For example, Edith is troubled by what she 
can reveal about herself to her close friends. When she finally describes the Molly Club 
to her friend Florence, she is immediately rebuked: ‘“You are doing dirt on your 
womanhood.. .I’m a free thinker, Edith, but really, this is going too far. What about your 
womanhood?”’ (381) Here, Edith comes up against the harsh reality of a closed moral 
system from the outside. Florence has a clear and distinct view of ‘womanhood’; it does 
not have a negotiable border. The irony within a phrase like Em a free thinker; but.. .makes
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clear the limitations of Florence’s conceptions. Edith realises she has made dramatic
changes to her sense of order and that, socially, this can be an alienating thing. Social
alienation is the legacy that goes with Ideas Ahead of Their Time.
Maybe her sense of womanhood was changing. Maybe some 
episodes which occurred in one’s life could, in fact, be put aside 
from one’s life, had no bearing on what one really was. Or were 
we the sum total of all that we allowed to happen to us? Were we 
made from everything that happened to us?
She arrived at another troubling thought. If her experiences were 
in fact ‘untellable’ to her friends, she was doomed to being a liar 
and a sneak with them, having those parts of her which she could 
not show. Or was there obligation to tell all? What about if she 
married? When and how should she explain these things then?
She realised that Ambrose was the only person on earth who truly 
knew her. (391)
What troubles Edith in the above thought is that untellable aspects of self undermine the 
theory of coordination which we will now look at further.
Objects, Aesthetics and Dancing with Chairs (again)
Edith’s adherence to a theory of coordination is made clear from the outset. As she first 
converses with Ambrose, she fears that any small misinterpretation may have 
catastrophic consequences:
“She would not let it pass. Otherwise they might stray further and 
further from mutual understanding. She always feared that in 
some unforeseeable way small early confusions led later to giant 
embarrassments.” (8)
Once again, the theory is an inherited trait: “she followed her grandmother’s advice that 
one should begin as one intended to continue.” (65) Looking at this as part of a family 
line, it could be argued that Moorhouse is suggesting that this might be a peculiarly 
Australian anxiety. As we see constantly in Lawson, the volatility of the Australian 
environment continually thwarts the best-laid plans. The theory of coordination 
Moorhouse’s characters create is designed to manage risk as far as possible. (Moohouse’s 
main characters all proceed from small coastal regions, on the very edge of the bush, and 
thus still at its mercy.) The theory is built upon reason and follows a mechanical logic; 
that is, if each part of a machine is in working order, then it follows that the entire 
machine should be in working order and the outcomes of the machine will be 
predictable.
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The ‘working order’ of ideals, the self, or other intangibles is maintained through
various means, itemised by Edith during her “dark night of the soul” ,H6. Importandy, they
include the ‘physicals,’ and the ‘Aesthetics of Objects’. When the Assembly decides to
build the Palais des Nations, rather than continuing to work in the Palais Wilson, (a
renovated hotel) Edith is moved to tears:
Of course, she would work in a hole in the ground for the League 
if  she had to, but the ‘physicals’— again, her father’s word; he had 
always stressed the physicals—were the credence of an enterprise.
The League had now to affirm itself and build its Palace as a 
bulwark against human frailty. (149)
As Edith indulgendy meditates upon the new physicals of the League, Moorhouse clearly 
draws up her theory of coordination. Her attention is drawn to her own apartment which 
she has meticulously created:
The opera played on and she thought to herself, Each of us has a 
space around us which we could sculpture, and then we could 
work outwards, each from our gardens, spreading into the world, 
as in Geneva the League would build a Palais des Nations in the 
pare l’Ariana, and grandeur and reasoned order would spread 
outwards, But unless that centre was in good order, no good 
order could flow out from it. (156)
Again, we are presented with Edith’s idea of the centralisation of good. Edith’s 
theory of coordination begins from the smallest detail. These details are the very stitching 
of her life, from which all stability comes. “She firmly believed that what you surrounded 
yourself with and exposed yourself to helped to make you, although it didn’t always seem 
obvious how it made you or into what.” (467) Edith’s apartment is a case in point. She 
spends much time procuring the correct items with which to surround herself. (154-156) 
These items include hand crafted rugs, furniture chosen for its mechanical ingenuity and 
various curiosities. She even goes so far as to send for her schoolbooks from Australia 
“as a way of reminding herself that she did know things. It somehow reinforced her as a 
person to have Porritt’s Chemistry of Rubber and Marshall’s Frog in her bookcase.” (156) 
Objects, then, have the job of reflecting one’s personality, taste, role and history.
186 The dark night o f the soul, a reference to the work o f St John o f the Cross, is an ironic take on Edith’s 
internal development. The important point here is that St John o f the Cross’ ‘dark night’ is a style o f  
negative theology'. That is, at a stage o f spiritual enlightenment, those seeking enlightenment realise their 
own inadequacy to reach communion with God, or an enlightened state. In contradistinction, Edith’s drive 
is to write down everything that she is in order to see herself revealed. The process is evidently futile: her 
“dark night” is cut short when she is relieved to hear the dinner bell.
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Buildings must also fulfil this function. In her first meeting at the League she makes this 
contribution:
‘This meeting may only be about the allocation of rooms but how 
we set ourselves up in buildings is a portrait of ourselves. More 
than that, even, it is an assertion of the gravity and spirit of the 
covenant.. .The physicals incorporate the philosophical.’ (50)
The building of the Palais des Nations brings out much of her aesthetic theory. When
debating about the new League building, she argues:
that negotiation was best done in august surroundings because 
august surroundings calmed passions and diminished egotism.
She wanted to work in a building which spoke to her and touched 
her every day she went to it. Which daily convoked her ideals as 
she went up its steps. She did not want to work in a building she 
failed to notice. Or worse a building which touted the personality 
of its architect.18 (158)
Edith takes a personal interest in the plans for the Palais and while
so, she discovers a letter from an Annie Dickinson, who is offering a chair
orphans for inclusion in the new Palais. The letter of offer is in the file for
furnishing but is stranded in the file by administrative apathy. Edith comes across the
letter and imagines: “the war orphans working industriously on the chair, [and] she saw
the public-spirited, practical Annie Dickinson hovering about, caring for them and
guiding them.” (159-160) Edith is inspired:
‘We start with just a chair as this—we start with Miss Dickinson’s 
chair. I want the Palais to be layer upon layer of the best of 
human effort and art, a museum of all the best in human 
experience.. .1 want the new Palais to be an organ of human 
memory.’ (163)
Layer upon layer — this is how the good work of the League will ‘spread’. Here, 
Edith applies her “Aesthetic of Happy Latency”: “She believed that Miss Dickinson’s 
chair had a happy latency which would sponsor a chain of other cheerful and assertive 
details.” (468) In Edith’s theory of coordination, the chair becomes a necessary anchor 
that will secure other and greater goods of and for the League. It is therefore morally 
essential that the chair be brought to Geneva as soon as practicable. To overcome the 
bureaucratic problems in handling the chair, for Miss Dickinson’s letter has not received 
a reply in months, Edith takes it upon herself to see that the chair is accepted and given
she is doing 
made by 
the Palais
187 She is referring, in particular, to the personality o f Le Corbusier.
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pride of place in the assembly room. A curious irony of power arises, as pointed out by 
Florence:
‘Edith, dear, what Pm suggesting is the assumption of command 
in a situation which requires initiative from a subordinate officer.’
(168)
In other words, Edith does not have the authority to take control of this situation 
yet the issue is too small to attend to for those who actually have the authority. Different 
scales of value appear:
Of course she couldn’t go barging into Sir E’s office about Miss 
Dickinson’s chair when he had disarmament, opium, the white 
slave traffic, and God knows what other world problems on his 
mind. (165)
Her friend Florence encourages her to break into Sir Eric’s office and sign the papers 
herself: “[Y]ou can become Secretary-General for a couple of seconds. The orphans at 
least deserve that much.” (167) The concept of deserving orphans is ethically charged. 
Florence uses the strategy that anyone with any moral sense at all could not deny poor 
war orphans. Edith does not readily submit to her idea given that even keeping an eye on 
correspondence about the chair “suggested misty codes of behaviour outside the staff 
rules.” (166) However, her ethic concerning the orphans and their diligence to the 
League overrules any consideration for the ethic of the office. “Edith was sickened to see 
that it was now five months after Miss Dickinson’s first letter. That alone, she felt, 
justified her taking action.” (169) Edith has thus created a moral crisis and she must find 
justification for any action she is to embark upon. To whom is owed the greater allegiance? 
Is she justified in bending the rules of office conduct—an office which she is utterly 
devoted to—in order to build that office, to help it become the “best of human effort.” 
She decides to commit the fraud and sign the papers on Sir Eric’s behalf. Later she asks 
herself:
Did forging Sir Eric’s signature make her complete within herself 
for that day? Not really. Although the action was further justified 
because, although in the scale of Sir Eric’s concerns it was not a 
great matter, within another scale and the spirit of the League it 
seemed to Edith that the matter of the chair was momentous.
(170)
The emphasis throughout the chair episode is on how we justify our actions and 
what is made clear here is that there is no absolute moral rule guiding her actions. In fact, 
there are two competing systems of value, just as there were competing ethics
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surrounding her attitude to the feminised Ambrose. Again Edith must decide between 
these two competing ethics. The very clash of moral systems suggest that there can be no 
‘highest order’ since she has already attributed this highest order to the League but now 
she feels she must act fraudulendy within it because of what she sees as even higher 
claims. This reveals the irony of her constitution and suggests a road she might ultimately 
take. Typically one might think that breaking into a superior’s office to commit a forgery 
is an unethical act. It seems even worse that the very “correct” Edith herself would agree 
to it. Yet to Edith what the chair symbolises is so much greater than these considerations 
that she realises the rules must be flexible. Indeed, “she was snapping the rules in two.” 
(171)
Pragmatically speaking, the only way to judge the quality of the act is in the 
consequences. Edith forecasts good consequences from her act and this becomes her 
justification. But consequences are not so easily predictable. Just as dressing up as a 
cowgirl “for a lark” for Ambrose opened an entire new personality within him, Edith 
may very well end up with consequences she didn’t bargain for. Edith is stepping outside 
of the boundaries of known and acceptable behaviour and thus has little habitual action 
to ground her. She becomes a loose cannon and the shrapnel may fall anywhere. And so 
it does. One letter does not solve the matter of the chair. More correspondence follows 
and she must ward off every7 letter before Sir Eric sees it, and continually reply back to 
Miss Dickinson in his name. As her previous experience with Captain Strongbow 
showed, “the mess was spreading”. When the chair is finally shipped to Geneva, one last 
letter arrives from Miss Dickinson saying it had to go to the International Labour Office 
instead because “the League of Nations does not accept presents.” (172) Edith’s 
frustration is clear:
Ye gods. Was there no end to it? Now she had to involve the ILO 
and pretend other things to other people to find the wretched 
chair, and deal with this nonsense about the League not accepting 
gifts. (172)
When the chair is finally installed, “mission complete” Miss Dickinson again 
writes to ‘Sir Eric’, this time wanting to install a plaque on the chair, to be personally 
delivered by herself and an orphan. Edith “wept tears of frustration and self- 
recrimination.” (175) Edith’s one action has caused a host of consequences that then 
create new situations that must be overcome. Reason alone cannot predict when these 
things may end. It is entirely up to chance. And Edith, this time, gets lucky. Events
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unfold that prevent Miss Dickinson and her charge arriving in Geneva and the disaster is 
averted, though importandy, through no action of Edith’s. It is pure luck. This is what 
must ultimately defy Rationalist theory. If reason were the centrepiece of all, these 
situations could be easily managed. Chance and the impact of participating (and often 
unknown) selves continually change the dynamic of any given situation which puts that 
situation beyond any sturdy grip that reason might offer. After all: “Every person in a 
conversation changed the nature of that conversation.” (375) Reason is a good starting 
point but, beyond this, the pragmatic attributes of responsiveness, agility, flexibility and 
intuition are required.
Disaster is averted in the chair episode, but Edith is troubled over this success.
She is still firmly in the grip of her high ideal of League-generated order and this justifies
her action. Despite her acts of fraud, she continues to take the moral high ground. At the
close of this episode Edith reveals her true arrogance about her morality.
Florence’s ways were not the ways of a diplomat but the errant 
ways of a misbehaving student.. .What did interest Edith about 
the whole business was that she now saw how others might use 
such stratagems within the organisation of the League, might 
pursue private policies by stealth, and how dangerous this would 
be. (177)
Yet what is there to distinguish the quality of her fraudulent actions from the 
quality of others’? She is saying here that her fraudulent acts are permissible because of 
the quality of her higher goal. Who judges this higher goal? When is subterfuge 
allowable? Why are her goals better than the goals of others? This will be played out 
when Ambrose is revealed as a spy.
Edith’s self-righteousness continues and threatens her with even greater 
calamities and, again, this issues from her theory of coordination. Here, it is not chairs, 
but what goes on the meeting table that is the cause of the potentially damaging 
consequences. Edith approaches the organisation of any meeting with what is comically 
portrayed as excessive protocol. At the preparatory meeting for world disarmament, 
Edith is given the task of organising the table arrangements. As we are told in the 
opening scene of Grand Days: “She had, perhaps, a disproportionate interest in the things 
that went on tables, and in the decoration and design of things. To put it more precisely, 
she had an abiding passion for Vart de la table.” (7) Edith believes that how a table is 
arranged affects, and effects, what happens around that table. For this important 
meeting, Edith is given the freedom to exercise her passion. She orders specially made
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stationery stands for each delegate, crafted, symbolically, from beech wood from the
jura, a mountain range between France and Switzerland. “She also instructed that botded
water plat, together with a crown seal bottle-opener, should be placed at each of the
delegate seatings along with the usual carafes of water and glasses.” (395) When
questioned on the inclusion of both botded and carafes of water she says: ‘“I want
botded water because it contributes to the gravity of the work.’” The carafes of water are
also included, perhaps to assert the safety of Geneva’s water supply and, by association,
anything else that may How from Geneva. Her water rationale also extends to her use of
leather instead of leatherette. She explains to Cooper, her dumbfounded colleague:
‘because the objects that people handle determine how they treat 
themselves, how they treat each other, and treat the things they 
are treating. The appropriate objects can cause people to be more 
contemplative.. .Make people more fertile - ’ wrong word; she 
didn’t falter — ‘more resourceful in themselves than they might 
otherwise be. To elevate their political emotions, Cooper. Some 
rooms, some chairs, even, I believe, coarsen political emotion.’
(395)
Her contribution, then, to world disarmament, she later ‘wryly’ observes is
“stationery stands and bottled waters.” (426) Edith’s point about setting the correct tone
of a meeting, to encourage the right amount ‘gravity’ is to be taken. Levels of formality
are important aspects of social ritual. However, Moorhouse constructs such striking
contrasts in this episode between the table water and world peace that it undermines the
stability of Edith’s position. The “principle of high contrast” is at work here.188 It is no
small irony that the domestic arts she learnt from her mother in jasper’s Brush contribute
to “the long march to disarmament” when “war as an instrument of international policy
would be outlawed, if not ended.” (399) It is from her parents that she has learnt a great
deal about “the psychology of meetings”. She is building on their knowledge:
She had a surpassing grasp too of the tone of meetings and the 
gradations of those tones. She knew when and when not to have 
bottled water or a plain carafe of water. Cooper, unfortunately, 
might have learned that it was important sometimes to have 
bottled water. But he would never know when to have both. (398)
The gloating arrogance that finally asserts itself in this passage leaves Edith’s 
character vulnerable to much ironic play. Here, Edith takes on the figure of alazon 
(“Greek for braggartism”) which, in studies on irony “is shorthand for any form of self-
188 Muecke, p. 53.
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assurance or naivety.”1HV When Edith takes on this character, being full of confidence she 
becomes vulnerable to blind spots. As Muecke writes, irony is: “a gyroscope that keeps 
life on an even keel or straight course, restoring the balance when life is being taken too 
seriously or, as some tragedies show, not seriously enough, stabilising the unstable but 
also destabilsing the excessively stable.”1'*’ Edith presents an excessively stable self here 
and Moorhouse uses irony to point out the dangers of such confidence. In relation to 
confidence, doubt and certainty, Muecke supplies the helpful quotation from 
Kierkegaard’s The Concept o f  Ironjr. “ [A]s philosophers claim that no true philosophy is 
possible without doubt, so by the same token one may claim that no authentic human life 
is possible without irony.”191 This concept of doubt and certainty is vital to Moorhouse’s 
League of Nations novels since the effects of personal action may have international 
ramifications. Here in Geneva, personal actions however seemingly minor (such as how 
water is served at a committee) may influence the turn of international events. In other 
words, for Edith to act with such surety suggests a naivety concerning the dynamism of 
the international field. The reader is aware that with Edith’s increasing self-assuredness, is 
an increasing blind spot that may prove her downfall. Of her table she thinks: “It was 
perhaps a masterwork. She had transferred her arts and ceremonies of home life to the 
League now that she had no real home life.” (399) This table is Edith’s greatest work of 
diplomatic art and the repeated emphasis, through her perception, of the table’s 
perfection, sets her up for a potential fall. This is the ironic purpose of the alazon: we are 
at once privy to the situation as it is generally understood (through her colleagues’ 
challenging criticisms and questioning) and also through the ironic nature of the 
narration which shows the strident confidence of the alazon from her point of view. 
Muecke writes:
This principle of high contrast applies also to the alazon. Instead 
of widening the gap between appearance and reality or 
expectation and event, one can magnify the alazon’s blind 
confidence or the circumspection, ingenuity or perseverance he 
[sic] shows in trying to avoid the unavoidable. Assurance and 
circumspection may be contraries, but in an alazon they amount 
to the same since his circumspection has a blind spot precisely 
where it should not. (54)
189 Muecke, p. 4.
190 Muecke, p. 4.
191 Muecke, p. 4.
229
The situation of Edith and her stationery stands afford us a perfect example of 
this literary form. Her love of the League and her “possessive loyalty” to it creates a blind 
spot in her otherwise analytical assessment of the meeting’s setting. She has an 
unwavering faith in the work of the League and its authoritative moral position. As stated 
previously, Edith believes the League has the “power of example. Of setting standards. 
Standards contained values.” (400)
Here, the love of the League is combined with her love for meetings. “She loved 
also the way new idiom evolved for each political situation and for each conference” 
(400):
Back in Australia, she’d like astonishing people by saying that she 
revelled in a good committee meeting. She thought of committees 
as parlour games where each person’s contribution was their 
throw of the dice from which followed certain moves around the 
board. For her, committees were the Great Basic LInit. When you 
understood the workings of a committee, John Latham said, you 
understood the workings of an empire. (44)
Whilst committees might be different in function to this larger preparatory
meeting, there is a similarity here. The meeting per se is what she loves: it involves the
contribution of many different points of view to find solutions. She is also attracted to
the formalisation of behaviour. Within meetings, everybody must abide by certain
protocol and etiquette. In this way, nothing can exceed expectation. It is a ritual. In this
episode, the love of the League and the love of conferencing contribute towards the
blind spot that her analytical powers can do nothing to redress.
She loved it all and, standing there in the Salle de la Reformation, 
she prayed that her work would not ever be taken away from her.
She feared, in the way she imagined someone in love might fear, 
that their loved one might be taken away by cruel fate. (400)
She projects her enthusiasm onto all the participating delegates as if they are all
devotees of the same religion. Indeed they are enthusiastic about the stationery stands for
half of the stands are stolen from the meeting room after the first day. When Cooper tells
her what has happened, she is “shocked”:
This more than confounded her. She did not want to show him 
that she was in any way unprepared for anything that could 
happen within the jurisdiction of her preparations. But this. This 
was confounding. Senior diplomats and members of parliament 
of some of the great nations had taken — stolen — League 
property? (408)
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She is confounded because the delegates have not behaved with the right amount
of gravity and integrity. That these people would conform to her table ethic is a moral
assumption on her part. A confounded assumption indicates a moral blind spot. A staffer
says to her: “You invited theft.. .You give people tilings so good, of course they steal.”
(410) So begins Edith’s extraordinary manoeuvring not only to salvage the dignity of the
meeting but her dignity also. If not, her male colleagues, critical of her “excessive womanly
concern with unimportant detail” (402) will be vindicated. An attack on the table livery is
an attack on her and her diplomatic prowess:
She could simply remove those stationery stands which were left 
and pretend that they’d never existed.
She would not pretend that they had never existed. (409)
Edith does not want to show she has been ruffled, for now she must keep up the 
pretence of her self-assuredness. Thus the situation escalates and she must go to great 
lengths to try and regain control of the situation. Her theory of coordination has been 
turned on its head — the small details are certainly affecting the large yet not in a way she 
could ever have planned:
Mustering what she hoped looked like hauteur,; she said that it was 
perhaps, yes, almost certainly, the importance of this commission 
that had led to the incident. Yes. The delegates had taken 
memorials, commemorating the conference, because the objects 
taken were destined to be historic. She listened to herself with 
wonder. (410)
Here, Edith herself “marvelled at her facility — not to lie, but to articulate what 
had been thought somewhere in her head, but not consciously reasoned.” (411) This 
points to her exceptional pragmatic skill of agility, that is, she is able to quickly reorient 
her mind-set to deal with the situation. Her problem has stemmed from the certainty that 
has precipitated this event and she now must call on all her pragmatic skills to deal with 
the emerging crisis. Her agile responses are even a source of marvel to herself. She lies to 
her colleagues that she has more of the stands to replace those ones taken because she 
has “anticipated that there would be, on such an historic occasion, the need for 
memorabilia.” (410) She therefore must retrieve the stolen stands without official 
intervention. This is also in order to protect the “honour of the nations which had taken 
the things.” (412) She realises: “I am not only a liar.. .1 lie myself into impossible 
situations.” To save herself momentarily, she creates an impossible situation, dealing with
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each event on a moment-by-moment basis. She takes a taxi to the hotel where the 
delegates are staying and speaks to the head of security, M. Dupont. She requests to be 
let into the delegates’ rooms on “a matter of diplomatic urgency.” M. Dupont is not 
convinced by her request or her carte de légitimation. “She watched his face and could see 
that the peace of the world being in balance made little impact on M. Dupont.” (413) 
Again, with this observation, the principle of high contrast is operating. Edith puts the 
importance of her stationery stands on the same level as world peace. Likewise, M. 
Dupont places his personal interest at the same level. In order to grant her request, he 
asks that she recommend him for a job if an international police force is created. She 
agrees. “She looked away. Now she was appointing people to the League police force.” 
(414) M. Dupont helps her into all the delegates’ rooms and realises what has happened. 
He makes the ironic remark that “These great men steal these things?.. .On these men, 
the future of the world rests?” (414)
Edith succeeds, a testament to her extraordinary dexterity and ingenuity, a 
flexibility that seems to proceed from her Australian-ness. These are pioneering attributes 
which allow people to cope on the borderline of moral systems. Her sense of assuredness 
about tables prompts an excessive level of action in order to save her reputation and the 
face of her beloved League. It is an irony that Edith has had to lie repeatedly and break 
into delegates’ rooms in order that everything is apparently correctly done. Again, two 
moral systems are competing with each other. Although Edith does not seem to be 
bothered about breaking into the delegates’ rooms, the reader is certainly aware of the 
irony. We have to ask, if world disarmament depends on a successful meeting and the 
successful meeting depends on the right number of stationery stands, isn’t Edith justified 
in the act of burglary? In light of the possibilities of world disarmament, it would be 
immoral not to retrieve the stands. Within her rational theory of coordination, this is self- 
evident, yet the high contrasts operating lead us to see the folly of her reasoning. It is the 
lasting irony that the happy latency of good objects, from which good forces proliferate, 
has been secured by criminal means.
Edith’s main concern is that these things must be in place for the right amount of 
gravity to be achieved, thus facilitating as far as can be expected, world disarmament. The 
insistence of unpredicted, random actions threaten the usefulness of Edith’s theory. In 
both instances — the stationer)7 stands and the orphan’s chair — the small-in-the-large 
theory is protected but can only be maintained by duplicitous means. This would suggest
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that at the base of these coordinations is untruth — that is, not everything is coordinated 
naturally. There are many flaws to be obscured rather than an operating, transparent and 
perfect working machine. It is the irony of Edith’s Rationalism that she is the cause of 
the flaws in order to create a perfect thing. The events suggest that the world does not 
follow- a plan and there may be many unintended consequences to action, however wrell 
intentioned. Situations do not follow a blueprint but are a product of unintended 
consequences.
Edith’s most challenging moral dilemma comes when she discovers that
Ambrose has been acting as a spy at the League for the British Foreign Office. She must
then decide to whom does she owe the greater loyalty — him or the League? She prepares
herself by running through the possible consequences. This will determine her action:
Plainly something had now to happen. Either she confronted 
Ambrose, and then what? He would admit or deny it. If admitted, 
then what? And if denied, then what? Should she induce him to 
stop or to resign?.. .What kind of loyalty did she owe to Ambrose 
as a friend—her lover—or to the League? (495)
The long series of questions suggests a moral struggle. She is trying to forecast all
possible consequences in order to find the most appropriate course of action. It also
suggests how little she knows of the situation and that she may be forced to act with an
extremely limited knowledge: “She could not be released from doing something and yet
whatever she did, she would suffer for it.” (500) She sides with the League because of her
belief of its “higher order”: “Was not an enemy of the League an enemy of hers?” It is in
this episode where Edith’s true zeal becomes dangerously clear. When she confronts
Ambrose, he defends himself on the grounds that zealots must be opposed:
‘Some in the League are. I am saying that it’s conceivable that the 
League could be captured one day by zealots. I don’t only mean 
Paulluci. It could be said that I was helping the League in a way — 
guarding it. Keeping an eye on it. Helping others to keep an eye 
on it.” (525)
He does not mention Edith’s name but the reader is aware that she is implicated. 
Edith then acknowledges this to herself: “She did tend to be zealous and she sensed she 
was becoming more so. Time was so short to remake the world. She was impatient. This 
led her to zeal, or was she just sedulous?” (527) The force of Edith’s zeal leads the reader 
to sympathise with the spy as he offers a new perspective on engaging with the 
established order, in this case, the work of the League:
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Ambrose said that sometimes people turned into revolutionaries 
or zealots before your very eyes. One’s duty then, he said, was to 
collaborate with those who opposed zealots. Especially to oppose 
those zealots who thought they were your friends but who had 
unwittingly become your enemies. He said it wasn’t required by 
the rules of the game that you told them you were working 
against them. (524)
Ambrose’s perspective is the ‘third position’, the position of engaged detachment.
The third position has also been explicitly mentioned in Conference- I d le  where a young
photographer approaches the narrator and describes his writing as writing from “the
third position”. Commentator Reid explains it thus: “The third position is on that border,
that margin or limbo-line.. .a personal and social dilemma.”192 It is a common state for
many of Moorhouse’s characters, particularly the narrator himself. It is also Ambrose’s
state. The inhabitants of this state are:
fringe-wanderers, or border-riders, outskirters, limbo-dwellers, 
since none have found a fixed abode of securely central values.
Community is variously imagined, but consistently 
problematic.. .The position of the most focal and vocal people— 
latterly, of the narrator himself—is always an uneasy one on the 
margins between mental countries, between social states.19’
Ambrose’s state becomes intolerable to Edith. The theory of coordination 
overtakes her ability to make more refined moral judgements: “Perhaps she considered 
Ambrose inherendy dubious, in the deepest sense. If his sexual rudiments were unstable, 
did not all of him become questionable?” (341) Her zeal for the ‘higher order’ removes 
her powers of discretion. In this, she has more in common with the Action Civique than 
the world of diplomacy she so values. Furthermore, Under-Secretary Bartou, in whom 
she confides about Ambrose, complicates her attitude to spying, saying that there are 
ways it could be advantageous to the League: “he could be doing nothing more that 
being a publicist for the League.” (503) The differences between Bartou’s analysis of the 
spying and Edith’s are extreme. His experience in diplomatic affairs allows him to see the 
spying in at least four different ways that pose no threat to the League. Edith does not 
have this insight. In this instance she can only deal in moral absolutes, a system of 
morality that we have routinely seen as unsophisticated. Bartou sees this and says “you 
are not good spy material.” (503) Yet, the final irony here is that in undoing a spy, she
192 Reid, I. ‘Writing from the Third Position: Frank Moorhouse’s Recent Fiction.” Meanjin. 37: 2. 1978. pp. 
165-170. p. 170.
193 Reid, p. 165.
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must become a spy herself. Again it is not the act per se that contains the moral value but 
the reason behind its action. Bartou says: “To spy on a spy is no crime.” (504) The 
intricacies of intention and action are such that it becomes impossible to make a moral 
comment on any of the parties’ actions. This is Moorhouse’s relentless point. This vast 
tangle of perspectives and actions, however well intentioned, create such a complicated 
and volatile experiential field that it renders the theory of coordination quite useless. 
There are always more influences on a situation that can be imagined by any single 
knowing self. “After all, he has gone on as if everything between you were as you 
thought it to be.” (503)
The final blow to Edith’s theory of coordination is delivered unwittingly by 
Ambrose himself when he makes a submission to a directors’ meeting. The following 
episode is an example of how Moorhouse ironises an idea by playing it out to an 
exaggerated end. The full folly of this coordination theory, or at least its excessive 
application, is revealed during Ambrose’s “crack-up”; that is, when he has lost his senses. 
Through the spying incident, Ambrose falls out of favour with the League’s upper 
echelons of power but he is not dismissed. Rather, he is sent to “Siberia”, that is, to a 
lesser department for a token position. During his time as an outcast he spends time 
philosophising and believes he has the answer to all the world’s ills. He presents it to the 
Directors’ Meeting:
What has come home to me is that we, in the League, have been 
dealing with all things in isolation, in compartments, when we 
should’ve been looking at them as a whole, as a planetary system, 
with the planets revolving in fixed axes to each other. We have 
not been thinking universally.. .1 see all international 
predicaments as linked one with the other, all in cause and effect.
If we are to wallop these predicaments, I would now argue that 
we must begin at one correct and vital place. Not at all places at 
once. And it is at this one point that we must apply all our coffers.
That somewhere, that beginning point, is the key to all our 
endeavours.. .There will be a cause-and-effect repercussion 
through to all the other predicaments — an explosive chain of 
consequence — through the whole of the universe of predicaments 
which bedevil us. In medicine we once called it the reflex arc, the 
theory that one organ can sicken another. (563)
The similarity between Ambrose’s and Edith’s philosophies are evident. The 
theory that one organ can sicken another is the same as Edith’s belief that the League 
could be an ‘organ of human memory’, the root of all good. Both ideas are based on the
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concept of centralisation. Edith’s and Ambrose’s theory depends on predictable 
outcomes, but we have repeatedly seen that any number of unpredictable effects may 
come from a single cause. Here Moorhouse tests the theory of coordination on the 
grandest scale possible — the eradication of all human ills. Ambrose locates the problem 
at a very basic source: “It came to me that all predicaments of the world are linked to a 
very rudimentary thing — they are all linked to hunger—  good politics comes from good 
diet.” (565) At this stage, those attending the meeting grow uncomfortable. It is 
becoming clear to them that Ambrose may be mentally unstable. He pushes on 
nevertheless with his presentation of “The New Century Hay Sweep”. He submits that if 
all agricultural communities have access to this “absurdly simple contrivance,” which 
speeds up agricultural production by eight times, “we can feed eight times more people, 
roughly speaking. Hence, banishing hunger for all time.” (567) Ambrose is obviously 
using his analytical powers of reason. For example, he is at a rush to assure them he does 
not have a financial interest in the hay sweep; he also admits there is a general problem 
with it — “the sweep is wider than most gates. But in countries with no fences that should 
not be a problem .. . ” (567) In the broad picture, his reasoning is clearly absurd. He 
finishes by asserting a logical line of cause and effect: “Hay is the secret to good 
husbandry, good husbandry is the secret of good farming, good farming is the secret to 
famine, the elimination of famine is the secret to the ending of disease and war.” (569) 
Ambrose is at a loss to understand why those at the meeting are not filled with his 
enthusiasm.
The Hay Sweep will work if all worldly things operate in a unified way. It works 
within the reason of a ¿///¿verse, that is, a world that follows one reason. In opposition to 
this theory, and it is an opposition that gathers increasing momentum throughout this 
novel and Moorhouse’s work in general, is the reality of the multiverse, just as the Queen 
suggests. Edith has gradually started to realise the folly of her previous expectations:
She recalled how inflexible her personality had been then as she
faced the ordeal of proving herself at the League and yet, for all
the rules of the League and all her own rules of inner
management, she recalled also how unguided she’d been. (539)
Edith is terrified by the possibilities of chance. Moorhouse seems to be suggesting that 
Rationalism functioned as a panacea for the times. Edith’s practice of Rationalism does 
not gel well with random, unpredictable occurrences because they cannot be controlled 
by rational predictions. The rationale can only come after the fact. People whose actions
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do not follow Edith’s reasoning also confound her rationalism. The ‘experience’ that is
the basis of her rationalist principles in fact takes her away from the tenability of
Rationalism at all. Ultimately, Edith’s theory of coordination denies the complex reality
of things. As she is taking a rest break in Chamonix, “in the footsteps of Shelley and
Ruskin”, she reads Ruskin, who also would visit Chamonix when:
‘Lost in various wonder and sorrow not to be talked of.’ Although 
he seemed to be mainly worried about his liver and his teeth: ‘If 
those would keep right, I could fight the rest of it all’, she’d read 
on the way down here in the train. She thought she knew what he 
meant. She had a problem with a recurring hand rash. Some days 
she thought if that could be cured, then she could cope with the 
rest. Or maybe when she could cope with the rest, it would then 
be cured? (455)
There is an important play on words in this paragraph that points towards a
minor ironic figure in a character called Liverright. Here Ruskin is cited as saying all
things would be well if he could get his liver ‘right’, an idea that Edith understands. It
follows her theory of coordination, a rationale of unity which is also the basis of
Ambrose’s “reflex arc” theory that all things flow from one source. However, Liverright
the character, functions in the exact opposite way and is therefore set up as one of the
ironic counterparts to Edith’s theory. He doesn’t seem to mind inner contradictions:
liverright was fond of saying that because a thing was bad on a 
large scale it was not necessarily bad on a personal scale and that 
one’s personal conduct didn’t change a thing in these matters.
That one could enjoy what one believed should eventually be 
forbidden or erased from human conduct. (461)
There is a significant point to be made here about random chance and the 
disunity of various reasons. That is, random chance is value free. It can bring good 
results as much as bad or frustrating results, as we have seen. It is not only reason which 
navigates successfully through difficult terrain. In fact, random forces are the source of 
Edith’s most important revelations in this novel. Significantly, Edith’s main revelations 
within in this novel come via a random thought brought about by conversing with 
another self. It rarely comes through self-reflection alone as her dissatisfying “dark night 
of the soul” makes clear. Here in Chamonix, she sits in her hotel room with the object of 
writing down all her tenets and aesthetics to articulate her own self order. Answers to the 
following questions evade her: “What are the values to be pursued? Are some choices, 
some values, not available at some times?” (461) “How did you avoid the errors that
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came from being young? She supposed you could avoid some by imitation of older 
models, by having wise mentors, and through reading—borrowed, but provisional, 
wisdom.. .Why weren’t the things of life self-evident?” (465) To her consternation, the 
answers to these questions and others she ponders are continually “too complicated for 
this list” (469) Edith is unable to find her answers within her self because there is no 
external stimulation. This is the crucial aspect of Moorhouse’s endorsement of 
difference. If unity exists, thus breaking down the barriers between nation states, what 
will propel people to new ways of thinking? It is continually evident in Edith’s 
conversations that she only progresses to a new or more sophisticated position by being 
in a state of difference with another being.
Moorhouse provides us with two prime examples where Edith finds new ethical 
ground through random thoughts while in conversation. Firstly, through conversation 
with Mrs Swanwick whom she dislikes and must disagree with at all costs and secondly, 
with John Latham, whom she wishes to defer to but finds she cannot. Edith is pushed 
into new territories of thought through this repulsion of Mrs Swanwick. When the first 
stone is laid for the new Palais, Edith is disappointed that the ‘ceremonials’ were rather 
lacklustre:
She was striving to exact something emotional and historical from 
the placing of the casket, from the foundation stone, from the 
occasion. To make herself feel something, to stir her deadness.
And now it was over...If she’d been back in Internal, she 
would’ve convinced Sir Eric to have a band. (547)
When Mrs Swanwick says she found the ceremony dull and badly managed, Edith baulks.
“Oh no,” Edith said loudly, involuntarily, pained, ‘it wasn’t like 
that.’
‘Oh?’ said Mrs Swanwick in an encouraging conversational 
tone used for gals from the colonies. ‘And how then should I see 
it?’
‘Well, nothing like this has ever happened — it could never be 
said to be dull. Surely?...It is to be the first building built and 
owned by the entire world.’
‘But my dear, I felt there should have been pageantry, flags 
and flowers and singing, didn’t you?’
‘The appropriate pageantry hasn’t been thought of yet. No 
pageantry would be suitable. Any pageantry would just be 
borrowed from some lesser activity. There just isn’t any pageantry 
suitable yet,’ Edith struggled to say. ‘For me, it was a simple event 
of the most magnificent order,’ and then added, rather 
pompously, ‘and we were invited by history to witness it.’
That wasn’t really quite what she felt. (549)
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Edith’s position is tenuous. She admits to herself that: “if she didn’t grate so
much with Mrs Swanwick, she would have allowed herself to agree with her more.”(550)
How then do we read the new position she has taken on? Is it a valid position at all? The
point to be made here is that new intellectual positions may appear arbitrarily and not
through the rigours of reason at all. Edith’s position flows from the contingent nature of
a dynamic environment. Her position is not the result of an absolute principle with an
absolute truth. In such cases, the unity that is the basis of the Rationalist line (unified in
the sense that it must follow the logic of rational thought) becomes untenable. It is only
by chance she has come to this new position in her thinking but now she has landed
there she must reorganise her intellectual attitude to accommodate this new thinking. She
must formulate an argument to make her attitude a workable truth. This realisation
creates other problems for Edith:
She tried to explain to Jeanne how her exchange with Mrs 
Swanwick had unintentionally led her to see the stone-laying as 
‘simple magnificent history’, quite properly stripped of all 
commonplace pageantry. She wouldn’t have been forced to see it 
that way if she hadn’t disliked Mrs Swanwick.
That raised other terrors. What if there was a whole false way 
of seeing things which she and other people customarily had, and 
which she would have gone on having had she not been tripped 
or trapped into seeing another way by chance encounters such as 
this?
It was not because the person you disagreed with saw the 
world correctly, but that you were forced to see it in an altogether 
different way, both from how you had seen it and from how the 
other person had seen it. Through the collision with that person, 
you were deflected into another third trajectory by the impact. By 
wanting to distance yourself from that person, you ended up in a 
new place entirely. But that was hardly a way to find one’s 
position in life. (553)
In Edith’s early days in Australia, John Latham, another fellow Rationalist, provides her 
with her initial training in the world of politics and diplomacy. It is to him she looks to 
for guidance and advice in all things. When he visits Geneva, however, she finds she has 
surpassed him in certain kinds of experience. He gives a talk on “plain speaking” to the 
Assembly meeting. Edith attends “as an Australian.. .and for an hour or so she allowed 
herself patriotic feelings.. .” (255) Put in this way, for Edith, Latham is speaking as an 
Australian. His speech is an argument against the previous French speaker, M. Loucher,
and therefore becomes a debate between new Australian values and those of the old 
world:
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who wanted blank votes included in the count when deciding 
whether a majority had voted for the candidate nation. M.
Loucher called blank voting ‘inertie courtoise'... John said that 
courteous inertia was an inconclusive argument and that nations 
should show the courage of their convictions. There should be 
more plain talking. People should vote yes or no. (255-256)
At first, Edith is proud of his style and agrees with his argument. That he, as an 
Australian, has pitched an argument to “call a spade a spade”, is certainly meant to 
distinguish the arguments on national lines (the French preferring courteous inertia.) This 
is what George means when he says “Australia is in a hurry”. Things need to get done. It 
is Europe that has time for grace, not Australia, given that Parliament House is still to be 
built and the city of Canberra is as yet, a collection of “dusty paddocks.” We can thus 
sympathise with Latham’s rejection of “empty rhetoric” and “double talk”. He never 
wants to be accused of “wearing] his underpants the wrong way round.” (256) Then, 
crucially, he mentions to Edith that Mrs Swanwick also agrees with him. Edith has 
heretofore been eager to agree with Latham given her past deference to him and because, 
on the face of it, plain speaking seems like the most efficient and most honest way of 
speaking. The mention of Mrs Swanwick throws Edith into a mental spin. “She leapt to 
find a position away from that of Mrs Swanwick. She no longer believed that empty 
rhetoric was empty.” (258) Her change is that sudden. We can see here that Edith’s initial 
conventional agreement (based on habit since Latham was always her superior) is entirely 
reasonable. She is acting within a custom she still respects and adheres to. Latham’s 
mention of Mrs Swanwick blows a hole in this custom and Edith is propelled out of her 
willing adherence and starts testing any other position that might be different to Mrs 
Swanwick’s. That her move to take a different position is petulant and spiteful is beside 
the point. The point is that there are other positions to be found if she is willing to look, 
if she is willing to seek beyond her customary bounds. She thus formulates a position 
against Mrs Swanwick and, as she does, starts to realise she is disagreeing with her old 
tutor. She argues:
She had come around to seeing that rhetoric was useful, even if 
unfelt by the speaker, because it contained within it the 
expression of what was ‘acknowledged’ as being desirable. That a 
hypocrite was affirming virtue by paying ‘lip service.’ Next time 
the virtue might be harder to disregard. Rhetoric contributed to
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the formation of a future consensus.. .Suddenly she saw that 
maybe John was wrong about courteous inertia. The French were 
perhaps wiser on this. There was nuance and that was what she 
had to learn. The blank ballot was a courtesy containing a 
comment, a nuance. A yes vote which was cast without 
conviction was perhaps the true hypocrisy. The courteous inertia 
created a third type of vote. (258-259)
The third type of vote is akin to the third position. The third position participates
in a disengaged way. That is, in resisting taking a position but still active within an
argument, this position maintains some critical ability that can be compromised when
one takes the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ position. It is a suspension, a deferral.
She felt this was a personal breakthrough in her thinking, une prise 
de conscience. She felt she had to digest it before putting it out into 
conversation, especially with John who was now in her mind 
clearly wrong. Simple plain speaking was not always the 
scrupulous way. It tried to pretend that everything could be 
expressed. But the greater fault in politics and discussion was 
careless imprecision. Diplomacy was closer to the truth because 
by creating honest silence it tried to avoid saying things which 
were untrue through imprecision. Diplomacy could create the 
‘semi-silence’.
Or it avoided saying things at that time, before anyone was 
ready to say something. It was a way of maintaining verbal 
relationships while at the same time holding off superfluous 
statement and unneeded position-taking. The raisings of 
unnecessary disagreement. Which, she guessed, was also the value 
of card-playing.
As she registered her thinking, she realised that she was 
changing her position on something rather important. She felt 
nicely nervous. (260)
Edith’s random rejection of Mrs Swanwick has brought her to an entirely new, 
more sophisticated approach to diplomacy. She has reached that moment of productive 
nervousness that is her overriding aim in life at the League. It is an irony that this mighty 
revolution in her thinking has not been initiated or provoked by considered, rational 
thought but is far more desultory. It is only through the off chance that Latham 
mentioned that Mrs Swranwick agreed with him that Edith is propelled into a different 
avenue of thought.
Over the course of Grand Dajs Edith’s surety of self and action is routinely 
questioned. It is largely her youth which leads her to depend on or simply expect order. 
On the ageing process, Bartou says to Edith: “For a young person the world always
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seems a scandalous place. Later in life, the world seems only to be an imperfect place
which can be worked on here and there.” (501) Edith is facing the end of the idealised
place of her youth. To comfort her in the loss, Bartou says:
‘[W]e take a course of action because there is no better one.
Rarely are we able to follow the ideal course. We are forced 
always to follow some imperfect way. The style of our character is 
made by how we involve ourselves in the imperfection of the 
world and how we handle the imperfection of ourselves. How 
favourably we exploit and conduct the imperfections of our life.
(663)
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The Perpetual Pioneers
This thesis has examined the philosophical similarities between Henry Lawson and Frank 
Moorhouse, and has shown that they share a philosophy o f pragmatism. By viewing their 
fiction through a framework of formal pragmatism, we can see how Lawson and 
Moorhouse put together a moral framework that is critical o f the limitations o f moral 
absolutes and that demonstrates the potential moral sophistication of a world where 
values and standards routinely change. The practical philosophies o f Dewey and James, 
through which a principled pragmatism emerges, emphasises the social as the source o f 
the moral and that the moral society is one which is open and subject to evolution and 
critical review. Pragmatism asserts that our moral origins are not found in an absolute 
moral system derived from some higher order, for an order such as this could not 
change, and therefore could not be useful for a progressive morality that could meet the 
ethical demands of a changing world. Lawson and Moorhouse both focus on the moral 
qualities of change, in their presentations o f worlds in which standards o f behaviour are 
highly flexible in the absence — or rejection — o f traditional or absolute values.
Lawson and Moorhouse endorse a cultural pattern whereby cultural practices are 
routinely tested in light of new cultural conditions. The insistent irony operating in 
stories like “The Union Buries Its Dead” and “Telling Mrs Baker” , for example, shows 
how sanctioned rituals or behaviours need to be the subject o f scrutiny in the ongoing 
project of moral development. This ironic voice is equally vital in Moorhouse’s work, 
functioning from “ the third position”— the detached yet embedded consciousness, the 
critical voice from within. It is through such consciousness that real social change can 
take place, for the agent of the third position is a sympathetic participant in cultural 
activities, deriving meanings from those activities,^/ is aware o f the moral limitations 
inherent within any “ final vocabulary.”
Lawson’s and Moorhouse’s injunction is to commit to the processes o f inquiry.
In their respective /^////¿verses, there is no set o f absolute moral principles waiting to be 
discovered in order to secure certainty o f meaning and action: “ our situation is too 
complex, varying, and tragic for that.” 194 Rather, inquiry and critical reflection hold the 
solutions to moral problems. In Deweyan terms, this critical reflection is known as
194 Gouinlock, J. “Dewey and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.” (ed) Stuhr, J. Philosophy an d  the 
Reconstruction o j C ulture: P ragm atic E ssay s after D ew y. New York: State University of New York Press. 1993. 
pp. 79-96. p. 94.
243
“social intelligence”, which is “founded on neither artifice nor intuition, but upon a 
searching examination of the entire human condition.”1 5 In stories like “The Union 
Buries Its Dead”, Lawson demonstrates what happens to communities who do not 
practice moral reflection; in the absence of this reflection, a community bereft of 
compassion develops. Significandy, in both Lawson and Moorhouse, the very faculties of 
critical reflection necessary for moral competence are often doused in alcohol, so the 
reader rarely witnesses any positive effects of critical reflection. The technique of critical 
reflection is left as implication only. Instead of dramatising a perfectly solved moral 
dilemma, both Lawson and Moorhouse use irony to imply another, more competent, way 
of being. Through the use of irony both writers can make moral suggestions and 
question both old and new standards without supplying a new dogma and new 
limitations.
Despite the endorsement of reflexive cultural patterns, both writers are sensitive 
to the anxieties prevalent in such volatility. Change is no easy matter. The issues of 
certainty and meaning are paramount. A panic-stricken George McDowell asks:
What is the news from Berlin?
What is the news from Paris? London? just how does one know 
what is really happening? Who to ask? On what does one 
construct one’s actions in these times of allegation?
Where are the Rules of Conduct?
(The Electrical Experience, 108)
Panic and anxiety over action and ethics stems from the awareness of the limitations of 
one’s worldview, which has heretofore been adequate: “When our meaning-constituting 
practices and ends are shattered, a crisis ensues, for individuals singly or for entire 
cultures.. .A disintegrating culture is riddled with anxiety7, despair, and confusion.” I%
Both Lawson and Moorhouse investigate the alternatives this crisis leaves us to ponder.
If culture or value can radically change, is meaning obtainable? Does anything “matter 
much”? Lawson and Moorhouse both investigate the effects of nihilism and imply a road 
elsewhere. For example, the irony of “The Union Buries Its Dead” undercuts the refrain 
that nothing mattered much; Lawson suggests that something matters very much indeed. 
So, too, the narrator in “Only the Interaction of Complex Things” admits that the 
libertarian assumption of meaninglessness was a defensive reaction: “an exit visa to avoid 
the complications of a fully operational life.” (The Everlasting Secret Family, 127). The
195 Gouinlock, p. 94.
196 Alexander, T.A. “The Human Eros.” Philosophy and the Reconstruction oj Culture. pp. 203-222. pp. 206-207.
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question both writers wrestle with is where value and meaning might be located given the 
instability of their new world and the realisation that no system of thought can be entirely 
coherent.
These writers show that it is the social contract which invests the self with 
meaning and identity. This is a pragmatic model: “We are beings who seek meaning 
imaginatively through each other, and the locus of this transformative encounter is the 
community.”' ; Thomas Alexander writes: “Culture.. .is the expression of a drive for 
encountering the world and oneself with a sense of fulfilling meaning and value realised 
through action.”1 This is meaning pragmatically idealised. It is contingent but no less 
valuable by virtue of that contingency; rather, both James and Dewey emphasise that this 
temporariness adds value, much like the rose that blooms once.
Culture, however, has an ironic double function in Lawson and Moorhouse. On 
the one hand, culture facilitates meaning-making; on the other, it can limit the ongoing 
progression of understanding the world around us, thus proscribing the meanings 
offered to us. Lawson and Moorhouse investigate the cultural interface and demonstrate 
the constant ironic tension within the practice of ritual and role-play. The cultural 
interface is a border place where types of being are negotiated and where the private self 
is made manifest and activated in the public realm. This border is a source of fascination 
for Lawson and Moorhouse whose often highly self-conscious characters struggle in their 
negotiations between types of being. Characters like Joe Wilson labour under the impost 
of “types”, a poet born a bushman by mistake, and yet these types of being remain 
crucial ways in which the self is enabled and finds meaning. In a comment on Grand 
Days, Moorhouse says: “the book is .. .concerned with borders and identity and the 
meaning of borders, national and other borders, as a way of framing one’s identity.”1 w 
Again, there is this double function: the border is required, yet it is limiting. Borders must 
be maintained, but not over-policed. Importandy in that novel, Moorhouse shows that 
border transgression is a necessary7 part of moral development rather than a descent into 
moral depravity (which, in Grand Days, is Florence’s fear for Edith’s “womanhood”) or 
social destruction (as is George’s fear). For within that movement across the line, there is 
a conscious intention to expand one’s consciousness and understanding, through the
197 Alexander, p. 203.
198 Alexander, p. 207.
199 Moorhouse, F. (ed) Wyndam, S. An Eloquent Sufficiency: 50 Writers Talk About Life and Literature Over 
Lunch. Sydney: Sydney Morning Herald Books. 1998. pp. 150-154. p. 151.
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experience of the other. The drive to understand the unknown other is an important 
pragmatic ethic for, firstly, it is based upon the awareness of one’s own moral and 
cultural limitations and, secondly, it is a movement of sympathy which, especially in 
Lawson’s work, is the key to progressive moral competence. The movement towards 
understanding the other has another crucial effect: in assuming a different position, one 
can critically evaluate one’s own ethic that otherwise lies safe behind the borderline. 
McDermott writes:
To participate in the plurality of experiences is personally 
explosive, for it trims our sails and curtails our arrogant 
provincialism while it widens our horizons and indirecdy 
sanctions those experiences which are mundane to us, but exotic 
to others.2"*’
In particular, Moorhouse shows that the flexibility required to perform these cross- 
cultural manoeuvres has serious implications for the way that “self’ might be 
comprehended. After Edith’s experimentations with different styles of being, she is 
trapped by a weighty question: “What are the values to be pursued?” Edith finally realises 
that, in the absence of a most correct way to be, she must accept ambiguity. Catherine 
Lumby has noted that Moorhouse’s particular “view of existence”, suggests that: “being 
in touch with oneself... means accepting that ambivalence, ambiguity and even chaos are 
rooted in our identity at every pass.”""1 The great advantage of this is that, in being freed 
from the cultural impositions of a certain way of being, styles of being are open for 
experimentation. Moorhouse’s narrator can be camp in the inner-city, but when in a bush 
camp, Belle calls him “Hemingway”.
These enactments, as with Joe Wilson’s fist-fight, contribute towards enhancing 
an individual’s cultural profile; that is, self empowerment is derived by taking one’s place 
in the cultural continuum. The task, however, is to see these cultural practices in the 
context of their contingency, that is, their place in time and space. So, even whilst 
engaging in prevailing custom, Lawson and Moorhouse emphasise that those customs 
must be viewed with ongoing critical reflection. The self must remain an ambiguous 
spectre, over which stable types of behaviour should have loose rein only, for Lawson 
and Moorhouse also emphasise the possibility — and necessity -  of being many things at 
once. The drover’s wife may well dress in her absent husband’s clothes to fight fire, but
200 McDermott, p. 124.
201 Gleeson, J., Lumby, C. & Bennett, B. (eds) Frank Moorhouse: A Celebration. Canberra: National Library of 
Australia. 2004. p. 3.
246
her gaunt, flat breasts can still produce milk. The phallic baton that she will use to kill the 
snake rests comfortably beside her copy of the Young Ladies Journal. In short, her 
experience demands that she be two types of being at once. So, whilst Lawson and 
Moorhouse both demonstrate how prevailing cultural patterns add value to lives that 
otherwise echo with Mrs Spicer’s “groping in the dark” voice, both of these writers 
demonstrate that the boundaries of behaviour must be flexible in order to ensure 
ongoing survival and meaning. Whilst the ambiguity of self engenders panic in characters 
like George, and the drover’s wife’s baby who screams at his mother’s disguise, the 
implication throughout all of Lawson’s and Moorhouse’s work, is that this ambiguity of 
self also contains the creative, progressive gene for social development.
The creative, pragmatic mode that operates in both writers’ works, shows that 
cultural practices remain the source of meaning-making yet under the caveat that these 
practices will -  and must be allowed to — change. From this perspective, the veracity with 
which standing practices are upheld, controlled and protected within their works is a 
continual source of irony. Muecke makes the following useful observation, regarding 
ironic practice and cultural fanaticism: “When Anatole France complained that martyrs 
lacked a sense of irony he might have added, with at least as much point, that a sense of 
irony did not characterize those who felt a need to martyr them.”""" With this and the 
experiences of the twentieth-first century in mind, we can say that George’s personal 
crisis quoted above has an important and dangerous corollary on the macro level. 
Alexander writes: “Like individuals, such cultures also may embark upon frantic quests to 
reassert the values of the past, adopting fanatic ideologies, or may continue to fragment, 
succumbing to alien values without retaining any coherence of their own.”2"1 And, from 
Cronulla to the Gaza Strip, the daily events of this world show the crisis and clash of 
culture as a continuing and dangerous fact of human existence.
One can sympathise with the defensive urge to protect a particular way of life or 
custom since, as Alexander points out: “[Tjraditions are highly valued largely because 
they provide such a stable network for guiding and interpretingy//////? activity.””"4 
However, when such custom is violently or relentlessly pursued in the absence of irony 
and self-critique, the borders between ways of behaving harden and, in so doing, inhibit 
any future becoming. McDermott writes: “This situation leaves us in a serious quandary,
202 Muecke, D.C. Compass o f  Irony. London: Methuen. 1969. p. 246.
203 Alexander, p. 206-207.
204 Alexander, p. 213.
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for the absence of compromise seems to foretell a permanent and irresolute struggle on 
the one hand, or the demolishing of difference on the other hand.”“"5 In either case, the 
potential for moral progress is lost. Thus, to the concept of self-empowerment through 
culture, we must also add that the self is empowered, via the critical faculties, by 
progressing through culture and expanding its boundaries to meet changing human needs. 
Edith wants so much to agree with her old teacher, as customarily she would, but her 
experience has surpassed his; she must move on. And yet this is only one stage of a 
never-ending cycle.
What the pragmatic point of view offers the modem mind is that, “understanding
is always from some empowering, as well as limiting, perspective.”“"6 Since, as James says,
“reality is not fixed”“" , agility is required to transcend one’s own point of view, only to
transcend it again, and then again.“"8 We saw this pragmatic agility in its symbolic,
physical form in “The Iron-Bark Chip,” and we see it throughout the work of Lawson
and Moorhouse where the reality of cultures is tested against the individual’s own
experiential field. This flexibility is the resource of the pioneer who is constantly
confronted with the unknown, the untested and the new. These untried environments
are common to both Lawson and Moorhouse as their characters make their uncertain
wTays into the new moral terrain which has complicated the “rules of conduct”. The
vicissitudes of the multiverse is the compelling force for Lawson and Moorhouse. This
type of position is effectively summarised by McDermott, when he writes:
It would be far better if we were to develop an epistemology 
which accepted surprise, novelty, and potential mishap as 
permanent ingredients of human inquiry. In so doing, our 
decisions would be more tentative, less absolute, and 
consequently truer to the actual situation in which we find 
ourselves.“
Rather than exert excessive controls, both authors suggest an alternate, but certainly less 
safe, route. Joe Wilson’s bounty in “The Double Buggy at Lahey’s Creek” implicitly 
endorses the pragmatic game of chance and negotiations with the other. Moorhouse 
takes an even more radical pragmatist line when he writes, “How clever the living process 
was.. .You couldn’t really make a mistake. Whatever you did, wherever you ended up, the
205 McDermott, p. 112
206 Wheeler, K. Romanticism, Pragmatism and Deconstruction. Blackwell: Oxford. 1993. p. 38.
207 VCLeeler, citing James, p. 94.
208 Wheeler, p. 37.
209 McDermott, p. 114
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mind reshaped to accommodate and even celebrate it.””10 The ethical correlative here is 
that the unexpected can introduce to us new ways of thinking, feeling and behaving 
which the imposition of inflexible moralities could not allow us to accept. The disabilities 
of our limited awareness can be overcome simply by acknowledging those limits. 
Emerson writes:
Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth that around every circle 
another can be drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every 
end is a beginning; that there is always another dawn risen on 
mid-noon, and under every deep a lower deep opens.”11
Or, in other words, we are perpetual pioneers with no final frontier.
210 “The Airport, The Pizzeria, The Motel, The Rented Car and the Mysteries o f Life.” Tales o f  Mystery and 
Romance, p. 62.
211 Emerson, p. 25.
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